ji·had·ica

Jihadi Pundit Translates, Analyzes RAND Study

Will McCants August 4, 2008

Yaman Mukhaddab, a Jihadi pundit who’s appeared on this blog several times, has translated the summary of the new RAND study, How Terrorist Groups End: Lessons for Countering al Qa’ida. It’s a fast turnaround for a translation, given that the existence of the study was first reported in Western media on July 28 and Yaman finished his work on July 30.

Yaman says he has rushed to translate the document for two reasons. First, he believes that it is dangerous. RAND, he says, has finally understood that the reason al-Qaeda attacks the U.S. is to provoke it into a direct military conflict in the Middle East, which will strengthen and consolidate the mujahids and bring about greater losses for the U.S. and its allies.

Second, RAND is the go-to contractor in the U.S. for crafting the government’s response to al-Qaeda. Past RAND studies have had a huge influence in this regard and most of their recommendations have been implemented.

Yaman further argues that the next administartion will follow the plan outlined in this study. Both Republicans and Democrats want to end direct engagement with mujahids in the Middle East and use proxies and clandestine operations instead.

Since RAND’s recommendations for correcting the U.S. response to al-Qaeda derive from a scientific study of past terrorist groups, the mujahids would do well to read them so as to not fall into the enemy’s new traps. Moreover, RAND studies are public and provide an early warning of what the U.S. will do next, so the mujahids would be foolish to ignore them.

After posting his translation of the summary, Yaman offers five thoughts:

  1. The enemy has finally begun to understand.
  2. There is much in this study that torpedoes the propaganda of the enemy, which will help the mujahids.
  3. How can the enemy’s new strategy be thwarted?
  4. The RAND study is not an exercise in disinformation. But it still has some major holes that its authors haven’t perceived.
  5. The study will be implemented. Indeed, there are signs of this happening already.

In the coming weeks or months, Yaman plans to flesh out the five points above. He also intends to translate the fifth section in the complete study called “Military Force and al-Qa’ida in Iraq” since it contains much of benefit to the mujahids. Finally, Yaman hopes to translate the entire 225 page document. I’ll keep you posted.

7-30-08-yaman-mukhaddabe28099s-commentary-on-rand-study-how-terror-groups-end

Saudi Terror Arrests Summary, Government Points Finger at Iran

Will McCants June 29, 2008

I’ve been collecting news stories on the terror suspects arrested in Saudi Arabia. Much of the reporting relies on Saudi security personnel and the Interior Ministry’s statement last week, so it should be read with due skepticism.

There’s a lot to discuss, but I’ll save my comments for later. For the moment it’s worth noting that, as of today, the Saudis are now injecting a new piece of information into the story: the network was taking orders and receiving money from someone in Iran:

  • The funding for the AQ cells in Saudi came from one of the major countries in the region in the form of Euros. (al-Qabas, “Oil Cell”)
  • Instructions for the cells came from the same major country in the region in which leaders of AQ sought refuge, like the Egyptian Sayf al-Adl who is currently living there. (al-Qabas, “Oil Cell”)

Below is my summary of all the data points I’ve been able to find (sources at the bottom):

The Network

  • Five networks have been captured. (al-Qabas, “Oil Cell”)
  • Of the 701 people arrested (181 of whom have been released), more than 50% are Saudi citizens. (Dhaydi, “Features”)
  • In the new batch of arrests, the demographic has shifted to Mauritania, Pakistan, Afghanistan, and Indonesia. In the past, non-Saudi militants active in the Kingdom came from mainly from Yemen, then Chad, Morocco, and Kuwait. (Dhaydi, “Features”)
  • 7 Mauritanians were among those in the “oil cell.” They were pursuing advanced degrees. One had a Master’s degree. The youngest was 35 and all of them played leadership roles. (al-Qabas, “Oil Cell”)
  • The seven Mauritanians had a “special driver” visa that enabled them to move around the country freely. (al-Qabas, “Oil Cell”)
  • The Afghans arrested were from Waziristan. (Malifi, “Africans”)
  • There were Yemenis and Iraqis in the “oil cell”. The number of Yemenis was higher than those of other nationalities in the cell. The number of Saudis in the cell is equivalent to that of the other nationalities in the cell. (al-Qabas, “Oil Cell”)
  • Only 50% of those in cell were Saudis. The rest came during pilgrimage season and did not go home. (Adnkronos, “Terror Cell”)
  • Most of the foreigners in the cell were recruited by imams in their home countries, or through the Internet. (Adnkronos, “Terror Cell”)

Recruitment

  • Because of Saudi security measures, the militants altered their methods of recruitment and their procurement of equipment. (Dhaydi, “Features”)
  • In Saudi Arabia, the main tool of recruitment is the Internet. (Dhaydi, “Features”)
  • The Eastern Province cell recruited illegal African residents to find jobs in the oil sector. (Malifi, “Africans”)
  • The recruiter network carried out organized efforts to target youth and to send them for training outside Saudi Arabia. (al-Sharq al-Awsat, “520 Arrested”; Malifi, “Africans”)

Leadership

  • There is no single leader for al-Qaeda in Saudi Arabia. (Dhaydi, “Features”)
  • A mobile phone that belonged to a member of the Eastern Province cell had a voice message from Zawahiri on it. This is the second recent message from Zawahiri that has been found recently on a terror suspect’s phone in Saudi. (Malifi, “Africans”)
  • The leader of one cell had a message from Zawahiri instructing him to gather money and promising to send people from Iraq, Afghanistan, and North Africa to target the oil infrastructure and fight security forces. (al-Sharq al-Awsat, “520 Arrested”)
  • 7 Mauritanians were among those in the “oil cell.” They were in graduate school. One had a Master’s degree. The youngest was 35 and all of them played leadership roles. (al-Qabas, “Oil Cell”)
  • Instructions for the cells came from the same major country in the region in which leaders of AQ sought refuge, like the Egyptian Sayf al-Adl who is currently living there. (al-Qabas, “Oil Cell”)

Funding

  • The new batch of militants are well funded. (Dhaydi, “Features”)
  • The Yanbu cell forged coupons for sacrificial livestock and sold them at pilgrimage [presumably to raise capital]. (al-Sharq al-Awsat,” 520 Arrested”; Malifi, “Africans”)
  • Cells planned to raise funds and send them outside the Kingdom. (al-Sharq al-Awsat, “520 Arrested”)
  • The leader of one cell had a message from Zawahiri instructing him to gather money and promising to send people from Iraq, Afghanistan, and North Africa to target the oil infrastructure and fight security forces. (al-Sharq al-Awsat, “520 Arrested”)
  • The funding for the AQ cells in Saudi came from one of the major countries in the region in the form of Euros. (al-Qabas, “Oil Cell”)
  • The financing of AQ in Saudi came from one particular direction, especially when AQ was being rebuilt. (al-Qabas, “Oil Cell”)

Preparation

  • The weapons and money caches were professionally sealed for long-term storage. (Dhaydi, “Features”)
  • Much of the money, weapons, and equipment were buried in remote desert areas. (al-Qabas, “Oil Cell”)

Media

  • The media cell was responsible for defaming clerics, raising doubts, and excommunicating other Muslims, all online. (al-Sharq al-Awsat, “520 Arrested”; Malifi, “Africans”)

Targets and Tactics

  • The cells are following the strategy outlined by Abu Bakr Naji in his Management of Savagery.
  • One of the five cells, the “oil cell,” planned to penetrate the secret police adminstrative building in Khafji with car bombs and to blow up oil installations in the Eastern region. (al-Qabas, “Oil Cell”)
  • Cell members intended to attack oil installations in Gulf states. They were going to use boats to attack some installations. (al-Qabas, “Oil Installations”)
  • Cell members had maps and pictures of hotels in many Gulf countries that foreigners stay in. (al-Qabas, “Oil Installations”)
  • Cell members plotted to attack boats in the Gulf. (al-Qabas, “Oil Installations”)
  • The plan of attack was to hit a variety of places while making sure that the cell’s base of operations was far away from the targets. (al-Qabas, “Oil Installations”)

Sources

Mashari al-Dhaydi, “Features of the New al-Qaeda,” al-Sharq al-Awsat, 26 June 2008.

Muhammad al-Malfi, “A High-Level Security Source: The Africans Are Actually from Mauritania and the Asians Are Afghans from Waziristan,” al-Watan, 26 June 2008.

“520 Arrested, Planned to Attack Oil and Security Installations and Spread the Takfir Methodology on the Internet,” al-Sharq al-Awsat, 26 June 2008.

“Saudi: Oil Cell Planned to Storm the Building of Secret Police of al-Khafji with Car Bombs,” al-Qabas, 29 June 2008.

“Oil Installations in Gulf Countries Intended Targets,” al-Qabas 27 June 2008.

“Saudi Arabia: Terror Cell Received Orders from al-Qaeda Deputy,” Adnkronos.com, 26 June 2008.

Managing Savagery in Saudi Arabia

Will McCants June 26, 2008

In the past six months, Saudi Arabia has arrested around 700 suspected terrorists.  Yesterday, the Interior Ministry released a statement which claimed that many of those arrested were trying to implement the blueprint laid out by Abu Bakr Naji in his Management of Savagery.

Naji argues that if Jihadis want to take power, they need to abandon the idea of overthrowing governments in the Middle East.  Instead, they should focus on creating security vacuums.  They can do this by striking  a country’s crucial industries, like oil and tourism.  The government will respond by pulling in its security forces to protect the infrastructure.  This will open up the desired security vacuums (“regions of savagery” as he calls them) that Jihadis can move into and set up rudimentary governments.  These vacuums can be as small as city blocks or as large as a province.  Once they have gained control, the Jihadis can then network with other “administrations of savagery” and proceed to more complicated forms of government.

According to the Saudis, many of the people they arrested wished to carry out this plan, based on Naji’s book:

(The intention of these groups is to) plan, recruit, and equip themselves in order to revive criminal activities in all regions of the Kingdom in an attempt to change the internal security situation into a stage that resembles the situation in other unsettled regions since perverse groups like these are not able to intellectually find a place for themselves in societies that are stable. This (plan) is clearly evident from the confiscation of numerous documents in their possession, including a study they call The Management of Savagery, which articulates their sick dreams and hateful visions.

Since The Management of Savagery is still an obscure book in the Middle East, there were several articles published in Arabic newspapers today that explain its contents.  There are two good articles, one in al-Sharq al-Awsat and one in al-Watan. Strikingly, there are two bad articles in the same papers. First the good ones:

Mashari al-Dhaydi in al-Sharq al-Awsat:

  • Dhaydi classes Management among the most important texts shaping the Jihadi Movement, along with Qutb’s Milestones, Faraj’s Neglected Duty, Juhayman al-`Utaybi’s writings, Zawahiri’s Knights, Sayyid Imam/Dr. Fadl’s three books, Suri’s “Syrian Experience,” and three books by Maqdisi.
  • Management is odd because it does not have a traditional flavor or a title that rhymes in Arabic (which is usually the case for classically-oriented Islamic books). It is also strange in that it uses terms that are common in the media but not in traditional religious texts.
  • He observes that an American (me) translated the book several years ago. [Like some other reporters, he wrongly attributes the sponsorship of the translation to West Point’s CTC. The Olin Institute at Harvard actually funded it; both Olin and the CTC host a copy online.]
  • Dhaydi quotes a Saudi security expert who says that the most dangerous parts of the book deal with how to vex (nikaya) the government and obtain power (shawka).
  • The same expert thinks the book was written by a committee. Dhaydi notes that some people online say it is Sayf al-`Adl. Others say it is an unknown person.

Shakir Abu Talib in Watan:

  • Shakir interviews Faris b. Hazzam, a journalist who specializes in terrorist groups. Faris relates that some people think the author of Management is Abu Qatada (recently released from a UK prison).
  • He notes that someone at West Point translated the document and that the U.S. has already been studying it for two years.

Now for the two bad articles. The first is by `Ali al-Qahtani for Watan. He reports that Naji was one of those captured by Saudi security forces yesterday, which is very wrong. Next he quotes Salih b. Sa`d al-Luhaydan, an adviser for the World Association for Mental Health, who says that he has never heard of the book before. The author, Luhaydan says, has nothing new to say; he is irrational and puts emotion before reason; and he is obviously suffering from an early childhood psychological trauma. An anonymous article in al-Sharq al-Awsat is equally derisive, ridiculing the author as irrational.

If you’ve read Naji, you know that he is anything but irrational or emotional. Those who dismiss him as deranged might make themselves feel better, but they severely underestimate the cunning of him and his ilk–always a bad idea.

I’m relieved that the same papers that published such pap also published serious analyses. I’m also grateful that the latter highlighted my translation and that they acknowledged that the U.S. is well advanced in studying Naji’s work.  The U.S. government deserves a lot of the lumps it gets for cultural ignorance, but many would be surprised how far ahead of its Arab counterparts it is in understanding Jihadism.

As for the question of Naji’s identity, I am pretty sure that he is dead–a major Jihadi insider, Husayn b. Mahmud, said so online. So that would eliminate Abu Qatada and Sayf al-`Adl.

Al-Qaeda and the Battle for Oil

Will McCants June 17, 2008

Algihadya, an Egyptian Jihadi blogger, has posted an essay by Zadi al-Taqwa titled “Al-Qaeda and the Battle for Oil.” I don’t know where Zadi usually hangs his electronic hat, but his essay is making the rounds on the forums. Zadi argues that AQ has focused on attacking U.S. oil interests since its inception in 1998 because it understands that oil is vital to the U.S. economy, which it wants to damage. This is one of the main reasons it went into Iraq, where it could thwart U.S. plains to obtain cheap oil and where it could damage the oil infrastructure of a major oil producer. There is no mention of religious justifications or Prophetic precedents for attacking oil; it’s purely economic in Zadi’s analysis.

According to Zadi, the price of oil is sky high today because of a variety of factors (quoting):

1) Reduction of the level of oil production in the United States of America

2) Reduction of the level of oil production in Iraq because of the war

3) Rising level of demand for oil in China and India, which are expanding economically

4) Reduction of the dollar’s buying power and rising levels of inflation

5) Many countries and their central banks are decoupling their currencies from the dollar and seeking refuge in currency baskets.

6) The strength of the Euro as a currency led to the decline of the value of the dollar; moreover, the value of renminbi, the currency of China, is rising.

AQ will continue to attack oil infrastrure and the price of oil will continue to rise. For example, on May 30 2008 AQ in Yemen launched an attack on a refinery in Aden, which AQ Central officially embraced. After this date, the price of oil went up to $122.80 per barrel of oil.

Document (Arabic): aq-and-the-battle-for-oil (القاعدة ومعركة النفط)

Shaykh `Isa on Near Enemy vs. Far Enemy

Will McCants June 12, 2008

In a first effort to pin down Shaykh `Isa on the big Jihadi questions of the day, I read through his opinion on the near enemy/far enemy debate: “Are jihadi operations in the abodes of the original infidels preferable? Or in the lands of Muslims that are ruled by infidels?” The “original infidels” in the first part of the question are people who have never been Muslims. The unqualified “infidels” in the second part includes original infidels and Muslims who have apostatized.

In answering the question, `Isa offers America as an example of the “abodes of the original infidels” and Afghanistan as an example of the “lands of Muslims that are ruled by infidels.”

`Isa’s bottom line: “The apostate who has authority over Muslim lands is, in the eyes of the inhabitants of these countries, the near enemy, and the original infidels in their lands are the far enemy” (p. 20). A few paragraphs later he says, “Undertaking jihadi operations in countries that were ruled by Islam and then taken over by the enemy–like Afghanistan–are more obligatory and have greater priority than undertaking these operations in the abodes of the original infidels that Muslims have never conquered and in which Islamic law has never been applied–like America. Preserving capital has greater priority than new profit, especially when the person who has taken over Muslim abodes is an apostate” (p. 20). Elsewhere, he says that if the Muslims who live in these lands are unable to overthrow the apostate, then the duty to fight him expands to include the Muslims of the surrounding countries (p. 1).

Although the document is not dated, his remarks about Afghanistan being taken over by “the enemy” and an apostate taking power indicate that it was written after the U.S. invasion of Afghanistan and the accession of Hamid Karzai. So `Isa is addressing a current debate, not a pre-9/11 debate.

`Isa’s position is at odds with the one publicly adopted by al-Qaeda’s leadership in the ’90s and today, so it is strange that he would have such a high-profile position in the organization. Perhaps `Isa is a more independent actor than press reports suggest. Or perhaps he gives himself wiggle room in this document by making the near enemy/far enemy debate dependent on the capacity of the locals to overthrow the local apostate. Or perhaps AQ Central is shifting its strategic focus back to the near enemy. Reading more of `Isa’s works and knowing more about his relationship with AQ Central will help sort out some of these questions.

Document (Arabic): abd-al-hakim-hassan-operations-in-foreign-infidel-countries-or-muslim-countries-ruled-by-infidels

(هل العمليات الجهادية في ديار الكفار الأصليين أفضل؟ أم في بلاد المسلمين التي استولى عليها الكفار؟)

Jihadi Curriculum, Part 1: Ideology

Will McCants June 5, 2008

A blogger by the name of Shamil al-Baghdadi has created a curriculum titled “Method for Building the Personality of a Terrorist Mujahid.” The curriculum is divided into three parts: ideology, physical training, and ops. I’m only interested in the ideological bit, but those who are interested in the rest can easily find it on Shamil’s blog.

Shamil begins by explaining how to find a good recruit. First, you need to study the potential recruit before speaking freely with him. Make sure he is serious before approaching him or allowing him to approach you, even if he already knows about the aims and beliefs of the global Jihadi community.

Training is divided into three parts: Sharia, physical, and technical. Begin with the Sharia training.

The first thing to do is make sure your recruit has a good command of classical Arabic, not just colloquial Arabic. He should study one of the commentaries on the Ajurrumiyya (one of the classical Arabic primers), like al-Rawda al-Nadiyya. If he excels, he can read Ansari’s Sharh qatr al-nada.

The recruit should also learn to recite the Qur’an, memorizing and studying a section every day, and reading the relevant portions of the Tafsir (Exegesis) of Ibn Kathir, the Safwat al-Tafasir, or the tafsir by Sa’di (probably `Abd al-Rahman’s Taysir).

The recruit then begins to read the following list of books, in this order: (more…)

Channeling Sageman

Will McCants May 26, 2008

Ekhlaas member Abu Hamza 2005, whom we’ve already met, has written a short essay called, “Bin Laden and the Globalization of Jihad.” In it, he argues that Bin Laden and al-Qaeda have transformed Jihadi-Salafism from an ideology in service of national or regional goals into a global ideology. Before 9/11, AQ was an organization that carried out operations. Through its actions and the response of the U.S. and its allies, Muslims came to more fully identify with the suffering of foreign Muslims. Now its primary role is to motivate the Muslim community to become part of the global conflict.

In its role of advocate and exemplar rather than organizer, AQ has done away with structural organizations and is instead marketing a methodology (manhaj). On account of its success and notoriety, cells have formed that identify with its methodology but do not necessarily join its organization.

Complimenting the shift of AQ from an organization to a methodology has been has been its use of new media to spread its message. This allows it to circumvent the censorship of state-controlled media in the Middle East and to have equal footing with the U.S.-dominated global media.

Many analysts have asked, “Will AQ survive once Bin Laden is gone?” Of course! Abu Hamza answers; one need only look at the death of Zarqawi. Many analysts said his organization would fall apart after he died, but the opposite happened. This will also be the case when Bin Laden dies since AQ is a flat organization that does not depend on leaders.

To finish, here are two interesting quotes:

The spidery chain of spontaneously-generating cells, an expanding network, and terrorist strikes will not end as long as there are basic incentives, like religious and ideological doctrine and the bitter reality of domination, oppression, and humiliation in which the umma lives.

….

Al-Qaeda is not an organization or a traditional side in an international war. It is cells and an ideological orientation that jumps every day to new regions that meet the requisite Sharia and strategic goals. It is important to note that a majority of the members of al-Qaeda are well educated and from the upper classes. They are skilled at dealing with the modern technology that the West produces and many of them have studied at technical institutes, which gives them an advantage in designing terrorist attacks…

All of this sounds suspiciously like Marc Sageman’s recent Leaderless Jihad, in which he argues that AQ Central’s international role is confined to inspiring a decentralized network of like-minded militants who follow the organization’s method and ideology, but do not have any formal ties to it. This is not to say Abu Hamza is reading Sageman (although Jihadis are quite well read in the latest Western academic literature on AQ). But it does seem to be an idea that has really taken hold among Western analysts and Jihadis.

For my part, I think Abu Hamza’s thesis is as overreaching as that of Sageman (whose book has a number of excellent observations to recommend it). This whole business about flat organizations, networks, spontaneous generation, and the like may sound swell in our current Facebook milieu, but it misses two important things. First, it presumes that AQ was something different before 9/11–a bureaucracy that had tight command and control. I don’t think that’s the case. In fact, I think it functioned much the same as it does today, albeit in a diminished capacity. It was and is a terrorist venture capitalist firm that funds projects and people it likes but does not absorb many personnel into its organization.

Second, the idea that you can knock off a talent like Bin Laden and it won’t matter is nonsense. Sure, the Jihadi Movement will keep rolling and Bin Laden will be hailed as a martyr, but it is very difficult to replace someone with Bin Laden’s skills. Look at Abu Hamza’s Zarqawi example: Abu Hamza maintains that AQ in Iraq was just fine after Zarqawi’s death. But a more reasonable assessment has to conclude that AQI has suffered a great deal and is close to completely losing its footing in Iraq.

Document (Arabic): 5-21-08-ekhlaas-abu-hamza-on-globalization-of-jihad

Bin Laden Statement Prompts Speculation on AQ Strategy in Palestine (Part 3)

Will McCants May 24, 2008

In the final installment of the series, we’ll look at a piece of analysis from Ekhlaas member Abu Hamza 2005 titled, “A Modest Reading of al-Qaeda’s Strategy in the Levant [bilad al-sham]”. Abu Hamza begins by referring to Bin Laden’s 2007 statement, “To Our People in Iraq.” The statement, according to Abu Hamza, indicates that the Islamic State of Iraq is the nucleus of a future caliphate, but the caliphate will not be realized until the countries surrounding Iraq are defeated and Israel is destroyed. For this reason, Al-Qaeda “the Mother” (i.e. al-Qaeda Central) is very keen on expanding into the Levant and the other countries surrounding Israel. It also wants to establish branches in important global capitals, which can put pressure on foreign countries and scatter the focus of the enemy.

Abu Hamza says that he is certain that AQ cells are being created in the Palestinian territories, Syria, and Lebanon. Because of al-Qaeda in Iraq’s geographical proximity, ease of communication, and networks in these countries, it is in charge of overseeing the development of these cells. Abu Hamza also says that northern Sinai, in Egypt, is also very attractive for AQ, but he does not mention any links with AQI.

Abu Hamza argues that there have already been AQ ops in the countries surrounding Palestine:

– On 19 August 2005, 3 Katyusha rockets were launched from the Sinai toward Eilat and the Gulf of Aqaba.

– On 28 December 2005, 10 rockets were launched from Lebanon at towns in northern Israel.

– On 20 February 2006, two Palestinians were charged with trying to carry out a suicide attack in the French Hill area of Jerusalem on behalf of the global jihad.

As for Lebanon, Abu Hamza believes that AQ Central would be silly to enter the Lebanese political game at this time. The Sunnis are not ready to support a group like al-Qaeda, as witnessed by the bad end of Fatah al-Islam in Nahir al-Barid. (Abu Hamza relates that some observers believe that Fatah al-Islam was seriously negotiating with AQ about becoming a formal affiliate before it was crushed.) Since the fight in Lebanon is part of a larger strategic conflict between US/Israel and Iran/Syria, an escalation of the conflict will ultimately benefit the local Sunni militants. So AQ will watch from afar until the situation in Lebanon escalates to the point that the local Sunni civilians militarize and incline toward AQ to protect themselves (à la Iraq). Until then, Iraq is AQ’s top priority because it is the key to liberating Palestine.  Once the U.S. leaves Iraq, al-Qaeda will transfer its leadership there and shift its focus elsewhere.

I think Abu Hamza’s piece is appropriately titled since his estimation of AQ’s chances in the Levant are much more modest than the previous two items in the series.  In this, he seems to be more in sync with Zawahiri, who has tried to play down expectations of an attack on Israel.

As for the bit about AQ branches being established in important global capitals, it supports the argument that AQ attacks in Europe and the U.S. are meant support the mother organization’s goals in the Middle East.

Document (Arabic): 5-18-08-ekhlaas-modest-reading-of-aq-strategy-in-levant

Bin Laden Message Prompts Speculation on AQ Strategy in Palestine (Part 1)

Will McCants May 20, 2008

Bin Laden’s statement on May 18th has prompted several Jihadi pundits to speculate on AQ’s future strategy in the Palestinian territories. Over the next few days, I’ll post the most interesting speculation. For part one, we’ll look at a short post by Ekhlaas member Khalid al-`Asqalani.

According to `Asqalani, Bin Laden has presented a complete program of action for the coming stage of the Jihadi movement, which is the liberation of Palestine.

1) Bin Laden explained that oppressive international order is in an alliance with Israel and its resources are at its disposal.

2) The apostate Arab regimes are the guardians of Israel’s security, so overthrowing these regimes will make liberating Palestine much easier.

3) The pressure of the repressive regimes causes the Islamic groups to abandon jihad on the justification that it harms the da`wa (spread of Islam).

4) Hezbollah is misleading the youth because it has duped them into thinking it is the only resistance to Israel and that any other resistance in southern Lebanon must give obeisance; it plays political games at the expense of the Muslim community; and it gives its allegiance to the Guardianship of the Jurist (i.e. the Iranian government).

5) Fighting and jihad are a “strategic choice” for the Muslim community to replace the strategic choice of the defeatist Arabs who submit to peace and recognize Israel.

6) A group of people must penetrate the borders of Palestine in order to resist the Israeli blockade.

This is not quite the program of action that we were promised, but `Asqalani does pick up on Bin Laden’s call for jihad against the countries surronding Israel as a prelude to action in the Palestinian territories.

More interesting than `Asqalani’s summary of Bin Laden’s message is his take on why the time is ripe for the Jihadis to liberate Palestine:

1) They have a mature mujahid leadership that is well aware of the situation on the ground and can make military plans accordingly.

2) A global community of Jihadis can be mobilized to fight in Palestine regardless of their nationality.

3) The Jihadis have established a central base with the Islamic State of Iraq that can supply every mujahid with weapons, money, and training and function as a gathering point.

4) The Jihadis know what they want, they understand their enemy, and they have pushed the religious scholars to mobilize the Muslim community to fight.

5) Palestinians now know that their conflict is not a national conflict but a religious conflict.

`Asqalani is not alone in feeling that al-Qaeda is getting ready for operations against Israel in the Paletinian territories, even though Zawahiri tried to downplay expectations in his recent Q&A. In the following days, we will be looking at other Jihadi pundits who are responding in a similar manner. Bin Laden may only be throwing a bone to the Jihadis online and to those living in countries surrounding around Israel, but this sort of talk (increasingly frequent) also creates expectations, which in turn creates pressure for the al-Qaeda High Command to do more than talk.

Document (Arabic): 5-19-08-ekhlaas-khalid-asqalani-response-to-bin-laden-statement-on-palestine

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