ji·had·ica

Saudi and Yemeni Branches of al-Qaida Unite

Thomas Hegghammer January 24, 2009

Earlier this week we learned that the Saudi and Yemeni branches of al-Qaida had formally merged. The release of Sada al-Malahim on Monday was accompanied by an extract from an interview with AQY leader Nasir al-Wuhayshi, who said the Saudi mujahidin had pledged allegiance to him and agreed to form a united organization under the old name “al-Qaida on the Arabian Peninsula.” In another development, Friday’s New York Times reported the rise of former Saudi Guantanamo detainee Sa’id al-Shihri to the deputy leadership of al-Qaida in Yemen.

The two stories came together in a fascinating video released on the forums yesterday. The video, entitled “From here we begin and in Jerusalem we will meet”, featured Nasir al-Wuhayshi, Said al-Shihri, Qasim al-Raymi and Muhammad al-Awfi seated side by side, each giving a 4-minute statement. The video served at least three purposes. The first was to tap into popular outrage over Gaza. The speakers presented their campaign as part of the struggle to liberate Palestine, since Israel and the Crusaders are one. They also cited the famous hadith according to which “an army of 12000 men will come out of Abyan to help God and his messenger”, and showed footage from a training camp as if to suggest that al-Qaida is currently building that army. (Incidentally, President Salih allegedly also proposed training volunteers for combat in Gaza). The second purpose was to display the union between the Saudi and Yemeni mujahidin. The seating arrangement (Yemeni-Saudi-Yemeni-Saudi) and mutual praise signalled a happy marriage. The third aim was to humiliate Saudi authorities, who have let al-Shihri and al-Awfi, both former Guantanamo detainees (ISN# 372 and 333 respectively) and graduates of the famous rehabilitation program, slip away. Unless al-Shihri and al-Awfi are agents (which I doubt), their appearance is indeed extremely embarrassing for Saudi authorities.

The video provides several clues about the background for the merger and the state of al-Qaida on the Peninsula. It seems clear that the unification was prompted by the arrival of al-Shihri and al-Awfi in Yemen. They must have arrived relatively recently, because they were only repatriated from Guantanamo on 10 November 2007 and spent at least a few months in the rehabilitation programme. There have been several indications in the past year that Saudi al-Qaida has withdrawn to Yemen. Why does the formal merger come now? One reason is that AQY has consolidated itself. Another reason is that al-Shihri and al-Awfi are the most senior Saudi jihadists to make it across the border so far. Previous Saudis in al-Wuhayshi’s ranks, such as Nayif al-Qahtani, have probably been considered too junior to represent the Saudi branch.

It is unlikely, though, that al-Awfi and al-Shihri represent anybody but themselves. They were in Guantanamo during the Saudi insurgency and did not spend much time in the Kingdom before leaving for Yemen. This is probably why they were so busy namedropping legendary Saudi jihadists in the video (I counted no less than fifteen names). They also showed a passage from the old QAP film Badr al-Riyadh from January 2004 featuring al-Muhayya compound bomber Ali Ma‘badi al-Harbi. The two fugitives clearly wanted to convey the impression that they had been part of the inner circles of al-Qaida in Saudi Arabia.

The merger speaks volumes about the weakness of al-Qaida in Saudi Arabia. Here you have the alleged leadership running away from home and submitting to a Yemeni emir. Add to this the deafening silence from al-Qaida in the Kingdom itself in the past couple of years, and it seems clear there is little substantial organizational infrastructure left.

Since al-Awfi and al-Shiri are not bringing a big fighting force to the table, the merger is probably not going to have any immediate consequences for al-Qaida’s capability. However, it does say something about intentions: it basically removes all doubt that al-Qaida now intends to use Yemen as a launching pad for operations in Saudi Arabia and elsewhere in the Gulf.

A point on personalities: The video offers the first live images of Nasir al-Wuhayshi, and I must say he comes across as surprisingly weak and uncharismatic, especially compared to Sa’id al-Shihri. I suspect al-Shihri will have considerable influence in the new organization, which further increases the likelyhood of operations in Saudi Arabia.

In the short term, though, most operations will probably focus on Yemen, where the group is clearly thriving, despite clashes earlier this week. The current state of AQY is reminiscent of that of Saudi al-Qaida in 2003, except that AQY enjoys an even more secure environment. Media production continues and increases in sophistication (as it did in Saudi).  Open-air training with over 20 individuals is or has recently taken place  – this did not happen in Saudi after February 2003. Journalists are able to conduct interviews with the leadership – this never happened in Saudi. Foreign fugitives well known to Saudi and US intelligence are able to find and join the top leadership – this didn’t happen in Saudi after May 2003. Finally, the top leaders have been around for three years – contrast with the short lifespan of Saudi leaders in 2003-2004. We will undoubtely hear more from al-Qaida in Yemen in the coming months, so stay tuned.

Update (26 January): In response to the video, Saudi authorities rearrested nine Guantanamo returnees yesterday, while al-Shihri’s father publicly disowned his son and provided interesting details on the latter’s recent trajectory.

Reactions To Israel’s Gaza Campaign

Will McCants December 29, 2008

As readers might guess, the discussions on the Jihadi forums are almost entirely devoted to Gaza (there’s some on Somalia–more on that later this week).  I’ve culled the most representative posts from the Faloja forum:

  • The forum administrators warn that anyone who is unduly critical of Hamas will be kicked off during this time of crisis.  They’ve also asked that any security-sensitive information not be posted.  This hasn’t stopped members from debating whether Hamas should be excommunicated or from posting early news of Gilad Shalit‘s injury during Israeli bombing.
  • One member asked for information about American and Israeli embassies abroad, prompting a torrent of responses (addresses, ambassadors, etc).
  • Another member, `Abd Allah al-Qurashi, has posted a list of suggestions for what Hamas should do next.  One suggestion is that Hamas release Salafi militants it arrested [presumably members of Jaysh al-Islam] and rearm them to fight against the Israelis.  Another is that security officers in the Interior Ministry should remove their clothes and be armed with Qassam equipment, which should be easy since most of them are already affiliated with Qassam.
  • Asad al-Jihad2, who some believe to be AQ senior leader Hukayma, has called on the mujahids of Hamas (i.e. Qassam) and members of prominent Jihadi-Salafi organizations in Gaza (Jaysh al-Islam and Jaysh al-Umma) to unite and reject the help of Iran, Hezbollah, and Fatah leader Mahmoud Abbas, who are selling them out.
  • There is clamor for a statement from Bin Laden or Zawahiri.
  • The powerful Saudi cleric, `Awad al-Qarni, has released a fatwa permitting attacks on Israeli interests anywhere in the world.  The fatwa from Qarni, who has been derided by the Jihadis in the past, has been repeatedly posted on the forums and applauded.

Update: As Shlomo points out in the comments, I may have confused `Awad al-Qarni with `A’id al-Qarni.  If so, then `Awad is the author of the fatwa and `A’id is the object of the past criticism.

Document (Arabic): 12-28-08-faloja-asad-al-jihad2-statement-on-gaza

Document (Arabic): 12-28-08-faloja-members-who-criticize-hamas-will-be-kicked-off

Document (Arabic): 12-28-08-faloja-qarni-fatwa-permitting-attacks-on-global-israeli-interests

Document (Arabic): 12-28-08-faloja-request-for-information-on-american-and-israeli-embassies

Document (Arabic): 12-28-08-faloja-steps-hamas-should-take

Document (Arabic): 12-29-08-faloja-demand-for-a-statement-from-aq-leadership-on-gaza-crisis

Document (Arabic): 12-29-08-faloja-news-of-wounded-shalit-sparks-debate-over-security-precautions

Document (Arabic): 12-29-08-faloja-on-whether-hamas-should-be-excommunicated

The Denudation Of The Exoneration: Part 10

Will McCants November 29, 2008

 

Amidst the personal attacks on Zawahiri in part 10, Sayyid Imam mentions a few more interesting historical tidbits.  First, he notes the opposition of two prominent Jihadis, Abu Mus`ab al-Suri and `Abd al-Rahman al-Kindi (died in 2003), to the attacks on the U.S.  He also discloses that Zawahiri’s imprisoned brother, Muhammad, has been trying to cut a deal with the Egyptian authorities.  Finally, Sayyid Imam claims that Bin Laden told him that the Sudanese had encouraged him to turn against Saudi Arabia in 1994.  Whatever the truth of this last bit, it reminds us that states have frequently used al-Qaeda to their own ends.

By the way, Nathan Field has a review of Sayyid Imam’s book.  His take: it’s lame.  I’ll withhold my final judgment until the whole book has been published but I like what I’ve seen so far.  It may be less theoretical than the first book and engage in more ad hominem, but Sayyid Imam is trying to build a case that Zawahiri can’t be trusted.  Reminds me of good ol’ rijal literature.  Those hoping for a true reformulation of jihad doctrine should look elsewhere.  Sayyid Imam would completely lose his core audience, which takes the medieval tradition as seriously as he does.  Remember, whatever else the Document and its sequel are good for, they have to be palatable enough for Egyptian Islamic Jihad members to support.  Finally, Sayyid Imam’s vigorous rejection of the victimization that permiates Jihadi thought is breathtaking.  I can’t recall another Islamist (or most Arab secularists for that matter) saying anything of the sort.

Continuing…

Zawahiri has worked for 30 years to establish an Islamic state.  However, when the Taliban succeeded in establishing one, he and bin Laden squandered it by attacking the United States.

Zawahiri has a dark history of failure.  He says to Muslims:

 

  • You establish groups and I will destroy them.
  • You establish a state and I will tear it down.
  • You fight jihad and I will flee, leaving my family behind and collecting donations in your name.
  • You give contributions to me and I will spend them on my personal security.
  • You go to prison and I will hold a microphone and encourage you to do it.
  • You abide patiently in prison while I pay for my release with thousands of dollars.
  • You fight America in Egypt so you can make it easier for me to negotiate with them.

 

Zawahiri is like a bad doctor you repeatedly send your family members too.  If he keeps failing and they keep dying and you keep sending them there is something wrong with your mind, even your faith.

God has prescribed jihad, but he prescribes it in the first place for defending Muslims from harm and in the second for making Islam dominant.  If the latter brings harm and dissension to Muslims, it should be stopped.  Yet Zawahiri keeps urging actions that harm his brothers and Muslims for the sake of his own personal fame.

A number of the brothers in Afghanistan tried to dissuade bin Laden from attacking the United States between 1998 and 2001.  Among them was Abu Mus`ab al-Suri and Abu `Abd al-Rahman al-Kindi.  Yet Bin Laden continued and neither respected the etiquette of being a guest nor his oath of allegiance to Mullah Omar.

What Bin Laden and Zawahiri did is like the story of the Bedouin who found a small, orphaned hyena.  He took it to his tent and let it nurse on one of the sheep.  When the hyena grew up, it killed the sheep that had nursed it.

Zawahiri quotes some famous shaykhs in an attempt to justify his actions.  One is `Abd Allah `Azzam, whom Zawahiri opposed during the Afghan jihad.  Zawahiri spoke out against him at a large meeting, saying he had changed his stripes.  Al Qaeda would never have been established without splitting with `Azzam.

As for `Umar `Abd al-Rahman [“The Blind Sheikh”), Zawahiri was his greatest opponent in the early 80s when the various Islamic groups tried to unite under `Abd al-Rahman’s leadership.

Zawahiri and others have accused me of using disrespectful words to describe those who violate sharia laws.  I only use sharia terminology found in scripture and in the writings of the Salaf.

* One of the mischievous things that Zawahiri is doing is repeating the question “what do you believe regarding Arab rulers?”

He should ask his brother Muhammad al-Zawahiri and Bin Laden.

Muhammad told Egyptian security he believes the ruler is a Muslim.  Then he told a gathering of youth that these rulers are hypocrites who should be killed if they don’t leave.  This is not in accordance with the sharia because the consensus of the Islamic scholars says that the hypocrite is a Muslim and cannot be killed.  In June 2007, his brother indicated his willingness to reconcile with the authorities, but he did so in secret.

Bin Laden wanted to fight Saddam in Kuwait in 1990 under the banner of the Saudi government.  Then he rebelled against them and excommunicated them in 1994 when they revoked his citizenship and took his passport.  The Khawarij excommunicated people for major sins but Bin Laden does it for citizenship and a passport.

I was in Sudan when this happened and asked bin Laden if he was afraid of the Sudanese response.  He said, “They encouraged me to do it.”  When Sudan expelled Bin Laden in 1996, he wrote a letter of apology to the Saudi government so they would take them back.  A major Sudanese representative carried his message to them, but they rejected it and he went to Afghanistan.

When Bin Laden settled in Sudan in 1992 I was in Pakistan.  I advised him at the time to remain in Saudi Arabia to help the Islamic affairs there as he had done in the Afghan jihad.  He didn’t accept my advice.

Document (Arabic): 11-29-08-al-masry-al-youm-denudation-part-10

 

The Denudation Of The Exoneration: Part 8

Will McCants November 28, 2008

In part 8, Sayyid Imam continues to hammer al-Qaeda for bringing disaster to the Middle East and for the hypocrisy of its leaders.  He

  • puts forward the odd claim that AQ lied to the U.S. about WMD in Iraq and about AQ ties with Iraq to push the U.S. to invade
  • observes that Iran and Syria have been the primary beneficiaries of AQ’s antics in Iraq
  • notes what any observer of the region already knows but rarely says: bashing the U.S. and Israel and talking about the Palestinian issue is great PR
  • offers an excellent explanation as to why AQ will not get a foothold in the Palestinian territories
  • claims that Bin Laden gave Saudi donations for jihad to Nawaz Sharif in support of his candidacy against Benazir Bhutto

Continuing…

Z claims that only the mujahids have thrawted the plans of the U.S.  That’s like Gamal Abdel Nasser’s slogan after the ’67 defeat that “no voice rises above the voice of battle” in order to silence his critics.

AQ brought the U.S. into the region and caused it to occupy Iraq and Afghanistan.  It gave the U.S. false information about WMD in Iraq and tying Iraq to al-Qaeda to give the U.S. the excuse to invade Iraq.  They did this to lure the U.S. into a battlefield where it could be destroyed.  But AQ killed far more Iraqis than it killed Americans.  It brought the U.S. in and excommunicated the people of Iraq solely to fulfill its desire to fight America.

Z claims that AQ thwarted the plans of the U.S. but the truth is the opposite.  Wherever AQ goes, it brings destruction to Muslims.

Those who have benefitted from the killing in Iraq are first Iran, then Syria.  Is Syria facilitating those who seek to fight in Iraq out its love for jihad, for the Iraqis, or for its own self interest?  Aren’t some of the leaders of AQ who are encouraging others to fight in Iraq located in Iran, particularly the son of UBL?  Is fighting for the interests of Syria and Iran a jihad?  Hasn’t Z previously paid his brothers to fight in Egypt in service of Sudanese intel?  Isn’t killing the Iraqis and demolishing their homes exactly what Jews are doing to Palestinians?  Is this jihad or even thwarting the plans of America?  Wasn’t Iraq part of the Abode of Islam under Saddam before the American occupation?  Didn’t al-Qaeda, at the hands of Zarqawi, trigger a sectarian civil war in Iraq by killing the Shia en masse?  Haven’t the Sunnis paid the ultimate price for this?  Killing the Iraqi Shia only strengthened their ties to Iran and facilitated Iranian involvement in Iraq, whereas it did nothing but weaken the Sunni position in Iraq.

Does the mentality that lost an actual Islamic state in Afghanistan really believe that an Islamic state will be established in Iraq and not just on the Internet?  Are the Islamic peoples to be test animals for Bin Laden’s and Zawahiri’s experiment?

No one is more pleased with al-Qaeda today than Iran and Syria.  All they have to do is turn a blind eye to the fighters who travel through their countries to blow themselves up, which serves Iranian and Syrian interests.

8) One of Z’s ignorant beliefs is that he proves the truth of what he says by pointing to the number of his followers.

Z says I heaped abuse on Bin Laden, but then he asks which of us has better understood reality and affected more of Muslim youth and masses? (Exoneration, p. 10)

The truth is known by its agreement with the Sharia, not by the number of its followers.

I have not called on anyone to follow me.  I am only relaying what I think is right according to the Sharia. 

Aren’t those who extol Bin Laden the same people that previously extolled Saddam Hussein?

Z’s words [ie the truth of what you say is proven by the number of your followers] indicate a fundamental aspect of his character: he has always been looking for fame and he is willing to get it by killing the innocent.

* One of the deceptions of Z is his trading on the Palestinian question

It is well-known that the fastest way to gain popularity among the Arab and Muslim masses is to bash the United States and Israel and talk a great deal about the Palestinian issue.  Nasser did it, Saddam did it, Ahmadinejad does it, as do others.  However, these people have actually done something for Palestinians, particularly Nasser, whereas Bin Laden and Z just talk.  Z even says in his Exoneration that “the slogan which the masses of the Muslim umma have understood and responded to well for 50 years is the slogan of calling for jihad against Israel.  Moreover, in this decade the umma is mobilized by the American presence in the heart of the Islamic world.” [I think this quote is from Knights but haven’t checked it yet]

Z and Bin Laden talk about Palestinian children being hurt but not about the death they bring to the children of Afghanistan.

* Why doesn’t al-Qaeda undertake operations in Palestine?

If Al-Qaeda is so interested in the Palestinian question, why hasn’t it undertaken operations against the Jews there?  There are two reasons.  First, killing Jews is not one of Bin Laden’s priorities.  Second, al-Qaeda is an organization without a state; wherever it is, it is a stranger.  One can’t carry out operations in a country without the help of some of the people in that country. 

Al-Qaeda has failed to ally with any of the Palestinian organizations for four reasons:

1) Palestinian organizations don’t trust Bin Laden.  There’s no room to explain here, but it is an old matter from the days of the Afghan jihad.

2) Al-Qaeda has nothing to offer Palestinian groups militarily since the latter are far more advanced.  Indeed, Al-Qaeda relied on the cadres of the Egyptian Islamic Jihad trained by the Palestinian groups in Lebanon from 1990 to 1992.

3) Different tactics with respect to the use of force.  Bin Laden uses blind force to kill as many people as possible, even if it leads to the destruction of his organization–“organizational suicide.”  Palestinian organizations, on the other hand, use limited force to make gains against the enemy while ensuring the survival of their organization.  They follow the traditional principles of guerrilla war, the “war of the flea and the dog.”  Bin Laden’s new way is the war of the elephant, which makes mass killing the goal.

4) Palestinian organizations don’t need Bin Laden’s money since they have their own resources, just as they are more politically sophisticated than Bin Laden.

This is why Al-Qaeda has failed to ally with Palestinian groups and failed to gain a foothold in Palestine.  That’s why Z in his recent statement called for the Bedouin of Sinai to engage in jihad in Palestine.  It’s just propaganda.

When the Palestinian organizations rebuffed al-Qaeda, Z started criticizing them. Z accused Hamas of killing Jewish children with their missiles.  Is this a rational person?  What about the innocents al-Qaeda has killed in Afghanistan, Iraq, Algeria, and elsewhere?  Is what is permitted for Al-Qaeda forbidden for Hamas?  Z is sad for Jewish children but kills Muslim children.

Z accuses Hamas of participating in elections on the basis of a secular constitution.  Why does Z criticize Hamas only?  Why not also criticize his shaykh Bin Laden?  Bin Laden paid a lot of money in support of Nawaz Sharif in parliamentary elections in Pakistan against Benazir Bhutto.  This was money for jihad that Saudis had give Bin Laden.  When I found out about this in 1992, I said to Abu Hafs al-Masri, who was the one who gave the money to Nawaz Sharif, “Abu Hafs! By God, Bin Laden is leading you to Hell!”

Document (Arabic): 11-27-08-al-masry-al-youm-denudation-part-8

The Strategic Effects of 9/11, Part 5: The Jihadi Domino Theory

Will McCants September 23, 2008

Continuing…

  • Why did al-Qaeda attack the U.S.?  Was it to drive the U.S. out of the Middle East?  Or was it to strike the far enemy for the sake of destroying the near enemy (i.e. regimes in the Arab and Islamic world)?
  • Regardless of the intent of al-Qaeda’s leaders, the sequence of events gives weight to the second possibility, which could also be termed the Domino Scenario.
  • According to a 2007 article by George Friedman, Bin Laden saw a rare opportunity after the fall of the USSR to begin re-establishing the worldwide caliphate.  But, says Friedman, armed groups can’t establish empires.  They can, however, seize a state and use it to begin to establish an empire.  UBL realized that Afghanistan wasn’t the ideal place for this because of its geographical position and its weakness.
  • Based on Zawahiri’s pre-9/11 writings, Friedman believes that UBL wanted to topple local regimes and replace them with Islamic ones.  He was looking to do this in Egypt because it leads the Islamic world.
  • Friedman says the two goals of the attacks were 1) to prove to Muslims that the US could be attacked and suffer great harm, and 2) to provoke a U.S. response.  Whatever the U.S. chose to do in response, Muslims would win.  If the U.S. failed to respond, it would look weak.  If it attacked, it would be engaged in a crusade.
  • The authors of a report from Decision Supports Systems, Inc. written two months after 9/11 understood al-Qaeda’s intent.  The study says that before 9/11, AQ attacked three targets without sufficiently provoking the US: civil, diplomatic, and military.
  • Based on al-Qaeda’s statements before 9/11, DSSI wrote that al-Qaeda was trying to provoke the U.S. into a conflict with it.  After the 9/11 strikes, the U.S. responded in the manner planned by al-Qaeda.
  • According to DSSI, AQ wanted to provoke the U.S. into a large military invasion of the Middle East so AQ could destroy its military and upset the geopolitical balance of power.
  • The DSSI report argues that the greatest indicator that this was AQ’s strategy is the fact that its operatives assassinated Ahmad Shah Massoud, the commander of the Northern Alliance.  AQ knew that when the US retaliated for 9/11, it would work through tribal proxies because the U.S. does not like to get its hands dirty.  Thus, AQ had to kill the most effective leader of those trbies.
  • As the DSSI study concludes, as long as the U.S. continues to behave in predicable ways, al-Qaeda can anticipate its responses and plan accordingly.
  • According to the DSSI study, there are three possibilities after 9/11.  1) The U.S. intervention in the Middle East provokes uncontrolable violence in the Middle East which will make it ungovernable in the long term.  2) The U.S. sends more troops to stabalize the situation but its presence polarizes Muslims and puts strain on its allies in the region, particularly the Gulf states and Pakistan.  The government of Pakistan could become unstable and AQ or its allies could get control of its nukes by infiltrating the security apparatus or overthrowing the government.   The collapse of these states will create security vaccuums that AQ or its allies will fill, giving them control of oil and nukes.  3) AQ could choose to destroy oil production in the MIddle East, forcing the U.S. to look elsewhere to meet its energy needs.

[Update: All of DSSI’s publications can be found here.]

Two Major Steps Forward in Studying al-Qaeda

Will McCants July 29, 2008

First, Thomas Hegghammer has written a very valuable article on the rise and fall of al-Qaeda in Saudi Arabia (more properly, “al-Qaeda on the Arabian Peninsula” or QAP).  Thomas’ study is valuable because he draws on a deep well of empirical research to challenge the three major explanatory models of Islamist militancy: ideological (as they believe, so shall they fight), structural (the system is pushing them to fight), or social movement (al-Qaeda is just the violent manifestation of a larger network of like-minded people).  Thomas argues instead that QAP’s material and human resources, organizational needs, and pan-Islamic orientation, coupled with the Saudi security environment in the early 2000s, were more determinative influences on the group’s behavior.  I’m interested to know what he makes of the latest round of militant activity and arrests in the kingdom.

Second, Steve Corman of the COMOPS Monitor has created a blog aggregation service for counterterrorism and public diplomacy.  It will be a one stop shop for CT reporting and analysis.  Membership is free and it has a voting feature (“flag it”), so the cream rises to the top.  This is going to save me a lot of mouse clicks.

Scheuer and the Salafi Stew

Will McCants July 20, 2008

In a new Jamestown article, Michael Scheuer has refined some of the arguments he made in May in response to the al-Qaeda-is-almost-defeated meme that has been going around since April. He and I had a brief exchange about it here (look in the comments), so I won’t reprise all of it.  But I do want to offer a counterpoint to his remarks on Saudi Arabia and Salafis.

In his new article, Scheuer asserts that the Western press has bought the idea that al-Qaeda is near defeat. Journalists, he says, have bought it because some Islamist ideologues who previously supported al-Qaeda have criticized the organization.  (Scheuer calls these criticisms “recantations,” but only a few of the people he mentions have recanted.) These criticisms, Scheuer says, “are part of a bigger project conducted by several Arab states–led by Saudi Arabia–to make the United States and its allies believe Islamism’s strength is ebbing.” This idea has been picked up by the Western media because people in the West “desperately wants to believe such claims.”

Why is Saudi Arabia conducting this campaign? To divert attention from the real problem, Salafism, which Scheuer calls “Saudi Arabia’s state religion.” The Saudis have even gone so far as to reach out to the pope and to consider the building of a church in the kingdom, all in the hopes that the West will forget that its religious ideology is the “engine of contemporary jihad.”

The West has a lot to be worried about, Scheuer says (quoting an al-Ahram article by Khalil El-Anani), because Salafism is gaining ground:

  • Salafis won a majority of parliamentary seats in Kuwait
  • A Salafi is the head of the Muslim Brotherhood in Jordan
  • Salafis are running the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt
  • Hamas hawks have more power than Hamas pragmatists

Al-Qaeda will be defeated, Scheuer concludes, when Salafism is removed “from schools and missionary activities.”

As I said in my earlier exchange with Scheuer, I agree with him that al-Qaeda is not near defeat, but I don’t think the al-Qaeda-is-near-defeat meme is a bad thing. The U.S. wins against al-Qaeda when it is no longer able to recruit or when the morale of its members becomes too low. One of the ways to achieve this is to create the public perception that al-Qaeda is losing. As long as the analytical community does not let this public perception cloud its judgment, I’m all for it. (Incidentally, I do think 2007 and 2008 have been rotten years for al-Qaeda in the Middle East proper.)

Scheuer’s assertion that the Saudis are leading a “project” to push this idea and to distract the West from its support for Salafism is too conspiratorial. The U.S. stands to gain as much as the Saudis do from exposing al-Qaeda setbacks to public view. Moreover, I would look a little closer to home for the idea’s origin. Finally, what in the world is wrong with Saudi leaders reaching out to the pope and considering the building of a church in the kingdom?

As for Salafism and its spread, there is less coherence to the movement than Scheuer makes out. Salafism is an ecumenical, originalist, Protestant-like movement in Sunni Islam whose followers reject adherence to the four traditional schools of law. But under this wide rubric, you find a great deal of variety. Wahhabis (a better term for the followers of the official religious ideology of the Saudi state) and the Ahl-e Hadith in Pakistan are Salafis under my definition, but they have very different attitudes toward politics. And it’s the attitude toward politics that should concern analysts the most.

A further problem with the label “Salafi” is that it says little about a group’s beliefs or political orientation.  Many Sunni groups call themselves “Salafi” because the word signals that their beliefs are derived from Islam’s “pious founders” (Ar. salaf).  But that’s almost like of a Sunni calling himself an “authentic Muslim,” which doesn’t give you a good idea of his religious or political attitudes (Thomas Hegghammer has made this point elsewhere).  Take the Muslim Brothers in Kuwait for example.  They sometimes call themselves Salafis, but they are usually at odds with self-described Salafi political parties in that country.

As an aside, Salafis in Kuwait did not win a majority of seats in that country’s recent parliamentary elections, as Scheuer’s al-Ahram source asserts. They took 7 seats by my count.

Scheuer took this point and several others from op-eds written by Arab secularists. For someone who berates the Western media for accepting ideas from Arabs who have agendas, he might view his own sources with a little more skepticism. Lumping every Islamist into the same Salafi stew may make a complex phenomenon more digestible or satiate the reading public’s appetite for ubiquitous doom, but it is neither analytically accurate nor politically useful.

Saudi Terror Arrests Summary, Government Points Finger at Iran

Will McCants June 29, 2008

I’ve been collecting news stories on the terror suspects arrested in Saudi Arabia. Much of the reporting relies on Saudi security personnel and the Interior Ministry’s statement last week, so it should be read with due skepticism.

There’s a lot to discuss, but I’ll save my comments for later. For the moment it’s worth noting that, as of today, the Saudis are now injecting a new piece of information into the story: the network was taking orders and receiving money from someone in Iran:

  • The funding for the AQ cells in Saudi came from one of the major countries in the region in the form of Euros. (al-Qabas, “Oil Cell”)
  • Instructions for the cells came from the same major country in the region in which leaders of AQ sought refuge, like the Egyptian Sayf al-Adl who is currently living there. (al-Qabas, “Oil Cell”)

Below is my summary of all the data points I’ve been able to find (sources at the bottom):

The Network

  • Five networks have been captured. (al-Qabas, “Oil Cell”)
  • Of the 701 people arrested (181 of whom have been released), more than 50% are Saudi citizens. (Dhaydi, “Features”)
  • In the new batch of arrests, the demographic has shifted to Mauritania, Pakistan, Afghanistan, and Indonesia. In the past, non-Saudi militants active in the Kingdom came from mainly from Yemen, then Chad, Morocco, and Kuwait. (Dhaydi, “Features”)
  • 7 Mauritanians were among those in the “oil cell.” They were pursuing advanced degrees. One had a Master’s degree. The youngest was 35 and all of them played leadership roles. (al-Qabas, “Oil Cell”)
  • The seven Mauritanians had a “special driver” visa that enabled them to move around the country freely. (al-Qabas, “Oil Cell”)
  • The Afghans arrested were from Waziristan. (Malifi, “Africans”)
  • There were Yemenis and Iraqis in the “oil cell”. The number of Yemenis was higher than those of other nationalities in the cell. The number of Saudis in the cell is equivalent to that of the other nationalities in the cell. (al-Qabas, “Oil Cell”)
  • Only 50% of those in cell were Saudis. The rest came during pilgrimage season and did not go home. (Adnkronos, “Terror Cell”)
  • Most of the foreigners in the cell were recruited by imams in their home countries, or through the Internet. (Adnkronos, “Terror Cell”)

Recruitment

  • Because of Saudi security measures, the militants altered their methods of recruitment and their procurement of equipment. (Dhaydi, “Features”)
  • In Saudi Arabia, the main tool of recruitment is the Internet. (Dhaydi, “Features”)
  • The Eastern Province cell recruited illegal African residents to find jobs in the oil sector. (Malifi, “Africans”)
  • The recruiter network carried out organized efforts to target youth and to send them for training outside Saudi Arabia. (al-Sharq al-Awsat, “520 Arrested”; Malifi, “Africans”)

Leadership

  • There is no single leader for al-Qaeda in Saudi Arabia. (Dhaydi, “Features”)
  • A mobile phone that belonged to a member of the Eastern Province cell had a voice message from Zawahiri on it. This is the second recent message from Zawahiri that has been found recently on a terror suspect’s phone in Saudi. (Malifi, “Africans”)
  • The leader of one cell had a message from Zawahiri instructing him to gather money and promising to send people from Iraq, Afghanistan, and North Africa to target the oil infrastructure and fight security forces. (al-Sharq al-Awsat, “520 Arrested”)
  • 7 Mauritanians were among those in the “oil cell.” They were in graduate school. One had a Master’s degree. The youngest was 35 and all of them played leadership roles. (al-Qabas, “Oil Cell”)
  • Instructions for the cells came from the same major country in the region in which leaders of AQ sought refuge, like the Egyptian Sayf al-Adl who is currently living there. (al-Qabas, “Oil Cell”)

Funding

  • The new batch of militants are well funded. (Dhaydi, “Features”)
  • The Yanbu cell forged coupons for sacrificial livestock and sold them at pilgrimage [presumably to raise capital]. (al-Sharq al-Awsat,” 520 Arrested”; Malifi, “Africans”)
  • Cells planned to raise funds and send them outside the Kingdom. (al-Sharq al-Awsat, “520 Arrested”)
  • The leader of one cell had a message from Zawahiri instructing him to gather money and promising to send people from Iraq, Afghanistan, and North Africa to target the oil infrastructure and fight security forces. (al-Sharq al-Awsat, “520 Arrested”)
  • The funding for the AQ cells in Saudi came from one of the major countries in the region in the form of Euros. (al-Qabas, “Oil Cell”)
  • The financing of AQ in Saudi came from one particular direction, especially when AQ was being rebuilt. (al-Qabas, “Oil Cell”)

Preparation

  • The weapons and money caches were professionally sealed for long-term storage. (Dhaydi, “Features”)
  • Much of the money, weapons, and equipment were buried in remote desert areas. (al-Qabas, “Oil Cell”)

Media

  • The media cell was responsible for defaming clerics, raising doubts, and excommunicating other Muslims, all online. (al-Sharq al-Awsat, “520 Arrested”; Malifi, “Africans”)

Targets and Tactics

  • The cells are following the strategy outlined by Abu Bakr Naji in his Management of Savagery.
  • One of the five cells, the “oil cell,” planned to penetrate the secret police adminstrative building in Khafji with car bombs and to blow up oil installations in the Eastern region. (al-Qabas, “Oil Cell”)
  • Cell members intended to attack oil installations in Gulf states. They were going to use boats to attack some installations. (al-Qabas, “Oil Installations”)
  • Cell members had maps and pictures of hotels in many Gulf countries that foreigners stay in. (al-Qabas, “Oil Installations”)
  • Cell members plotted to attack boats in the Gulf. (al-Qabas, “Oil Installations”)
  • The plan of attack was to hit a variety of places while making sure that the cell’s base of operations was far away from the targets. (al-Qabas, “Oil Installations”)

Sources

Mashari al-Dhaydi, “Features of the New al-Qaeda,” al-Sharq al-Awsat, 26 June 2008.

Muhammad al-Malfi, “A High-Level Security Source: The Africans Are Actually from Mauritania and the Asians Are Afghans from Waziristan,” al-Watan, 26 June 2008.

“520 Arrested, Planned to Attack Oil and Security Installations and Spread the Takfir Methodology on the Internet,” al-Sharq al-Awsat, 26 June 2008.

“Saudi: Oil Cell Planned to Storm the Building of Secret Police of al-Khafji with Car Bombs,” al-Qabas, 29 June 2008.

“Oil Installations in Gulf Countries Intended Targets,” al-Qabas 27 June 2008.

“Saudi Arabia: Terror Cell Received Orders from al-Qaeda Deputy,” Adnkronos.com, 26 June 2008.

Mauritania Again

Will McCants June 28, 2008

In the news surrounding the Saudi statement on its capture of suspected terrorists over the past six months (see Marisa’s links here and here and here), one thing stood out: 40 Mauritanians were arrested in Saudi’s oil-rich Eastern Province, some (all?) of whom were part of a cell that planned to attack oil installations in the province.

I’ve written before on the repeated blipping of Mauritania on my radar screen and Alle has helped me understand (here and here) the rise of Islamist militancy in that country. But why are so many involved in militancy in faraway places like Saudi and Afghanistan/Pakistan? Why not just join al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb?

(Picture of one of the Mauritanians arrested in Saudi)

Managing Savagery in Saudi Arabia

Will McCants June 26, 2008

In the past six months, Saudi Arabia has arrested around 700 suspected terrorists.  Yesterday, the Interior Ministry released a statement which claimed that many of those arrested were trying to implement the blueprint laid out by Abu Bakr Naji in his Management of Savagery.

Naji argues that if Jihadis want to take power, they need to abandon the idea of overthrowing governments in the Middle East.  Instead, they should focus on creating security vacuums.  They can do this by striking  a country’s crucial industries, like oil and tourism.  The government will respond by pulling in its security forces to protect the infrastructure.  This will open up the desired security vacuums (“regions of savagery” as he calls them) that Jihadis can move into and set up rudimentary governments.  These vacuums can be as small as city blocks or as large as a province.  Once they have gained control, the Jihadis can then network with other “administrations of savagery” and proceed to more complicated forms of government.

According to the Saudis, many of the people they arrested wished to carry out this plan, based on Naji’s book:

(The intention of these groups is to) plan, recruit, and equip themselves in order to revive criminal activities in all regions of the Kingdom in an attempt to change the internal security situation into a stage that resembles the situation in other unsettled regions since perverse groups like these are not able to intellectually find a place for themselves in societies that are stable. This (plan) is clearly evident from the confiscation of numerous documents in their possession, including a study they call The Management of Savagery, which articulates their sick dreams and hateful visions.

Since The Management of Savagery is still an obscure book in the Middle East, there were several articles published in Arabic newspapers today that explain its contents.  There are two good articles, one in al-Sharq al-Awsat and one in al-Watan. Strikingly, there are two bad articles in the same papers. First the good ones:

Mashari al-Dhaydi in al-Sharq al-Awsat:

  • Dhaydi classes Management among the most important texts shaping the Jihadi Movement, along with Qutb’s Milestones, Faraj’s Neglected Duty, Juhayman al-`Utaybi’s writings, Zawahiri’s Knights, Sayyid Imam/Dr. Fadl’s three books, Suri’s “Syrian Experience,” and three books by Maqdisi.
  • Management is odd because it does not have a traditional flavor or a title that rhymes in Arabic (which is usually the case for classically-oriented Islamic books). It is also strange in that it uses terms that are common in the media but not in traditional religious texts.
  • He observes that an American (me) translated the book several years ago. [Like some other reporters, he wrongly attributes the sponsorship of the translation to West Point’s CTC. The Olin Institute at Harvard actually funded it; both Olin and the CTC host a copy online.]
  • Dhaydi quotes a Saudi security expert who says that the most dangerous parts of the book deal with how to vex (nikaya) the government and obtain power (shawka).
  • The same expert thinks the book was written by a committee. Dhaydi notes that some people online say it is Sayf al-`Adl. Others say it is an unknown person.

Shakir Abu Talib in Watan:

  • Shakir interviews Faris b. Hazzam, a journalist who specializes in terrorist groups. Faris relates that some people think the author of Management is Abu Qatada (recently released from a UK prison).
  • He notes that someone at West Point translated the document and that the U.S. has already been studying it for two years.

Now for the two bad articles. The first is by `Ali al-Qahtani for Watan. He reports that Naji was one of those captured by Saudi security forces yesterday, which is very wrong. Next he quotes Salih b. Sa`d al-Luhaydan, an adviser for the World Association for Mental Health, who says that he has never heard of the book before. The author, Luhaydan says, has nothing new to say; he is irrational and puts emotion before reason; and he is obviously suffering from an early childhood psychological trauma. An anonymous article in al-Sharq al-Awsat is equally derisive, ridiculing the author as irrational.

If you’ve read Naji, you know that he is anything but irrational or emotional. Those who dismiss him as deranged might make themselves feel better, but they severely underestimate the cunning of him and his ilk–always a bad idea.

I’m relieved that the same papers that published such pap also published serious analyses. I’m also grateful that the latter highlighted my translation and that they acknowledged that the U.S. is well advanced in studying Naji’s work.  The U.S. government deserves a lot of the lumps it gets for cultural ignorance, but many would be surprised how far ahead of its Arab counterparts it is in understanding Jihadism.

As for the question of Naji’s identity, I am pretty sure that he is dead–a major Jihadi insider, Husayn b. Mahmud, said so online. So that would eliminate Abu Qatada and Sayf al-`Adl.

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