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NOTES ON THE JIHADISTS' MOTIVATION FOR SUICIDE-OPERATIONS



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Zusammenfassung:

ANMERKUNGEN ZUR DSCHIHADISTISCHEN MOTIVIERUNG FÜR SELBSTMORDANSCHLÄGE

Der Artikel bietet anhand der Rhetorik ausgewählter arabischer Quellen des Dschihad einen Einblick in die Motivation und die Definition sogenannter Glaubensbekenner-Operationen. Wesentlicher Bestandteil ist das Grundverständnis, dass solche Arten von Operationen rechtlich erlaubt sind und keinen Selbstmord darstellen. Diese Operationen werden von Gott im Jenseits belohnt und sind integraler historischer Teil der militärisch-operativen Vorgehensweise früher Muslime im Denken dschihadistischer Gelehrter, die diese Taktiken in die Gegenwart übertragen und entsprechend sanktionieren. Anhand der im Internet auf einschlägigen Foren und Webseiten veröffentlichten Interviews, Videos und Statements nach der Glaubensbekenner-Operation des palästinensisch-stämmigen Abu Dujana gegen eine von der CIA betriebene „Forward Operations Base“ in Khost, Afghanistan, wird der Artikel nach einem theoretischen Teil mit pragmatischen Argumenten durch die Dschihadisten abgeschlossen.

“God willing, we will get you, o troop of the CIA! God willing, we will wipe you off the face of the earth! Do not assume that you are safe by pressing a button to kill the Mujahideen, rather, we will come upon you in ways, you do not even take into account, God willing. Look: This awaits you. This is not a watch, but a detonator, for I will kill a great number of you, God willing. This is my goal: To kill you, your Jordanian colleagues and – God willing – I will be brought into the highest Paradise, you will go to hell. On the Day of Resurrection we will meet again, God willing.” (Abu Dujana al-Khurasani)

“For ‘suicidal’ operations or self-sacrificial operations are a kind of those operations, where an individual or a group undertakes it against a higher

number of enemies who are better equipped. And whoever undertakes such an operation is fully aware beforehand that their destiny is certain death. He is alone and he is death.” (Yusuf al-‘Uyairi)

INTRODUCTION

On 31 December 2009 a suicide-bomber was able to penetrate a heavily secured Forward Operations Base (FOB) run by the American Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) in Khost, Afghanistan.¹ After a Taliban statement had at first claimed responsibility for the attack, the assailant was subsequently identified within jihadist forums as one of their most active members, known by his *nom de guerre* and online alias Abu Dujana al-Khurasani. A Palestinian medical

Doctor and family father from Jordan, Abu Dujana, later known by his clear name Humam Khaleel Muhammad Abu Malal, was praised and eulogized on 7 January 2010 by one of the more prominent al-Qaeda (AQ) leaders, Abu Mustafa 'l-Yazid.² It was soon clear that Abu Dujana had worked as a spy for the CIA and the Jordanian General Intelligence Directorate (GID), while his true intentions had been to use his access to strike in the heart of the worst enemy of AQ and its allies: the intelligence services operating in Afghanistan which are held responsible for the massacre of scores of Muslims by the use of unmanned drones.³ With the “statement regarding the raid of Abu Dujana al-Khurasani – may God accept him – infiltrating the strongholds of the Americans” signed by al-Yazid and issued under the auspices of the “Organization Qaedat al-Jihad – General Command”, Abu Dujana was made a legend instantly. After al-Yazid’s statement the major jihadist forums’ administrators also addressed individual congratulations to Abu Dujana on his successful killing of seven CIA agents and one Jordanian GID operative.⁴ A video was broadcast within the AQ sphere of the internet, showing Abu Dujana sitting next to the Tehrik-e Taliban Pakistan (TTP) Commander Hakimullah Mehsud. In this video, after making his claims in English, Abu Dujana repeats his allegiance in Arabic to Osama bin Laden while eulogizing slain former TTP commander Baytullah Mehsud, who was killed in a drone strike.⁵ Later, the operation was termed a “revenge operation for Baytullah Mehsud”. A campaign of jihadist operations on a global scale is thus promised by Abu Dujana.



Abu Dujana and Hakimullah Mehsud, 'Umar Studio (media outlet of the TTP). Abu Dujana talks in English about revenge operations against the Americans outside the Pakistani borders after they killed TTP commander Baytullah Mehsud.

While suicide operations are a fundamental part of the jihadist military modus operandi as well as a topic for the continued on- and offline propaganda⁶, the case of Abu Dujana provides a greater insight into the jihadists’ mindset and their ultimate justification of undertaking such operations. Rarely has a suicide-bomber received so much attention or has been able to speak as comprehensively as Abu Dujana was able to address the (online) sympathizers and followers after his operation. The materials had been well prepared, recorded and made available on the internet. It must be noted that only the 9/11 hijackers had a similar attention span with plenty of filmed testimonials, pre-preparations and planning of both the hijackings and the operative layout of the designated collision routes into the World Trade Center (as propagated in the as-Sahab⁷ videos). These as-Sahab videos had been released over a lengthy period of time, showing the jihadist media orientation and planning.

For decades jihadists and Islamists issued writings and depicted scholarly views on the topic that is subsequently – and in-depth – reflected in the videos, interviews and letters from ‘suicide-bombers’. The material of Abu Dujana⁸ that had been released shortly after his deadly attack, will serve as a foundation for this article to provide non-Arabic speakers with a first-hand insight into the motivations and the theological fundamentals of one of the most renowned assailants. With specific writings and especially the dissemination of professionally-made videos, contemporary jihadists have created a thorough basis to defend, justify and determine what is perhaps most dangerous, namely to term so-called ‘suicide-bombing’ as ‘martyrdom’ or ‘self-sacrificial operations’ (al-‘amaliyat al-istishhadiya). This article intends to have a close look on selected jihadist Arabic primary documents issued by the scholars and advocates of jihad to provide an insight into the mindset as well as the reflection based on these sources which are cited and disseminated as credible motives for aspiring ‘suicide bombers’ as well as ‘regular’ Mujahideen. But first the ‘regular’ Mujahideen and the ‘suicide-bombers’ must be distinguished while both of these elements of jihadist hierarchies define death as a reward attained by their commitment to jihad.

DISTINGUISHING BETWEEN ‘REGULAR’ MUJAHIDEEN AND ‘SUICIDE-BOMBERS’

Particularly within the online circles and spheres of organizations such as al-Qaeda and its affiliated (sub-)sections, the ‘suicide-bomber’ has become a role model incorporated in all forms of the jihadists’ propaganda. While ‘suicide-bombers’ regularly appear within jihadist videos, these operatives must be distinguished, both on a military as well as on an ideological level, from ‘regular’ Mujahideen who are killed on the battlefield, during enemy aerial bombings or as a result of wounds suffered in battle.⁹ The Arabic clearly distinguishes between the ‘suicide-bomber’ (al-istishhadi) and the Mujahid who died in battle (shahid). The verb ‘istashhada’, however, is also used in jihadist statements and declarations when leaders or high-ranking members are killed, thus receiving the status of a shahid, bearing witness to jihadist-Islamic principles; but unlike those who conduct ‘amaliyat al-istishhadiya’ the shahada was attained passively. Both terms (istishhadi and shahid) must be further analyzed for a proper and correct understanding of the jihadist mindset and the jihadist language¹⁰ within the boundaries of the legal declarations of the legitimacy of the ‘al-istishhadiya operations’. The Mujahid as well as the Mujahid who decides to undertake such an operation, henceforth termed the istishhadi, are both wandering on the “path of God” (fi sabilillah) in hope of attaining the shahada by good deeds. The shahada is the Islamic creed, the confession that “there is no God but God and Muhammad is His messenger.” Thus to attain the shahada in jihadist speak has a greater meaning of one’s readiness to sacrifice all possible worldly goods for God – including one’s own life and to pass on to the Afterlife (the shahid is not dead, only in this world). Hence the statements commemorating the death of passively killed Mujahideen and especially leaders are often introduced by Quran 3:169: “Think not of those, who are slain in the path of God, as dead. Rather, they are alive with their Lord, they are bestowed with provision.” This is tied to the essential understanding of the shahada as the expression of confessing the oneness of God (tawheed) – “there is no God but God”.



A picture of a ‘regular’ Mujahid, killed in a fight with Yemeni troops. The depicted right hand shows its relaxed fingers whereas the posture of the index finger is interpreted as the final confession of the shahada – one God.

Furthermore, the jihadist sources emphasize that individual believers are expected to have “spent” their lives and their wealth “on the path of God”. Quran 9:111 is cited to provide an alleged theological and judicial framework: “God bought from the believers their lives and their wealth, for the Paradise will be theirs, forasmuch as they shall fight in the path of God and shall slay and be slain. It is a promise which is binding on Him in the Torah and the Gospel and the Qur’an. And who fulfills His covenant better than God? Rejoice then in your bargain that you have made, for that is the most supreme triumph.” The announcing of the “Islamic State Iraq” (ISI), AQ in Iraq, on 25 April 2010 that two of their most high-level leaders had been killed, repeated the referencing of the above described cherry-picked excerpts from the Quran within the jihadists’ mindset.¹¹ Death is highly propagandized just as much as the sources dominate the justified universal fight in the name of God and the monotheistic creed.

In most jihadist sources a violation of the “tawheed” is used as a strictly drawn line of demarcation between ‘Muslims’ and ‘non-Muslims’. The principle of tawheed is the main pillar of Islam, the statement of the monotheistic concept of one God who can neither be associated with any kind of ‘partners’ nor be idolized in any way (which would be “shirk” and a violation of Quran 6:163¹²). This is also claimed by Abu Dujana in his “Letter in the Night of the istishhadiya Operation” where he states that “the believer must be inaccessible, fortified and God-fearing before Satan. It is indeed based on the hadith, that whoever says ‘there is no God but God, He alone, no partner beside Him, for He is the king, for His is the praise, He is almighty in every regard.’”¹³ Muslims reinforce this principle by expressing the shahada – while the jihadists are abusing this as a prime factor in their writings and videos to legitimize

their interpretations of religious sacred texts, making the shahada and the attributes in jihadist mindset the only true form of 'Islam'.

Various sources on the accounts of Muhammad are cited to validate jihadist writings. The sayings and actions of the Prophet have been gathered and collected in the hadith collections. Hadith citations are deliberately installed to further draw a particular line to provide the consumers with the feeling of treading on the right path. Historical accounts such as the saying documented by al-Bukhari are sought to prove the jihadists' mindset, which is taken out of context and simply quoted to found the language of the jihadist. "You should not deify me [Muhammad] in the way as the Christians deified the son of Mary. I am the only servant of God and I am His Messenger"¹⁴ is thus consequently portrayed as early warnings of other creeds that may distort the principle of tawheed in the course of history. A practical example on how jihadists incorporate this quite smartly into their political and religious agenda is represented in the logo of the "Islamic State of Iraq" which combines a black banner ("raya/liwa" as early Muslims under Prophet Muhammad's command used to carry into battle) with an Arabic calligraphy depicting "God, Messenger, Muhammad". The circle that encompasses the three words had been on one side of a historical coin first introduced by the early Caliphate and further undermines the jihadists' claim to be fighting for both an 'Islamic statehood' based on the rulings and divine commands by God as well as forming a unified body that shall serve as a part of a future caliphate that should incorporate former Islamic territories, including al-Andalus of Spain.¹⁵ It must be noted that the logo of ISI has been successfully exported and now appears within related jihad movements such as the Harakat al-Shabab al-Mujahideen (Somalia)¹⁶ or the newly founded AQ Organization on the Arab Peninsula in Yemen.¹⁷



By incorporating parts of the shahada, the jihadists empower their claim to conduct jihad as the only rightful worship, especially in times when the Islamic community (the ummah) is thought occupied, harassed, and crushed by non-Islamic forces. The restoration of the Islamic ummah (and honor) can only be guaranteed by this defined worship with the military supplement bound to the military raids and operations by early Muslims as the ultimate justification. Historical references to the hadith collections are drawn upon to enforce the Messengers "command": "I am commanded to fight the people until they say: 'There is no God but God'. For if they say this, only then are their blood and their property granted safety."¹⁸ Such sentiments are quoted by jihadists in their writings and often uttered in interviews to sanctify and validate violence.¹⁹

The shahada is the ultimate goal. Its implementation is based on violent measures within proposed theological and emotional-religious parameters which are vital factors of motivation. The foundation of both terms (shahid and istishhadi) is to bear witness to tawheed, to acknowledge Muhammad as the Messenger of God and to claim a comprising legal basis of historical and religious accounts to undertake military operations in the name of God. Shahid is a status that can only be finally accredited by God. The istishhadi is a Mujahid who is sought to have attained the shahada, meaning that the individual is deceased, killed by "the enemies of God", or is a Mujahid who will carry out an operation that will result or has ultimately resulted in his death. The istishhadi is seen in jihadist endeavors as a true believer who by his operation bears witness in an active stance to enforce the oneness of God in his aspiration to "elevate the word of God"²⁰ within the mental framework of the fight against non-Muslim enemies. By committing to this universal fight, often portrayed as a "conflict of the program of truth (al-haqq) versus the program of falsehood (al-batil)"²¹, the Mujahideen also propagate to combat all forms violating the principle of tawheed. AQ followers and sympathizers stress this principle and draw a further line of demarcation by terming themselves as 'muwahhedeen', those who profess the unity of God (tawheed) in sharp contrast to everyone else.²² The shahid as well as the istishhadi have confessed and subsequently proven determination ('azm) and steadfastness (thibat) on "the path of God" and is thus "deemed as such, but it is God alone, who deems upon one's degree."²³

A first coherent and consistent output of the range of jihadist language was the *Sawt al-jihad*, the Saudi AQ's systematically run and exclusively disseminated online magazine. Founded in 2003, it clearly indicated the jihadists' ideological foundation and their aspiration, addressed in their language and combined to statements and memoranda of operations carried out, it connected vital ideological dots to the military side of the jihadist agenda. So-called 'martyrdom' is the vital backbone of jihadist ideology and a prime motivation for AQ's internet activity to radicalize, indoctrinate and eventually recruit new followers who wish to attain the shahada (which comprises more than the basics of 'martyrdom'). The *Sawt al-jihad*, as contemporary and historical jihadist writings, constantly enforces the element of the shahada. While the jihadist strives in this world for "victory" (nasr) and therefore remaining alive, with the aim of establishing a Caliphate, he just as much desires to die on "the path of God", fighting the enemies before the final victory. Both, victory or death is a win for the jihadist. Death is part of the shahada, whereas the most noble and most valuable worldly possession of the Mujahid is spent for the cause of God which will be rewarded in the jihadists' understanding by entry to Paradise or a successful outcome in this world: "Our war is with America, the domain of war is the world, the entire world!!! We are not going to stop – with the permission of God – until we perceive victory or until God bestows upon us the shahada. We are telling our enemies the Americans and those who are their allies, [such as] the Brits and their agents, the government of Karzai and the government of Pervez Musharraf and to all the marionette-governments: 'Are you expecting for us anything else then one of the most beautiful things [shahada or victory]? We expect for you that God will torment you by His or by our hands. Await then, for we are waiting with you.'"²⁴

Death as much as the istishhadi operations are a logical part of worldly affairs in order to serve God. Furthermore, it is part of the jihadist rationale of the "truth" (al-haqq) and a reactionary countering of "falsehood" (al-batil) which is (re-)presented in historical as well as contemporary times: "As for us, we are determined to reason and we will continue on this path – with the permission of God – until we either attain the victory or the shahada. For we are bestowed with the highest reward, but under no circumstances with both. We deem our jihad as sacrifice.

For victory, for it is by the hand of God, He bestows as He wills His servants. We fight until the end; the most important victory is the steadfastness [thibat] for the truth [al-haqq]. [...] Verily victory means the implementation of the rule of God as well as to meet all requirements of a difficult phase for us; for us the 'people of the ditch'²⁵ and therefore the people of the [battles of] Badr, al-Yarmuk, Hittin, Bosnia, Khost and Manhattan are the degree."²⁶

The battles of Badr, al-Yarmuk and Hittin are legendary in Islamic history and thought as these battles had been waged successfully against better equipped and greater numbers of enemy combatants. Bosnia, Khost (Afghanistan in the 1980s as well as today) and Manhattan, New York City, are mentioned here as a direct analogy to repeat the historical success against more advanced enemies. To die within the universally portrayed framework of the clashing "programs of truth and falsehood" thus means being received by God as a shahid. 'Suicide operations' are justified as the claim to attain the shahada while giving one's life to implement it, to defend Muslims and thus actively choosing steadfastness over spiritual weakness or a lack of proving the oneness of God. Both are fighting elements of jihad, struggling and striving in the name of God on His path, ready and willing to sacrifice their lives, to fulfill what is praised within the writings and videos as a promise to God that must be kept. The jihadist re-emphasizes and re-deploys such rhetoric when stating that "verily, we are keeping our promise, while we, once we have committed ourselves to sacrifice the soul on the path of God and to raise the words 'there is no God but God'", as expressed by 'Abd al-Ghani al-Muhajir, an istishhadi whose testimony was released on the Internet by ISI.



A typical screenshot of an istishhadi. Note the right index finger as well as the detonator are in the same hand that set off a massive explosion of a prepared truck, rigged with explosives, driven into a military barracks of the Kurdish Peshmerga in northern Iraq.

The underlying notion of such filmed testimonies by the istishhadi is to reclaim and to enforce their conviction of attaining the shahada as a result of one's "love for jihad and the istishhad on the path of God; to raise the banner 'there is no God but God' and to establish the sharia, the divine jurisdiction, on the territory of the Islamic state."²⁷ Al-Muhajir, a name marking the operative as a 'migrant' from another country, continues to restate the jihadist notion that his operation will lead to receiving the shahada as a divine reward for the actions in this world. "Whereas we perceive the shahada on the path of God as a provision of the means of subsistence²⁸ by God, bestowed upon His servants, as He wills it."²⁹ The shahid and the istishhadi are striving for such rewards and for the cause of elevating the "religion of God, for that the highest being is the speech of God", as frequently stated by jihadist icons such as Abu Mus'ab al-Zarqawi.³⁰ However, as already stated, the fundamental difference between the 'regular' Mujahid and the istishhadi is that the latter selects a military mission that will result in most cases (and most idealistically) in his worldly death "when assaulting the rows of the infidel, fighting, knowingly that he will be killed. It is therefore permissible to combat the infidel, until being killed."³¹ While the 'regular' Mujahid has the same intention, to die "on the path of God", a result of mostly traditional asymmetrical combat, the istishhadi chooses his death by detonating explosives such as vehicular bound improvised explosive devices (VBIED)³², thus 'actively' receiving – in jihadist perception – the shahada. The followers of global jihad movements seek to attain the shahada, in the firm belief of waging a defensive war for the sake of the "truth" (al-haqq) in a universally portrayed battle against "falsehood" (al-batil), having struggled in this world, hoping to receive "one of the two most beautiful things": Either "victory or the shahada".³³



The propaganda advertisement for the video "Crushing the Peshmerga", al-Furqan.

THE CASE OF ABU DUJANA AL-KHURASANI - "THE HERO OF THE RAID OF THE SHAHID, THE COMMANDER BAYTUL-LAH MEHSUD".

In an interview with as-Sahab, released January 2010 after the istishhadi attack by Abu Dujana in Afghanistan, Abu Dujana is speaking directly to the audience of the internet jihad followers and sympathizers. The interview starts with an introduction by as-Sahab that "the new Crusader wars³⁴ have entered their second decade, while the battle of truth (al-haqq) and falsehood (al-batil) continues at its fiercest. This battle has exposed the scandalous and hideous face of the people of falsehood which is typical for the disbelieving West, the western henchmen and the apostates (murtadin) in the Islamic world."³⁵ Parallel to this introduction, filmed sequences show US Air Force helicopters heading into battle, fighter jets dropping massive payloads in Afghanistan and US-President George W. Bush being welcomed by Jordan's King Abdullah II, before both are meeting Israeli Prime Minister Ariel Sharon according to international news footage from 2002. Sequences of burned, killed and injured civilians follow as well as stills from the Iraq Abu Ghraib prison. US-President Obama's meeting with Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak and the continued war against Muslims is thus bound to the ongoing perception of an unchanged war that has since G. W. Bush only been intensified. Various acts of injustice and tyranny are depicted in the introduction, including the situation in Gaza³⁶, the occupation of Palestine and particularly Jerusalem, the "fierce bombing-runs against Muslims in Afghanistan and Pakistan, extirpating complete villages" and the ongoing CIA "crimes against the Muslims in general and the Mujahideen especially." Praising jihadist groups and their proposed healthy status, ranging from the "Jaysh al-'usra", a glorifying entitlement for the Somali Harakat al-shabab al-Mujahideen, to Iraq, where "the lions of ISI must suffer under the Crusaders, the Shiites and their henchmen"; to the Islamic Maghreb where the "lions of the Atlas" are fighting the "sons of France"; to Pakistan, "where no day goes by – with the grace of God – without the Mujahideen clarifying the devastating apostasy of the police, the army and the secret services"³⁷; and finally to the Arab Peninsula, where "the progeny³⁸ of the companions of Muhammad are coming to consciousness of the people of apostasy in the

government of the Aal Sa'ud and their henchmen, the Crusaders – and of their sibling, the Yemeni government.” With a short sequence from Osama bin Laden, reinforcing his infamous statement that “America and who lives in America won't dream of having security before we live in security as a fact in Palestine and all infidel armies have left the soil of Muhammad [the Arab Peninsula]”, the interview with Abu Dujana, “the shahid, the hero”, begins. “So he plunged [inghimas] with his explosives belt in the midst of the operational leadership of the CIA in Afghanistan. He killed the director of operations and a senior officer of the American intelligence who notably came from Kabul to meet the lion. Just as much he killed in this blessed raid the agent Sharif ‘Ali bin Zaid, a cousin of Mossad and CIA [an operative of the Jordanian General Intelligence Directorate, under the command of the idol in Jordan].”

By this short introduction of Abu Dujana and his operation, as-Sahab references a vital element of the istishhadiya operations that is noted in nearly every jihadist fatwa, writing and article defending such a modus operandi: The element of “plunging [inghimas] into the rows of the enemy”, expecting certain death and killing to the very end. This is argued as not being suicide and is derived – once again – from the rich bases of Islamic texts and is clear to most consumers of this interview with Abu Dujana. Inghimas, literally the “plunging into” is deeply embodied in historical texts and often accessed by the scholars of jihad to justify the istishhadiya operations. Based on the collections of the sayings and deeds of the Prophet who was asked by one of his men “where am I, o Messenger of God, when I am killed?” he replied: “In Paradise [al-janna].” “So he dropped his shield in his hand and fought, until he was killed.”³⁹ This is consequently part of the understanding by jihadist scholars that there is “a clear proof in this hadith; for the Messenger of God ordered the companions not to fight in Badr but in one [united] row⁴⁰. Their chests had been at level of the pikes until no one was outside the row. For when Umayr [one of the companions] heard of the grace [to attain the shahada when killed], he split from the row and stormed alone into the enemy, he was not rebuked by the Prophet, despite that the death [of Umayr] was the result of his action, he was right in his bid”, according to Abu ‘Umar and ‘Abd al-Hakim Hasan.⁴¹ Furthermore, Abu ‘Umar and Hasan refer to the hadith collection by al-Nawawi,

famed for his 40 hadith, and state: “By this [hadith] the permissibility of plunging into the disbelievers [is given] and the shahada is set forth. This is legal, there is no reprehensibility among the masses of the Islamic scholars.”⁴²

Furthermore, historical sources are cited that state how fellow companions deliberately chose to head into combat without any armor in order to attain the shahada. When the “Messenger of God was asked what makes the Lord laugh⁴³ who serves Him?” he said: “When the Lord sees His servant plunging by His hand into battle and is killed uncovered. So he removed his armor and went, he fought until he was killed as a shahid.”⁴⁴ This serves as an analogy to the modern sense of inghimas, whereas Abu Dujana moved into the enemies' rows to fight until being killed. By detonating his explosives belt, he plunged into battle and was instantaneously killed, unlike historic figures, but he served a greater cause, committed revenge and delivered a decisive blow to the enemies while exercising the firm belief to attain the shahada as a reward. The historic examples are plentiful and as such depicted within modern jihadist writings. Normally a male approaches the Messenger of God and asks a question that is consequently answered. “O Messenger of God, what is your opinion if I were to plunge into the idolaters [mushrikeen] fighting them until I will be killed. Will I go to Paradise?” The Messenger of God said: “Yes”. “So the man plunged into the rows of the mushrikeen and fought, until he was killed.”⁴⁵ Without acknowledging the historical conditions the jihadists incorporate early Islamic sources into their mindset, claiming to reenact the behavior of early Muslims in the, perhaps best described as, first universal war of “truth” and “falsehood”. The inghimas concept serves as one of a multitude of factors to justify, defend, legitimate and to incite the ‘suicide-operations’ (which are not suicide at all but rather a direct approach to attain the shahada in jihadists' reasoning). Such historical statements are deciphered as “clear proof for the permissibility to storm into the troops of the enemies, even when the assailant knows, he will be slain. Indeed two of the companions – may God be satisfied with them – plunged with the admission of the prophet and his affirmation [into the enemies]. One of them was without any armor; both knew that they will be slain for certain.”⁴⁶

The intention (niyya) of the Mujahid is in the historical as well as modern context of great impor-

tance. The individual, who is deemed an *istishhadi*, decides to recklessly plunge (*inghimas*) into the enemy, exposing himself to danger, seeking Heaven and thus terrorizing the enemies and supporting the Muslim community is a niche well covered by radical sources once again based on historical references. In Abu Dujana words: “And this is the operation *al-istishhadiya*, when I have purified the intention, it is a ticket to travel from the worldly life to the highest Paradise.”⁴⁷ Such thought is also based on passages from historical scholar and writer Ibn Nahhas⁴⁸ who states that the “determination and piety must be well found in the intention to request the *shahada*.” Devotion, sincerity and virtue must be attributes of the *Mujahid* when seeking to attain the *shahada*. In a “Ruling of *istishhadiya* Operations” Hamid bin ‘Abdallah al-‘Ali⁴⁹ describes the legal basis as being comprised of two parts:

“For the first of two parts: It is a storm attack against a great number of enemies, while the attacker knows they will definitely kill him, for that the chance of escape is simply non-existent, as he throws himself upon a thousand of the enemies. For he plunges into them by himself, alone. In a contemporary sense this is when [the operative] enters a military barracks of the enemies for a bombing operation, he is aware that his chances to exit the military installation are non-existent as the security measurements are in place – thus sentencing the operative [either to captivity or death] – as a great number of soldiers and guards, for example, are present. The operative cannot, due to these circumstances, kill the enemies directly, but they are the ones, that can kill him immediately. Not by himself [can he attack the enemies as in a historical context], but by indirectly killing himself can he storm attack the enemies, well aware of the fact that he will be killed in the operation. There is no other possibility, no other way to carry out such a bombing attack in this military installation. It must be accessed by human elements.

For the second part: The direct ruling of the *Mujahideen* in regard of killing himself when he knows that this will lead to the death of a great number of the enemies, while it is not possible to kill them without killing himself along with them or destroying their area of the residence of the leadership of the enemies or the capacities of the military installation et al. This is not possible without annihilating a human operative [*Mujahid*] in this operation. This is confirmed and approved by the recent *époque* by the

means of modern [forms of attacks with] explosives or the downing of aircraft over important positions of the enemy causing great losses et al.

[...] The general scholars do not differ between [indirect] occasion and direct [cause of the death of the *Mujahid* as a result of attacking the enemies]. This is meant as if two witnesses bear witness to a lie and a Muslim is hence executed, for these two will be punished if they draw upon their lies in their testimony.”

For this is a just cause that “by this knowledge it is permissible for the *Mujahid* to indirectly kill himself by plunging into the row of the enemy, while there is no return for him. There is no distinguishing whether or not to directly kill oneself [instantly] in the row of the enemy and between at first being among them with the intention of killing a high number of them without killing oneself.”⁵⁰

This is implied by the *as-Sahab* introduction to the interview with Abu Dujana and repeated in his “Letter in the Night of the *istishhadi* Operation.”⁵¹ For Abu Dujana is a *Mujahid* who attacks Jordan, “the primary state after America who are opposing the *Mujahideen* while he laughed at them (...) when he plunged into them without fear, without paying attention to them, so he blew them up.”⁵² Describing his “last night of my life in this world”, Abu Dujana confirms his conviction and his promised reward while “inciting fellow Muslims” to follow his footsteps and to receive the *shahada*. “There is something I will see tomorrow when God accepts me among the *shuhada*’ [pl. of *shahid*] and that I will remember until I am in the castles of Paradise among the virgins; tomorrow I will see it and I will never see it again, the noble-heartedness for the *shahid*, granted to him in hope of killing on the path of God a dozen times, and then? After entering the Paradise the *shahid* sees its amenity straightly. For it is a special happiness with the scent of the coming Afterlife. It is upon God to have excluded the *inghimas* operations from being unlawful.”⁵³

Abu Dujana, a *Mujahid* and an ‘*alim*, an honorable term for those to whom knowledge, wisdom and scholarship is accredited, actively “recommends to every *istishhadi* to become acquainted with the book by Ibn Nahhas entitled ‘*Mashari*’ *al-ashwaq*’, particularly with the chapters detailing *inghimas*, in order to know how such operations are rewarded.”⁵⁴ The repeated motivational factor in Abu Dujana’s words stated in the video interview is the combina-

tion of the legality of such an operation as the only means to avenge slain Muslims killed by unmanned drones and the US military actions on a global scale. He portrays himself as the only Mujahid capable to undertake this mission as he has used tricks and deceit to fool both the CIA as well as the GID. But before speaking about himself and his personal motivations, Abu Dujana tells the jihadist audience how he dreamt of the man who was killed by an F-16 in an airstrike in Iraq: “I saw Sheikh Abu Mus’ab al-Zarqawi when I was asleep, he was in my house, so I asked him: ‘Aren’t you dead?’ He said: ‘I have been killed, but as you see me alive.’ His face was like the moon at night when the moon is full and he seemed busy as if he were preparing an operation. So I hoped that I could bring him to a safe place and to take him by my car outside of my house. And I also hoped that we would be hit in an airstrike and we would die together. It was as if the secure place is the shahada on the path of God.” At a later point in the interview Abu Dujana claims that his steadfastness as a Mujahid and subsequently as an *istishhadi* was not only to “revenge the murder of Abu Mus’ab al-Zarqawi, but also the murder of our brothers by unmanned espionage drones in Waziristan” as well as to avenge the death of ‘Abdallah ‘Azzam. ‘Azzam was a highly influential Palestinian jihadist ideologue who established the “Maktab al-khidmat”, “the Service Bureau” in Afghanistan that would later develop into al-Qaeda. His comprehensive works and legal rulings are of great importance to the global and globalized jihad movement and are frequently cited within various publications and videos.⁵⁵

Originally Abu Dujana wanted to either “capture or kill Abu Ziad”, his GID handler in Peshawar, out of revenge for ‘Azzam who had been killed by a car bomb in 1989 in Peshawar.⁵⁶ Abu Ziad, according to Abu Dujana, “confessed to me saying ‘if you kill any leader of the Mujahideen, you will become the high ranking man in Jordan, like my superior officer ‘Ali Burjaq.’ He told me a story about that man, the counter-terrorism director in Jordan, who was in charge of killing the Sheikh, the shahid – as we deem him being so – ‘Abdallah ‘Azzam in Peshawar, about 20 years ago. After this he started receiving higher and higher positions until he became the

director of counter-terrorism. That is how the Jordanian intelligence service works.” The GID’s alleged responsibility for having assassinated one of the top ranking jihadist ideologues (the circumstances of his death to this day remain unclear), must be seen in combination with the GID’s general role in the perceived US-led ‘war against Islam’. The GID is the most active native Arabic service deploying active field agents who, according to Abu Dujana, are responsible for countless assassinations of high ranking figures within jihadist movements. “They are the ones sowing the spies in their proximity. [...] The truth is, we had been able to gain further intelligence, like the role of the Jordanian secret services in killing ‘Imad Mughniye, the military chief of Hizbullah, the Jordanian secret services are the ones who also murdered this man by planting a spy [in his circle of trust], and this is what they had in mind when they sent me to Waziristan and Afghanistan. They have a history of such operations. The criminal [Abu Ziad] confessed to me that the Jordanians are the ones who killed Abu Mus’ab al-Zarqawi, as their apparatus provided the Americans with the vital information of his whereabouts. But, with the permission of God, after this [*istishhadi*] operation, they won’t stand on their feet again, ever again.”

Even the claim that thousands of US-Dollars had been paid while millions had been offered did not corrupt Abu Dujana’s firmness and steadfastness, his conviction of the righteousness to attain the shahada while waging war on behalf of the “truth” against the “falsehood”. Abu Dujana repeats this notion several times, including that “Abu Ziad and his fellow colleagues called themselves ‘the knights of the truth [fursan al-haqq]’ – while they are the knights of falsehood!” “Thousands of Dollars paid to me are now at work in the services of the Mujahideen, who have bought the explosive substances that will bring death and destruction upon them. [...] I prefer this way to thwart the efforts of the Jordanian secret service and the CIA, this is a lecture taught by this *istishhadi* belt. We will use these explosives which we have bought to fabricate the belt – this substance is pure C4 to kill these infidels of the American intelligence. The specialists who came [from Kabul] as well as Abu Ziad and whoever is with him.”



Qahir (“Crush, destroy”) is a popular term often found within jihadist sources; as deployed by jihadist media to “crush the Peshmerga/Crusaders/Zionists”; it is used here specifically for Abu Dujana, the “Crusher of the CIA”.

Being questioned by as-Sahab “why having chosen the work of an istishhadi in this operation instead of another tactic?”, Abu Dujana reinstates a practical and ideological thinking that combines both, the military tactics and the proposed religious legitimacy of such acts. “When we met and discussed this topic during a session of the Shura Council, how to inflict the largest possible pain and how to kill a great number while sustaining minimal losses which is always embodied in the istishhadi operations. It is never possible to kill a higher number while only sustaining few shuhada’ [plural of shahid] and losses in the rows of the Mujahideen. Except by an istishhadi operation. [...] This is a chance for me to turn my flesh, my bones and my teeth into shrapnel killing these criminals of the American and Jordanian intelligence services. How could I have refused!? [...] When they think that this man is a spy, then suddenly this man turns into a bomb, this man turns into a missile, he turns into explosives, this crushes the determination and they will understand that the sons of this religion have never and will never bargain about this religion.”

By studying the primary sources of jihadist origin, including the videos, great similarities and overlapping propagandistic elements can be discovered. What is most appealingly portrayed in such sources is the firm belief of conducting a rightful act to restore one’s honor, the honor of violated women, to commit revenge for suffered pains and to effectively operate within an alleged theological and historical framework against the perceived body of the “enemies of Islam”. In another post-operation release by

as-Sahab, Abu Dujana’s voice tells the story how “one female istishhadi went to a checkpoint of the apostates. She then made it visible, she was weeping to receive attention and to attract a great number of soldiers around her. When the soldiers had come to her, she screamed ‘allahu akbar’ and exploded herself in order to turn her body into a shrapnel, to sever the limbs of the enemies of God.”⁵⁷ Such passages portray a ‘lost’ honor in a war against a conspiracy working against Islam in the jihadists’ perception. This perception is bound to cherry-picked historical religious sources and favored historic Islamic scholars, who are only being seen by the eyes of the jihadist to deploy any modern means available to meet the political agenda of jihadist groups. Out of context citations and references from the Quran are highlighted by jihadist sources to code and guide their specific understanding of the world, while only emphasizing on further developing their arguments and citations to cover more and more niches of the jihadist life- and combat-style. Only by thoroughly and properly understanding and deciphering specific outlets of jihadist ideology and their means of dissemination over the internet can paradigms and paradoxes of jihadist arguments – that are in some parts of course appealing to individuals of a global audience – be deciphered and, hopefully, be defused in corporation with members of the Islamic communities, who are as much (and much more) victims of jihadist warfare and their specific rhetoric.

ENDNOTES

- ¹ <http://www.nytimes.com/2010/01/07/world/asia/07intel.html>.
- ² The statement was disseminated by al-Fajr via the jihadist forums and websites. It was released on 7 January 2010 and is dated to the 2 January, signed by “Mustafa Abu ‘I-Yazid, General Command of AQ”. For further reference: Al-Quds Al-Arabi, 8 January 2010. The statement was re-published as the introduction to the “Letter in the Night before the Suicide Operation by the Determined Lion Abu Dujana al-Khurasani” which was conveyed online as part of the Arabic language Afghan jihad magazine *Tala’i khurasan* no. 16.
- ³ Such rhetoric is quite common within the internet spheres of AQ. The deployment of unmanned aerial drones in Afghanistan and Pakistan has in the meantime entered mainstream jihadist speak. These allegations, however, have a deeper range within the jihadist mindset. Not only is Western military aircraft in Islamic airspace deemed an act of war, but also a violation of Islamic principles, such as being a contradiction to the honor of Muslims. For a practical example consult recent statements from Yemen, particularly the audio message by Sa’id al-Shehri, *Rad al-‘adwan al-salibi* (February 2010).
- ⁴ <http://www.nytimes.com/2010/01/05/world/asia/05cia.html>.
- ⁵ <http://onlinejihad.wordpress.com/2010/01/09/abu-dujana-video/>. The video was released on 9 January 2010. Abu Dujana promises future attacks on a global scale. Hakimullah Mehsud is thought dead after reports of severe injuries after a drone strike had been made public. A video published by the TTP in May 2010, however, dated to 4 April 2010 shows Hakimullah Mehsud alive and well, addressing the umma the truth, rejecting any allegations made.
- ⁶ The difference between al-Qaeda’s on- and offline propaganda is that the Internet simply is the primary outlet, while groups such as the Palestinian Hamas or the Lebanon-based Hezbollah have the means and locations to set up posters and flags in their zones of influence. But the collection and study of offline propaganda reveals great parallels to the ongoing online campaign of jihadist and Islamist groups.
- ⁷ As-Sahab is one of AQ’s main media outlets. With the rise of the Organization al-Qaeda on the Arab Peninsula (AQAP), as-Sahab was also in charge of producing and disseminating videos from mainly Saudi Arabia, but has established itself ever since as a genuine global media outlet of jihadist AQ-affiliated operations.
- ⁸ It must be noted, however, that Abu Dujana was a renowned writer and a frequent contributor to jihadist forums and online magazines. The 15th edition of the magazine *Vanguards of Khurasan* (Tala’i Khurasan, 33-37) contained an interview with him prior to his attack in which he is introduced as “a person who is well known by his articles and postings that are distributed via jihadist online forums in the internet.” His reputation as a writer was also made clear when a major jihadist online forum in later 2009 offered comprising new “cyber-agit/propaganda” packages to be used to spread radical writings from mobile phones by Bluetooth. In the first package 39 articles authored by Abu Dujana had been one of the central elements. Cf. Nico Prucha, *Freely Roaming Data: al-Qaeda’s Mobile Phone Campaign is Characteristic of new Techniques Surrounding “Cyber-Agit/Prop”*. Security Europe, April 2010, <http://www.seceur.info/>.
- ⁹ Various jihadist media outlets have been created to report and eulogize the killed Mujahideen. Ranging from Iraq, where the al-Furqan media department from time to time releases writings depicting brave and subsequently slain Mujahideen, the same modus operandi and content is taken from sources issued in Afghanistan or the “Islamic Party of Turkistan” (western China), Somalia, Chechnya, Palestine or the Arab Peninsula (Saudi Arabia and Yemen).
- ¹⁰ Western media outlets are always quick to simply use the term “martyr” for both, the fallen Mujahid as well as the ‘suicide-bomber’. Arabic jihadist sources, however, provide a multitude of writings, emphasizing each term by historical and religious accounts. Simply translating both Arabic terms as “martyr” neglects the comprehensive meaning of these terms and does not acknowledge the deeply rooted ideological concepts that are fundamental to understand the motivation and determination of both the shahid as well as the istishhadi.
- ¹¹ The Ansar al-Mujahideen forum – one of many platforms – issued an audio recitation of Quran 3:169 on the main page where links to the “statement of the istishhad of the amir of the believers Abu ‘Umar al-Baghdadi and his Minister of War, Abu Hamza al-Muhajir – may God receive both” are issued with corresponding sympathetic and eulogizing reactions.
- ¹² A verse that reinforces that God has no partners (la sharik lahu) which is frequently incorporated in jihadist writings.
- ¹³ *Tala’i Khurasan* no. 16, 7.
- ¹⁴ Sahih al-Bukhari (12/144).
- ¹⁵ A speech by the renowned and famed ‘Abdallah ‘Azzam provides a description of the jihadists’ perception of an “Islamic state”, for which the Mujahideen already waged war against the Soviets in Afghanistan. ‘Abdallah ‘Azzam, *al-Jihad bayna Kabul wa-Bayt al-Maqdis*, transcription of his sermon in Seattle, USA, 1989.
- ¹⁶ For a comprehensive overview of the region of Somalia see Max Taylor, *Somalia and the Horn of Africa*, in: Alex P. Schmid, Garry F. Hindle (eds.), *After the War on Terror* (London 2009), 70-86.
- ¹⁷ Thomas Hegghammer, *The Failure of Jihad in Saudi Arabia*. Combating Terrorism at West Point, Occasional Paper Series 25 February 2010, http://www.ctc.usma.edu/CTC_OP_Hegghammer_Final.pdf.
- ¹⁸ Sahih al-Bukhari (3/262).
- ¹⁹ One example can be found in the *Sawt al-jihad* interview with Abu Jandal al-Azdi (aka Abu Salman Faris al-Zahrani) who draws on this citation to validate violence on the Arab Peninsula. *Sawt al-jihad* no. 11, 17-21 (part two of the interview).
- ²⁰ A frequent element cited by various istishhad operatives in their filmed and written testimonials.
- ²¹ Roel Meijer, Yusuf al-‘Uyairi and the Making of a Revolutionary Salafi Praxis, in: *Die Welt des Islams – International Journal for the Study of Modern Islam* 47 (2007), no. 3-4, 422-459. Furthermore, the exegetical study of the “Sharia judge of the Islamic State of Iraq” should be considered. Abu Sulayman al-‘Utaybi, *al-Furqan bayna ‘I-haqq wa-l butlan*, *Minbar tawheed wa-l jihad* 6.4.1427 (2.5.2006), <http://tawhed.ws/r?i=f3dkkksv>.
- ²² A short overview of such terming would be mushrikeen for those who are sought guilty of ‘partnering’ or associating God with idols, other Gods or material objects. The term mushrikeen is based on historical sources and the Quran, whereas the jihadist implements the historical meaning in modern times. Christians, Jews and mushrikeen are three named groups in the Quran who had been historic enemies. Mushrikeen is a term frequently used for non-Muslims (Christians, Jews, idolaters) but also for fellow Muslims (Shiites, Sufis). Another prominent term deployed within jihadist writings and the speeches of AQ figures is the specific definition of the ‘apostates’ (murtadin). The murtadin is a jihadist wording for primarily fellow Muslims (indifferent of their specific creed) who are working for any type of state. As ‘statehood’ in a modern sense is part of the violation of the tawheed

principle, those Muslims are in the jihadist mindset not Muslims anymore and part of a greater hostile system incorporated in the understanding of the universal conflict of “truth” and “falsehood”. For a jihadist ruling and definition of ‘murtadin’ cf. Abu ‘Abd al-Rahman al-Masri, al-‘alaqa bayna ahkam ar-ridda wa-l qital, Al-Ansar Mailing News List Newsletter, 2009.

²³ A frequent expression found – for example – within the *Sawt al-jihad*. Cf. Nico Prucha, *Die Stimme des Dschihad* “*Sawt al-jihad*”: *al-Qaidas erstes Online-Magazin* (Hamburg 2010), 225 (translation and commentary of the 17th memorandum).

²⁴ For a thorough discourse *ibid.*, 39-45.

²⁵ A comprising concept frequently issued in the jihadist fatwas (legal advice) and writings to justify the determination to end one’s life to remain steadfast to the Islamic principles of the shahada/tawheed. This is another concept used by the scholars of jihad to describe and legitimize the ruling of such operations. For a view as well on *inghimas* (based on the writings of Ibn Taymiya) and the people of the ditch, see Rebecca Molloy, *Deconstructing Ibn Taymiyya’s Views on Suicidal Operations*, in: CTC Sentinel 2 (March 2009), Issue 3.

²⁶ *Sawt al-jihad* no. 3, 30.

²⁷ Statement by ‘Abd al-Ghani al-Mujahir prior to his *istishhadiya* operation. From the al-Furqan video by the Islamic State of Iraq *Intafadat hayyat*, part 1 (March 2010).

²⁸ The Arabic *rizq* implies both “nourishment” as well as a “benefit”, that will be granted to the *istishhadi* as much as the *shahid* by God in the Afterlife. This is based on verses from the Quran such as 65:2-3 or 3:169.

²⁹ *Intafadat hayyat*, part 1 (March 2010).

³⁰ But also by the Saudi AQ branch that began operating in the Kingdom in 2003. Prucha, *Die Stimme des Dschihad*.

³¹ Citation by Islamic historical scholar Ibn al-Ghazali who was quoted by Muhammad bin ‘Abdallah al-Sayf, “the Mufti of the Mujahideen of Chechnya” in his fatwa, taken from Saudi AQ ideologue Yusuf al-‘Uyairi, *Hal intaharat Eva am istishhadat?* Published as part of a *Festschrift* for deceased Saudi scholar Hamud bin ‘Uqla al-Shu’aybi.

³² Over the years several film series have been created depicting such attacks. The *Fursan al-shahada*, for instance, has in the meantime seven lengthy titles, portraying *istishhadi* operatives and (in most parts) their executed bombing runs against military and civilian targets. While bomb rigged trucks, garbage trucks and mini-busses are often shown, car-bombs are used on more softer targets (checkpoints, watchtowers, recruiting stations) while the trucks are usually driven into an enemy compound (military installation, fortified checkpoints, governmental buildings) and then manually (as propagated) exploded by the *istishhadi*.

³³ Prucha, *Die Stimme des Dschihad*, 39-45. Based on Quran 9:52.

³⁴ The expression “the new Crusader wars” is an indirect reference to Saudi scholar, bin Laden bodyguard and first leader of AQAP Yusuf al-‘Uyairi who coined this in his writing *Haqiqat al-harb al-salibiyyat al-jadida* (“The Truth of the new Crusader Wars”).

³⁵ *Liqā’ ma’ al-shahid* Abu Dujana al-Khurasani *rahimahu l-llah*. As-Sahab video, January 2010.

³⁶ “The unjust siege continues against our people in Gaza. Furthermore, [US-President] Obama has initiated plans for his henchmen in Egypt to build a steel wall at the border with Gaza to try to turn it into the biggest prison of history.”

³⁷ Secretly filmed sequences with a mobile phone show how Pakistani soldiers torture an elderly person, including CIA agents water boarding a prisoner.

³⁸ The Arabic term for progeny (*ahfad*) had been propagated with videos issued by the ‘new AQAP’ from Yemen, depicting the leaders as well as the 23 year old Saudi *istishhadi* ‘Abdallah Hasan Assiri, who attempted to kill the Saudi Prince Nayef in his office in Jeddah after pretending to surrender and to accept a governmental amnesty. Assiri was flown from Yemen to Jeddah, security measures failed to detect his concealed ‘underpants’ explosive device. The *modus operandi* was later re-used by Omar al-Faruq, the *wanna-be istishhadi* from Nigeria who was trained in Yemen and sought to bomb a US-bound aircraft to Detroit from Amsterdam. Pictures of Assiri as well as of Faruq are shown.

³⁹ Citation taken from Abu ‘Umar, ‘Abd al-Hakim Hasan, *Hukm al-‘amaliyyat al-istishhadiyya*, *Minbar tawhed wa-l jihad*, <http://tawhed.ws/dl/?i=7wnq2uc7>, 16.

⁴⁰ A row (*saff*) is most important during the order of the Islamic prayer and as such, a unified row of pious Mujahideen, the conduct of war had been. This element is heavily used in contemporary propaganda.

⁴¹ Abu ‘Umar, ‘Abd al-Hakim Hasan, *Hukm al-‘amaliyyat al-istishhadiyya*, *Minbar tawhed wa-l jihad*, <http://tawhed.ws/dl/?i=7wnq2uc7>, 16.

⁴² *Ibid.* The authors reference *Sharh al-Nawawi ‘ala Muslim*: 46/13.

⁴³ This is also described as a battle cry, with the Mujahid smiling or laughing while in the conduct of war.

⁴⁴ *Ibid.*, 17. Among other sources, Ibn Ishaq Sira and al-Tabari are referenced.

⁴⁵ *Ibid.*

⁴⁶ *Ibid.*

⁴⁷ *Tala’i Khurasan* no. 16, 10.

⁴⁸ Taken from his famous and comprising work *Mashari’ al-ashwaq*, vol. 1, 539. An “abridged version” (400 pages) was disseminated online by the Global Islamic Media Front in 2008 highlighting the importance of the historical figure who actively fought the Crusaders and defined jihadist-religious concepts in doing so. Parts of Ibn Nahhas’ comprehensive work was translated by Yemeni-US citizen Anwar al-Awlaqi, who is sought responsible for both indoctrinating the attempted bomber Faruq as well as Nidal Malik Hasan, the attempted *istishhadi* who plunged into the US Army base Ft. Hood and killed a number of his comrades.

⁴⁹ Hamid bin ‘Abdallah al-‘Ali, *Hukm al-‘amaliyyat al-istishhadiyya*, <http://tawhed.ws/r/?i=kyq0jppp>. Also part of the *Festschrift* for Saudi scholar al-Shu’aybi, deceased in 2002.

⁵⁰ Hamid bin ‘Abdallah al-‘Ali, *Hukm al-‘amaliyyat al-istishhadiyya*, 10f.

⁵¹ Published as a special edition by the magazine *Tala’i Khurasan* no. 16.

⁵² *Ibid.*, 4.

⁵³ *Ibid.*, 5.

⁵⁴ Ibn Nahhas’ comprising work focuses on the various states of fundamental elements such as the “Mujahid, the *murabit*”, the *shahid* and *jihad* in general. His work was first published in 813 AD. Ibn Nahhas, *Mashari’ al-ashwaq ila masari’ al-‘ushaq* (Beirut 2002).

⁵⁵ For a recent account of contemporary jihadist movements and particularly the “Palestinian Cause” cf. Marwan Shahada, *Al-Harakat al-Islamiyyat al-mu’asira wa-dawraha fi ‘l-sira’ ‘ala ‘l-ard al-muqadda*, a scholarly article disseminated by the jihadist media group *Sariyyat al-sumud al-i’lamiyam* in 2010.

⁵⁶ ‘Abdallah Anas, *Waladat al-Afghan al-‘Arab sirat ‘Abdallah Anas bayna Mas’ud wa-‘Abdallah ‘Azzam* (Beirut 2002), 85-93.

⁵⁷ Abu Dujana al-Khurasani: *Ayyuha al-mutaraddad: innaha farida!* Published by as-Sahab, but al-Fajr is referenced as the source.