ji·had·ica

Usama bin Laden Called Yunus Khalis “the Father Sheikh:” Weird But Possibly True

Kevin May 21, 2013

Many authors have tried to fill in the gaps in the historical account of how al-Qa’ida’s central leadership came to reside in Jalalabad for part of 1996, with mixed results. Yunus Khalis has become a fixture in these narratives largely because he was the best known person that Bin Laden interacted with in the summer after al-Qa’ida’s leadership fled Sudan for Nangarhar. For many authors, Khalis’s fame and prominence in the region combined with his known interactions with Bin Laden provide an adequate explanation: al-Qa’ida must have come to Nangarhar in 1996 because of the importance of the Khalis-Bin Laden relationship.

This is, of course, a vast oversimplification, and I hope that the report I recently published for West Point’s Combating Terrorism Center will go some way towards exposing the most obviously untenable parts of this narrative. But as part of the research for this monograph, I have also found a primary source which upholds what I had long believed to be the most unlikely component of the accepted account of al-Qa’ida in Afghanistan: the idea that Usama bin Laden called Yunus Khalis a father.

The biographical material on Yunus Khalis is extensive and appears to be growing relatively rapidly. Some of his biographers, like Haji Din Muhammad, are still aligned with the government in Kabul and so have clear reasons for downplaying the connections between Yunus Khalis and the erstwhile al-Qa’ida leader. Other biographers,  like Puhnamal Ahmadzai, take a different approach by either ignoring the issue entirely or by actually playing up Khalis’s contact with Bin Laden for one political purpose or another. One of these latter biographers, ‘Abd al-Kabir Talai, states explicitly what has heretofore only been the subject of speculation and hearsay: that Usama bin Laden called Yunus Khalis “the Father Sheikh.”

Although this is so far the only known primary source that makes such an argument about the relationship between these two, Talai gives a clear and believable reason for why Usama bin Laden had such a warm view of Khalis. I encourage anyone interested in the specifics of this exchange to read my report, but for now I’ll simply say that apparently Bin Laden appreciated that Khalis was not a “fair weather friend.”

In any event, there was nothing particularly exceptional about someone calling Khalis by such a familiar name; the titles of two of his biographies refer to him as “Khalis Baba.”  In Pashto and Persian “baba” can be either “papa,” “granddad,” or simply a term of respect for an older man, and it is entirely possible that Bin Laden was just following the practice of Khalis’s Pashtun friends by using this term of endearment.

Although I was frankly surprised to find a confirmation of this particular historical tidbit about Bin Laden’s fondness for Yunus Khalis in my primary source research, there are a number of excellent reasons to believe Old Man Khalis was peripheral to the growth of al-Qa’ida as a major terrorist organization. So far there is every indication that Yunus Khalis was dismissive of Bin Laden’s calls for jihad against the American presence in Saudi Arabia in the 1990s. And in any event, by 1996 when the al-Qa’ida leadership returned to Afghanistan, Khalis was nearing the end of his productive working life.  Although he remained engaged in attempts to promote negotiations between the Taliban movement and various mujahidin factions, he would soon be too ill to have much effect on the operations of groups like al-Qa’ida even if he had wanted to.

The exciting thing about discovering these kinds of historical nuggets in the biographical material of mujahidin leaders like Yunus Khalis is that it reminds us how little we still know about both Khalis and other, much more famous people like Usama bin Laden. And as more sources become available in print, I suspect that we can look forward to all kinds of unexpected adjustments to the current mujahidin myth cycle.

A Jihadi Homeopath

Kevin December 4, 2012

[Editor’s note: We are very pleased to welcome Kevin Bell to Jihadica. Kevin has lived in Afghanistan and Tajikistan for a number of years and recently wrote a master’s thesis on Yunis Khalis for Princeton’s Near Eastern Studies Department. He’s hunting for a job in Afghanistan–probably not for long given his proficiency in Pashto. You can follow him on Twitter @allegorycave]

Yunis Khalis is best known for his role as the leader of the Hizb-e Islami (Khalis) mujahidin political party, and as a host to Osama bin Laden in 1996 in Jalalabad. However, even a cursory review of the various Khalis biographies written in Pashto reveals that there was far more to his life, interests, and influence on Afghan politics than might be indicated by a discussion limited to his role as a jihadi leader.

I extensively discuss many of these new perspectives about Khalis in my forthcoming report from the Combating Terrorism Center, but some of the most interesting episodes from the biographical literature are unfortunately not included in that study. The most fascinating and unexpected of these is Din Muhammad’s account of Yunis Khalis’s “medical practice” as a homeopathic healer.
Din Muhammad begins by pointing out that Yunis Khalis’s curriculum as a madrasa student in pre-partition India included exposure to Greek medical texts, but Khalis’s real introduction to the theory and practice of medicine began after he went into exile in Pakistan in 1974. Shortly after Khalis arrived in Pakistan he spent some time living in the home of Mawlawi Salim in Kurram Agency. Mawlawi Salim was already an established medical practitioner who wrote books about homeopathic healing in Urdu from his home. Khalis spent some time perusing these and asking Salim questions about the more challenging parts of the text before he traveled to Peshawar where the majority of the mujahidin leadership then resided. By this time Khalis had acquired enough knowledge to begin his own research and he began to practice homeopathy independently after buying some books and medicines from the bazaar in Peshawar.

In order to substantiate his account of Khalis’s knowledge of medicine, Din Muhammad eagerly recounts two incidents where he witnessed the effectiveness of Yunis Khalis as a healer. Although we immediately notice that the illnesses/wounds that Khalis heals in these two anecdotes are neither dramatic nor life threatening, Din Muhammad’s point is not that Khalis was a miracle worker. Once he establishes that Khalis actually understood something about medicine, Din Muhammad uses this to make a larger point about Khalis’s character: he was generous with his time, skills, and treasure, and he did not charge the poor for his services. This is a theme which Din Muhammad picks up elsewhere, such as in his account of the construction of Khalis’s new neighborhood of Najm al-Jihad south of Jalalabad for widows, orphans, and disabled mujahidin after the end of the Soviet Afghan War.
We are right to question the possible bias of authors like Din Muhammad who have such a clear personal connection to their subject matter. However, it is easy enough to argue that the state of our knowledge of Yunis Khalis is so poor that even accounts of him that are semi-hagiographical in nature deserve real attention. He is a key figure in the history of both the development of the Haqqani Network and the growth of the Eastern Shura (aka Jalalabad Shura) in the mid 1990s.

But ultimately, that has nothing to do with why I enjoyed reading this particular subsection of Din Muhammad’s biography. This account of Khalis as a homeopath reminds us that there are systems of knowledge and ways of approaching learning in the Afghan frontier that are both vital and important to local communities, and almost totally unanalyzed in the West. Considering that I have only scratched the surface of the extant primary source material about Yunis Khalis and other major Afghan mujahidin leaders, I expect that further study will reveal even more surprising and interesting addenda to our understanding of the history of Afghan Islamism.

Fatwa calling for the death of the director, producer, and actors involved in making the film “Innocence of Muslims”

Nico Prucha September 18, 2012

Yesterday, Ahmad ‘Ashush published a fatwa on the jihadist forums where he “decrees and calls on all Muslim youth in America and in Europa to fulfill this inescapable obligation. Namely, to kill the director, producer and the actors and anyone who helped to promote this film.” The fatwa was published by the relatively new al-Bayan media group that has established itself in the jihadist forums since the turmoil in Egypt. The media group acts in parallel to the al-Faruq media battalion, which has in the meantime published several videos showing Egyptian cleric Ahmad ‘Ashush with other renowned jihadist scholars in Tahrir, such as Muhammad al-Zawahiri or Marjan Salim (videos here and here). Ahmad ‘Ashush first surfaced in the al-Shumukh forum a while ago with a lengthy interview talking about the Hizb al-Nur (here) and established himself as an Islamic authority clearly adhering to the “jihadist torrent” while his – as of now – few writings are online over at al-Maqdisi’s Minbar al-Tawhid wa-l-Jihad website (here).

This fatwa, however, is not unique and certainly nothing new from ‘Ashush. In July, the German GIMF department (probably courtesy of Austrian-Egyptian leader Muhammad Mahmud, aka Abu Usamah al-Gharib) posted a German translations of ‘Ashush’s article “an outcry… Supporting our prophet” (German). This was a direct reaction by ‘Ashush to events in Germany demanding the death of those who insulted the prophet by showing the Danish Muhammad Cartoons, attacking both the German government as well as demanding the beheading of the defamers in Europe. A violent clash preceded ‘Ashush’s reaction when salafist-jihadists in Germany clashed with police in Bonn and Solingen in May this year. ‘Ashush wrote: “There are free youth among the Muslims, living in Europe, who became angry for the prophet. They went out to defend his honor. The Germans beat, humiliated and arrested them. So, where are you in support of them?”

The German-language propaganda departments had plenty of new materials and produced videos and published reaffirming translations justifying violence in support of the prophet. Again, GIMF published a German translation of al-Maqdisi’s writing “The Drawn Sword against those who Insult the Lord, the Religion or the Messenger of God” (Arabic and German). This is based on the historical writing of Ibn Taymiyya, available on al-Maqdisi’s site here.

The protests that turned violent were directed against a German ultra-rightwing minority party “PRO-NRW” who succeeded in instigating the German salafists by showing the Muhammad cartoons on billboards. With the police in the middle, the salafists counter-demonstration turned violent and led to many arrests. In a video entitled “In Reih und Glied standen sie für Rasulullah” (They stood in a single file for the messenger of God – here, note the Arabic opening nasheed) violence to defend the honor of the prophet is further justified and sanctioned, depicting the salafists as ‘true’ believers and real men. Shortly after, Abu Ibraheem (Yasin Chouka), one of the German propagandists of the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan called for the “death of Pro-NRW”, re-affirming the obligation to “kill those, who insult the prophet, no matter if they are Muslims or disbelievers.” (here)

Two similar writings of Ahmad ‘Ashush – the ‘Muhammad-movie-fatwa’

In his self-entitled fatwa yesterday, ‘Ashush repeats basic sentiments he had addressed as a response to the insult of the prophet in Germany. In both legal decrees, ‘Ashush cites the Qur’an (al-Ahzab: 6):

“The Prophet has a greater claim on the faithful than they have on themselves, and his wives are (as) their mothers.” (trans. by Shakir)

‘Ashush seeks to act as a high-profile ideologue, citing in length the hadith and drawing on Ibn Taymiyya. “Killing them [the movie affiliates] is a duty for every capable Muslim. The killing of the aforementioned is prescribed by Islamic law (…).” Stating two examples, Ka’b ibn al-Ashraf, a Jew, that Ibn Taymiyya in detail analyzed and a woman who had insulted the prophet, ‘Ashush makes his case clear that “the prophet had commanded the killing of al-Ashraf” as well as the killing of a woman, as stated later. For ‘Ashush this serves as proof that anyone “offending the prophet, even Muslims, are sentenced to death for this.” Independent of Muslim or non-Muslim, man or woman, the blood of those insulting Muhammad must be shed. “For this is the ruling of the prophet”. ‘Ashush recounts the hadith of a female companion who on the account of a blind man insulted Muhammad and was subsequently put to death for her insults. The blind man had been her husband and he was the one who had killed her with his knife. He then stated to Muhammad the reason: “o messenger of God, I am her husband and she insulted you often (…) yesterday she insulted you and I took a knife and stabbed her in her stomach (…). The messenger replied: “so then witness her blood shed””.
This hadith, for ‘Ashush, provides enough argumentation to oblige Muslims to act accordingly, listing four key arguments:

  1. As the man had been blind and a companion of the prophet most aware of the shari’a, the woman insulting the prophet had been killed. She had been his wife, killed by him.
  2. Referring to the citation of the Qur’an, the prophet has a greater claim on the faithful than anyone else – even if this woman has children, or is the wife of a companion, she must be executed for her insult.
  3. This accounts for no matter what standing of position her children have;
  4. Or her position being a companion of the prophet, being in his service. “Killing her for insulting the prophet is pleasing for God, the Lord of the Worlds.”

Following a typical jihadist rhetoric, ‘Ashush repeats his statements of his writing in response to the insulting of the prophet in Germany, asking where the true scholars of Islam are, refuting the ‘state-owned’ ‘ulama’.


The Limits of Gamification

Will McCants April 25, 2011

Jarret and Alix have published an intriguing article in Foreign Policy on how jihadi ideologues and forum administrators are deliberately applying gaming principles to their discussion boards and propaganda.  The jihadis are doing so to encourage their readers to compete with one another to embody the community’s ethos and take direct action.

That’s a new way to frame some old features of jihadi discussion boards and propaganda.  But given that the features were around well before gamification was theorized, it’s a stretch to say that Awlaki or anyone else is deliberately employing gaming techniques in a “systematic” way, as the authors assert.  There are some other claims in the article that are also difficult to verify, such as the notion that competition for things like virtual badges leads to violent action (there may be some other factor causing both intense competition and violence, cases that confirm the theory are few and could be explained differently, etc).

It’s not that Jarret and Alix’s application of the theory is wrong; it just misses the larger context that makes it right.  The jihadi forums create communities whose members crave recognition, as with any community.  Competing for badges is part of that, but so is sharing dreams, crafting poems, writing hagiographies, and so on.  As someone who spent too much of his graduate career playing Warcraft, I can assure you that leveling up and getting good gear was not worth it unless you were part of a group that could appreciate it.  And that competition for levels and gear was just a tiny part of what kept me coming back given that everyone had better gear and higher levels.  What mattered more was making my online community laugh and applaud and if there is any link between the forums and violence, that impulse is where you will find it.  As for the end of my sessions online, my only orcish impulse was to raid the fridge.

Entering a new dimension – Jihad via Bluetooth (Part 2)

Nico Prucha March 22, 2011

In the first part we examined the structure of the data provided by the “Mobile Detachment” (Fariq jawwal al-ansar, FJA) media department of the Ansar al-Mujahideen Forum. As stated, in the second part we will take a closer look at the ‘mission statement‘ to understand the ambition of (re-) publishing indoctrinating jihadist materials with the intention of users being able to consume and disseminate this content by the means of one’s personal smart phone. One intention perhaps is the fact that your smart/mobile phone certainly is a highly personal gadget, which is rarely shared – unlike family household computers. The content on your mobile phone has a more private nature and allows you to quickly navigate and read through the jihadist materials without anyone noticing. The downside for jihadis, however, is an upside for the police, as the sympathizers are inspired to store incriminating content on their personal phones. That is probably the reason for including encryption software in the first data-package.

The Mission Statement

The FJA defines four sub-detachments in a posting that can be understood as a ‘mission statement’. A regular posting announced a “specialized detachment / unit (fariq) in the crafting and dissemination of all content, intended to run on mobile phones. The content [includes] knowledge (‘ilm), incitement (tahrid) and missionary work (da’wa) issued under the sponsorship of the Ansar al-Mujahideen forum’s administration.” The basic line is brokered into four simple categories, with the call of seeking support by any capable sympathizer within the forum:

1. “The fariq of audio-engineering: Engineering and dissemination of audio fragments of speeches and sermons given by the scholars and leaders. This includes recitations [of the Quran], poems, songs and other formats.

2. The fariq for transcripts: Selection, transcribing and publication of jihadist magazines, affecting stories, unique articles and the most important statements in a visible format or by any format that mobile phones support.

3. The fariq for designing propaganda pictures [‘Photoshop-Jihad’, examples here]: The design and dissemination of jihadi pictures and unique styling of any format supported by mobile phones.

4. The fariq of conversion and upload: The conversion of jihadist movies into any format supported by mobile phones [mostly 3GP] and by uploading parts [of the conversed videos].”

With the mobile phone turned to Jihad, each and any sympathizer can assume an active role in trying to disseminate jihadi content via Bluetooth to other devices. The goal is clearly described as “disseminating the jihadis’ mindset by the means of mobile phones (…) as well as developing the propaganda.” The fundamental principle of the FJA is to simply promote and spread chosen materials of jihad by all means. In this case, the modus operandi is sought that sympathizers are enabled by these data-packages to check their individual surrounding for Bluetooth enabled devices and hence blindly send out these catchy materials to unwary (primarily Arab) users. In some Arab countries, due to the harsh enforced segregation of the sexes, communicating and setting up  ‘secret dates’ has mainly turned to the use of modern technology. AQ in its never-ending endeavor is also always keen to capitalize on newest technology.

As described in the mission statement, “the jihadi forums rise up for the firebrand assaults and oppose the enemies of God, of His messenger, and of the believers with their hopeless attempt to wage war [against us] with our judiciary efforts by such means. These have progressed – slowly but surely –, all praise be God, with the development of the propaganda and by technical aspects. And this is the benefit of God. That’s what the brigades and media groups are about, who convey the methodology (manhaj) and the fundamentals of faith (aqida) of the pious Salafists.”

The FJA considers itself as yet another platform to disseminate, proselytize and hence protect the true version of religion. “What else are these projects than an answer to our noble scholars, stressing the need to develop the jihadi media.” The FJA concludes with the call to “thus help your brothers by whatever means you can” in order to counter any attempts of countering the jihadi narratives and by using every possibility.

Entering a new dimension – Jihad via Bluetooth (Part 1)

Nico Prucha January 24, 2011

In October 2009 the Arabic “al-Ansar al-Mujahideen Forum” offered a special data-package designed for mobile phones. Published by a newly created “Mobile Detachment“ the contents are aimed at sympathizers and adherents of jihadist principles. Provided with a special software the mobile users can access the documents or watch videos on their portable device while being able to send out these highly indoctrinating and radicalizing sources via Bluetooth to other, unwary, Bluetooth enabled devices. The data offered in these conveniently administrated packages provides nearly everything of the grand-genre of jihadist materials.

For the first part, a overview of these data-packages is provided, while for the future parts a closer look will be taken at specific documents and the “mission statement”. A total of five packages has been published up to date, with each remaining loyal to the same layout, logo and coherent file structure consisting of the following:

Programs: In this folder the program Symbian Blog is available to install on your Bluetooth capable mobile phone, including a Quran and a encryption software. By incorporating a specially designed operating system, these agitprop packages can be transferred to a mobile phone for re-dissemination via Bluetooth.

Audio: This section has three subfolders a) anashid, b) recitation of the Quran, c) speeches. The mix consists of indoctrinating politico-religious notions such as the “interview with Shaykh Abu Mus’ab al-Suri”, the “Biographies of the martyrs”, “There is nothing like Falluja”, or “Various Speeches by Shaykh Osama”.

Pictures: Here a great number of pictures are available for the user. Most pictures depict renown figures such as Jordanian Mujahideen commander Khattab in Chechnya, the 9/11 attacks or simply show various logos and in general the iconography of Jihad groups worldwide.

Videos: All the videos in this folder have been converted into the 3gp format, a playable version specially designated for mobile phones. For several years now, the jihad-videos are disseminated in multiple sizes and formats, one being 3gp. These include a video from the al-Malahim Media group by the Yemen based AQ branch. Videos also consist of “A martyr eulogizing another martyr” by the Somalia based Harakat al-shabab al-mujahideen, or al-Sahab videos showing the martyrdom operation against the Danish embassy in Pakistan.

Texts: The Arabic writings are offered in three formats: a) MS-WORD, b) Adobe Acrobat, c) Text-format. This guarantees that these texts can be read and made available via any mobile phone or computer by a simple standard text editor. The texts include all genres of the flourishing jihad literature. Predominantly the stories of slain Mujahideen and the testimonies of martyrdom operations are sought as a main driver of radicalization and indoctrination of these appealing role-models. Literature is offered telling the stories, once again, of outstanding and prominent jihadist figures and leaders from all over the world. This includes the biography and renown operations of Chechen commander Shamil Basayev, the architect of the Moscow theatre siege as well as the Beslan school massacre. The focus was clearly evident, as the case of the 5th data-package shows, which re-disseminated the martyrs biographies of fighters of the “Islamic State of Iraq”. Also complete electronic magazines are found in some data-packages, such as the Arabic language al-Sumud (“Resistance”) published by the Afghan branch of the Taliban or the Sada (“Echo”) of Jihad”. Another main element are the various statements, such as declarations and memorandum of the AQ offshoot in Africa, AQIM, or statements made by ISI claiming highly diverse attacks, military operations or simply refuting “lies made by the government of the Green Zone”. Handpicked books, transcribed sermons and interviews are, however, also among the files, which are deemed of great importance. These writings include ideological titles written by Hammud bin ‘Uqla al-Shu’aybi, “How to Prepare for your Afterlife” by newcomer-ideologue Khalid ‘Abd al-Rahman al-Husaynan or older documents such as “And Incite the Believers” by Saudi first-Generation AQAP member ‘Abdallah bin Muhammad al-Rushud.

The content of all data-packages is well chosen and partially comprises of new, up-to-date materials, but also capitalizes on older fundamental documents that are of ultimate importance in the jihadists’ mindset. The general aim by these packages are described in a “mission statement” that includes a invitation to join the endeavor of spreading jihadist materials and to “develop the jihadist media”.

 

How to Spot a Jihadi

Scott Sanford August 31, 2009

On 30 August 2009, Jordanian journalist Murad Batal al-Shishani published a new article in al-Hayat where he asserts that an Islamist’s clothes are often political statements and can indicate his precise type of Islamist orientation.

Al-Shishani states that during the 1980s, the Salafi style of “short clothing” (a likely reference to the ankle-high pants Salafis commonly wear) became prominent along with “Afghan clothing,” which is the shalwar kameez and which represented solidarity with the Afghan-Arab Mujahidin. Today, he claims that someone with a beard is often described as one of the “brotherhood.”

He writes that two prominent differences in clothing currently exist. The first is the contention between those who follow Abu Muhammad al-Maqdisi and the “neo-Zarqawis,” who consider themselves as the legacy of Abu Mus’ab al-Zarqawi. The second is between Hamas and the jihadi groups in Gaza.

In the al-Maqdisi—neo-Zarqawi split, al-Shishani states that the neo-Zarqawis wear a black skullcap, which some consider a representation of the Salafi-jihadis.  Al-Maqdisi himself said the black skullcap, or any color skullcap for that matter, did not accurately represent someone’s religious tilt. Rather, he claimed, to know someone’s religious affiliations one should look into someone’s heart and actions. However, he did acknowledge that “some simple and novice youth” recognize the black skullcap as a Salafi-jihadi symbol.

As for the Hamas—Salafi-jihadi split, Abd al-Latif Musa, AKA Abu al-Nur al-Maqdisi, a former preacher for Jund Ansar Allah stated on 15 February 2009 that the Salafi-jihadi wears dark-colored Pakistani clothes with “a military jacket” that is a bit larger than the person so he can “hide his personal weapon or radio under it. He wears a small black hat that resembles the hat Abu-Mus’ab al-Zarqawi … [wore]. Some of them allow their hair to grow to their shoulders covering it was a piece of cloth called a hatteh or a shaleh.”

Al-Shishani provides a practical guide on the type of clothes one could expect a jihadi to wear. However, he warns that in the case of Salafi-jihadis, they will not likely wear their typical jihadi clothes during an operational mission because doing so could garner unwanted attention.

(In case anyone is interested, the article reminded me of this unrelated piece about the Qubaisiyat, a secretive female Islamic group in Syria.)

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