ji·had·ica

New FFI Report and Conference Papers

I would like to draw your attention to some new FFI publications. Most important is the new report by Einar Wigen on the Waziristan-based Uzbek group Islamic Jihad Union. Einar has trawled Turkish-language jihadi websites to produce this very impressive piece of work which is arguably the best available analysis of the history of the IJU and the nature of its international network. I promise not to post on every new FFI report, but this one is exceptionally good – and very topical. I am delighted to reveal that Einar will be contributing to Jihadica in the near future.

We have also made available a number of conference papers by FFI fellows. Some were presented at the International Studies Association Conference in New York in February, others at the joint FFI/Sciences-Po/West Point workshop in Oslo in March. The papers, wihch can be accessed here, cover a range of topics:

Blood Brothers or a Marriage of Convenience? The Ideological Relationship between al-Qaida and the Taliban (Anne Stenersen)
Ideological influences and patterns of Jihadism in Europe (Petter Nesser)
Which Jihad in Iraq? (Truls Hallberg Tønnessen)
Al-Qaida in Islamic Maghreb: Ideological Dissent in the Algerian Jihad (Hanna Rogan)
Does al-Qaida Articulate a Consistent Strategy? A Study of al-Qaida Leadership Statements, 2001-2008 (Brynjar Lia)

Foreign fighters in Afghanistan and Pakistan after 9/11 (Anne Stenersen)
The advent of the Sunni insurgency in Iraq (Truls H. Tønnessen)
Why Robert Pape is right: jihadi ideological cleavages and patterns of suicide bombings (Thomas Hegghammer)
Violent Patterns: A quantitative study of al-Qaida in the Islamic Maghrib (Hanna Rogan)
The search for a jihadi identity in Europe (Petter Nesser)

Weekend Reading: “The Second Foreign Fighter Glut”

Longtime Jihadica friend Clint Watts recently published an article at the Small Wars Journal titled, “Countering Terrorism from the Second Foreign Fighter Glut.” This article is the third in a series he has authored using data from the Sinjar records (Part 1 and Part 2 of the series). He concluded, “The key to success for future CT strategies will be the disruption of terrorist recruitment in foreign fighter source countries using a mixture of cost effective, soft power tactics to engage local, social-familial-religious networks in flashpoint cities – cities that produce a disproportionately high number of foreign fighters with respect to their overall population.” It is a good analysis and is definitely recommended reading.

Jihadists Study Jihadi Studies

At the risk of seeming omphaloskeptic, I will add a few more observations about jihadists citing western scholars, because this phenomenon taking larger proportions than I expected.

Since my last post on the subject, both the Militant Ideology Atlas and the RAND study mentioned by al-Maqdisi have been posted on al-Maqdisi’s own website, Minbar al-Tawhid wa’l-Jihad (MTJ). Maqdisi’s readers can now enjoy the original version, the original executive summary as well as an Arabic summary of both reports. As many of you know, MTJ is the largest online library of jihadi literature, so this means that the CTC and RAND are now part of the official jihadi literary canon.

It also means we now know which RAND study al-Maqdisi was referring to in last week’s statement:  Building Moderate Muslim Networks by Angel Rabasa, Cheryl Benard, Lowell Schwartz and Peter Sickle.

Since the last post I have also learned that Joas Wagemakers has been cited before; In fact, both Muhammad al-Mas’ari and Abu Humam al-Athari have mentioned him in the past. The latter notes on p. 94 of his book The Exalted Declaration that “A Christian from one of the European countries has written a PhD thesis on al-Maqdisi in which he speaks about our sheikh al-Maqdisi and the sayings of his opponents and supporters. Curiously, this Christian has read all the books of our sheikh al-Maqdisi and he has an article in which he responds to the claim that al-Maqdisi has revoked his positions.”

At FFI we have been watching all these references to colleagues in the field with a mixture of jealousy and relief. We seemed to have escaped the scrutiny of the jihadists. Or so we thought.

A few days ago a scanned PDF version of Brynjar Lia’s book Architect of Global Jihad turned up on the al-Faloja forum as well as on Archive.org . It soon also appeared on Thabaat where it was applauded as “objective” (hat tip: Adam R.)

But the icing on the cake was the appearance, on Minbar al-Tawhid wa’l-Jihad, of an Arabic translation of my colleague Hanna Rogan’s FFI report on Jihadism Online. The translation is the work of the MTJ itself and is accompanied by an introduction to the report, to FFI and to Hanna’s bio. The fact that al-Maqdisi’s assistants took the time to translate Hanna’s 38-page report into Arabic is quite extraordinary. I have not seen this honour bestowed on any other recent academic publication.

What’s next, the Infidel Scholar Atlas?

Document (Arabic): 04-29-09-minbar-new-articles-inventory
Document (Arabic): 04-29-09-minbar-atlas-summary
Document (Arabic): 04-29-09-minbar-rand-summary
Document (Arabic): minbar-translation-of-hanna-rogan-ffi-report
Document: 04-27-09-faloja-architect-of-global-jihad

Update (30 April): Jihadica’s reporting inspired a frontpage story in the New York Times today.

Jihadica Shmoohadica

Last week David Solway at Frontpage Magazine published an entertaining article ridiculing people who try to “understand” jihadism and its “roots” (his quotation marks). These people are like the cartoon characters shmoos (see also here), because, like the shmoos, they “recognize no threats, treat everyone as a friend and, even as they are about to be voluntarily exterminated, are all smiles and contentment.”

Solway proceeded to highlight yours truly as a resident of the “Valley of Shmoon” in good standing, describing my review essay in the Times Literary Supplement as an excellent example of the “sacrificial” attitude to jihadism.

As someone who studies jihadism for a living, I do not often find myself accused of not taking jihadi terrorism seriously. I am sometimes criticised for emphasising the political over the theological sources of jihadism, but usually by people who actually know what they are talking about (such as Raymond Ibrahim).

The Frontpage article is extraordinary in that it actively argues in favour of ignorance. For Solway, detailed knowledge about the jihadis, their backgrounds and their thinking seems irrelevant. Trying to understand the myriad of factors that influence militants’ readings of scripture and the different tactical conclusions they draw from those readings is humanizing the enemy, a moral transgression. Jihadists are religious fanatics and it is enough to know where they are so we can bomb them.

The irony here is that the people who work the hardest to “understand” jihadism and its “roots” are not academics or leftist intellectuals; they are the analysts in the intelligence community. The Valley of Schmoon, I’m afraid, covers most of northern Virginia.

Jihadi Pundit Translates, Analyzes RAND Study

Yaman Mukhaddab, a Jihadi pundit who’s appeared on this blog several times, has translated the summary of the new RAND study, How Terrorist Groups End: Lessons for Countering al Qa’ida. It’s a fast turnaround for a translation, given that the existence of the study was first reported in Western media on July 28 and Yaman finished his work on July 30.

Yaman says he has rushed to translate the document for two reasons. First, he believes that it is dangerous. RAND, he says, has finally understood that the reason al-Qaeda attacks the U.S. is to provoke it into a direct military conflict in the Middle East, which will strengthen and consolidate the mujahids and bring about greater losses for the U.S. and its allies.

Second, RAND is the go-to contractor in the U.S. for crafting the government’s response to al-Qaeda. Past RAND studies have had a huge influence in this regard and most of their recommendations have been implemented.

Yaman further argues that the next administartion will follow the plan outlined in this study. Both Republicans and Democrats want to end direct engagement with mujahids in the Middle East and use proxies and clandestine operations instead.

Since RAND’s recommendations for correcting the U.S. response to al-Qaeda derive from a scientific study of past terrorist groups, the mujahids would do well to read them so as to not fall into the enemy’s new traps. Moreover, RAND studies are public and provide an early warning of what the U.S. will do next, so the mujahids would be foolish to ignore them.

After posting his translation of the summary, Yaman offers five thoughts:

  1. The enemy has finally begun to understand.
  2. There is much in this study that torpedoes the propaganda of the enemy, which will help the mujahids.
  3. How can the enemy’s new strategy be thwarted?
  4. The RAND study is not an exercise in disinformation. But it still has some major holes that its authors haven’t perceived.
  5. The study will be implemented. Indeed, there are signs of this happening already.

In the coming weeks or months, Yaman plans to flesh out the five points above. He also intends to translate the fifth section in the complete study called “Military Force and al-Qa’ida in Iraq” since it contains much of benefit to the mujahids. Finally, Yaman hopes to translate the entire 225 page document. I’ll keep you posted.

7-30-08-yaman-mukhaddabe28099s-commentary-on-rand-study-how-terror-groups-end

Economist Article on al-Qaeda

If you only have time to read one article on the current state of al-Qaeda, read the new special report in the Economist.  Not only does the author, Anton La Guardia, have great taste (Jihadica and some CTC products I worked on are listed in the sources), but he has done a masterful job of tying together a lot of conflicting trends.

(Note that the links for all of the articles in the report are on the right-hand side of the screen.)

Scheuer and the Salafi Stew

In a new Jamestown article, Michael Scheuer has refined some of the arguments he made in May in response to the al-Qaeda-is-almost-defeated meme that has been going around since April. He and I had a brief exchange about it here (look in the comments), so I won’t reprise all of it.  But I do want to offer a counterpoint to his remarks on Saudi Arabia and Salafis.

In his new article, Scheuer asserts that the Western press has bought the idea that al-Qaeda is near defeat. Journalists, he says, have bought it because some Islamist ideologues who previously supported al-Qaeda have criticized the organization.  (Scheuer calls these criticisms “recantations,” but only a few of the people he mentions have recanted.) These criticisms, Scheuer says, “are part of a bigger project conducted by several Arab states–led by Saudi Arabia–to make the United States and its allies believe Islamism’s strength is ebbing.” This idea has been picked up by the Western media because people in the West “desperately wants to believe such claims.”

Why is Saudi Arabia conducting this campaign? To divert attention from the real problem, Salafism, which Scheuer calls “Saudi Arabia’s state religion.” The Saudis have even gone so far as to reach out to the pope and to consider the building of a church in the kingdom, all in the hopes that the West will forget that its religious ideology is the “engine of contemporary jihad.”

The West has a lot to be worried about, Scheuer says (quoting an al-Ahram article by Khalil El-Anani), because Salafism is gaining ground:

  • Salafis won a majority of parliamentary seats in Kuwait
  • A Salafi is the head of the Muslim Brotherhood in Jordan
  • Salafis are running the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt
  • Hamas hawks have more power than Hamas pragmatists

Al-Qaeda will be defeated, Scheuer concludes, when Salafism is removed “from schools and missionary activities.”

As I said in my earlier exchange with Scheuer, I agree with him that al-Qaeda is not near defeat, but I don’t think the al-Qaeda-is-near-defeat meme is a bad thing. The U.S. wins against al-Qaeda when it is no longer able to recruit or when the morale of its members becomes too low. One of the ways to achieve this is to create the public perception that al-Qaeda is losing. As long as the analytical community does not let this public perception cloud its judgment, I’m all for it. (Incidentally, I do think 2007 and 2008 have been rotten years for al-Qaeda in the Middle East proper.)

Scheuer’s assertion that the Saudis are leading a “project” to push this idea and to distract the West from its support for Salafism is too conspiratorial. The U.S. stands to gain as much as the Saudis do from exposing al-Qaeda setbacks to public view. Moreover, I would look a little closer to home for the idea’s origin. Finally, what in the world is wrong with Saudi leaders reaching out to the pope and considering the building of a church in the kingdom?

As for Salafism and its spread, there is less coherence to the movement than Scheuer makes out. Salafism is an ecumenical, originalist, Protestant-like movement in Sunni Islam whose followers reject adherence to the four traditional schools of law. But under this wide rubric, you find a great deal of variety. Wahhabis (a better term for the followers of the official religious ideology of the Saudi state) and the Ahl-e Hadith in Pakistan are Salafis under my definition, but they have very different attitudes toward politics. And it’s the attitude toward politics that should concern analysts the most.

A further problem with the label “Salafi” is that it says little about a group’s beliefs or political orientation.  Many Sunni groups call themselves “Salafi” because the word signals that their beliefs are derived from Islam’s “pious founders” (Ar. salaf).  But that’s almost like of a Sunni calling himself an “authentic Muslim,” which doesn’t give you a good idea of his religious or political attitudes (Thomas Hegghammer has made this point elsewhere).  Take the Muslim Brothers in Kuwait for example.  They sometimes call themselves Salafis, but they are usually at odds with self-described Salafi political parties in that country.

As an aside, Salafis in Kuwait did not win a majority of seats in that country’s recent parliamentary elections, as Scheuer’s al-Ahram source asserts. They took 7 seats by my count.

Scheuer took this point and several others from op-eds written by Arab secularists. For someone who berates the Western media for accepting ideas from Arabs who have agendas, he might view his own sources with a little more skepticism. Lumping every Islamist into the same Salafi stew may make a complex phenomenon more digestible or satiate the reading public’s appetite for ubiquitous doom, but it is neither analytically accurate nor politically useful.

Smackdown! Sageman vs. Hoffman

That’s how the New York Times sets up the Sageman/Hoffman argument today: Two powerful academics are feuding over whether al-Qaeda is a leaderless movement (Sageman) or a hierarchical terrorist organization (Hoffman). There are billions in federal dollars hanging in the balance. And best yet, the two guys can’t stand each other.

There’s a lot more agreement between Sageman and Hoffman than the Times piece portrays. Both men accept that there are grassroots Jihadi groups popping up without any operational connection to AQ and both men believe that AQ Central (Bin Laden, Zawahiri, et al) is alive and well in the FATA region of Pakistan. The main difference is over how strong AQ Central is and what relationship it has to those who fight in its name. In his latest book, Sageman says AQ Central is not that strong outside of Pakistan/Afghanistan and that it doesn’t have any operational links with groups or individuals outside the region. Hoffman disagrees, arguing that AQ Central does have these links and that it is planning and financing global operations again. My money is on Hoffman’s thesis; Abu Ubayda’s shenanigans should be proof enough.

The problem with Sageman’s thesis is that it is four years too late. It works very well in 2004 when AQ Central was on the run and grassroots groups were popping up. But it is incomplete today when we have both grassroots activism and a powerful AQ Central. What makes things difficult now is that the grassroots groups are reaching out to the mother ship.

As for Sageman’s why-me? posture in the Times article, puh-lease. In his books, Sageman dismisses entire fields of study with a flick of the pen, excoriating colleagues for their lack of scientific rigor. His fulminations would be tolerable if his own scientific practice were rigorous, but it’s not–his datasets are not easy to obtain, his coding of the data is idiosyncratic, and some of his strongest conclusions rest on weak evidence. This is what Hoffman is reacting to in his review of Sageman’s latest book and it is long overdue.

Sageman has a lot of very useful ideas, but they are hard to talk about when he is standing in the way:

Maybe he’s mad that I’m the go-to guy now.

Blech.

AQ on the Ropes

The meme going around the past few weeks is that al-Qaeda is on the ropes. One of the first places I saw it in the mainstream press was an LA Times story from April, the main themes of which have been echoed recently in the Bergen/Cruickshank and Wright pieces. The main evidence offered is that several hard-line religious scholars that used to support AQ have now renounced the organization. Awda (Saudi cleric), Hamid al-Ali (Kuwaiti cleric), Sayyid Imam (former head of Egyptian al-Jihad), and the Grand Mufti of Saudi Arabia are the most commonly cited personalities.

Michael Scheuer dissents (of course!), arguing that these scholars have either been co-opted, have an ax to grind, or are has-beens, so their criticism won’t matter to the Jihadis. In fact, Scheuer argues that the Jihadis are on the march:

these arguments are occurring in the context of the jihadis expanding in North Africa, the Levant, and Europe; effectively resisting U.S.-led military coalitions in Iraq and Afghanistan; and winning elections every time one is held in the Arab world — Gaza, Egypt, Bahrain, and most recently in Kuwait.

There is something to the recent meme that Scheuer is missing: these attacks from former prominent supporters or fellow travelers are severely damaging the publics’ opinion of AQ, especially among educated Salafis. The books or letters written by Awda or Sayyid Imam are carefully formulated criticisms of AQ from within the classical Islamic tradition, not silly there-is-no-violence-in-jihad arguments. Moreover, these men have major names in the Jihadi-Salafi community and their earlier works are still much cited, so they have to be dealt with. Although Zawahiri dismisses their attacks in precisely the same way Scheuer does, he wrote a 188-page book in response to one of them, Sayyid Imam. And he released it only two months after Imam’s book came out. You do not write a book of that length and release it that fast if you are not worried. Since Scheuer is all about listening to the enemy, he should not be so quick to dismiss something Zawahiri takes so seriously.

That said, Scheuer is right that there is a little too much optimism about AQ’s impending doom. AQ may be collapsing in Iraq and losing the larger war for public sympathy, but it is still attracting recruits and expanding its operations on the margins of the Middle East–Algeria and Pakistan/Afghanistan.
It is also casting its eye on Yemen, Lebanon, and Gaza (good luck with the last two!).

In short, there are some positive signs that AQ is losing the war of perceptions (i.e. it looks like a loser right now), but it is still quite strong.

One final note: Scheuer’s suggestion that the recent electoral successes of the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt and the Salafis in Kuwait constitute jihadi expansion is wrongheaded. What does the U.S. stand to gain by lumping democratically-elected MB and Salafi candidates in with AQ? The U.S. should be looking for ways to increase the political participation of these groups while identifying local variations between them that can be used to the advantage of the U.S. and to the detriment of AQ.

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