ji·had·ica

Al-Qa’ida Revisions: The Five Letters of Sayf al-‘Adl

Vahid Brown February 10, 2011

The jihadi forums have seen some rather heated and confused debate over the past several months after the publication online of a series of writings from senior leaders of the pre-9/11 al-Qa’ida organization whom we’ve not heard from in years, and which are bringing back into the open serious disagreements over strategy and ideology that had divided al-Qa’ida prior to the 9/11 attacks. The online imbroglio over this growing al-Qa’ida revisions literature – even the existence of the literature itself – has, to my knowledge, escaped the notice of Western audiences. My aim here is to draw attention to this new “crack in the foundation” of the movement, focusing on the most recent salvo: five letters written, under a pseudonym, by Sayf al-‘Adl (also spelled Saif al-Adel), the second-in-command of al-Qa’ida’s historical leadership. These letters are the latest addition to a significant recent body of work by al-Qa’ida figures that directly challenges the claims to the al-Qa’ida legacy made by the more familiar faces of the post-9/11 al-Qa’ida organization – Ayman al-Zawahiri and Abu Yahya al-Libi in particular – a challenge that has not gone unnoticed by al-Qa’ida’s online constituency.

The Five Letters

The letters in question (here and here) were posted by Mustafa Hamid (Abu al-Walid al-Masri) to his website on December 31, 2010, and Hamid introduces them as “five articles, full of frankness and ardor, sent to me by one of the brothers in jihad, an old comrade in arms from Afghanistan.” He describes the author as having adopted the new nickname “’Abir Sabil” (lit., wayfarer or passer-by), and places him among that first generation of jihadis that has “weathered the treachery and betrayals of two decades of activity.” Hamid says the essays are written in a tone “much different from the convulsive tension which has become the predominant characteristic of those who belong to or attach themselves to the jihadi current,” whose vision of jihad “is a mixture of violent hysteria, harm of oneself and others, fighting without guidance or insight, and the killing of as many human beings as possible.” The letters themselves are not dated, but appear to have been written around November 19, 2010, as they refer in one place to the Lisbon Conference as “now underway.” Hamid presents them in the hopes that they will lead to an internal Islamic dialogue that would seek to come to terms with the past mistakes of jihadi activism, and in this sense he frames them as part of the larger trend of jihadi revisions – though, as will be seen below, the five letters do not call for a cessation of violence, a point on which the five letters differ from the broader revisions literature.

Who is ‘Abir Sabil?

In an introductory note appended by Mustafa Hamid to each of the letters, we are told that the author “is a long-time member of the al-Qa’ida Organization. He joined the organization at the end of 1989, when the Soviets had withdrawn from Afghanistan, and the famous battle of Jalalabad had entered the phase of gradual attrition. Though not one of its founders, he assumed some of the most important roles in the organization, including operational leadership in the areas of training, the administration of the camps, and general security and military activity. In 1995 he played a major role in Somalia, supervised the training of the Somali groups, and worked to set in motion their operations in the field. He also played a prominent role in the battle of Kandahar at the end of 2001…. After the martyrdom of Abu ‘Ubayda al-Banshiri in 1996 and then Abu Hafs al-Masri in 2001 – two co-founders, with Usama bin Ladin, of the al-Qa’ida Organization – “Abir Sabil” became the most senior and important member in the uppermost rank of the field leadership of that organization.”

All of these details are consistent with what is known of Sayf al-‘Adl – who also happens to be Mustafa Hamid’s son-in-law.  Jamal Ismail, who reported on the five letters the day after they appeared on Mustafa Hamid’s website, also identifies Sayf as the author. Without naming sources, Ismail further reported that Ayman al-Zawahiri had contacted Sayf, whom Ismail claims is living inside Afghanistan, to urge him against releasing his letters. Ismail’s story does not refer to Mustafa Hamid’s website as the medium of distribution, but there can be little doubt that he is referring to the five letters signed ‘Abir Sabil. (See also this piece for further context.)

The Five Letters as Revisions Texts

Though Ismail’s story is subtitled “Sayf al-‘Adl issues revisions against violence,” Ismail does not repeat or detail anything specific in the article that portray the five letters in this light. In fact, the letters do not appeal to the jihadi community in general nor to al-Qa’ida in particular to renounce violence, though they do contain other characteristics of the jihadi revisions “genre”: they argue that the jihadi movement has made fundamental mistakes, has refused to acknowledge or learn from them, and is in dire need of some re-evaluation. The letters do not get into specifics about what those mistakes are or how to correct them, but they are nonetheless quite damaging to al-Qa’ida’s current leadership.

First of all, not only did Sayf bypass al-Qa’ida’s official channels for distribution, he elected to release these letters via Mustafa Hamid, the most well-known jihadi insider to have come out in no uncertain terms against al-Qa’ida’s current leadership and strategic vision, going so far as to call on its North Waziristan-based bosses to disband the group altogether. In the fifth letter, Sayf admits that his connection to Mustafa Hamid may provoke some controversy, and he claims to have had disagreements with Hamid, old and new. However, Sayf says he also agrees with Hamid on many issues, adding that “we are both sons of the same current, both on one path in which there is no retreat and no surrender. Shaykh Abu al-Walid has a track record that nobody can deny.”

The first three letters are devoted to Afghanistan, and basically present arguments for that country’s unique suitability as a graveyard of empires. There is some dissonance with al-Qa’ida’s ideological messaging within these letters – he speaks highly of the fact that the Afghans are united in their adherence to the Hanafi school of Islamic law, for instance, a notion that al-Qa’ida’s Salafis would find abhorent – but it is really in the last two letters that Sayf takes exception, if often only implicitly, with al-Qa’ida’s current approach.

The fourth letter is addressed to the preachers and scholars of the ummah, and while he has some bones to pick with Muslim religious leaders for distracting the community with irrelevant minutia and for being all-too-willing to legitimize corrupt and oppressive regimes, the main message of this letter is one of conciliation, and Sayf devotes just as much space to criticizing the religious failings of the mujahidin as he does to clerical hypocrisy. He is willing to acknowledge the good in a variety of Muslim leaderships typically condemned in the harshest terms by al-Qa’ida’s current leadership. He ends with an appeal to Islam’s preachers and scholars and to “all who belong to the Islamist trends: we are not enemies of one another. Rather you are our partners in changing the world…. We are not claiming that there is only one way, but rather that there are two paths: preaching (da’wa) and jihad. Our view is that the importance of jihad lies in preparing the ground and clearing the way for the call (da’wa)… The conclusion that must be drawn – no matter whether you were with us but became lost and perplexed, or are of those who think we seek worldly gain – is that our enemy is clear, and our swords must be drawn against him alone for the liberation of the ummah. Islam is coming, so be with us and we will secure the victory together, and will realize the caliphate of God on earth. Da’wa and jihad together – this is our strategy.”

The final letter begins by bemoaning al-Qa’ida’s failure to fess up to and learn from its mistakes, and then turns to outlining a strategic theory for anti-imperialist jihad that Sayf credits Mustafa Hamid with introducing to al-Qa’ida in Afghanistan. This echoes ‘Abdallah Muhammad Fazul’s 2009 autobiography, which makes the provocative claim that Mustafa Hamid “convinced the al-Qa’ida leadership to confront the United States.” (I discuss this briefly here). Basically, Sayf says that Hamid, using the metaphor of pack mules and the mule driver, explained how American imperialism is a project that distributes the burden of subjugation upon various agent regimes, who are thus divided, ruled, and made to serve the interests of empire even in their internal and external conflicts. The implication is that violent opposition to what in most jihadi literature are called the “apostate regimes” is ultimately counter-productive. Sayf concludes by appealing to the “youth of the ummah” to focus their jihad on the mule driver and not the mules – to fight the US, not its client states.

In its broad strokes, none of this is radically different from what we’ve come to expect from al-Qa’ida’s official statements. But in a number of respects – its manner of distribution, its call for review, its relatively ecumenical appeal to Islamists, and its implicit rejection of state-focused revolutionary violence – these messages do present a challenge to Zawahiri and the current leadership of al-Qa’ida, a challenge made all the more serious by the author’s stature in the world of jihadism.

(For background on the revisions literature, Jihadica has followed this genre in a number of posts, and see also this more lengthy study by Omar Ashour. On the cast of characters mentioned here, see my now somewhat dated Harmony profiles of Sayf, Mustafa Hamid, and Fazul).

The Forgotten Recantation

Nelly Lahoud January 8, 2010

‘Abbud al-Zumar, one-time military intelligence colonel in the Egyptian army who was implicated in the assassination of Anwar al-Sadat, has recently released a co-authored document with his cousin and brother-in-law Tariq from prison. The document, al-Badil al-Thalith bayna al-Istibdad wa-al-Istislam (The Third Alternative between Despotism and Surrender) was published by the Egyptian newspaper al-Shuruq in late August and early September 2009 (the document was also published in al-Masriyyun and can also be found on the discussion forum of the Egyptian Islamic Group website – click here for a collated PDF printout).

The text has received surprisingly little media coverage so far. This is curious, not least considering the importance of ‘Abbud al-Zumar to the legacy of the Egyptian al-Jama‘a al-Islamiyya (Islamic Group). According to Muntasir al-Zayyat (one-time activist in al-Jama‘a and now a lawyer who specializes in defending Islamist activists – see his website), ‘Abbud was the military strategist of the group that was led by Muhammad ‘Abd al-Salam Faraj, the author of al-Farida al-Gha’iba (The Forgotten Obligation) and the leader of the group that assassinated Anwar al-Sadat.

Following Faraj’s execution, a split among al-Jama‘a ensued and ‘Abbud became leader of the group’s wing Tanzim al-Jihad (the Jihad Organization), while Sheikh ‘Umar ‘Abd al-Rahman (who is currently serving a prison sentence in the US for the 1993 bombing of the World Trade Centre) became leader of the wing known as al-Jama‘a al-Islamiyya (al-Zayyat, al-Jama’a al-Islamiyya, p. 229).

It is worth noting that ‘Abbud and Tariq al-Zumar were not among the authors of the series of books published by al-Jama’a leaders since 1997 as part of the so-called ‘Mubadarat Waqf al-‘Unf’ (The Initiative of Halting Violence).

With al-Badil al-Thalith, ‘Abbud and Tariq al-Zumar have produced what they believe to be an initiative containing a domestic plan of action based on political, not military, reform for Egyptian Islamists; and a global road map for Islamists and jihadis, including al-Qa‘ida, designed to develop a strategy based on working with (not against) select Western forces for the purpose of advancing the Islamist cause worldwide.

Given that this initiative was authored behind bars, to what extent should we assume that this is a document that genuinely represents the authors’ convictions instead of the views their jailors want us to believe that al-Zumars now espouse? For obvious reasons, this legitimate concern cannot be fully resolved, but two important points should be noted in this respect: first, al-Shuruq obtained the rights to publish al-Badil al-Thalith from ‘Abbud’s parents and the publication does not appear to have been orchestrated by Egyptian authorities; second, the authors’ critical stance of the Egyptian regime, as will be discussed below, suggests that that the document has not been tampered with by the hands of the authorities, wallahu a‘alam.

The authors are aware of their readers’ dilemma. That is why they are keen to stress that the muraja‘at (‘revisions/re-examinations/recantations’) cannot achieve their objectives unless three conditions are met: (1) the release of all political prisoners; (2) the removal of all the obstacles facing the youth from taking part in public life; (3) the opportunity of making peaceful regime change feasible, through  finding ways of making leaders accountable and removing them when necessary.

It is within this framework that al-Zumars have put forward a new initiative, proposing an amnesty for all those who participated in the crimes of torture in Egyptian prisons. This, they believe, should be part of a national reconciliation that includes (1) amnesty and release of all political prisoners, (2) compensating the thousands of prisoners who have endured torture and (3) compensating the families of those whose loved ones lost their lives in the process.

What’s in it for the Egyptian government? Al-Zumars point out that it is necessary to end quickly the ‘torture file’ before international forces use it as an excuse to interfere in the domestic affairs of Egypt. They highlight that such an intervention could be either at the hands of foreign governments as well as NGOs that are concerned with violations of human rights around the world. In other words, Husni Mubarak’s regime has more to gain by professing a mea culpa on its own domestic terms instead of being forced to do so through external international legal bodies.

How should ending military struggle proceed?
Al-Zumars enumerate several conditions towards this end. These include a call for regional and international co-operation between Arab and Islamic states, including Iran; forging alliances with those seeking to reform the United Nations in an effort to guarantee the interests of politically marginalized nations and oppressed peoples. While they obviously want the government to govern on the basis of the creed of divine unity (tawhid), al-Zumars stress that the interest of the Islamic mission (al-da‘wa) may entail adopting a neutral stance vis-a-vis the authorities and avoiding confrontations with them.

Islamic movements, al-Zumars hold, should meet several critical challenges. Al-Zumars propose a nuanced approach to dealing with non-Muslims. To begin with, they call for devising a new comprehensive vision that defines the nature of the relationship with Western civilization, away from the ‘clash of civilization’ paradigm (Third Alternative, part 4). In their minds, the importance of forging political alliances cannot be understated and it does not contradict ‘aqidat al-wala’ wa-al-bara’ (i.e., the Islamic creed that provides guidelines related to Muslims’ obligations to associate with and support fellow Muslims and when to dissociate from non-Muslims). Al-Zumars remind their readers that the Prophet himself forged alliances with non-Muslims when the objective of these alliances was in the interest of repelling oppression, as in the case of hilf al-fudul (‘pact of chivalry’ – this pact antedates Islam; the Prophet took part in it when he was young and he is said to have maintained his commitment to its principles after he received the Revelations. In other words, hilf al-fudul is a product of the jahiliyya era, but its principles stand even after the advent of Islam).

Al-Zumars also highlight that the Prophet entered into alliances with non-Muslims when he deemed that such alliances were in the interests of Muslims, as in the case of the ‘constitution of Medina’ (an alliance that is said to have been between the Muslims who escaped Meccan persecution (al-Muhajirun), their supporters in Medina (al-Ansar) and the Jews of Medina). Accordingly, al-Zumars assert that ‘forging alliances and cooperating with non-Muslims is permitted so long as the objective behind these alliances is legitimate’; indeed ‘forging alliances may be an obligation (wajib) if the objective is to realize the freedom of propagating the Islamic mission or simply preserve the life and safety of its preachers.’

Working within this pragmatic framework, al-Zumars argue that co-operating with non-Muslims can be in the interest of effectively resisting occupation. ‘The military and political campaigns led by the US and its allies against the Islamic world’, they hold, ‘do not necessarily represent the will and visions of the American and European people. That is why it is necessary to devise a plan that deals with these campaigns based on differentiating between the leaders/elites and their peoples. For we continue to observe the opposition against the military campaign against Iraq mounted by the American and European peoples; opinion polls in Europe reveal a great sympathy with the Palestinian cause … for this reason, it is not sensible to direct our bombs against societies that are calling on their governments to stop their aggression against Iraq’ and support other Islamic causes (Third Alternative, part 5).

Al-Zumars do not appear to have given up entirely on the hope of the US government changing its policies towards the Islamic world. They remark that the election of Barack Obama represents a clear coup against the aggressive policies of George W. Bush’s administration. The Obama administration’s policies however remain subject to implementation, not least considering that Iraq is still occupied and preparations are underway to send more troops to Afghanistan (note that al-Badil al-Thalith was published before the troop increase in Afghanistan). Al-Zumars called on President Obama to translate his statements into positive practical measures, among them the release of Sheikh ‘Umar ‘Abd al-Rahman.

Al-Qa‘ida and Military Jihad
Despite al-Zumars’ new commitment to peaceful political reform, they do not reject military jihad without qualification nor do they condemn al-Qa‘ida outright. Instead, they state that with respect to al-Qa‘ida, ‘we declare our support for lawful jihad (al-jihad al-mashru‘) that al-Qa‘ida is mounting in those parts of the Islamic world that are subject to occupation or aggression; indeed, al-Qa‘ida’s jihad in this respect is esteemed and respected by all those who are sincere in the umma, and we are perfectly ready to pay with our lives as a price to defend this noble jihad.’  Al-Zumars however go on to call on the leaders of al-Qa‘ida to re-examine their strategies that seek to move military operations to the Islamic world; they hold that this strategy has breached many Islamic legal stipulations. They also call on al-Qa‘ida ‘to re-examine its legal opinion (fatwa) that makes it lawful to shed the blood of Western civilians, for it is not consistent with Islamic law’ (Third Alternative, part 8).

Undoubtedly, al-Badil al-Thalith represents a clear departure from the worldview al-Zumars once espoused. It is to be remembered that they, especially ‘Abbud, were once fully committed to the thesis Muhammad ‘Abd al-Salam Faraj advocated in his al-Farida al-Gha’iba. Faraj believed that only the path of military jihad could save Muslims in this world and the next and that jihad must be directed first and foremost against the near enemy, i.e., Muslim rulers who are in apostasy of Islam because they do not govern according to the justice Islam preaches.

Why then should al-Badil al-Thalith not receive the attention that other so-called muraja‘at of militant struggle through jihad have received, most notably, Dr Fadl’s Tarshid (2007) and his later response to Ayman al-Zawahiri’s (al-Ta‘riya li-Kitab al-Tabri’a), both of which have been covered here on Jihadica.

In his critique of al-Badil al-Thalith, Hani al-Siba‘i (a London-based Egyptian lawyer sympathetic with the strategy of military jihad and director of al-Maqrizi centre), remarked in a commentary that the reason why al-Zumars’ initiative has not received much media attention is due not just to its bad timing (it was released during Ramadan) but more importantly because its message did not win the approval of Egyptian authorities.

I suspect there is some truth to that. As al-Siba‘i remarks, unlike Dr Fadl who personalized his attacks against al-Qa‘ida and especially Ayman al-Zawahiri and therefore lost credibility, al-Zumars have refrained from polemical attacks.

There is more to this than al-Siba‘i is suggesting. From the Egyptian authorities’ point of view, Dr Fadl didn’t really present an alternative to Egyptians who might be sympathetic with al-Jama‘a, whereas al-Zumars are presenting a proactive alternative based on peaceful and political reform. While al-Badil al-Thalith is by no means a comprehensive plan, it nevertheless highlights basic and legitimate demands of the Egyptian government, most notably, accountability for the rulers and the freedom for all to partake in the political process.

Al-Badil al-Thalith presents yet another challenge to the Egyptian authorities, namely al-Zumars’ recognition of the efforts and sacrifices the Muslim Brotherhood has made to ‘open up channels for Islamic political engagement’ despite all the obstacles the government has placed in its way. Saluting the model of the Muslim Brotherhood could signal a potential problem for the Mubarak regime: a scenario whereby al-Jama‘a and al-Ikhwan could form an alliance and contest elections is not a prospect the Egyptian government is willing to entertain, especially with a Presidential election looming in 2011.

Will al-Badil al-Thalith make a dent in the jihadis’ global strategy? Probably not. Indeed, the jihadis are likely to point out that al-Zumars’ proposal has gone undebated not just in the Arab and Islamic world, but also in the West, which, in their minds, goes to prove that only polemical statements like those allegedly authored by Dr Fadl make it into the headlines. They are also likely to point out that Western analysts who rush to promote recantations such as those authored by Dr Fadl are wittingly or unwittingly doing the bidding of the Egyptian government. All this, they would say, proves why military jihad is the only path that could lead to genuine reform in the Islamic world.

Revisions or Just a Change of Heart?

Scott Sanford November 21, 2009

Islam Online, an Islamic website founded by Yusuf al-Qaradawi, recently published an article called “Jihadist Revisions or Changing Their Minds” by Jordanian writer Yasir al-Za’aterah. It argued that revisionists (see here, here, and here) may have shifted their positions on violence, but they have not changed their fundamental political views.

Al-Za’aterah stated that the revisionists are basing their new approach on “religious legitimacy,” which is what they used to justify their violence in the past. He maintained that the issue of forcibly expelling an unjust leader who claims to be a Muslim is contentious in Islamic jurisprudence because it often involves many “mistakes”, making it closer to what scholars consider fitna or civil unrest, which is why many refuse to condone force against a Muslim ruler.

Al-Za’aterah concluded that modern Islamic movements have not rejected armed insurrection because they consider violence non-permissible; rather, they have rejected it because such action is impossible in the face of the modern state with a powerful security apparatus supported from abroad. Thus, revisionists have not acknowledged their failure.  Instead, they have adopted a new “intellectual” position, not a new political position. “The reality is that [these groups] were defeated on the ground before their ideas changed and the revisions are only paving the way for the release of their leaders and members from prison.”

Al-Za’aterah’s article suggests two points. First, revisionists will continue to push for their version of Islamic rule, which could bolster the most conservative segments of Islamic society. Second, since it is state power that has caused the revisionists to stop their calls for violence, if such power were to wane, they could revert to armed action. Thus, while the revisionist trend is a positive step, the revisionists themselves have not changed much and may represent a security threat or an obstacle to reform in the future.

Fizazi Letter Published

Thomas Hegghammer October 29, 2009

Der Spiegel has just published a full version of Fizazi’s letter, as well as a good article by Yasin Musharbash and Andreas Ulrich.

Upon reading the letter it seems to me that Fizazi is speaking primarily about terrorism in Germany and by extension about terrorism in Europe. His statements do not amount to a renunciation of violence, but to a moderation of his previous views regarding where and against whom violence can be used. By saying that Germany is not a legitimate area of operation, he is implicitly rejecting al-Qaida’s global jihad doctrine.

Unfortunately Fizazi does not elaborate on his views on violence elsewhere. I am speculating, but I suspect he still views attacks on Western targets in Afghanistan and Iraq as legitimate, not to mention the jihad in Palestine. It is not clear what he might think about attacks in the US or attacks on Arab regime targets. While all this makes Fizazi less of a moderate than many would have hoped, it makes his statement seem all the more genuine.

Fizazi Joining Recantation Club?

Thomas Hegghammer October 26, 2009

Der Spiegel reports that the imprisoned Moroccan scholar Muhammad Fizazi has issued a letter to Muslims in Germany declaring Germany “not a battle zone”. The letter, which was allegedly issued on 21 July, has not yet been made public.

Without knowing the precise content, it is difficult to assess its importance. We don’t know whether he is discouraging operations in Germany only, in Europe more broadly, or renouncing violence altogether.

But Fizazi is one of the most influential ideologues in the European/North African jihadi sphere, so this could be quite significant.

Of course, all the caveats of recantations from prison apply. Moreover, as I have said before, no individual recantation is going to end jihadism, but a critical mass of such declarations will have an influence.

In any case, Berlin must be relieved. After the latest barrage of anti-German al-Qaida statements, here is finally a jihadi with nice things to say about Germany.

A First Look at the LIFG Revisions

Vahid Brown September 14, 2009

(Editor’s note: This piece is a sneak preview of our second guest blogger: Vahid Brown from the Combating Terrorism Center at West Point. He will not start writing regularly until October, and I will present him more formally then, but he has already written this important piece, which for obvious reasons cannot wait.)

I have just looked at the first three installments of the LIFG Revisions posted to the internet, and though these initial releases amount to less than ten percent of the work, we can already see that this is a very sweeping repudiation not just of salafi jihadism but of all forms of revolutionary Islamism in general.

The text is remarkably broad in its scope, and strikes me as a 21st-century Sahwist renewal of the 1970s-era Muslim Brotherhood rejection of Qutbist Islamism. Indeed, the phrase in the last sentence of the excerpt below, about the authors being “preachers not judges,” refers to the famous 1977 Muslim Brotherhood tract of the same title (Hudaybi’s authorship is controversial) that repudiated Sayyid Qutb’s violent form of takfiri revolutionary politics.  Given the prominence of the group of people who have already publicly endorsed the Revisions – including Salman al-‘Awda and Yusuf al-Qaradawi – the work promises to be quite consequential.

The first section includes a brief precis of the contents of the work, which I translate below. Much of this is somewhat allusive and often couched in the techinical terminology of Islamic jurisprudence, but I think the message comes through nonetheless:

“We have arranged this study in nine chapters, each with sections and sub-headings.  The first chapter is “The Covenant of Islam and how it is Established,” in which we discuss the qualities necessary for a person to establish their bond [covenant] with Islam and be endowed with the rights of a Muslim, and we point out certain errors in this regard and delineate their negative consequences.

The second chapter is “Knowledge and the Scholars,” (‘ilm wa’l-‘ulama) in which we explicate the virtues of Shar’ia knowlege, the characteristics of its adherents, its importance, and the grave seriousness of issuing judgments without jurisprudential qualifications.  We mention that many of the calamities besetting the Muslims today have arisen on account of ignorance and the issuing of decisions, without jurisprudential qualifications, on matters of great importance, especially those having to do with blood and money.

The third chapter is “The Call to God,” which concerns that call (da’wa) which God has made a defining feature of this community (umma), and we discuss the objectives [of da’wa], its various types and areas of application, the need for it, and the obligations and characteristics of those that raise this call (du’at).

The fourth chapter is “Jihad,” in which we mention its virtue and position, and expound upon the ethical requirements, regulations and etiquette (adab) of jihad, mentioning the disastrous consequences of deviating from these regulations.  We discuss the history of the use of violence in political revolutions, the position of the scholars on this issue, as well as our own position on armed struggle, established on the basis of our personal experiences in this regard.

The fifth chapter is “Differences in Legal Opinions” (fiqh al-khilaf), in which we explain the various types [of acceptable multiplicity/contestation of legal views in Islamic jurisprudence], and define what is and is not permissible in this regard. We call attention to the deleterious effects on Muslim unity arising out of ignorance of the proper rules relating to divergence of legal opinion.

The sixth chapter is dedicated to “Religious Extremism” (ghuluw fi’l-din), in which we discuss its manifestations and causes, as well as its negative effects on the individual and the community (umma).

The seventh chapter is “The Beneficial and the Harmful,” (al-masalih wa’l-mafasid), in which we explain the importance of considering the consequences of actions, and the weighing of the beneficial and harmful in the scale of the purposes of sacred law; we conclude that neglect of this issue has been the cause of most of the errors in the Muslim community (al-umma al-islamiyya).

The eighth chapter is on “Commanding Right and Forbidding Wrong,” the basis of the community’s well-being. We discuss some of the errors committed under this rubric, which, despite the best of intentions, lead to evil results.

Finally, the ninth chapter is on “Passing Judgment on People,” in which we explain the grave seriousness of issuing decrees against people, and in particular the excommunication (takfir) of a Muslim. We discuss the regulations on passing judgment, the regulations on those qualified to pass such judgments, and we conclude that, indeed, we are preachers not judges, and that it is not ours to know the hearts of men, or to search their breasts, but rather to invite them unto righteousness.” (Kitab al-dirasat al-tashihiyya, part one).

Libyan Jihad Revisions

Thomas Hegghammer September 8, 2009

There is a very significant development taking place in the so-called war of ideas. Senior leaders of the Libyan Islamic Fighting Group (LIFG), who recently laid down their arms, are publishing a Dr. Fadl-like treatise revising their previous understanding of jihad. The text, entitled “the Book of Correctional Studies” (kitab al-dirasat al-tashihiyya), is being published as a nine-part series on the website www.oealibya.com. You can find the first three chapters here, here and here. Unfortunately I don’t have the time to look at it in detail, but Jarret Brachman will be covering the story. He already has some interesting background info and analysis.

The text in itself is probably not a landmark work of Islamic jurisprudence, but it is important because it adds to what may now be called a corpus of treatises by former militants challenging al-Qaida on theological grounds. The trend started with al-Gamaa al-Islamiya in Egypt, continued with Dr Fadl and now it’s the LIFG’s turn. Credible MB figures like Yusuf al-Qaradawi have also chipped in. Of course, no one text is going to change the world, but put together, these treatises will constrain al-Qaida’s recruitment pool somewhat. The Libyan text has yet to make a big splash on the forums, though it is talked about. It will be very interesting to see if and how the AQ leadership will respond to the latest salvo.

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