ji·had·ica

Shabab and al-Qaeda Infighting (or Game of Thrones, Somali Style)

Will McCants January 8, 2013

The most high-profile foreign fighter in Shabab, Omar Hammami, published two documents online yesterday detailing splits among Shabab’s leaders. Clint Watts has the scoop. Last night, I helped Clint read through the longer of the two Arabic documents and here were some things that struck me:

  • Global vs. Local: Hammami uses “Ansar” (“Helpers”) for Somali jihadis and “Muhajirun” (“Emigrants”) for foreign fighters, which hearkens back to the distinction between Ansar and Muhajirs in Medina. The Ansar are divided between those who support the global jihad of al-Qaeda and those with a more local focus. He portrays the Muhajirs in Somalia as uniformly “globalist.”
  • Oath of Allegience: On the one hand, Hammami claims that Godane, the current leader of the Shabab and the architect of its merger with al-Qaeda, has a lofty view of al-Qaeda:  “[Godane] said that an oath of allegiance to al-Qaeda is tantamount to an oath of allegiance to the caliphate” (bay`at al-qa`ida bi-nafsi mathabati bay`at al-khilafa). On the other hand, Hammami argues that those who gave their bay`a to al-Qaeda later felt tricked by Godane into doing so and that Godane used the merger to isolate his rivals and silence his critics among the foreign fighters. Read Clint’s post for details.
  • Game of Thrones: Clint suggested that the best pop culture lens for viewing Shabab infighting is Game of Thrones. Case in point, much of the dispute between the two principal powers in the Shabab, Godane and Robow, centers on protecting their geographical bases of support from one another.
My takeaway as an analyst: Understanding the historical roots of terminology or concepts will only get you so far. What matters more is how actors use those concepts to articulate their aspirations for power.

Lesson From Kismayo

Jean-Pierre Filiu October 6, 2009

(Editor’s note: This post is the last from our guest blogger Jean-Pierre Filiu this time around. He might be back later in the year with occasional articles, but he is now leaving the stage for our next guest. Please join me in thanking Jean-Pierre warmly for his excellent contributions. And if you read French, buy his latest book, which is now out.)

A few days after they emphatically pledged allegiance to Usama Bin Laden, the Somalian Shabab clashed with their jihadi allies from Hizbul Islam in the Southern city of Kismayo. The rebel factions control the port city since August 2008 and were supposedly united in their common fight against the Mogadishu-based Transitional Federal Government (TFG) and the African Union peacekeepers. The rift erupted on October 1, when the Shabab started taking over Kismayo port from Hizbul Islam, especially one of its components, the Ras Kamboni brigade. Despite mediation meetings during the last days, the tension appears to run high between the Shabab and Hizbul Islam.

What is fascinating in this Kismayo showdown is a new illustration of the dialectics between global and local jihad. By joining the global realm, even only for propaganda purposes, a jihadi group as the Shabab may try to get the upper-hand over its rival/partner, in that case Hizbul Islam. Hassan Dahir Aweys, the leader of Hizbul Islam, has long worked to incorporate the Shabab in his own organization, and he even strove to take credit for the Shabab’s wave of suicide attacks. But the Shabab refused such a merger and found in the allegiance to Bin Laden the most powerful deterrent to Aweys’ plans. Kismayo quickly became the focus of this new inter-jihadi competition.

A lot has been said and written about the very selective process through which Al-Qaeda decides to lend its franchise to local groups, how it was for instance refused to Fatah al-Islam, while it was eventually granted to the Algerian GSPC, now Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb. But, since it takes two to tango, one should also question the rationale that leads those groups to try and go global. The Algerian precedent as well as those most recent Somali developments underline the importance of the local dynamics: the more a group wants to stand apart from its local allies, especially under the background of mounting rivalries, the more it will be tempted to identify publicly with Al-Qaeda and its slogans. The global rhetoric can then go hand in hand with intense feuding for local positions of power, like the port of Kismayo for the Shabab. Talk globally (about AQ-led jihad) and act locally (against the rival jihadis) could be the relevant motto for such a process.

Eid News from the Shabab

Jean-Pierre Filiu September 21, 2009

The Somali Shabab al-Mujahidin just released its “Eid gift” to all Muslims: a video dedicated and pledging allegiance to Usama Bin Laden. (The video is also on youtube).

The production is subtitled in English and features the now famous Abu Mansour al-Amriki. One of the targeted audiences is obviously the English-speaking one, which makes sense now that the number of Somali-Americans killed fighting for the Shabab has reached six. But the main message is the commitment to al-Qaida’s global jihad, which  is not new in essence, but was never previously expressed with such emphasis. My initial analysis is that the Shabab, despite its conspicuous allegiance to Al-Qaida’s emir, is meeting the latter halfway, while echoing his harsh attack, last March, against the Somali president. The release of the video may also be an effort to counter the negative impact of the killing of Saleh Ali Saleh Nabhan on 14 September (even though the video was produced before the US strike).

Visions of Afghan and Somali Emirates

Scott Sanford August 27, 2009

On 25 August 2009, the Global Islamic Media Front (GIMF) published a plea by Dr. John Boutros for Muslims to aid the jihadi cause. He stated, “Do not mourn because the Islamic Caliphate is imminent… Trust me, the US is one or two thrusts” away from crumpling. However, in order to make this happen Muslims must give aid to the jihadis.

Boutros claimed that the United States is weak due to the financial crisis, which is allegedly causing the rich states to consider separating from the Union. He stated that militarily the United States is vulnerable because it has so many soldiers in the mountains of Pakistan and Afghanistan, and in the suburbs of Baghdad, who are easy targets. In regards to the United States homeland he continued, “Hundreds of thousand of soldiers stationed in the streets of Washington and Los Angeles wait for a martyr to cross the continents carrying a nuclear, biological, or chemical bomb.”

He alleged that from al-Qaida’s viewpoint, things are much better. Somalia is becoming more peaceful and prosperous because the Shabab al-Mujahidin are instilling sharia law and in Afghanistan the Taliban control 80% of the country while coalition forces only leave their bases in armored vehicles in the other 20%. However, the Islamic State of Iraq has made many sacrifices, as has Ansar al-Islam, who gave up their bombs, snipers, and bases.

He then stated that given the current state of affairs, if the United States fell, “In a short period, the Taliban Emirate will be a great state encompassing Afghanistan, Pakistan, Kashmir, Turkistan, and a large part of Iran.” In the western area of the Islamic world, the Shabab al-Mujahidin will control all of Somalia, Djibouti, and Sudan after the US fall. Then, he maintained, there will be justice in the Afghanistan and Somali Emirates and in other areas like Iraq, Chechnya, Algeria, and Nigeria where things will either turn around for the already established emirates or the mujahidin will prevail.

He then gets to the point of his fairytale, “After your mujahid brothers sacrifice themselves and their funds on this path, will you be stingy in support and assistance? Will you be stingy in spreading the word? Will you be stingy in financial support after many operations are canceled because of a shortage of materials like what happened during operations within Denmark?”

The fanciful nature of this report is striking even for the GIMF and I am not sure what to make of it. Is this an indication that something structurally has changed within the GIMF? Or, is it simply an attempt to garner support and the editorial staff did not realize how unrealistic it sounds? Regardless of its meaning, if this is the grand strategy of budding al-Qaida strategists, I am not worried.

The Posts That Never Were

Thomas Hegghammer July 13, 2009

Apologies for the slow publication pace here at Jihadica, but deadlines and an upcoming house move mean I can only dream about serious blogging these days.

This does not mean forums are quiet. Every morning this past week I found things on the forums that deserved commentary. In a dream world, here’s what I would have written about had I had the time:

–    France is taking heat. Al-Qaida in the Islamic Maghreb published a statement declaring “France the mother of all evils”, and other posts fumed over the recent French plans to ban the niqab or the burka. I suspect the Americans and the Brits (who of course have long argued that France is the mother of all evils)  are happy to share the burden of jihadi attention. Unfortunately for the Anglo-Saxons, however, I don’t think the veil weighs nearly as heavy in the jihadi basket of grievances as military occupations.

–    Another one bites the dust. Exiled leaders of the Libyan Islamic Fighting Group told al-Quds al-Arabi on 2 July they are laying down their arms. The declaration is now being spun in the media as the first case of a group leaving al-Qaida. This is a misrepresentation of what’s happening but I can see why people want to spin it that way.

–    The non-strategic “Special strategic study”. The “Department for Historical Studies and Strategic Advice” of the “Falluja Think Tank” released a widely publicized “special strategic study” of the war between America and the jihadi movement. The title and the high-profile advertising had raised my expectations, but I was a little disappointed, mainly because it’s not a proper strategic study. It is a political analysis which stays at the macro-level and doesn’t offer much in terms of meso-level considerations and concrete recommendations that I associate with classics of jihadi strategic studies. It is still worth reading, though, and there is an intriguing note on AQ and nuclear weapons at the end. Scott might be covering the study it in more detail later this week.

–   Jihadis “twittering” about Swat and Helmand campaigns. The jihadi commentary and analysis of battles in Afghanistan and Pakistan is coming out so quickly it is close to twittering. Within days of the Helmand offensive there was a long Faluja thread reporting news from the frontline. The Swat debacle has been followed closely for a while, and there is now already a strategic study of the campaign. I haven’t read it yet but it looks very interesting.

–    The other American.  The Somalia-based Abu Mansour al-Amriki has released a new audio statement in English entitled “The beginning of the end” It lambasts Obama along well-known lines in very articulate native English. I agree with Evan that Abu Mansour beats Adam Gadahn on presentation skills. Abu Mansour’s tajwid is really impressive. The message is clearly intended for the mobilisation of US-based Muslims. As interesting as the message itself was the accompanying pictures of three other alleged Americans in Somalia, not least given the New York Times story about Shabab recruitment in America. By the way, Evan has a fantastic post on the Shabab on the CTBlog today.

–    Happy birthday ISI. Last Thursday was the 1000-day anniversary of the foundation of the Islamic State in Iraq, and the occasion was marked with banners on all the forums, but not much more.

–    Good Qaradawi or bad Qaradawi? Marc Lynch had a great post the other day on Yusuf al-Qaradawi’s latest book on jihad, which he thinks will undermine al-Qaida, more so than the recantations of Dr Fadl and others. Rob at the Shack disagrees, saying the side effect of Qaradawi’s stance is more legitimacy for regular national liberation struggles, which might actually cause more problems for the US in the long term. They are of course both right.

Finally there is this gem from the CBS Terror Monitor (hat tip: Cecilie), by an analyst who has clearly had enough forum watching (here’s a pdf if they remove it). Hoda you have my sympathy – there have been days where I have felt the same.

Have a great week everyone!

Back

Thomas Hegghammer March 26, 2009

I have been busy the past two weeks, but the jihadis have been busier. Bin Ladin has issued two audio statements, one proposing practical steps to liberate Palestine and the other about the treacherous government in Somalia. Al-Zawahiri warned against the forthcoming Crusader attack on Sudan, while Mustafa Abu al-Yazid has addressed the people of Pakistan. Abu Umar al-Baghdadi has spoken about the US plan to withdraw from Iraq, but he does not seem to get the same attention from the online community as his colleagues in Afghanistan. Abu Qatada has issued a statement from prison about the decision to extradite him to Jordan. Fatah al-Islam sharia officer Abu Abdallah al-Maqdisi has been taking questions since Monday, but nobody is allowed to ask about Shakir al-Absi or Asad al-Jihad2 (hmm).

On the magazine front, Sumud 33  has been out for a little while. Fortunately Sada al-Malahim 8 came out on Sunday so now Greg can sleep again. Turkestan al-Islamiyya 3 came out earlier this week, adding to the past month’s increasing flow of Uighur jihadi propaganda.

We have also seen the publication of a couple of unusual videos featuring Abu Muhammad al-Maqdisi, one with him delivering a funeral sermon in front of a crowd of several hundred people, and another showing him at a large wedding alongside half the jihadi community in Zarqa.  I suspect these videos are part of an attempt to bolster al-Maqdisi’s legitimacy by showing that he is enjoying freedom of movement and expression. By the way I highly recommend the 2-hour wedding video. It offers a fascinating inside look into the sociology of Islamism. It serves as a great illustration of a point I made in a recent article about Zarqa, namely that you cannot deradicalise entire communities. The film may depress you, but you might enjoy the songs.

I will be back soon with a report from the jihadi roundtable in Oslo.

Update (27 March): The Christian Science Monitor became the first Western newspaper to report on the Maqdisi controversy today – and Jihadica is mentioned.

Document (Arabic): 03-26-09-shouraa-mustafa-abu-al-yazid
Document (Arabic): 03-19-09-shouraa-abu-qatada-statement
Document (Arabic): 03-23-09-shamikh-abu-abdallah-al-maqdisi-qa
Document (Arabic): 03-22-09-shouraa-sada-al-malahim-8
Document (Arabic): 03-25-09-shouraa-turkestan-al-islamiyya-3
Document (Arabic): 03-12-09-faloja-maqdisi-fima-kuntum
Document (Arabic): 03-12-09-ansar-maqdisi-wedding-video

Shabaab Propaganda Indicates Growing Power, Anxiety

Will McCants January 4, 2009

The Shabaab Movement has greatly accelerated its Arabic propaganda efforts in the last two weeks, keeping pace with its growing power in Somalia (compare it with their meager attempts just three months ago).  In the two week period there have been at least four major publications (video and audio). The acceleration might be attributed to more capable personnel or perhaps the organization has decided it needs to reach out more to the Arab world.  If the Taliban experience is any precedent, better propaganda = better insurgency.

But there’s also something else that is driving the recent acceleration: anxiety about losing “the fruits of jihad.”  This harvest metaphor is often invoked by Jihadis as part of cautionary tales of past militant groups who excelled at fighting but failed to consolidate their gains once the fighting ended.  The Shabaab employ it explicitly in the first publication below and implicitly in the second:

  • “So That the Way of the Criminals Is Made Clear” criticizes Sharif Ahmad, a former leader in the Islamic Courts Union that the U.S. and Ethiopia overthrew, and his Alliance for the Re-Liberation of Somalia for their moderate Islamism and their willingness to cut deals with the enemy (Ethiopia, U.S.).
  • “No Peace Without Islam” charges Ahmad with turning the ARS into an Iraqi-style Awakening Council at the behest of his American sponsors.

Both pieces indicate that the Shabaab views the ARS as its primary rival once Ethiopia withdraws and that it’s not yet confident of defeating it.

Document (Arabic): 12-29-08-faloja-shabaab-statement-la-salam-bi-la-islam

Document (Arabic): 12-25-08-faloja-shabaab-statement-on-somali-criminals

New Jihadi Mags Analyze Mumbai, Somali Pirates

Will McCants December 18, 2008

Issue 31 of Sada al-Jihad is out, as well as issue 4 of Qadaya Jihadiyya.  In Sada, Ta Ha al-Miqdad argues that the Mumbai attacks demonstrated that Jihadis have a “strategic awareness” because:

  • They hit the commercial center of India at a time of great global economic instability.
  • All of the attacks were from Pakistan, which demonstrated solidarity with the Muslims in India.
  • They sent a message to the chief Crusader allies by taking citizens of those countries hostage and executing them.
  • The attacks widened the scope of the confrontation in Afghanistan to include countries allied with the Crusaders against Muslims (i.e. India).
  • Most important, the attacks were a message to Obama, who wants to pull out of Iraq and concentrate on Af/Pak.  Obama knows he needs peace between Pakistan and India for his strategy to work and the Jihadis have shown they can destroy this peace.

In Qadaya Jihadiyya, Abu `Ammar al-Khusti observes that the allied powers have not cracked down on the Somali pirates and have agreed to pay their outrageous ransom demands.  The reason for this, he postulates, is that the allied powers are happy to pay the ransoms if it means the pirates will grow strong and thwart the designs of the Shabaab movement to conquer Somalia.  This is the Somali version of the Sawha movement in Iraq.

Document (Arabic): 12-17-08-faloja-issue-31-of-sada-al-jihad

Document (Arabic): 12-18-08-shamikh-qadaya-jihadiyya-issue-4

When Will Somalia’s Shabaab Movement Declare An Islamic State?

Will McCants November 16, 2008

That’s the question asked by a member of the Faloja forum.  Here are some of the answers:

 

  • Al-Yamami: The Shabaab will soon declare its allegiance to the Islamic State of Iraq (ISI); that’s why ISI’s head, `Umar al-Baghdadi, mentioned the movement recently.
  • Muhibb al-Muqrin: It will be become an emirate and remain so until the ISI returns to full strength after the occupiers leave Iraq at the end of the coming month.  It will then give its allegiance to the ISI.
  •  Buya`tu Allah: It is not in the Shabaab’s best interest to declare a state or to join al-Qaeda right now because it doesn’t want to face more enemies.
  • Al-Mu`tazz bi-Din Allah: It should declare a state after the Ethiopians withdraw from Somalia.
  • Qannas al-Dawla al-Islamiyya: It should declare an emirate soon.
  • Khayr Jubnd Allah: The Shabaab will declare a state after the occupiers have been driven from all of the important cities.
  • Abu Bakr al-Muhajir: I think that this business of declaring separate states and emirates will end and a single emirate or caliphate will be declared for the whole world.

 

As can be seen from above, the declaration of the “Islamic State of Iraq” has caused some confusion.  Does the “State” (dawla) part of the name mean that it is the nucleus of a future superstate, like previous Islamic superstates or empires (e.g. Dawla `Abbasiyya)?  If so, then other Jihadis groups should forgo setting up their own states and declare their allegiance to Baghdadi and the ISI.  Or does the the “Iraq” part of the name mean that the ISI is only a national entity, which is a little bothersome for Islamists since they reject nationalism? 

Document (Arabic): 11-15-08-faloja-when-will-somalia-declare-islamic-state

New Issues of Two Jihadi Journals

Will McCants October 5, 2008

Issue 12 of the Tala’i` Khurasan (Vanguards of Khurasan) is out.  Several big names have written pieces, including Atiyyat Allah (we have to learn from our mistakes), Abu al-Walid al-Ansari (how past jihads failed), Abu Yahya al-Libi (fighting to restore the Sharia is the only way forward in Palestine), and Mustafa Abu al-Yazid (the meaning of piety and patience).  It also includes a 9/11 anniversary article on al-Qaeda’s strategic reasons for attacking the U.S., an article on Jihadis released from prison in Afghanistan, and a summary of the most important operations in Afghanistan over the last four months.

This month we also have a new journal published by al-Shabaab, the AQ-linked group in Somalia.  Marisa thinks its publication means Shabab is growing stronger; that may be, but they can’t produce an attractive journal yet.   The name of the journal, Millat Ibrahim (The Religious Community of Abraham), is an allusion to a Qur’anic verse and a book by Abu Muhammad al-Maqdisi that have to do with shunning lukewarm Muslims.  There’s even a blurb for Maqdisi’s book at the end of the periodical.  Not surprisingly then, some of the content is devoted to exposing the evils of more compromising Somali opposition groups; for example, there’s a chart of differences between the Shabab and the Liberation Party of Somalia.  Also of interest is a biography of slain Shabab leader Adam Ayro.

Document (Arabic): 10-4-08-shamikh-issue-12-of-talae28099i-khurasan-released

Document (Arabic): 10-4-08-faloja-shabab-publishes-new-journal-millat-ibrahim

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