ji·had·ica

The Strategic Effects of 9/11, Part 3: Striking the Enemy at the Center of Gravity

Will McCants September 14, 2008

Continuing…

  • It is no accident that the World Trade Center was the main object of the 9/11 attacks since it was the symbol of U.S. economic hegemony. Bear in mind that the attacks had been planned in the ’90s during the height of U.S. economic power.
  • The strikes were meant to polarize Muslims as well as the enemy’s population. They were also intended to push the U.S. into overreacting and committing errors.
  • Why didn’t all four strikes on 9/11 hit the Pentagon alone? Why did al-Qaeda attack civilians and the WTC? We need a new strategic framework to understand its reasoning. Three things needs to be considered.
  • First, when the U.S. attacks a country, it abides by the principle of the ends justify the means. This is one of the foundational principles of American pragmatism. Studies that came out after 9/11 really brought this mindset to the fore. But, according to a principle of international relations, it is the right of oppressed people to respond in kind. Al-Qaeda decided that there was no difference between civilian and soldier among the enemy, especially since is a democracy. Since U.S. citizens vote, they are responsible for U.S. policies and thus subject to terrorism. This was the first strategic breakthrough of AQ.
  • Second, although the U.S. is militarily superior to everyone else, it sometimes uses asymmetrical warfare against its enemies. In response, AQ decided to make use of it as well. Asymmetrical warfare is part of guerrilla warfare and AQ added terrorism to its asymmetrical toolkit.
  • Third, the U.S. began promoting fourth generation warfare in ’89 after the collapse of the Berlin Wall. Fourth generation warfare means that there is no longer a battlefield; rather, the society of the enemy is the theater of conflict. 4GW puts emphasis on small, flexible forces. The goal is to destroy the enemy from within and the list of targets iss expanded to include the enemy’s culture and popular support for the war.
  • For fourth generation warfare to succeed, it is necessary to correctly identify the enemy’s strategic center of gravity. In this type of warfare, there is no delineation between war and peace and no clear battlefields. In these circumstances, differences between civilian and soldier are erased.
  • The idea of the center of gravity has changed the conceptual framework of warfare. In any war, you identify the enemy and identify the point on which you’ll concentrate all your effort to achieve victory with the least amount of effort and losses. This point is called the center of gravity.
  • In traditional warfare, the center of gravity was the opposing army. If a country lost its military strength, it was unable to continue fighting and consequently lost the war. But the development of weapons and the growing complexity of the means of control in modern societies means that the center of gravity is now more flexible and elusive. It’s not just material power. The U.S. won all its battles in Vietnam but lost the war because public opinion turned against the war. “In other words, America lost the political will to pay the costs of the war and did not consider the hypothetical return on investment commensurate with the expected loses.”
  • The center of gravity is certainly not the enemy’s point of weakness such that a strike at it will end everything. Clausewitz, who invented the term “center of gravity,” had difficulty defining it, as do contemporary American military theorists. The meaning slides between an enemy’s point of weakness or its point of strength. In Clausewitz’s work, it is evident that the concept is not confined to a place, a potentiality, or a fixed source of power. Rather, it is the point of equilibrium from which the enemy derives the potentialities of power and the will to fight.
  • Identifying the enemy’s correct center of gravity is half the battle according to the American colonel, Antulio Echevarria. He believes that the center of gravity in Clausewitz’s original text is judged according to its impact on the whole, not according to its potentialities and capabilities. In other words, it is the specific point that, if struck sufficiently, will have a decisive impact on the whole body. On this basis, Echevarria suggests redefining the term as focal points which inhere to the combatant’s complete structural order and which bring it strength from several sources and give it purpose and direction. [To quote directly from Echevarria: “A center of gravity is the one element within a combatant’s entire structure or system that has the necessary centripetal force to hold that structure together.”] He also believes that an enemy’s center of gravity should be continually reassessed due to its temporary and transitory nature.
  • In total wars, the strategic center of gravity is a combatant’s economic-industrial potential.  In limited wars, it is the military-security potential.  National leaders are not centers of gravity because they themselves do no have the potential to defeat the enemy.  They are only catalysts.
  • Now to return to the strikes on the U.S. center of gravity.  Firstly, the center of gravity for the U.S. during WWII was its industrial complex.
  • Secondly, In the past two decades, U.S. financial centers seemed to be its center of gravity.  They absorbed the liquidity of the world and its interest.
  • Thirdly, the U.S.’s primary means of attracting funds is its capacity to impose its will through force on other countries and its belief that it can’t be defeated because of its geographical and geopolitical protection (it’s surrounded by oceans) and its military dominance.
  • Fourthly, hitting the U.S. homeland, despite all the strengths we mentioned, demonstrated the country’s brittleness, which gave reassurance to the U.S.’s enemies, especially in the Islamic world.
  • Fifthly, the strike on the WTC was not enough to destroy the world’s confidence in the U.S., even though it shook one of the pillars of its control of the world.
  • Does all of this mean that AQ committed the mistake of Japan in WWII, creating its own Peal Harbor?  In other words, did it provoke the giant without finishing it off and now it must bear the consequences?
  • There is a difference in both cases.  Japan was a small, isolated, maritime nation that had no resources or raw materials.  Since Japan fought a traditional war, its defeat was certain given that it could not match or destroy the U.S.’s center of gravity [its industrial base].  AQ, on the other hand, stretches over continents and its resources are from the umma; these resources have been barely affected.  AQ’s mode of fighting is new and not one to which the U.S. is accustomed.

The Strategic Effects of 9/11, Part 2: Provoking the Tyrant of the Sea & Air

Will McCants September 10, 2008

Continuing:

  • The main strategic question of the ’80s was how to mobilize Muslim youth to fight the Soviet incursion into the Islamic world while local conflicts were distracting the youths’ attention.
  • After the fall of the USSR the question became, why provoke the sole remaining superpower?  Is the US comparable to the USSR?  After all, the latter was attacked in Afghanistan at the nadir of its power.
  • Even more sensitive questions have been raised, like what was the Sharia basis for defying the Taliban emirate and suddenly attacking the US?  Was it worth ignoring the interests of the Taliban for the sake of a frivolous war?  Did Palestinians benefit from 9/11 when Sharon exploited it as a pretext to use excessive force in the Palestinian territories?  Did it help Iraqis?
  • The most troubling question has been: was the strike an attempt to escape the jihad’s setbacks that came in Egypt, Algeria, Chechnya, Bosnia, and Somalia at the end of the ’90s?  By provoking the enemy, was the intent to reunify the mujahids and mobilize the Muslim masses, as was done against the Soviets?
  • Most of these questions don’t matter anymore in light of revelations that the US wanted to invade Afghanistan and Iraq before 9/11 and that it wanted to do away with the Oslo Accords.
  • What can be said is that 9/11 forced the U.S. to use the worst means to carry out its pre-9/11 plans.
  • The purpose of this section is to examine the strategic motives for the 9/11 attack.
  • The USSR was the superior land power and the US was the superior naval power.  Similarly, in early Islamic times, Persia was the dominant land power and Byzantium was the dominant naval power.  Muslims defeated the Persians and the Byzantines because the two empires were exhausted from fighting each other.  Muslims ruled both the land and the sea for centuries until the Mongols invaded, controlling the land, and the crusaders invaded, controlling the seas.  Consequently, the caliphate in Baghdad was lost.  In modern times, naval and land powers also combined to defeat the Ottomans, destroying its caliphate.  When the mujahids helped defeated the USSR’s land power, the US moved in to fill the strategic gap and Muslims were not strong enough to stop them.
  • The US sought to control Eurasia to prevent a Russian resurgence and to maintain their global dominance (cites Brzezinski’s Grand Chessboard and a statement by Halford Mackinder on the importance of controlling Eurasia).
  • During the breakup of the USSR, Muslims were used as a new tool to thwart post-communist Russia so that it couldn’t return to regional ascendancy.  It fell to the mujahids to confront the global power imbalance.  They had not liberated Afghanistan to see one hegemon be replaced by another.
  • This does not mean that al-Qaeda wants to fight all enemies at the same time.  They wish to neutralize some enemies before others.
  • The essence of the US’s problem is that it arrived at its global dominance prematurely, before it was capable of handling it, as the geographer Jamal Hamdan has argued.  Its body developed before its brain was capable of handling its new capabilities.
  • In the two years before 9/11, the US realized that it was becoming too economically dependent on the rest of the world.  But because it cut its military budget in the ’90s it did not have enough forces to protect its imperial economic interests.  Moreover, it had lost its ideological appeal in the eyes of other nations. (For these points, Abu al-Fadl cites Emmanuel Todd’s After the Empire.)
  • It is at this propitious moment that the planes struck in New York and Washington, revealing the face of American fascism when the US’s terrible retaliation began.
  • What happened on 9/11 was not an attempt to hurt the US economy, even if the strike caused enormous damage.  It was a symbolic, ideological strike that has accelerated the decline of America.

The Strategic Effects of 9/11, Part 1: America & the World Before the Strike

Will McCants September 8, 2008

To continue the series, here’s my summary of part 1 of Abu al-Fadl’s study:

  • American strategy experts overlook the Soviet defeat in Afghanistan as the decisive event that ended the Cold War. Instead, they focus on the USSR’s and Eastern Europe’s attraction to Western culture. The myth promulgated by these experts is that soft power defeated the USSR without firing a single bullet. This is the myth of Western values that produce miracles.
  • This myth doesn’t explain the reason for putting nukes in Europe for half a century; the star wars program under Reagan; Brzezinski’s ingenious idea to destroy the USSR from the inside by breathing life into oppressed Islamic peoples; or why Reagan praised Afghan militants as freedom fighters.
  • As one of the preeminent neo-realists in American foreign policy, Stephen Walt, said, the Soviet withdrawal from the arena of conflict in the ’80s left the U.S. in a position of power unequaled since the days of Rome [quotes Walt’s 1999 article “Musclebound: The Limits of U.S. Power”]. But Walt also said that like the previous empires, the U.S. has found it difficult to manage so many local conflicts (Yugoslavia, Palestinian territories, etc).
  • In the ’90s, there was a debate over how to manage the world. Was it to be unipolar, with the U.S. imposing its will on everyone, or multi-polar, with countries ruling according to the logic of consensus, securing the interests of the many at the expense of the few.
  • Clinton faced “challenges of managing destructive chaos” after small fires ignited in what was called the “arc of crisis” and beyond. The Middle East was no longer considered the sole source of tension and unrest. The former USSR and Yugoslavia were also volatile.
  • China adopted a unique path by retaining communism but allying with the U.S. against the USSR. Rather than fighting the U.S., China flooded U.S. markets with cheap goods. Now it is one of America’s chief financiers.
  • Europeans moved toward greater political and economic integration, which also challenged the U.S. But the explosion in Yugoslavia reminded the European Union of its fragility.
  • Since the fall of the USSR, the Arab world has been totally dependent on the U.S. Consequently, Israel is now in a better position to cut deals with its neighbors.
  • After the descent of Afghanistan into chaos following the Soviet withdrawal, the U.S. and regional governments agreed to channel the Afghan Arabs toward more desirable arenas, like Bosnia, Chechnya, Tajikistan, and other countries that were experiencing difficulties in transitioning from one era to another; the one exception is Palestine, which is the international and Arab red line. In other words, the Afghan theater was not enough to annihilate the rebels fighting against regimes in the Arab and Islamic world [so they were sent to die elsewhere].
  • As for the Jihadi Movement that `Abd Allah `Azzam built in Afghanistan, it now revolves around a new star, Bin Laden. In 1996, he returned to Afghanistan and declared jihad on Americans.
  • His announcement came after a failed experiment in Sudan and that country’s collapse in the international arena; the destruction of the Salvation Front in Algeria because it was infiltrated; the Egyptian Islamic Jihad’s suspension of violence in Egypt; and the reconsiderations [i.e. renunciation of revolutionary violence] by some of the the historical leaders of the Islamic Group in Egypt. At this time, an ingenious idea was conceived: strike the remote enemy so that the near enemy would collapse since the far enemy [the U.S.] supported the near enemies [local regimes].
  • At this troubled time, full of dangers and opportunities, the foundation of the nucleus of jihad was reestablished and a strategic program was put in place for it.
  • U.S. public opinion relaxed considerably after the absence of an external enemy [the Soviets]. Not even Bush Sr. could convince people of the need to maintain a high level of spending on the military to deal with problems like North Korea and Yugoslavia. Thus, Clinton won in 1992 on the campaign slogan of “It’s the economy, stupid.”
  • To summarize, Bush Sr. and Bush Jr. used hard power–military power–to coerce the U.S.’s enemies and to frighten the rest. Clinton, on the other hand, believed in soft power, which is the extension of U.S. power through the non-violent mechanisms of globalization. Clinton’s preference for soft power explains his reluctance to get involved in the war in Bosnia-Herzegovina in 1992-1995. He withdrew from Somalia after an ambush on U.S. troops in Mogadishu. He resorted to bombing Iraq in Desert Fox; he did the same in Afghanistan and the Sudan in answer for the embassy bombings in 1998. After the Cole bombing in 2000, he did nothing. Finally, Clinton only used air power in 1999 under the banner of NATO to solve the Kosovo crisis.
  • In response to the softness of Clinton, the neocons put forward a study in Sept. 2000 called “Rebuilding America’s Defenses.” The basic idea was that the U.S. should use its unprecedented power to maintain its status as the lone superpower. The document recommended increasing the size of the army; preparing it to handle multiple conventional wars at a single time; modernizing and strengthening the U.S. nuclear arsenal to deal with different possibilities; preventing the spread of nuclear technology; and reviving star wars.
  • When Bush Jr. was narrowly elected, he and the neocons were on the verge of augmenting U.S. soft power with hard power in order to control the world. These were the circumstances before the attacks of 9/11.

The Strategic Effects of 9/11: Introduction

Will McCants September 7, 2008

In commemoration of the seventh anniversary of 9/11, Faloja member Abu al-Fadl Madi has been serially posting chapters of his new study, “The Strategic Effects of the Raid on New York and Washington.” He started posting in early August and it looks like he will finish on or around 9/11.  Abu al-Fadl’s study looks interesting, so I’ll be summarizing it throughout the week.

In early July, Abu al-Fadl announced his series as follows:

Since the seventh anniversary of September 11 is rapidly approaching amid the dust rising from battles on many fronts, especially in Afghanistan, the graveyard of invaders, I propose to begin studying the strategic landscape that followed the events of September 11, as well as the possibilities and prospects to which the attacks gave rise, to say nothing of its effects.

The following is a summary of the introduction he posted in early August:

  • American strategists don’t agree on the strategic effects of the September 11 attacks. They also differ over AQ’s ability to carry out another attack of this size.
  • Complex strategic questions remain as a result of 9/11.  If 9/11 was merely an isolated terrorist act isolated from the world, then its consequences and means of containment are easy to manage. But if it was part of a comprehensive strategy that was the first step in igniting a conflict and setting the parameters of that conflict, then it will be more difficult to cope with its effects.
  • The theater of the conflict has become expansive, and the battle requires many and sundry tools and, sometimes, contradictory paths to achieving a single goal, which is, in its first stage, the draining of the enemy’s material resources and casting doubt on its ideological underpinnings, before surrounding, restricting, and finally eliminating him in the second and final stage.
  • Preliminary conclusions about 9/11 were wrong.  Many theories were intended to distort the historical achievement of al-Qaeda that no other state or terrorist group had achieved against the U.S., even during the Cold War.  Consequently, there were a lot of conspiracy theories.  Neocons put forward one of their own [presumably Iraqi involvement in the plot] to justify their intervention in the Middle East.
  • The repercussions of any military or terrorist act are not fully under the control of those who carry it out.  If you look at whom the unintended consequences benefit, you might wrongly conclude there was active coordination between the attackers and the chief beneficiaries.  For example, Sunnis in Iraq think al-Qaeda coordinated the attacks with Iran because Iran has benefited so much from the American response to 9/11.
  • Experts in war recognize that the victors are those who seize the initiative until their goals are realized.
  • The 9/11 attacks revealed al-Qaeda’s hidden intentions.
  • The aim of this study is to recreate the strategic landscape before 9/11 and explain what changed after the attacks.  What has happened since then?  What are the challenges facing the umma and the mujahids?  And finally, what opportunities can be exploited to implement the ultimate, fundamental plan, which is liberating the land of Islam and establishing its state?
  • This paper depends on American strategic studies that were published after 9/11 in an attempt to understand the near- and longterm effects of the attacks.  It also draws from the well of valuable observations that some leaders of the jihad expressed during the “stage of the ditch,” to use the phrase of Abu Mus`ab al-Suri.  It provides a conceptual framework for a strategic path which is in the process of growth, even if it is with great difficulty.

The “ditch” to which Abu al-Fadl and Suri allude is the Qur’anic story of the Companions of the Ditch who threw those who refused to recant their faith into a ditch and burned them alive.  Suri writes on p. 827 of his Muqawama that the counterterrorism campaign against Jihadi groups from 2001-2004 was “the ordeal of the modern ditch that swallowed up (the Jihadi movement’s) cadres.”  So when Abu al-Fadl says that he will draw on the writings of Jihadi thinkers from the “stage of the ditch,” he presumably means strategists like Suri, Qurashi, `Uyayri, and others who were active from 2001-2004.

[Note: I’ll post the complete text of Abu Fadl’s study once he’s finished writing it.]

Document (Arabic): jul-08-faloja-abu-al-fadl-announces-strategic-effects-article-and-reasons-for-writing-it

Cold vs. Hot Terrorism

Will McCants September 4, 2008

Hesbah pundit `Abd al-Rahman al-Faqir has been writing a series of essays he collectively calls “Real War vs. Symbolic War.” The point of the essays is to explain the difference between terrorist attacks (symbolic war) and other types of military violence (real war).

One of his essays, “Cold Terrorism,” examines the decision-making of groups choosing between killing for the sake of eliminating enemies without drawing attention to themselves (cold terrorism) vs. killing to provoke a response against themselves (hot terrorism). The following quotes are from a recent English translation:

* Can we afford not to take the responsibility of the operation?

* Does the safety of the performers take precedence over the attack or otherwise?

* The ease of performing the operation and the available means

* Are we ready to tackle the retaliation of the enemy or not?

If the aim is to get rid of the enemy without looking on to any other goal then it is preferred to use cold terror.

As for if the aim is to terrorize the enemy only, then it is preferred to use hot terror, even though the security situation and the safety of the performers currently calls for the cold terror as it gives the performers the chance to retreat and escape.

Faqir concludes with some aphorisms on where hot and cold terrorism fit into real and symbolic war:

In the actual war, cold terror is used, as it helps us in avoiding the retaliation of the enemy and enables the performers to withdraw safely.

In the symbolic war, hot terror is used because it causes more stir and more terror and is more effective in the media.

In the actual war, the reason behind attacking the enemy is getting rid of it.

In the symbolic war, the reason behind attacking the enemy is to terrorize it.

Document (English): 9-3-08-ekhlaas-real-war-vs-symbolic-war cold vs hot terrorism

Assad al-Jihad2 Remarks on the State of al-Qaida

Will McCants August 26, 2008

[Scott Sanford]  On 23 August 2008, Ekhlaas member Assad al-Jihad2 (أسد الجهاد2), or the Lion of Jihad 2, posted a statement concerning the state of al-Qaida in the world today. He started the statement with a 13 December 2001 news report about the battle in Tora Bora and how it seemed that al-Qaida was on the brink of total destruction. However, he argued, “In only seven years…they [al-Qaida] were able to…triumph over the world alliance against them.” He based this assertion on several events he attributed to al-Qaida:

  1. Many United States government officials were forced to leave their posts after their failure to defeat al-Qaida
  2. American historians have claimed that President Bush has been the worst president in American history
  3. Al-Qaida weakened the most powerful country on Earth in “the Badr of the [21st] century” (This is a reference to the 624CE Battle of Badr where approximately 300 Muslim soldiers defeated the much larger Meccan army of approximately 1000 soldiers. Muslims believe divine intervention granted them victory.)
  4. Al-Qaida brought down the Spanish government after its 11 March 2004 attacks
  5. Al-Qaida brought down the British government after its 7 July 2005 attacks
  6. Al-Qaida defeated the Musharraf government after it attacked Islam

Assad al-Jihad2 (AJ2) did admit that after September 11th, al-Qaida did not expect “the great betrayal of the Pakistani government” or “the betrayal of the scholars of evil.” (The scholars are likely prominent Salafi ideologues like Sayyid Imam al-Sharif (Dr. Fadl) or Salman al-‘Awda, who turned against al-Qaida’s bloody methods.) However, regardless of the supposed betrayals, he stated that today one can find al-Qaida in Iraq, North Africa, Somalia, Saudi Arabia(where he claimed that al-Qaida has huge human reserves), and Yemen. He also stated that the Palestinian Territories are merely in need of a “spark” for al-Qaida to show its presence there.

Normally I do not give much credence to such reports emanating from the forums, but this one is important for two reasons. First, it is possible that AJ2 is a military commander for al-Qaida. The blogger and Jordan University professor Akram Hijazi stated in a reference to one of AJ2’s statements, “It is not inconceivable that [AJ2] is one of al-Qaida’s military commanders.” (Hijazi is an al-Qaida supporter and his blogs are regularly posted on takfiri websites. He is the “senior researcher” at the Arab Researchers’ Center, which sells takfiri videos and statements that are otherwise free on the Internet. Fu’ad Husayn, who wrote a biography of al-Zarqawi and spent time with him in prison, runs the center. The website for the Arab Researchers’ Center is Arabresearchers.net.) Additionally, the fact that AJ2 often times posts through the al-Qaida-affiliated Global Islamic Media Front (GIMF) and Ekhlaas has given him the title of “innovative pen 1,” which is one of the highest titles one can achieve on Ekhlaas, adds credibility to Hijazi’s assertion.

Second, in a January 2008 statement, AJ2 stated that the Palestinian territories will be the primary front for terrorists graduating from Afghanistan and Iraq. He claimed that due to Hamas’ suppression of al-Qaida-inspired militants in Gaza, al-Qaida cannot announce its presence in the Palestinian Territories at this time. However, he added that al-Qaida will announce its presence sometime after the current US presidential cycle. He then mentioned that the battle with Israel will begin between 2010 and 2013. Finally, he claimed that al-Qaida has already begun preparing for war with Israel and he gave advice for how the Palestinians should prepare. In this context, AJ2’s recent remark about al-Qaida needing a spark to start operations in the Palestinian Territories takes on more significance. It is unclear what exactly this spark could be, but it does seem that AJ2 is again indicating that al-Qaida is preparing to engage Israel.

Regardless of AJ2’s views, I remain skeptical that al-Qaida will be able to gain a significant presence in Gaza and then maintain that presence. After Hamas forced the al-Qaida-inspired Army of Islam (AI) to release BBC reporter Alan Johnston, the two organizations have been at loggerheads, which has been at the detriment of AI. If an indigenous group of terrorists with backing from a prominent Gazan clan, the Dughmush, cannot operate relatively freely in Gaza, I doubt a group of foreign al-Qaida operatives will do much better.

Document (Arabic): 8-23-2008-Ek-ls.org-AJ2-After-the-Fall-of-Pervez

Document (Arabic): 2-18-2008-Ek-ls.org-Akram-Hijazi-Blog

Document (English): 8-27-2008-Arabresearchers.net-about-the-Arab-Researchers-Center

Document (English): 8-27-2008-Arabresearchers.net-Research-by-the-Arab-Researchers-Center

Document (Arabic): 29-01-2008-Ek-ls.org-AJ2-GIMF-Statement

Sahab Releases Full Zawahiri Message in English

Will McCants August 17, 2008

A few days ago, ARY (a Pakistani network) ran an extremely truncated version of a lengthy audio tape of Zawahiri addressing Pakistanis in English.  Yesterday, Sahab (the media production arm of al-Qaeda) released the full audio recording online (open the .pdf below for links).  Here are the interesting bits:

  • Zawahiri says at the beginning that he wants to address Pakistanis in Urdu, but he can’t speak the language.  He is speaking English to communicate with them, even though it is the language of the enemy.
  • Zawahiri’s attachment to Pakistan began in his childhood.  His grandfather was the first to translate the poetry of Muhammad Iqbal into Arabic.
  • Musharraf is a tool of the U.S.
  • Pakistan made a “strategic blunder’ when it allowed the U.S. to install Hamid Karzai in Afghanistan since Karzai is friendly to India.  Now, Pakistan has no “strategic depth” in the mountains of Afghanistan, which would be useful in a war with India.
  • How can military officers and soldiers not be bothered by Musharraf’s strategic blunders?  How can they not be bothered by killing fellow Muslims and Pakistanis?  How can they not be troubled by their defeats at the hands of the mujahids?
  • Until the mujahids in Kashmir free themselves of ISI influence, they won’t be able to liberate it.
  • The new head of the Pakistani army, Kiyani, is also an enemy of Islam like his predecessor.
  • Officers and soldiers in the Pakistani army are apostates if they fight against fellow mujahids.  Zawahiri belabors this point a great deal.
  • There are historical examples of Muslim resistance to British rule in the region, such as `Abd al-`Aziz, Ahmad Shahid, Isma`il Shahid, Shah `Abd al-Hayy, Shaykh al-Hind Mahmud al-Hasan, and his student Sayyid Husayn Ahmad Madani.
  • Zawahiri invites Pakistanis to join the jihad.  If they don’t rise up, Pakistan will become part of Greater Hindustan.

It may not come across in the summary, but Zawahiri directs a lot of his remarks to Pakistani military personnel to explain why they will have to be killed if they don’t disobey orders.  Perhaps this is a prelude to an increase of violence in Pakistan against military installations and personnel outside the tribal regions.   I better understand now why ARY cut most of the video.

If you’re interested in watching it, open the .pdf below and download it from one of the first two sections of links (the links below these are for an Urdu translation).  The password is the long string of letters and numbers above the links.

Document (Arabic): 8-16-08-ekhlaas-complete-zawahiri-english-message-to-pakistan

New Issues of Two Jihadi Journals

Will McCants August 14, 2008

Issue 28 of Sada al-Jihad is out.  Articles include, “Hamas Responds Negatively to the Invitation of Shaykh Ayman al-Zawahiri” and “The Intellectual Pollution of the Followers of the Salafi-Jihadi Method.”

A new journal, Qadaya Jihadiyya (Jihadi Issues), has also be released.  The production quality is better than most of the Jihadi journals and the articles look interesting.  There is a “Strategic Issues” section, reminding me of Abu `Ubayd al-Qurashi’s column in the Ansar journal.  It has two articles: “The Islamic State of Iraq and Early Signs of American Failure” and “Regional Alliances and the Path of Jihad.”  Another section, “Thoughts of a Mujahid,” has the memoir of someone who attended the al-Faruq training camp.

Document (Arabic): 8-8-08-faloja-issue-28-of-sada-al-jihad

Document (Arabic): 8-12-08-faloja-issue-1-of-qadaya-jihadiyya

Jihadi Explains Iranian Realpolitik

Will McCants August 6, 2008

Abu `Abd al-Rahman `Atiyyat Allah (possibly this person) has written a new booklet titled Ru’ya kashifa in which he tries to convince his Jihadi brethren that Iran and Hezbollah are not working with the U.S. and Israel as part of a grand conspiracy to subjugate Sunnis. Rather, he argues, Iran and its cat’s paw Hezbollah are seeking hegemony in the region. Achieving it means supporting popular Muslim causes and making temporary alliances with ideological enemies or competitors. Below is a summary:

  • It is hard to analyze Shia states and groups because of their doctrine of dissimulation (taqiyya), or concealing one’s true beliefs. p.4
  • Dissimulation is permitted in Sunni Islam if you are in danger. But the Shia make a habit of it. p.5
  • Outwardly Iran and Shia groups stress Sunni-Shia unity; embrace causes that are important to Muslims, particularly the Palestinian issue; and put Iran forward as the only authentic Islamic state, which fills a void left by the absent caliphate. p.12-14
  • Inwardly, Shia sincerely believe in Islam, but it is an Islam of their own making, not true Islam; they believe they are the only true Muslims; and they are seeking to dominate the Islamic world. p.15-16
  • “The hostility between the Rejectionists [the Shia], America, and Israel is real hostility.” p.19
  • Those who believe there is no real hostility between Iran on one side and the U.S. and Israel on the other have bought into conspiracy theories, which are a regrettable flaw in our culture. p.19
  • The hostility of Iran toward the U.S. and Israel is partly religious, in that Shi`ism retains the religious hostility toward Christians and Jews found in the true religion, Sunnism. It is also due to Iran’s desire for power. p.19
  • Iran helped the U.S. in Afghanistan and Iraq because of its self-interest–the U.S. eliminated two of its enemies, the Taliban and Saddam. This is a good example of the opportunistic and circumstantial nature of Shia politics. p.21
  • The Shia make these kind of decisions because their greatest enemy is the Sunnis. They can live with Jews and Christians, but not Sunnis. Look how Iran treats its Sunni minorities, how Hezbollah behaves toward Sunnis, and how the Shia government in Iraq has dealt with Sunni Iraqis. p.21, 24
  • Contrary to what many Jihadis say, Hezbollah is not Israel’s collaborator. But Hezbollah will talk to Israel and work with it on a limited basis if it suits Hezbollah’s interests. p.22-3
  • The Shia are pragmatic. They are willing to work with anyone regardless of their stated beliefs. This includes working with Wahhabis. p.23
  • Hezbollah supports Palestinian militants to achieve the wider aims of Iran. It has adopted a popular cause to increase its popularity. It is also filling a leadership vacuum left by other Arab states who have failed to step up. p.32-3
  • Hezbollah is a tool of both Iran and Syria. It serves their interests and policies. p.36
  • Hezbollah prevents any Sunni resistance from setting up on the Lebanese border with Israel. It has cut deals with Syria, the U.S., and even Israel to retain its control of the area. p.36

Despite the excessive focus on dissimulation (which also plagues Western analyses of Shia politics) and the Iran-wants-to-rule-Sunnis argument (does it really want to rule Indonesia?), this is a good primer on Iran’s realpolitik in the Middle East and dovetails well with the findings of an excellent new book, The Limits of Culture. That `Atiyyat Allah has to chastise his fellow Jihadis for their conspiracy thinking and their overemphasis on cultural motives when analyzing state behavior shows that they are problems for the Jihadi analytical community. Same could be said for us.

abu-abd-al-rahman-atiyyat-allah-ruya-kashifa رؤية كاشفة

Prophetic Precedents for Various Types of Warfare

Will McCants August 5, 2008

This one is for all those who believe that Jihadis act strictly according to the Qur’an and the Sunna.  It’s a detailed study by Abu al-Harith al-Ansari of the various types of warfare and the prophetic precedents for each.  There are 41 kinds in all, including “media warfare,” “economic warfare,” “secret warfare,” “war of attrition,” and so forth.  If you’ve ever needed to make the argument that Islamic scripture determines Jihadi behavior, this 278-page book is for you.

Of course, you’d still have a hard time explaining why a branch of al-Qaeda in Iraq recently broke with the organization and renounced suicide attacks.

abu-al-harith-al-ansari-irshad-al-saul-ila-hurub-al-rasul إرشاد السؤول إلى حروب الرسول

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