ji·had·ica

Al-Qaida Advises the Arab Spring: Yemen

Joas Wagemakers June 5, 2012

Uh-oh. Several jihadi scholars are engaged in some ideological infighting again and it’s not pretty. As long-time readers of Jihadica know only too well, several jihadi ideologues have participated in quite heated debates about jihad, violence and suicide bombings with the people who are supposedly their brothers in arms. The best-known among these are the accusations between Sayyid Imam and Ayman al-Zawahiri (see here for the first installment of Will’s series of posts on this subject, for example) and the conflict between Abu Muhammad al-Maqdisi and the supporters of his former pupil Abu Mus’ab al-Zarqawi (see here, for instance). This time, it’s the Syrian-British shaykh Abu Basir al-Tartusi who starts this discussion by criticising the Yemeni militant group Ansar al-Shari’a, which is responsible for several major attacks in Yemen in the past months and is said to have strong ties to al-Qaida. This discussion does not just tell us something about differences of opinion on one radical organisation, but also sheds light on highly diverging views on what the Arab Spring should be all about.

Brothers

As usual, Abu Basir starts his criticism of Ansar al-Shari’a by pointing out that his critique is simply brotherly advice. That’s about as far as his politeness goes, however, since he immediately starts accusing the group of using suicide bombings without taking the limits and conditions of such operations into account. He also asks: “What is your problem with the Yemeni soldier? You are dealing with him as if he is an American soldier!” Abu Basir states that Yemeni soldiers are against the regime too yet they apparently still constitute legitimate targets for Ansar al-Shari’a. “Is this the shari’a that you proclaim and on whose behalf you’re working?”, he asks rhetorically.

Abu Basir suggests that Ansar al-Shari’a change its strategy now that Yemeni President ‘Ali ‘Abdallah Salih has left. He accuses the group of continuing their fight “as if the tyrant ‘Ali Salih hasn’t left […], as if the revolution never happened and no changed whatsoever occurred in Yemen!” This unchanged policy has resulted in alienating the protesters and demonstrators in Yemen and “a policy of aggression” that has left many innocent people dead. This only appears to strengthen the claim made by Salih that al-Qaida would fill the void he left. This leads Abu Basir to conclude that Ansar al-Shari’a is not serving the purpose of the revolution but is, in fact, doing exactly what “the tyrant” wants. Despite fighting for more than ten years, the group has not succeeded in implementing the shari’a at all, Abu Basir states. “Or do you think that the shari’a is only about raising slogans?”, he asks sarcastically. “What strategy is this that you are following?”, he adds, while pointing out that they should go and seek the advice of Yemeni scholars on what to do.

End and means

Abu Basir’s criticism was published on his website in March of this year and in that same month, Abu Hummam Bakr b. ‘Abd al-‘Aziz al-Athari wrote a still rather friendly refutation of his critique. He states that he excuses Abu Basir for his latest remarks because “what we have learned from him […] is more than […] what we criticise him for.” Nevertheless, al-Athari goes on to accuse Abu Basir of ignoring – not being ignorant of – two things: the goal that change must bring about and the means to bring about change. The former is to bring people from darkness to light and this is not going to happen, al-Athari states, through democratic reforms called for by the demonstrators; rather, it will be achieved by applying the shari’a, which is exactly what Ansar al-Shari’a wants. The means that will lead to this end has been provided by God himself, al-Athari states: jihad.

Al-Athari further wonders why Abu Basir would like the revolution to stop because President Salih has left. “[Ansar al-Shari’a] fought [Salih] because he ruled through something different than the shari’a.” His successor ‘Abd Rabbuh Mansur has only added to that, al-Athari states. “How can it be allowed to fight the former but not the latter?! Or [how can] the democracy of Mansur be Islamic but the democracy of Salih unbelief?!” They both ruled through “un-Islamic” laws and allowed their armies to fight on behalf of the Americans, which also shows you why Ansar al-Shari’a has “a problem” with Yemeni soldiers.

Scholars

Also in March, Abu l-Zubayr ‘Adil al-‘Ubab, a writer or ideologue who appears affiliated with Ansar al-Shari’a itself, wrote another refutation of Abu Basir’s letter. He specifically targets Abu Basir for his criticism of the supposedly reckless use of suicide bombings by Ansar al-Shari’a. He claims that, contrary to what Abu Basir says, the organisation does try to take the conditions and limits of suicide bombings into account and has only been involved in nine of them, which he describes in such a way that makes it seems like a very high number. We only use suicide bombings, he says, “if we have no alternative, if the alternative is very difficult or if it involves more losses”.

Al-‘Ubab says things about Yemeni soldiers and the army that are similar to what al-Athari pointed out about them, but delves more deeply into the question of the scholars Abu Basir advises Ansar al-Shari’a to consult. He distinguishes three categories of scholars in Yemen. The first category consists of Sunnis, with whom they consult regularly and from whom they seek advice, except for those Sunni scholars who support the regime or want to go into politics. Then there the scholars of the Muslim Brothers, whom he dismisses as “politicians” and, finally, “the scholars of religious innovations like Sufism, Shiism (al-rafida), Zaydism and those who adhere to them”. Since it is obvious that the members of Ansar al-Shari’a will not ask the latter for advice, al-‘Ubab wonders what Abu Basir is talking about.

Disgusting

If the previous two refutations of Abu Basir were still rather friendly, this does not apply to Abu l-Mundhir al-Shinqiti’s refutation: “The Disgusting Deviations of the Critic of Ansar al-Shari’a: A Refutation of Shaykh Abu Basir”, which was published some two weeks ago. Al-Shinqiti is a formidable foe for Abu Basir since the former is one of the most active jihadi ideologues at the moment and seems to be almost the sole provider of fatwas on the Shari’a Council of the Minbar al-Tawhid wa-l-Jihad. In fact, with other leading scholars such as Abu Qatada al-Filastini, Nasir b. Hamd al-Fahd and Abu Muhammad al-Maqdisi locked up, Abu Basir and al-Shinqiti may well be the most influential and most prolific radical scholars in the world right now.

Whatever the case may be, al-Shinqiti does not mince words. He accuses Abu Basir of not basing his views on real arguments and of simply wanting to slander the mujahidun. On top of this, he adds that Ansar al-Shari’a does consult with scholars in Yemen and that these are “more famous and knowledgeable” than Abu Basir. If the latter is so serious about his “advice” to Ansar al-Shari’a, al-Shinqiti says, does he not believe that the Yemeni government is an apostate government that should be fought? “Do you want to abandon the method of jihad and do democracy like the rest of the revolutionaries?”, al-Shinqiti asks. He gets even more direct with regard to Abu Basir’s question about why Ansar al-Shari’a targets Yemeni soldiers. “I don’t understand”, al-Shinqiti says. “Is it possible that you are really ignorant of the answer to this question?”  Al-Shinqiti deals with the same points mentioned above, but does so much more vehemently and elaborately, dismissing Abu Basir’s accusations as “fabrications”.

It is clear that Abu Basir’s criticism of Ansar al-Shari’a is quite unacceptable to several of his radical colleagues. His advice to lay down arms and take a more peaceful approach is not an exception, however, as we have seen in my previous posts in this series. Abu Basir consistently takes a more irenic approach towards certain remnants of the regimes that have been toppled and people who do not follow the right type of Islam and often condemns extreme violence. That major radical scholars such as Abu Basir and especially al-Shinqiti are more and more on a collision course is not just clear from the above but also from the fact that the latter ends his critique of Abu Basir by saying: “God willing, we will continue this conversation with shaykh Abu Basir in a forthcoming article entitled “The Enlightenment of the Truth of Shaykh Abu Basir’s Method”. We have not seen the last of this.

Inspire 2

Thomas Hegghammer October 12, 2010

The second issue of the English-language jihadi magazine Inspire is out. Dina Temple-Raston, Jarret Brachman and Memri have already made some initial observations, but I’ll throw in my own for what they’re worth. 

For a start, the second issue confirms that the magazine is produced out of Yemen by Samir Khan, the online propagandist who was based in the United States until October 2009. As with the first issue, the magazine contains a mix of original material and reprints of older texts by Bin Ladin, Abu Dujana al-Khurasani, Abu Mus’ab al-Suri and others. Most of the new stuff is ostensibly written by Samir Khan himself, but there are a couple of new pieces by al-Awlaki as well. There are also numerous quotes from Western media, including several about the first issue of Inspire. 

Three things in the magazine struck me as noteworthy. First is the account by Samir Khan himself about the reasons and details of his move to Yemen (pp. 45-49).  The piece is interesting because we don’t have that many autobiographical texts by this notorious jihadi media mogul. By his own account he is in hiding in Yemen. He must have some kind of communication link with the AQAP organization, because the magazine includes pictures from the field and interviews with AQAP members. At the same time, Inspire contains less original material than AQAP’s Arabic-language magazine Sada al-Malahim, which suggests he is further removed from the organization than his colleagues over at Sada al-Malahim.

Second is the article by Anwar al-Awlaki criticizing “the Mardin Declaration”, a statement issued in April 2010 by a group of moderate clerics who had gathered in the city of Mardin to reinterpret a famous fatwa on jihad by Ibn Taymiyya (pp. 33-40).  The fact that al-Awlaki chooses to engage in this particular debate is very interesting because it suggests he and others in al-Qaida are concerned about these types of theological initiatives.

Third and most interesting is the set of articles that give specific operational advice to prospective activists based in the West (p. 51ff). There are suggestions for low-cost operations in the US soil, such as shooting sprees in restaurants catering for government workers (such as in Washington DC), and using trucks to mow down pedestrians on crowded streets. The latter tactic can be further refined, Khan suggests, by welding sharp blades to the front of the truck so as to create “the ultimate mowing machine.”

Perhaps most interesting are the advice on how to avoid detection:

  • Do not travel abroad for jihad – act on US soil instead.
  • Do not use mobile phones and the Internet for any jihad-related communication – if you have to, use coded language and encryption tools.
  • If you are clean stay clean – do not interact with other activists.
  • Do not access jihadi websites – get your jihadi propaganda fix from anti-jihadi monitoring sites such as MEMRI and SITE.

Obviously, someone who follows these guidelines is going to be extremely difficult to catch. The question is how many people are ready to act in this way. Khan’s strategy presupposes that individuals can aquire the motivation to die for the cause almost in a vacuum. However, in most historical cases, individuals only acquired this motivation after interacting with other radicals, going abroad for jihad, or accessing jihadi propaganda – all of which are activities discouraged by Samir Khan. Of course there have been exceptions, such as the Fort Hood shooter Nidal Malik Hassan, but even he was not completely “clean”, as evidenced by his email correspondence with Anwar al-Awlaki. Decentralized jihad is indeed a scary concept, but it does not necessarily work.

Un-Inspired

Thomas Hegghammer July 6, 2010

International media have been in a frenzy recently over the publication of an English-language jihadi magazine entitled Inspire. The magazine – available here (beware of possible virus) – appears to be the work of the Yemen-based group al-Qaida on the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP). The magazine features the logo of the “al-Malahim foundation”, AQAP’s media arm, and contains articles by and about AQAP members such as Anwar al-Awlaqi and Nasir al-Wahayshi. Unfortunately, only 3 of the 67 pages are legible, as the PDF seems to be corrupt. The coverage has been followed by extensive blogospheric speculation about the document’s significance.

Rarely have I seen so much fuss over such an insignificant event. The hulabaloo says a lot more about Western media than about al-Qaida. Specifically it reveals a level of ignorance about the world of jihadi propaganda that I find very disappointing nine years after 9/11.

For one, Inspire is not – I repeat: not – the first English-language jihadi magazine. It is not as if non-Arabic speaking Muslims have been isolated from the world of jihadi propaganda until now. There have been several online magazines in English in the past, and most have been of higher quality than Inspire. Has everyone forgotten last year’s Jihad Recollections? Besides, there were several English-language paper magazines in the 1990s. London-based GIA supporters had a newsletter in the early 90s, Abu Hamza al-Masri’s “Supporters of Sharia” group had another in the late 90s, and Australian Islamists published the magazine Nida ul Islam from the mid-1990s to the mid-2000s.

Second, online jihadi propaganda of other types – such as websites and videos – have been widely available in English for over a decade. (Remember Azzam Publications?). Al-Sahab, the entity that disseminates statements from al-Qaida Central, has been subtitling videos and translating transcripts on a regular basis since at least 2005.

Third, the market for English-language propaganda is not quite as large as people think. Many Muslims living in the West speak the language of their country of origin, so they don’t need English-language material. In fact, many aspiring activists prefer ideological material in Arabic because they consider it more authentic. Those who don’t speak it themselves can rely on friends to convey the content for them, use translation software, or simply watch videos.

Fourth, the question of authenticity is neither soluble nor particularly important. Most commentators address the issue of authenticity in binary terms, as if documents are either fabricated by the CIA or manufactured by the inner core of al-Qaida. This is not how propaganda production works. Virtually no propaganda today is produced by the inner core of militant organizations. Propaganda production is usually outsourced to cells and individuals with varying degrees of contact with senior operatives. In fact, a considerable amount of jihadi media is produced by self-started entrepreneurs with no direct ties to militants whatsoever. Authenticity is therefore most often a matter of degrees, not a question of either-or. Inspire may well be the work of genuine religious activists, but not necessarily of the inner core of AQAP. Without signals intelligence it is extremely difficult to determine the precise nature of the link between the editors and the AQAP leadership.

Judging from the amount of recycled material in Inspire, I would be surprised if the AQAP connection is very strong. Remember that AQAP’s Arabic-language magazine Sada al-Malahim (published since 2008) usually contains much more original material, suggestive of much closer links between editors and operatives. Even if Inspire was produced by AQAP cadres, I am not sure it would tell us anything we didn’t already know. We already know that the group is alive and well, that it has ambitions to recruit in, and strike at, the West, and that it has a very active media apparatus.

Fifth, there is nothing particularly new or uniquely worrying about the content of Inspire, at least judging by the table of contents. The exact same types of articles have appeared in other magazines for years. The article on “make a bomb in the kitchen of your mom” is hardly a game changer in the world of terrorism. Tactical instruction manuals abound online and have done so for a decade.

The bottom line is that Inspire is a drop in an ocean of jihadi propaganda. The recent media coverage suggests that otherwise educated observers don’t seem to realise 1) how large and 2) how old that ocean is. I find this both disappointing and disconcerting. For a decade, militants have been pumping out sophisticated propaganda and genuinely dangerous training manuals to a vast Arabic speaking audience. In comes a sloppy magazine in English, and suddenly people speak of a new al-Qaida media offensive. This ignorance and linguistic myopia is inexcusable, since blogs and translation services have made information about jihadi propaganda more available than ever.

In my view, the only interesting thing about the release of Inspire is the fact that the PDF file is corrupt and rumoured to carry a Trojan virus. This is somewhat unusual. However, before we can say what it means, we need to know for sure whether the file was simply corrupt or whether it actually contained a virus. Basically we need more input from people who know the technological side of things (Aaron, have you looked at this?) Personally I don’t see why either jihadis or intelligence services would deliberately disseminate viruses, given that a virus would hurt both friends and enemies. In any case, whoever created Inspire wanted attention, and they certainly got that – in spades.

Magazines

Thomas Hegghammer October 29, 2009

Al-Qaida on the Arabian Peninsula has a published the eleventh issue of its magazine Sada al-Malahim. Naturally, Greg over at Waq al-Waq has it covered (see also here).

The 36th issue of Sada al-Jihad is also out, and it is as chunky and well-produced as ever. The front page reads “Hamas continues its war on the Sunni Mujahidin”, and judging from the table of contents, almost the entire issue is about the recent events in Gaza.

Back

Thomas Hegghammer March 26, 2009

I have been busy the past two weeks, but the jihadis have been busier. Bin Ladin has issued two audio statements, one proposing practical steps to liberate Palestine and the other about the treacherous government in Somalia. Al-Zawahiri warned against the forthcoming Crusader attack on Sudan, while Mustafa Abu al-Yazid has addressed the people of Pakistan. Abu Umar al-Baghdadi has spoken about the US plan to withdraw from Iraq, but he does not seem to get the same attention from the online community as his colleagues in Afghanistan. Abu Qatada has issued a statement from prison about the decision to extradite him to Jordan. Fatah al-Islam sharia officer Abu Abdallah al-Maqdisi has been taking questions since Monday, but nobody is allowed to ask about Shakir al-Absi or Asad al-Jihad2 (hmm).

On the magazine front, Sumud 33  has been out for a little while. Fortunately Sada al-Malahim 8 came out on Sunday so now Greg can sleep again. Turkestan al-Islamiyya 3 came out earlier this week, adding to the past month’s increasing flow of Uighur jihadi propaganda.

We have also seen the publication of a couple of unusual videos featuring Abu Muhammad al-Maqdisi, one with him delivering a funeral sermon in front of a crowd of several hundred people, and another showing him at a large wedding alongside half the jihadi community in Zarqa.  I suspect these videos are part of an attempt to bolster al-Maqdisi’s legitimacy by showing that he is enjoying freedom of movement and expression. By the way I highly recommend the 2-hour wedding video. It offers a fascinating inside look into the sociology of Islamism. It serves as a great illustration of a point I made in a recent article about Zarqa, namely that you cannot deradicalise entire communities. The film may depress you, but you might enjoy the songs.

I will be back soon with a report from the jihadi roundtable in Oslo.

Update (27 March): The Christian Science Monitor became the first Western newspaper to report on the Maqdisi controversy today – and Jihadica is mentioned.

Document (Arabic): 03-26-09-shouraa-mustafa-abu-al-yazid
Document (Arabic): 03-19-09-shouraa-abu-qatada-statement
Document (Arabic): 03-23-09-shamikh-abu-abdallah-al-maqdisi-qa
Document (Arabic): 03-22-09-shouraa-sada-al-malahim-8
Document (Arabic): 03-25-09-shouraa-turkestan-al-islamiyya-3
Document (Arabic): 03-12-09-faloja-maqdisi-fima-kuntum
Document (Arabic): 03-12-09-ansar-maqdisi-wedding-video

Prêt à porter terrorism

Thomas Hegghammer March 2, 2009

As most Jihadica readers probably know, the jihadi internet is used for many things, but not for operational planning. I have yet to come across online discussions or instructions for concrete operations by professional militants. However, once in a while you see amateurs proposing specific operations – “prêt a porter plots” – for others to carry out.

One such bright idea was posted on Faloja yesterday by a member named Sabir, who proposes that al-Qaida on the Arabian Peninsula (QAP) fire Katyusha rockets from the Saudi shore of the Gulf of Aqaba toward Sharm al-Sheikh, where international leaders are meeting today to raise money for the reconstruction of Gaza.

Sabir addresses his message “to Abu Basir [Nasir al-Wuhayshi], Emir of al-Qaida on the Arabian Peninsula” and humbly presents “a small and simple operation for three Islamic lions from the military corps under your command.” He notes that Ras al-Shaykh Hamid on the Saudi coast is only 7-8 kilometers away from Sharm al-Shaykh, while Katyusha rockets have a range of 10-22 kilometers. One could even use medium or heavy mortar shells, which have a range of 4.9-8.2km and 10 km respectively. Having done a certain amount of background research, Sabir includes maps, satellite pictures and photographs from the area to illustrate his point. Unconcerned about Muslim collateral damage, he concedes that one might not succeed in hitting the conference venue directly, but even striking nearby will send a strong signal, as did the failed mortar attack on UN secretary general Ban Ki Moon during the latter’s visit to Baghdad in March 2007. Sabir also admits that “you may not have time to do it today, but you have plenty of time in the coming days to acquire long-range missiles”.

There have been missile plots in Saudi Arabia in the past. In January 1998, Saudi security forces intercepted a shipment of missiles on the Yemeni-Saudi border intended for an al-Qaida attack on the US consulate in Jidda (see p 708 of this article). In May 2002, guards discovered empty missile tubes from a failed attack on planes taking off from the Prince Sultan Airbase. The missiles from the latter attack had been acquired in Yemen, and they were allegedly from the same batch as those used in the Mombasa attack later the same year.

Still, Sabir’s idea is completely off the wall. Katyushas have never been found on the Arabian Peninsula, the QAP is currently holed up in Yemen, and it takes more than a few days to plan an operation like this. Moreover, as other forum members dryly note in their comments, the idea is useless the moment you post it on online for all the intelligence services in the world to see.

The posting is nevertheless interesting, first of all because it is unusually specific and shows that we cannot completely dismiss the Internet’s potential as an arena for operational brainstorming. At the same time, it illustrates the lack of military know-how of many online jihadists. In much of the forum material, there is a spectacular disconnection between intention and capability. Unfortunately, the haute couture of terrorism is prepared behind closed doors.

Document (Arabic): 03-01-09-military-plan-for-qap

Update (6 March): This post not only prompted enthusiastic comments (see below), but was also discussed on Faloja itself. We wish our new readers a warm welcome.
Document (Arabic): 03-05-09-faloja-on-jihadica

Al-Awfi Captured, New Yemen Blog

Thomas Hegghammer February 17, 2009

Muhammad al-Awfi, one of the two former Saudi Gitmo detainees who appeared in the video by al-Qaida in Yemen on 19 January, has now been captured. Press reports and forum rumours this morning were confirmed this afternoon by the Yemeni embassy in Washington.

I owe the latter piece of information to a fantastic new blog that covers Islamism and security in Yemen. I strongly recommend it. Few people know more about jihadism in Yemen than Gregory Johnsen and Brian O’Neill. Welcome to the blogosphere, guys.

It is a shame, then, that there is not a single al-Qaida operative left in Yemen. Or so says the Yemeni Interior Minister, echoing past statements by his Saudi counterpart, who claimed in October 2001 that al-Qaida had no links to Saudi Arabia.
Back to al-Awfi. The official story is that he surrendered to Yemeni authorities. This is probably spin; if he did, it was at gunpoint. The question is why al-Awfi’s capture comes now, only weeks after he made headlines. This is especially interesting given Yemen’s very poor record of locating and arresting al-Qaida leaders. My guess is that Saudi intelligence has become more actively involved in Yemen. If true, this is a good sign, for the Saudis have become very good at counterterrorism.

The biggest question now is of course whether al-Awfi will lead investigators to the rest of the leadership of al-Qaida in Yemen. After six years in Guantanamo, he is no doubt used to interrogations. At the same time, he cannot claim ignorance of his comrades’ whereabouts, having appeared in a video with them just a few weeks ago. My guess is we will see more arrests in coming weeks, although probably not a dismantling of al-Qaida, who will have taken precautions by now.

I hope to write something about the Saudi list of 85 in the coming week. In the meantime you can read more on al-Awfi and the other ten escaped Saudi Gitmo detainees in this excellent new report by Evan Kohlmann.

Document (Arabic): 02-17-09-faloja-rumours-of-awfi-arrest

Saudi and Yemeni Branches of al-Qaida Unite

Thomas Hegghammer January 24, 2009

Earlier this week we learned that the Saudi and Yemeni branches of al-Qaida had formally merged. The release of Sada al-Malahim on Monday was accompanied by an extract from an interview with AQY leader Nasir al-Wuhayshi, who said the Saudi mujahidin had pledged allegiance to him and agreed to form a united organization under the old name “al-Qaida on the Arabian Peninsula.” In another development, Friday’s New York Times reported the rise of former Saudi Guantanamo detainee Sa’id al-Shihri to the deputy leadership of al-Qaida in Yemen.

The two stories came together in a fascinating video released on the forums yesterday. The video, entitled “From here we begin and in Jerusalem we will meet”, featured Nasir al-Wuhayshi, Said al-Shihri, Qasim al-Raymi and Muhammad al-Awfi seated side by side, each giving a 4-minute statement. The video served at least three purposes. The first was to tap into popular outrage over Gaza. The speakers presented their campaign as part of the struggle to liberate Palestine, since Israel and the Crusaders are one. They also cited the famous hadith according to which “an army of 12000 men will come out of Abyan to help God and his messenger”, and showed footage from a training camp as if to suggest that al-Qaida is currently building that army. (Incidentally, President Salih allegedly also proposed training volunteers for combat in Gaza). The second purpose was to display the union between the Saudi and Yemeni mujahidin. The seating arrangement (Yemeni-Saudi-Yemeni-Saudi) and mutual praise signalled a happy marriage. The third aim was to humiliate Saudi authorities, who have let al-Shihri and al-Awfi, both former Guantanamo detainees (ISN# 372 and 333 respectively) and graduates of the famous rehabilitation program, slip away. Unless al-Shihri and al-Awfi are agents (which I doubt), their appearance is indeed extremely embarrassing for Saudi authorities.

The video provides several clues about the background for the merger and the state of al-Qaida on the Peninsula. It seems clear that the unification was prompted by the arrival of al-Shihri and al-Awfi in Yemen. They must have arrived relatively recently, because they were only repatriated from Guantanamo on 10 November 2007 and spent at least a few months in the rehabilitation programme. There have been several indications in the past year that Saudi al-Qaida has withdrawn to Yemen. Why does the formal merger come now? One reason is that AQY has consolidated itself. Another reason is that al-Shihri and al-Awfi are the most senior Saudi jihadists to make it across the border so far. Previous Saudis in al-Wuhayshi’s ranks, such as Nayif al-Qahtani, have probably been considered too junior to represent the Saudi branch.

It is unlikely, though, that al-Awfi and al-Shihri represent anybody but themselves. They were in Guantanamo during the Saudi insurgency and did not spend much time in the Kingdom before leaving for Yemen. This is probably why they were so busy namedropping legendary Saudi jihadists in the video (I counted no less than fifteen names). They also showed a passage from the old QAP film Badr al-Riyadh from January 2004 featuring al-Muhayya compound bomber Ali Ma‘badi al-Harbi. The two fugitives clearly wanted to convey the impression that they had been part of the inner circles of al-Qaida in Saudi Arabia.

The merger speaks volumes about the weakness of al-Qaida in Saudi Arabia. Here you have the alleged leadership running away from home and submitting to a Yemeni emir. Add to this the deafening silence from al-Qaida in the Kingdom itself in the past couple of years, and it seems clear there is little substantial organizational infrastructure left.

Since al-Awfi and al-Shiri are not bringing a big fighting force to the table, the merger is probably not going to have any immediate consequences for al-Qaida’s capability. However, it does say something about intentions: it basically removes all doubt that al-Qaida now intends to use Yemen as a launching pad for operations in Saudi Arabia and elsewhere in the Gulf.

A point on personalities: The video offers the first live images of Nasir al-Wuhayshi, and I must say he comes across as surprisingly weak and uncharismatic, especially compared to Sa’id al-Shihri. I suspect al-Shihri will have considerable influence in the new organization, which further increases the likelyhood of operations in Saudi Arabia.

In the short term, though, most operations will probably focus on Yemen, where the group is clearly thriving, despite clashes earlier this week. The current state of AQY is reminiscent of that of Saudi al-Qaida in 2003, except that AQY enjoys an even more secure environment. Media production continues and increases in sophistication (as it did in Saudi).  Open-air training with over 20 individuals is or has recently taken place  – this did not happen in Saudi after February 2003. Journalists are able to conduct interviews with the leadership – this never happened in Saudi. Foreign fugitives well known to Saudi and US intelligence are able to find and join the top leadership – this didn’t happen in Saudi after May 2003. Finally, the top leaders have been around for three years – contrast with the short lifespan of Saudi leaders in 2003-2004. We will undoubtely hear more from al-Qaida in Yemen in the coming months, so stay tuned.

Update (26 January): In response to the video, Saudi authorities rearrested nine Guantanamo returnees yesterday, while al-Shihri’s father publicly disowned his son and provided interesting details on the latter’s recent trajectory.

New Issue of Sada al-Malahim

Thomas Hegghammer January 19, 2009

Al-Qaida in Yemen (AQY) has released the seventh issue of its magazine Sada al-Malahim (SM), adding to the mounting evidence that the group is thriving. The slick 44-page publication contains no less than 30 articles by 23 different pen names. Many of the latter are no doubt invented, but the issue must be the work of a well-run media cell of a certain size. An undated picture on p. 16 showing 20 people training in the desert, as well as note on p. 12 inviting readers to submit questions to the journal’s gmail address, suggest that AQY is not about to collapse any time soon.

The front page story, “Gaza under siege by Arab rulers”, is quite interesting. The article hardly mentions Israel and America, but instead lashes out at the Arab regimes and government clerics for facilitating the siege by repressing the mujahidin. “[The rulers] incriminated anyone who merely thinks about liberating the holy sites, which can only be liberated by toppling these governments” [my emphasis] (p. 4). Heard this before? This is basically the good old “near enemy first” argument of the kind found in Ayman al-Zawahiri’s classic article “The road to Jerusalem passes through Cairo”. The statement adds to a number of other indications that AQY is considerably more regime-critical (and thus less pan-Islamist) than its Saudi counterpart al-Qaida on the Arabian Peninsula.

At the same time, AQY also advocates direct confrontation with the far enemy. In the text accompanying the magazine release, the Emir of AQY, Abu Basir, is quoted as saying “we are preparing to open training camps to send you [Palestinians] a generation of reinforcements.” There is in other words a tension in AQY’s ideological production between two strategies: one advocating confrontation with the near enemy and the other with the far enemy. A similar ambiguity, or hedging of bets, is also found in their operations, which have targeted both Westerners and the government. This lack of ideological clarity makes the group less predictable in the short run. But it may also constitute a liability in the long run, as it leaves prospective recruits in the dark as to what AQY is actually fighting for.

Here’s the table of contents (excluding poetry and purely theological pieces):

  • Gaza under siege by Arab rulers
  • Seven years of Crusader wars
  • The ruling on the soldiers and helpers of the Pharaoh of our time
  • The ruling on escaping from the tyrant’s prison and its persecution
  • The ruling on fighting the occupier
  • A dialogue among the deaf (who is debating whom?!) [on interreligious dialogue]
  • Stances on judges
  • How to reach [us]
  • The duty to confront or flee
  • Three years since the escape
  • The power is in firing [on firearms]
  • A word from sheikh Dr. Ayman al-Zawahiri
  • The departure of Bush and the arrival of Obama
  • North Africa and the coming hope
  • The message of Shafiq Ahmad Zayd “Abdallah al-Yamani”
  • The Lion of Jawf: Amir Huraydan
  • Victory over the investigators
  • The Mujahid sheikh Nassar al-Marsad
  • Al-Tayammum [Dry ablution] [on life in prison]
  • I would behave if let out of prison
  • Letter from the daughter of a mujahid
  • Preventing and treating colds
  • Letters from the readers

Document (Arabic): 01-19-09-faloja-sada-al-salahim-7

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