ji·had·ica

New Issues Of Al-Qaeda In Yemen Journal

Since July al-Qaeda in Yemen has not released its monthly journal, Sada al-Malahim (The Echo of Glorious Battles).  This period of silence included the September attack on the U.S. embassy, which made it hard to confirm if al-Qaeda in Yemen had carried it out.

Now the group has published issues 5 and 6 of Sada al-Malahim with apologies for the delay “due to technical matters.”  Issue 5 includes the following titles:

  • “Exclusive Interview With Brother Ghrayb al-Taizi”
  • “Call To Assist Somalia”
  • “Lessons From The Tarim Operation”
Issue 6 includes:
  • “Lessons From The Embassy Operation”
  • “Status Of The Embassy Employees”
  • “Why The Embassy?”
  • “The Al-Furqan Raid,” an official statement from AQ in Yemen on the embassy bombing
  • “The Just Punishment,” an official AQY statement on the assasination of Muhammad b. Rabish

Document (Arabic): 11-9-08-faloja-issues-5-and-6-of-sada-al-malahim

Attacks in Yemen: Claimant May Be Lying

[Gregory D. Johnsen] Details are still coming in about this morning’s attack on the US Embassy in Yemen, and it will likely be a couple of days before a complete and accurate picture of the attack can be drawn. But in my conversations very early this morning what seems to be clear is that the attack involved at least two separate car bombs and came very close to succeeding on a much more spectacular level.

Even at this early stage it is important to note a couple of things. The attack, while shocking, was not necessarily unexpected. On August 19, Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula: The Soldiers’ Brigades of Yemen posted its 13th statement to al-Ikhlas. The statement threatened attacks in retaliation for the death of Hamza al-Q‘uyati, who was killed along with four of his comrades in a raid on an al-Qaeda safe house in the eastern city of Tarim on August 11. The proof, the statement said in a common Islamist phrase, “will be in what you see and not what you hear.” The group has been silent since. However, on September 9, a teaser was posted to al-Ikhlas indicating that the fifth issue of Sada al-Malahim was due to be released in the coming days. Sada al-Malahim is the journal of al-Qaeda in the South of the Arabian Peninsula. The combination of these two indicators should have triggered warnings in Yemen, as over the past year al-Qaeda has developed a pattern of linking its attacks to its rhetoric. That is to say, an attack usually follows the release of a statement, journal or video.

Unfortunately, on a side note, the al-Ikhlas website was taken off-line, most likely by hackers, before the fifth issue of Sada al-Malahim could be posted in what I can only imagine was a counterproductive attempt to disrupt al-Qaeda’s statements. This means that analysts are now flying blind in the sense that they no longer know what al-Qaeda in Yemen is saying either in its journals or statements. This will make predicting and analyzing the group that much more difficult.

On the issue of responsibility I have seen reports both in English and in Arabic that a group calling itself the Islamic Jihad in Yemen has claimed responsibility for the attack in a statement signed by someone calling himself Abu Ghayth al-Yamani. Personally, I have strong reservations about the veracity of this claim. This typically happens in Yemen following a suicide attack, but is rarely true. What usually happens is that some individual such as Abu Ghayth al-Yamani hears the news and dashes off a fax, and then a day or two later the group responsible posts an official statement claiming responsibility. Unfortunately, with al-Ikhlas being down getting access to this statement will be difficult (see above paragraph).

There are two other things to note from the August 11 raid – neither of which have been well reported – that killed al-Q‘uyati, who spent time in Afghanistan in the late 1990s before escaping from a Yemeni prison in February 2006. First, his cell was extremely localized. Of the seven individuals involved in the fighting – five of who were killed and two were captured – five of them were from al-Mukalla while the other two came from the neighboring towns of al-Qatn and Shabwa. This should have given a number of people pause; most of whom were proclaiming victory in the war against al-Qaeda in Yemen. The localized nature of the cell, I believe, indicates a diffusion of strength that should have worried Yemen as well as the US and the UK, which both relaxed their travel restrictions to Yemen following the death of al-Q‘uyati. I attempted to articulate this in a conference in DC at the end of August, but I don’t believe I was particularly successful.

The second important point to note from the August 11 raid is that it was precipitated by a local tip. One of the worrying trends in Yemen has been the lack of a strong public outcry against al-Qaeda attacks in the country, which have killed many more Yemenis than they have westerners. In order to truly defeat al-Qaeda in Yemen, something similar to what happened in Saudi Arabia in late 2003 and 2004 needs to take place. This has yet to happen, but there have been signs throughout the summer that the tide could be turning. One can only hope that this attack, coming as it did during Ramadan, and killing only Yemenis and other non-westerners will further enrage popular opinion within Yemen.

For those interested in reading more, see the article appended below.

Document: gregory-johnson-on-recent-aq-attacks-in-yemen

New Issues of Three Jihadi Journals

Issue 4 of Sada al-Malahim (The Echo of Glorious Battles), the main organ of al-Qaeda in Yemen, is out. One article caught my eye: “Somalia…The Forgotten Land.”

Issue 27 of Sada al-Jihad (The Echo of Jihad) is also out. SJ is produced by the Global Islamic Media Front. A few articles look interesting: “Al-Qaeda Is a Stone’s Throw From Palestine,” “Apostates Are More Dangerous Than the Enemy,” and “Interrogation (Methods and Phases).”

Finally, the Ansar Media Institute published issue 50 of Hassad* al-Mujahidin (Harvester of the Mujahids). The periodical focuses mainly on Iraq and most of this issue is about various attacks and prison breaks. There is one article worth noting: “The Camera: A Weapon Without Bullets.”

* Note: Hisad (“harvest”) seems to make more sense than Hassad (“harvester”) for the title, but that’s how the .pdf file is vocalized, so I’m going with it.

Document (Arabic): 7-13-08-ekhlaas-issue-4-of-sada-al-malahim

Document (Arabic): 7-10-08-ekhlaas-issue-27-of-sada-al-jihad

Document (Arabic): 7-14-08-ekhlaas-issue-50-of-hassad-al-mujahidin

Saudi Terror Arrests Summary, Government Points Finger at Iran

I’ve been collecting news stories on the terror suspects arrested in Saudi Arabia. Much of the reporting relies on Saudi security personnel and the Interior Ministry’s statement last week, so it should be read with due skepticism.

There’s a lot to discuss, but I’ll save my comments for later. For the moment it’s worth noting that, as of today, the Saudis are now injecting a new piece of information into the story: the network was taking orders and receiving money from someone in Iran:

  • The funding for the AQ cells in Saudi came from one of the major countries in the region in the form of Euros. (al-Qabas, “Oil Cell”)
  • Instructions for the cells came from the same major country in the region in which leaders of AQ sought refuge, like the Egyptian Sayf al-Adl who is currently living there. (al-Qabas, “Oil Cell”)

Below is my summary of all the data points I’ve been able to find (sources at the bottom):

The Network

  • Five networks have been captured. (al-Qabas, “Oil Cell”)
  • Of the 701 people arrested (181 of whom have been released), more than 50% are Saudi citizens. (Dhaydi, “Features”)
  • In the new batch of arrests, the demographic has shifted to Mauritania, Pakistan, Afghanistan, and Indonesia. In the past, non-Saudi militants active in the Kingdom came from mainly from Yemen, then Chad, Morocco, and Kuwait. (Dhaydi, “Features”)
  • 7 Mauritanians were among those in the “oil cell.” They were pursuing advanced degrees. One had a Master’s degree. The youngest was 35 and all of them played leadership roles. (al-Qabas, “Oil Cell”)
  • The seven Mauritanians had a “special driver” visa that enabled them to move around the country freely. (al-Qabas, “Oil Cell”)
  • The Afghans arrested were from Waziristan. (Malifi, “Africans”)
  • There were Yemenis and Iraqis in the “oil cell”. The number of Yemenis was higher than those of other nationalities in the cell. The number of Saudis in the cell is equivalent to that of the other nationalities in the cell. (al-Qabas, “Oil Cell”)
  • Only 50% of those in cell were Saudis. The rest came during pilgrimage season and did not go home. (Adnkronos, “Terror Cell”)
  • Most of the foreigners in the cell were recruited by imams in their home countries, or through the Internet. (Adnkronos, “Terror Cell”)

Recruitment

  • Because of Saudi security measures, the militants altered their methods of recruitment and their procurement of equipment. (Dhaydi, “Features”)
  • In Saudi Arabia, the main tool of recruitment is the Internet. (Dhaydi, “Features”)
  • The Eastern Province cell recruited illegal African residents to find jobs in the oil sector. (Malifi, “Africans”)
  • The recruiter network carried out organized efforts to target youth and to send them for training outside Saudi Arabia. (al-Sharq al-Awsat, “520 Arrested”; Malifi, “Africans”)

Leadership

  • There is no single leader for al-Qaeda in Saudi Arabia. (Dhaydi, “Features”)
  • A mobile phone that belonged to a member of the Eastern Province cell had a voice message from Zawahiri on it. This is the second recent message from Zawahiri that has been found recently on a terror suspect’s phone in Saudi. (Malifi, “Africans”)
  • The leader of one cell had a message from Zawahiri instructing him to gather money and promising to send people from Iraq, Afghanistan, and North Africa to target the oil infrastructure and fight security forces. (al-Sharq al-Awsat, “520 Arrested”)
  • 7 Mauritanians were among those in the “oil cell.” They were in graduate school. One had a Master’s degree. The youngest was 35 and all of them played leadership roles. (al-Qabas, “Oil Cell”)
  • Instructions for the cells came from the same major country in the region in which leaders of AQ sought refuge, like the Egyptian Sayf al-Adl who is currently living there. (al-Qabas, “Oil Cell”)

Funding

  • The new batch of militants are well funded. (Dhaydi, “Features”)
  • The Yanbu cell forged coupons for sacrificial livestock and sold them at pilgrimage [presumably to raise capital]. (al-Sharq al-Awsat,” 520 Arrested”; Malifi, “Africans”)
  • Cells planned to raise funds and send them outside the Kingdom. (al-Sharq al-Awsat, “520 Arrested”)
  • The leader of one cell had a message from Zawahiri instructing him to gather money and promising to send people from Iraq, Afghanistan, and North Africa to target the oil infrastructure and fight security forces. (al-Sharq al-Awsat, “520 Arrested”)
  • The funding for the AQ cells in Saudi came from one of the major countries in the region in the form of Euros. (al-Qabas, “Oil Cell”)
  • The financing of AQ in Saudi came from one particular direction, especially when AQ was being rebuilt. (al-Qabas, “Oil Cell”)

Preparation

  • The weapons and money caches were professionally sealed for long-term storage. (Dhaydi, “Features”)
  • Much of the money, weapons, and equipment were buried in remote desert areas. (al-Qabas, “Oil Cell”)

Media

  • The media cell was responsible for defaming clerics, raising doubts, and excommunicating other Muslims, all online. (al-Sharq al-Awsat, “520 Arrested”; Malifi, “Africans”)

Targets and Tactics

  • The cells are following the strategy outlined by Abu Bakr Naji in his Management of Savagery.
  • One of the five cells, the “oil cell,” planned to penetrate the secret police adminstrative building in Khafji with car bombs and to blow up oil installations in the Eastern region. (al-Qabas, “Oil Cell”)
  • Cell members intended to attack oil installations in Gulf states. They were going to use boats to attack some installations. (al-Qabas, “Oil Installations”)
  • Cell members had maps and pictures of hotels in many Gulf countries that foreigners stay in. (al-Qabas, “Oil Installations”)
  • Cell members plotted to attack boats in the Gulf. (al-Qabas, “Oil Installations”)
  • The plan of attack was to hit a variety of places while making sure that the cell’s base of operations was far away from the targets. (al-Qabas, “Oil Installations”)

Sources

Mashari al-Dhaydi, “Features of the New al-Qaeda,” al-Sharq al-Awsat, 26 June 2008.

Muhammad al-Malfi, “A High-Level Security Source: The Africans Are Actually from Mauritania and the Asians Are Afghans from Waziristan,” al-Watan, 26 June 2008.

“520 Arrested, Planned to Attack Oil and Security Installations and Spread the Takfir Methodology on the Internet,” al-Sharq al-Awsat, 26 June 2008.

“Saudi: Oil Cell Planned to Storm the Building of Secret Police of al-Khafji with Car Bombs,” al-Qabas, 29 June 2008.

“Oil Installations in Gulf Countries Intended Targets,” al-Qabas 27 June 2008.

“Saudi Arabia: Terror Cell Received Orders from al-Qaeda Deputy,” Adnkronos.com, 26 June 2008.

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