ji·had·ica

Blog Recommendation

Thomas Hegghammer January 7, 2010

There is a new blog in town: On War and Words. It is produced by military historian Mark Stout, who is probably best known to our readers as the lead author of the Terrorism Perspectives Project (the most comprehensive treatment available of the genre “jihadi strategic studies”). I am very excited that he has decided to blog. Do not be fooled by his understated autobiography – this man really knows a lot about jihadism and an insane number of other subjects.

Article on Ideological Hybridization

Thomas Hegghammer November 18, 2009

I feel bad posting so many secondary sources and even worse plugging my own stuff, but I hope you will agree that this article is quite relevant to the issues Jihadica was set up to cover.

Abu’l-Walid is Back… with the Taliban (and not al-Qaida)

Vahid Brown October 9, 2009

(Editor’s note: I am delighted to introduce our next guest blogger, Vahid Brown from the Combating Terrorism Center at West Point. Vahid is a linguist and historian with deep knowledge of the history of al-Qaida and the jihadi movement. He is the author of Cracks in the Foundation and the co-author of several well-known CTC reports. Vahid and I share many research interests, so I am thrilled that he will be with us for the next month or so.)

Mustafa Hamid Abu’l-Walid al-Masri, once a senior member of al-Qa’ida, has re-emerged lately after several years of relative silence and is once again chronicling, critiquing and offering strategic guidance to the jihadi movement.  He began posting new “editions” of his voluminous early writings to a blog in 2007 and ‘08, and this July he began to add newly-written articles on the Afghan insurgency, one of which has already been covered by Leah Farrall on her blog and in the Australian.

The October issue of the Taliban monthly al-Sumud reveals that Abu’l-Walid, author of at least two of the articles in the latest issue, has taken up one of his old jihadi jobs: official Taliban propagandist and media strategist.  His recent output also leaves little doubt that Abu’l-Walid is still at odds with the al-Qa’ida senior leadership over a wide range of ideological and strategic issues, and that he has every intention of continuing to publicly air al-Qa’ida’s dirty laundry.

All of which makes the timing of Abu’l-Walid’s appearance in al-Sumud very interesting, and for two reasons. First of all, the writings that Abu’l-Walid has posted to his blog are among the most damning criticisms of al-Qa’ida in existence, and his newer articles continue to ridicule Bin Ladin; in this one from September, for instance, UBL is singled out as the spokesman of the Salafi jihadi movement, which Abu’l-Walid slams for its do-it-yourself approach to Islamic jurisprudence. That such a vociferous critic of al-Qa’ida has been given an official platform by the Taliban, in their flagship Arabic magazine, clearly sends an important signal.

Second, as documented by Farrall, Abu’l-Walid broke his operational silence, so to speak, in July, by publishing an essay giving strategic advice to the Taliban – advocating a concerted campaign to kidnap American soldiers.  Aside from a lot of rather predictable anti-ISAF propaganda, the only piece of strategic guidance in Abu’l-Walid’s two al-Sumud articles appears in the one titled “They are Killing NATO Soldiers… Are They Not?,” (al-Sumud vol. 40, pp. 40-3), where he writes, “I say again that the mujahidin need direct guidance from their political leadership to the effect that taking prisoners is of far greater importance than capturing weapons or war booty.” That Abu’l-Walid’s guidance on this issue has moved from a blog to an official Taliban organ is obviously an important – and disturbing – development.

Also interesting is that on October 2, the same day that the latest issue of al-Sumud was released online, “Hawadit,” the pseudonymous administrator of Abu’l-Walid’s blog, posted there two letters written that day to the editors of al-Jazeera and to al-Quds al-‘Arabi, respectively, taking both papers to task for relying on Leah Farrall’s aforementioned piece in the Australian in their reports on Abu’l-Walid’s pro-kidnapping essay.  Why cite a counter-terrorism security official, writing in a “Zionist” newspaper, when they could have referenced the available writings of Abu’l-Walid himself – “one of your own former correspondents,” al-Jazeera is asked.  Most interesting, though, is the one and only detail that “Hawadit” takes issue with Farrall about: her description of Abu’l-Walid as a “senior al-Qa’ida figure.”  Both letters are emphatic on this point: Abu’l-Walid is most certainly not a member of al-Qa’ida at this time.

(For background on Abu’l-Walid, see the brief biographical profile I wrote for the CTC a couple of years ago; Muhammad al-Shafi’i’s excellent series of articles on Abu’l-Walid in al-Sharq al-Awsat, including this one in English; and Sally Neighbour’s Mother of Mohammed (Melbourne University Press, 2009, and forthcoming from the University of Pennsylvania Press), which tells the story of Rabiah Hutchinson, an Australian woman who married Abu’l-Walid in Afghanistan in 2000.)

UPDATE: Leah Farrall has provided some excellent additional analysis to this issue, here, here and here.

Al-Qaida and the German Elections

Thomas Hegghammer September 25, 2009

Usama Bin Ladin has just released a new audio statement to the European peoples.  It is relatively short (under 5 minutes) and basically tells the Europeans to get out of Afghanistan.  The statement is subtitled in German and is clearly timed to coincide with the German elections this coming Sunday.

Bin Ladin’s statement comes in addition to a series of three statements from Bekkai Harrach threatening Germany. I have not seen this kind of jihadi media offensive in connection with any other non-US election. Of course, I, like everyone else, can’t help thinking of the Spanish elections in 2004.

Peter Neumann at FREEradicals has a good analysis where he reveals that German intelligence are very nervous. Should they be?

Personally I think al-Qaida would not issue all these messages if something really big was in the making in the next few days, precisely because media offensives put intelligence services on high alert.

My guess is that these messages are primarily intended to influence German public opinion at a crucial juncture in the Western campaign in Afghanistan. Germany is a pivotal player in the coalition; her withdrawal could initiate a vicious (or virtuous, depending on one’s preferences) circle of European withdrawals from the Afghanistan enterprise. Al Qaida is focusing the weakest link in the coalition, just as the Madrid bombers were advised to do.

Another function of messages such as this is to set the stage for attacks that may be several months away. By warning Germans before the elections, al-Qaida can punish them afterwards for not doing as he said.

Finally, Bin Ladin and Harrach are probably also hoping that these messages will inspire some independent initiatives from grassroots jihadists in Europe. Today’s arrest of a man in Stuttgart suspected of distributing the video suggests there are people inside Germany who are thus inclined. On a related note, Leah at All Things CT has a post about forum reactions to the Bin Ladin message.

In short, there are good reasons for German analysts to be working some overtime this weekend.

Calendars

Jean-Pierre Filiu September 12, 2009

So we all managed to survive a new celebration of 9/11. But why should Al-Qaida commemorate 9/11 in the first place? I am not referring to the heavy debates that raged among its leadership about the strategic relevance of striking US territory and that Vahid Brown documented in his landmark study Cracks in the foundation. I am talking about the very un-Islamic way Bin Laden’s network focuses on the number 11 and sticks to the Gregorian calendar.

The attacks on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon opened a series of Al-Qaida suicide bombings on the eleventh day of a Christian month: in April 2002, against the Ghriba synagogue on the Tunisian island of Djerba; five years later, in April 2007, against the government palace and two security stations in Algiers; in December 2007, again in Algiers, this time against the Constitutional court and the UN headquarters. And Fernando Reinares described how the Madrid bombings were planned months in advance to take place on March 11, 2004.

But I would welcome any satisfactory explanation to this al-Qaeda obsession with “eleven”. My guess is that it is a sinister branding of a terror outfit that wants indeed to commemorate its major strike on 9/11, while demonstrating its sustained ability to control timing.

The fact remains that al-Qaida keeps on computing time according to the “infidel” enemies’ calendar. The simultaneous attacks against the US embassies in Kenya and Tanzania, on August 7, 1998, were supposed to mark the eight anniversary of the US military deployment on Saudi soil (the same way the Egyptian Islamic Jihad attack against the Egyptian embassy in Islamabad, on November 19, 1995, was intended to “celebrate” the eighteenth anniversary of President Sadat’s visit to Jerusalem). And the recent bombings that Al-Qaida in Iraq combined against ministries in Baghdad marked the sixth anniversary of the destruction of the UN headquarters in Iraq by Zarqawi’s group. When jihadis strike, they tend to follow the “kuffar’s” calendar.

By contrast, the references to Islamic calendar are few, seldom operational and sometimes pointless. Ramadan is hailed as the favored month for “jihad”, but it is difficult to prove a systematic surge in violent activity during that period. The two ‘Id, and sometimes the Prophet’s birthday, are often chosen for public display of self-confidence by Al-Qaida leadership. But the most common landmark echoes the battle of Badr that the Prophet won on the seventeenth day of Ramadan, during the second Islamic year. The siege of Tora Bora, in December 2001, matched that Islamic timing, but certainly not what the jihadi propaganda celebrated as “Badr of New York” (9/11) or “Badr of the Maghrib” (the triple suicide-bombing in Algiers in April 2007). And the AQAP attacks in the Saudi capital on November 9, 2003, occurred during Ramadan and were glorified as “the Badr of Riyadh”, but the heavy toll of Muslim casualties generated an anti-jihadi backlash.

So the “eleven” riddle is still to be solved, but the practical acculturation of Al-Qaida, and its deep alienation from Islamic references, seems once more obvious.

Visions of Afghan and Somali Emirates

Scott Sanford August 27, 2009

On 25 August 2009, the Global Islamic Media Front (GIMF) published a plea by Dr. John Boutros for Muslims to aid the jihadi cause. He stated, “Do not mourn because the Islamic Caliphate is imminent… Trust me, the US is one or two thrusts” away from crumpling. However, in order to make this happen Muslims must give aid to the jihadis.

Boutros claimed that the United States is weak due to the financial crisis, which is allegedly causing the rich states to consider separating from the Union. He stated that militarily the United States is vulnerable because it has so many soldiers in the mountains of Pakistan and Afghanistan, and in the suburbs of Baghdad, who are easy targets. In regards to the United States homeland he continued, “Hundreds of thousand of soldiers stationed in the streets of Washington and Los Angeles wait for a martyr to cross the continents carrying a nuclear, biological, or chemical bomb.”

He alleged that from al-Qaida’s viewpoint, things are much better. Somalia is becoming more peaceful and prosperous because the Shabab al-Mujahidin are instilling sharia law and in Afghanistan the Taliban control 80% of the country while coalition forces only leave their bases in armored vehicles in the other 20%. However, the Islamic State of Iraq has made many sacrifices, as has Ansar al-Islam, who gave up their bombs, snipers, and bases.

He then stated that given the current state of affairs, if the United States fell, “In a short period, the Taliban Emirate will be a great state encompassing Afghanistan, Pakistan, Kashmir, Turkistan, and a large part of Iran.” In the western area of the Islamic world, the Shabab al-Mujahidin will control all of Somalia, Djibouti, and Sudan after the US fall. Then, he maintained, there will be justice in the Afghanistan and Somali Emirates and in other areas like Iraq, Chechnya, Algeria, and Nigeria where things will either turn around for the already established emirates or the mujahidin will prevail.

He then gets to the point of his fairytale, “After your mujahid brothers sacrifice themselves and their funds on this path, will you be stingy in support and assistance? Will you be stingy in spreading the word? Will you be stingy in financial support after many operations are canceled because of a shortage of materials like what happened during operations within Denmark?”

The fanciful nature of this report is striking even for the GIMF and I am not sure what to make of it. Is this an indication that something structurally has changed within the GIMF? Or, is it simply an attempt to garner support and the editorial staff did not realize how unrealistic it sounds? Regardless of its meaning, if this is the grand strategy of budding al-Qaida strategists, I am not worried.

Hijazi Comments on New AFPAK Strategy

Scott Sanford August 16, 2009

On 28 July 2009 the popular jihadi blogger Akram Hijazi initiated a series of articles under the title, “The Power of God in the Great Empires.” He titled the first installment “The American Strategy in Afghanistan,” the second “Dismembering the Strategy,” the third “Strategic Crisis and NATO’s Humiliations,” and the fourth, which is the last and not yet published, “The Realities of the Taliban’s War.”

In the first article, Hijazi questions if there ever really was an American strategy in Afghanistan and he asserts that observers will have to wait and see how the new strategy will play out given Afghanistan’s history as the “Graveyard of Empires.” However, his tone is not optimistic. He then continues to describe the evolution of the US Afghanistan strategy by quoting from US public officials and Western media. The strategy he describes is basic counterinsurgency, increased troop levels, and eliminating safe havens in Pakistan.

Hijazi’s second article starts by stating that the old strategy was to destroy al-Qaida and the Taliban, but instead they have become stronger. He claims that the strategic logic for the US is “killing and destruction, nothing else. This is barbarism, not strategy…. This barbaric logic is what the US and its allies have implemented, through targeting civilians, in frantic attempts to eliminate al-Qaida and the Taliban from [their] popular embrace.” Hijazi continues that after seven years of failure the US decided to change its strategy from killing civilians to protecting them in addition to helping the Afghan government impose its will in Afghanistan. Finally, he states that the new strategy is an attempt to plug the holes in the old strategy, which respected nothing about Afghanistan and built a corrupt central government lacking institutions, infrastructure, a military, or capabilities.

He cites the debate (see here) in the US on whether or not US forces should continue its counterinsurgency efforts in Afghanistan. He mentions calls for a withdrawal from the AFPAK region because al-Qaida is no longer a strategic threat to the US, which means Afghanistan and Pakistan also are not strategic threats. With this he implies that the US is engaged in the region for ulterior motives, which are to divide Muslim lands. Supporting his first implication, he makes a second point stating that the fight against al-Qaida is futile because it is not a nationalist organization or political entity controlling territory.

He also attacks other Arab and Islamic organizations, claiming that for the global jihadi movement, the age of patriotic, nationalist, leftist, and Islam-nationalist battles is over because they have failed. He adds that the “great powers” will not return to Muslim lands because if they do, “domesticated Arab armies or those who claim ‘Islam is the solution’” [the Muslim Brotherhood], will not oppose them; rather, the jihadis will.

According to Hijazi, the US will attempt to implement its strategy on three levels. First, on the military level, Hijazi indicates that the US prompted Pakistan to engage the Taliban in the Swat Valley in order to isolate the area from Afghanistan and deprive the movement of people and supplies between the two counties. Additionally, he states that US analysts believe the Iraq model is appropriate for Afghanistan despite historical, geographic, and environmental differences. Hijazi maintains that efforts to turn tribes against al-Qaida and the Taliban are evidence of this belief, which is really an effort to turn the tribes against each other. He concludes that the changing US military strategy is an indication of increasing Taliban power.

Second, on the civilian or cultural level, he posits that the US has no civilization or history and is not aware of the history of other nations or civilizations such as Afghanistan. As such, the US only knows how to revert to violence and force in dealing with others. He adds that the US military is undergoing a cultural shift from traditional concepts of warfare to counterinsurgency. He concludes with two questions that imply the supposed brutality inherent in the American psyche: 1) If the US does not achieve its goals through protecting populations, will it use force against all who oppose its goals? 2) Will the US also use this force against civilians under its protection?

Finally, on the political level, Hijazi states that the US wants stability and change. However, he believes it will fail in achieving these goals because the US is like someone who “prepares for the trip but misses the train.” He adds that the US wants a “non-centralized” government where every Afghan state would be like its own country and that non-centralization is really an attempt to sow local discord.

Hijazi concludes his report with several statements confirming supposed military, civil, and political gains the Taliban have made recently, which, he states, are indications of the Taliban’s rising power.

Hijazi’s overall message is that the US continues to blunder, while the Taliban are making great strides. His subtle assertions that al-Qaida and the Taliban are better at protecting Muslims indicate that his audience is politically minded Muslims who have not yet aspired to global jihad. Hijazi’s references to common anti-American grievances, such as the perceived use of excessive force and sowing of discord among Muslims, support this assumption. Moreover, he says nothing of al-Qaida’s targeted campaigns against civilians.

Finally, Hijazi’s remarks on the public debate regarding counterinsurgency and the future structure of the US military are interesting. His insistence that the real US strategy is creating discord among Muslims may be an indication that the shift in US policy is worrying jihadis. Similar statements by other jihadi ideologues would add credence to the effectiveness of the new plan.

My next posts will outline part three and, if available, part four of Hijazi’s report.

The Non-Strategic “Special Strategic Study”

Scott Sanford July 22, 2009

The “Falluja Think Tank” recently published the “Special Strategic Study of the Global Battle and the Jihadi Movement’s Place in It.” Like Thomas, I had high expectations, but was disappointed in the end because the study amounted to little more than general summaries of U.S. and jihadi history. However, the author did state that divine providence allowed 9/11 to happen, which caused the U.S. to abandon its principles of democracy and human rights.

The author started by establishing that the battle between the United States and the jihadis is religious in nature rather than geopolitical or for acquiring resources. He commented that today’s “crusaders” are not only supported by their governments, but also by the “dogmatists” like the Knights Templar and the Knights of Malta, who, he claimed, “resemble the mujahedeen because they fight for faith.”

He went on to chart America’s “path” to global dominance and then gave a history of the jihadi movement from colonialism until now. He broke the “Jihadi Path” into four distinct phases. The first was the “Popular Jihad” against colonialism that was marked by Moroccan ‘Abd-al-Karim al-Khattabi allegedly killing 25,000 “crusader” troops and capturing 20,000 others, including 95 generals and five marshals. I am not very familiar with Moroccan history, but the numbers sound highly exaggerated.

The second phase was the “Local Jihad” (الجهاد القطري) against the ruling regimes allied with the West, i.e. the near enemy. He made a point to exclude Hamas and the Moro Islamic Front because they deviated from the proper jihadi ideology.

The third phase was the “Regional Jihad,” which was the result of oppression at home that sent the jihadis elsewhere. He stated that Afghanistan was the ideal model for this because jihadis could go there, receive training, and go on to other battle fronts. He mentioned that jihadis still aid Kashmir, Somalia, the Philippines, Kosovo, Burma, and other places as well.

Finally, the fourth phase is the “Global Jihad,” which sprang from the “crusader invasion of the Arabian Peninsula” in 1990.

The meeting point of the American and jihadi paths, according to the author, was al-Qaeda drawing the U.S. into an asymmetrical conflict where al-Qaeda’s “stupid technology” (تكنلوجيا الجهل), i.e. suicide bombers, could check American technological superiority. September 11th marked the beginning of this conflict.

The author then identified two paths to victory for the jihadi movement. The first is the continuance and completion of the historical path already laid out through the previously stated four phases, while the second path is converting the West to Islam. I believe it is unlikely that either path will come to fruition. However, I have concluded that if the entire West were to convert to Islam, it should convert to Shi’a Islam in order to study the jihadi reaction.

In conclusion, the author stated that it was God’s will for 9/11 to happen because if the jihadis had conducted a nuclear attack, the whole world would be against them. However, the knee-jerk U.S. response to 9/11 and the human rights issues it raised allowed the U.S. to destroy itself without al-Qaeda taking the blame. He stated:

“If we substituted the 9/11 plan for the plan of targeting American nuclear reactors that al-Qaeda planners had previously abolished, its massive destructive damage could have reached a degree of existential disaster. If we were to have done that, America would be completely forgotten. However, the entire world would hate us for what we did to the exemplary system for human life and we would become enemies of the freedom and justice that America represents in the eyes of the people. It was God’s wisdom that struck America on its skull causing it to agitate, provoke, and anger without a care, exchanging the principle of peaceful coexistence in the shadow of the United Nations for the principle of either you are with us or against us. It caused America to substitute the principle of respecting sovereignty and referring to the Security Council for a principle of occupying two countries without physical evidence, and to exchange spreading democracy around the world to rejecting the votes of Palestinians who elected Hamas. His wisdom caused America to exchange the system of trade globalization for a system of occupying sources of raw materials, and to replace the principle of defending general freedoms and respecting human rights for the principles of Abu-Ghraib, Guantanamo, and secret prisons.”

While the “Special Strategic Study” was somewhat disappointing, the author does underline the importance, for the jihadis, of defeating America’s image abroad as a symbol of freedom. He also points out that the best way to defeat this symbol is to provoke America into destroying its own reputation. However, the author inadvertently highlights a jihadi weakness in that the jihadi ideology is too weak to destroy and replace American ideals. Only America can do that.

The Posts That Never Were

Thomas Hegghammer July 13, 2009

Apologies for the slow publication pace here at Jihadica, but deadlines and an upcoming house move mean I can only dream about serious blogging these days.

This does not mean forums are quiet. Every morning this past week I found things on the forums that deserved commentary. In a dream world, here’s what I would have written about had I had the time:

–    France is taking heat. Al-Qaida in the Islamic Maghreb published a statement declaring “France the mother of all evils”, and other posts fumed over the recent French plans to ban the niqab or the burka. I suspect the Americans and the Brits (who of course have long argued that France is the mother of all evils)  are happy to share the burden of jihadi attention. Unfortunately for the Anglo-Saxons, however, I don’t think the veil weighs nearly as heavy in the jihadi basket of grievances as military occupations.

–    Another one bites the dust. Exiled leaders of the Libyan Islamic Fighting Group told al-Quds al-Arabi on 2 July they are laying down their arms. The declaration is now being spun in the media as the first case of a group leaving al-Qaida. This is a misrepresentation of what’s happening but I can see why people want to spin it that way.

–    The non-strategic “Special strategic study”. The “Department for Historical Studies and Strategic Advice” of the “Falluja Think Tank” released a widely publicized “special strategic study” of the war between America and the jihadi movement. The title and the high-profile advertising had raised my expectations, but I was a little disappointed, mainly because it’s not a proper strategic study. It is a political analysis which stays at the macro-level and doesn’t offer much in terms of meso-level considerations and concrete recommendations that I associate with classics of jihadi strategic studies. It is still worth reading, though, and there is an intriguing note on AQ and nuclear weapons at the end. Scott might be covering the study it in more detail later this week.

–   Jihadis “twittering” about Swat and Helmand campaigns. The jihadi commentary and analysis of battles in Afghanistan and Pakistan is coming out so quickly it is close to twittering. Within days of the Helmand offensive there was a long Faluja thread reporting news from the frontline. The Swat debacle has been followed closely for a while, and there is now already a strategic study of the campaign. I haven’t read it yet but it looks very interesting.

–    The other American.  The Somalia-based Abu Mansour al-Amriki has released a new audio statement in English entitled “The beginning of the end” It lambasts Obama along well-known lines in very articulate native English. I agree with Evan that Abu Mansour beats Adam Gadahn on presentation skills. Abu Mansour’s tajwid is really impressive. The message is clearly intended for the mobilisation of US-based Muslims. As interesting as the message itself was the accompanying pictures of three other alleged Americans in Somalia, not least given the New York Times story about Shabab recruitment in America. By the way, Evan has a fantastic post on the Shabab on the CTBlog today.

–    Happy birthday ISI. Last Thursday was the 1000-day anniversary of the foundation of the Islamic State in Iraq, and the occasion was marked with banners on all the forums, but not much more.

–    Good Qaradawi or bad Qaradawi? Marc Lynch had a great post the other day on Yusuf al-Qaradawi’s latest book on jihad, which he thinks will undermine al-Qaida, more so than the recantations of Dr Fadl and others. Rob at the Shack disagrees, saying the side effect of Qaradawi’s stance is more legitimacy for regular national liberation struggles, which might actually cause more problems for the US in the long term. They are of course both right.

Finally there is this gem from the CBS Terror Monitor (hat tip: Cecilie), by an analyst who has clearly had enough forum watching (here’s a pdf if they remove it). Hoda you have my sympathy – there have been days where I have felt the same.

Have a great week everyone!

Obama is more Dangerous than Bush

Thomas Hegghammer June 29, 2009

This is the title of the main story in the July issue of al-Sumud, the Arabic-language magazine of the Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan. The 56-page magazine has several articles devoted to Obama and the Cairo speech, and the front page features a particularly unflattering picture of the US president. But it is the lead article which I find the most interesting, because it confirms that jihadis feel threatened by Obama in their fight for Muslim hearts and minds.

The two-page article (pp-18-19) is written by the Saudi sheikh Abd al-Aziz al-Julayyil and is actually taken from the latter’s website, which says the text was written on 17 May 2009.

Al-Julayyil starts off by saying he was motivated to write this article after observing a lot of optimism among Muslims over the arrival of the new US administration. He says he realises  many will react to the headline, for how can the Satanic Bush, who invaded Muslim countries and whose planes and tanks killed Muslim children, be less dangerous than Obama, who has declared he is not at war with Islam?

The first reason, he writes, is that Bush’s follies actually benefited Muslims by inflicting significant damage to America. The most important fruit of Bush’s policies was the wake-up call it produced among Muslims in terms of realising the true nature of their enemy, reviving the creed of loyalty toward Muslims and dissociation from infidels, and raising the flag of jihad in several battlefields. Another benefit of the Bush era was the infamy suffered by America on the world stage and the demise of its false discourse on human rights; in the world’s eyes America itself became a proponent of oppression and a threat to human rights. Add to this the American economic and military decline.

All this happened because God duped Bush and made him act in the interest of Muslims. When the Americans realised what was going on, they tried to address their mistakes and improve their image. So they brought Obama, with his sly policies and his attempts to deceive the world, especially the Muslim world, with his professed love for peace and criticism of the policies of his predecessor. And many Muslims were duped by his sweet-talk and pinned their hopes on this man to lift the oppression from them. This is extremely dangerous, al-Julayyil argues, because it is weakening their enmity toward America and makes them more positively inclined toward her future policies. It is numbing them, reducing their hatred toward infidels, and making them stop fighting. There is great danger here for the creed of loyalty and dissociation (al-wala’ wa’l-bara’). The improvement of America’s image is not in the interest of Muslims; rather it is in their interest that the decline continue and that the drivers of [America’s] destruction and fragmentation multiply.

Second, American policies will not change. It is a mistake to believe that a single individual can change US policy, because it is institutionalised, with its own targets, centres and planners. Bush and Obama are two faces of the same coin.

Third, the only thing that has changed in America are the methods employed to getting to the same old ends. The American-Crusader aggression against Muslim countries and the support for the Jewish state has not changed since Obama took office. Meanwhile, Obama has been in the media cajoling the Muslim world. He has denounced the use of banned weapons against civilians in Gaza massacre, yet he originally gave them these weapons; he has declared before AIPAC that Jerusalem is the eternal and united capital of Israel; he has stepped up the missile campaign against civilians in Pakistan; and increased troop levels in Afghanistan. So what compassion does this infidel criminal declare with these acts and intentions?

Al-Julayyil concludes: So beware of this cunning Satan, for he is more dangerous than the foolish Satan.

The author of this article is not a pro-Obama campaigner, but a hardline Saudi sheikh who has spent time in prison for his anti-American views and association with people like Nasir al-Fahd. At the same time, the view expressed in the article is not a completely marginal one, as evidenced by the responses on al-Julayyil’s website.

There are some interesting things to say about al-Julayyil and his recent activities, but I will save that for my next post.

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