ji·had·ica

The Iraq Connection

Thomas Hegghammer December 15, 2010

A key question in the Stockholm investigation is whether Taymour Abdalwahhab was acting on behalf of the al-Qaida linked group “Islamic State in Iraq”. The question matters because if he was, then ISI is targeting Europe and can be expected to send more bombers.

First, let me stress that “acting on behalf of” means someting more than simply “training with”. Given Taymour’s Iraqi background, his recent trips to Jordan (and possibly Syria), and his own claim of having been to the Middle East for jihad, we can pretty much assume that he trained with Islamist militants in Iraq. What we are trying to find out is whether he was dispatched by ISI – i.e. whether the plot was initiated, directed and resourced by senior ISI operatives – or whether he simply attended a camp and then acted independently, in a manner comparable to Times Square bomber Faisal Shahzad.

There is some concrete evidence in favour of Taimour having a close ISI connection:

  • The photomontage on the Hanain forum presenting Taymour as “One of the knights [fursan] of the Islamic State of Iraq”
  • Taymour’s reference to “the Islamic State” in his martyrdom will
  • Taymour’s reference, in the same will, to having been a mujahid for “four years”

There is also some circumstantial evidence:

  • ISI leader Abu Umar al-Baghadi’s September 2007 statement calling for attacks in Sweden as punishment for the publication of cartoons of the Prophet Muhammad
  • The past involvement of other Swedish Muslims in ISI and its predecessors (see Brian Fishman’s excellent piece for details)

A more debatable piece of evidence is the early identification of Taimour Abdalwahhab on the Shumukh forum by a writer using the alias “Abu Sulayman al-Nasir.” As Aaron, Ibn Siqilli and Garbi point out in the comments to my previous post, the alias bears a striking similarity to the name of ISI’s War Minister Abu Sulayman al-Nasir li-DIn Allah. Could they be the same person? Personally I am sceptical. It is extremely rare (though admittedly not unheard of) for senior activists to use their real names on forums. Moreover, Abu Sulayman the forum writer has also issued audio statements threatening NATO. Why would ISI’s War Minister issue “rogue” statements outside of ISI highly streamlined propaganda framework?

On the other hand there is weighty evidence against Taimour acting on behalf of ISI:

  • The absence of a claim of responsibility from ISI proper, despite ISI being perhaps the world’s largest producer of jihadi propaganda
  • The absence of a post-attack martyrdom video, which is what groups with media wings tend to produce
  • The near absence of past ISI-directed plots in Europe. AQI was admittedly linked to the 2007 Glasgow and London attacks but the nature of those links have never been elucidated. Why would ISI conduct its first (or one of its first) major European attack in Sweden? Why not use Taymour to strike in Britain, a country that actually participated in the Iraq invasion and the country in which Taymour resided?

Of course it is still early, and an ISI claim or video could appear any time. However, in the absence of such documents, I lean toward the view that Taymour trained with Islamist militants in Iraq, but  was not on an ISI-directed mission. I share Aaron’s view that the case most resembles that of Faisal Shahzad, who trained in Pakistan but did most of the planning and organization himself.

This does not preclude the possibility that Taymour had a handful of helpers, in Sweden and/or in Britain. On this note, there is an interesting report in the Swedish newspaper Aftonbladet quoting the previous owner of the bombing vehicle as saying Taymour came to buy the car together with another man. The other man was a bit shorter, aged 45-50 and did not say very much.

A number questions remain, notably:

  • Who is the mystery man who came to buy the car with Taymour?
  • Is there a second person coughing on Taymour’s audio recording?
  • Why did Taymour choose to attack in Sweden when he lived in the UK?
  • Is it a coincidence that Taymour lived three streets away from Muhammad Qayum Khan?
  • Where exactly in the Middle East did Taymour travel between 2006 and 2010?
  • If ISI trained him, why are they not taking some form of credit?
  • If Taymour left a written message for his wife two weeks before the bombing, why does his wife say she didn’t know anything?

 

[PS: I am still unable to print forum posts to PDF, but I will do so as soon as I can] 

New Book On Al-Qaeda And WMD

Will McCants December 10, 2008

Many of you who follow al-Qaeda may not be familiar with FFI, but you’re doubtless familiar with the excellent work of its members (e.g. Lia, Hegghammer, and Nesser).  However, FFI has a secret weapon who only insiders know: Anne Stenersen.  Anne is an outstanding Arabist (and Russianist) and has an unfair amount of knowledge about terrorist training and weaponry.  She’s now published a book on al-Qaeda and WMD.  Like everything else the FFI crew produces,  I’m sure it’s going to set a new standard for study of the subject.

How Online Recruitment Works

Will McCants September 18, 2008

In a feeble attempt to live up to Jihadica’s new billing as the “most dangerous” website monitoring Jihadis online, I thought I’d post some thoughts on what role Jihadi forums play in recruitment and radicalization.

The usual characterization of online recruitment goes like this: some hapless Sunni Muslim starts poking around online, discovers Jihadi propaganda, and upon watching or reading it becomes radicalized and ready to fight.

It is certainly the case that some Sunni Muslims see or read online Jihadi propaganda about Muslim suffering at the hands of the West and decide they need to do something about it.  Why some respond and not others is a complicated issue that I won’t deal with here.  What I’m interested in is the mechanics of the propaganda’s delivery and how its effects are sustained.

Firstly, we don’t have a lot of examples of Muslims who were radicalized online and remained radicalized without meeting face-to-face with committed militants or like-minded acquaintances who could reinforce their new worldview.  Moreover, the pattern seems to be face-to-face radicalization first, followed and compounded by online material.  There are exceptions, but I think the general trend points in the direction I’ve indicated.

Secondly, online recruitment is not happening on the forums.  I have seen no evidence of new members being persuaded that fighting is the right thing to do; that would be preaching to the choir.  What I have seen is a lot of Jihadi missionary activity on more mainstream Muslim discussion forums.

Take for example a recent posting on the Shumukh (“Pride”) forum by member Abu Dharr al-Makki.  Makki announces the formation of an “Incitement Brigade” whose members will join other forums and, cloaked in proxy-provided anonymity, post recruitment material.  He provides a long list of such forums and suggests each member be responsible for five them.  There are lots of other examples of this type of outreach, but Makki’s post is enough to make my point.

So here’s my basic model: Jihadi forums are good for creating and storing propaganda material.  Mainstream forums are where online recruitment, if any, is happening.  But even if the recruitment is effective, the recruits still need some face time with committed militants or other recruits to remain radicalized; ingesting more propaganda or joining Jihadi forums isn’t enough.

Document (Arabic): 7-21-08-shamikh-recruitment-brigade-and-list-of-forums-for-dawa

Training for the Lone Jihadi

Will McCants August 19, 2008

Ekhlaas member Dir` li-Man Wahada (Armor for One Who Was Alone) has written a brief guide for the Jihadi initiate to consult in preparation for the coming al-Qaeda strikes.  His purpose, he says, is to enumerate the general strategic framework of al-Qaeda so the initiate will be able to implement the organization’s vision locally, either by himself or in a small group.

The initiate must prepare himself in three respects: religiously, intellectually, and physically.

For the religious aspect, he must read:

  • تنبيه الراحل إلى أهم ما يحتاجه من المسائل (Informing the Traveler of the Most Important Issues He Needs to Know) by `Izz al-Din al-Maqdisi
  • حقيقة الحرب الصليبية الجديدة (The Reality of the New Crusader War) by Yusuf `Uyayri (or `Ayiri–have we decided yet?)
  • الباحث في حكم قتل أفراد وضباط المباحث (An Inquiry Into the Ruling of Death upon Soldiers and Officers of the Security Forces) by Faris Al al-Shuwayl al-Zahrani

For the intellectual and security aspect, he must read:

  • موسوعة أبي زبيدة الأمنية (The Security Encyclopedia of Abu Zubayda)
  • دعوة المقاومة الإسلامية العالمية (Call for the Global Islamic Resistance) by Abu Mus`ab al-Suri.  (“Reading the book will fill several weeks.  Don’t fail to complete it and don’t skip sections.”)

For physical preparation, the individual should at least do the following:

  • Exercise no less than three times a week for at least half an hour.  Beginners should join sports clubs.
  • Run outdoors at least once a week.
  • For those who can, swim on the days you are not exercising.
  • Avoid difficult exercises in the first few weeks to avoid injury.
  • Exercise less during Ramadan.

Dir` cautions those who take up this program to keep their Jihadi interests to themselves.  Dir` also acknowledges that some of the Jihadis think reading these books takes too much time; he counters that if they don’t know why they are fighting, they will merely be brigands.

This curriculum is similar in some respects to one we looked at in June.

Document (Arabic): 8-17-08-ekhlaas-how-individual-can-prepare-for-coming-jihadi-stages

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