ji·had·ica

Media Incursion of Abu al-Nur al-Maqdisi

Scott Sanford October 10, 2009

The Global Islamic Media Front, in cooperation with the Faloja Forums, has announced, “The Media Incursion of the Imam and Martyr Abu al-Nur al-Maqdisi.” It has five goals:

  1. Expose the truth about Hamas’s “crime” and “lies,” i.e. the recent attack on Jund Ansar Allah (JAA).
  2. Expose the truth about Hamas today and how it has “strayed” from its foundational roots.
  3. Let Muslims know that the money they give Hamas equates to “bullets in Muslims’ chests.”
  4. “Support the monotheistic mujahidin, who fight for the word of God and for the rule of God’s absent law.”
  5. “Distribute the legacy of the Imam Shaykh Abu al-Nur al-Maqdisi.”

Thus far, the effort consists of a new forum dedicated to Abu al-Nur al-Maqdisi on Faloja. There are not many posts yet, but several appear to be interesting, such as a photo list of JAA members killed in the battle with Hamas. Other posts include: “Two Imams of Truth: The Red Mosque and the Ibn Taymiyyah Mosque. What is the difference?”; “Was Abu al-Nur al-Maqdisi one of the Khawarij or a Tyrant?”; “Dangerous Speech: Hasan al-Banna – Hamas is not Islamic and it Claimed That”; “A Resounding Scandal: A Voice Recording Confirming the Execution of Wounded Mujahedin by Hamas During their Ride to the Hospital”; and “Hamas’s Crime in Rafah.”

This makes the split between Hamas and the salafi-jihadi movement plainly obvious. As the attack against JAA and last year’s attack on the Army of Islam indicate, Hamas is currently powerful enough to deal with these fringe elements. However, if conditions in Gaza continue to worsen or Hamas’s position becomes more perilous, these groups may gain more momentum and power, complicating any reconciliation with Fatah or Palestinian agreements with Israel.

Abu Talha the German Threatens to Attack Germany

Scott Sanford September 19, 2009

On 18 September 2009, alleged al-Qaeda operative Abu Talha al-Almani (“The German”) implicitly threatened an attack on Germany within two weeks if Germany does not withdraw its forces from Afghanistan. Here is a rough translation of what Abu Talha said:

“For the Muslims in Germany I say, Peace and God’s mercy and blessing be upon you: My beloved brothers in God, al-Qaeda requests that you keep away from everything that is not necessary in the two weeks following the elections if the German people do not decide to withdraw their troops from Afghanistan. Keep your children close to you during this time. Ask God to protect you, your children, and all the children.”

He went on to say, “To the people of Islam I say: My brothers in God! If the jihad in Germany begins, then leave al-Qaeda to work. If there were the need to move to the second level, then we will inform you of what you can do to participate in the German jihad. No matter how long the conflict lasts, the city of Kiel will remain safe. This is a promise from me.” A Faloja forum participant named Qaher commented on Abu Talha’s remarks and suggested that Kiel would not be attacked because of a new Islamic center located in the city.

Additionally, the video does not appear to be an official al-Qaida production. The beginning of the video states that it is an “al-Qaida statement”, something the organization generally does not do. Rather, the production entity will put its name on the very first section that warns others not to attach music to the video. The video also may indicate that Abu Talha is acting alone, since he noisily turned the pages of his speech while speaking instead of having someone turn cue cards.

While Abu Talha’s threat may be real, it is possible that he is operating either alone or in a very small group. The video is not up to normal al-Qaida standards, which may indicate that any attacks Abu Talha attempts to perpetrate will be equally sloppy and, hopefully, easier for security officials to prevent. It is also noteworthy that he promised not to attack Kiel. Perhaps he is from or has some connection to the city?

Libyan Jihad Revisions

Thomas Hegghammer September 8, 2009

There is a very significant development taking place in the so-called war of ideas. Senior leaders of the Libyan Islamic Fighting Group (LIFG), who recently laid down their arms, are publishing a Dr. Fadl-like treatise revising their previous understanding of jihad. The text, entitled “the Book of Correctional Studies” (kitab al-dirasat al-tashihiyya), is being published as a nine-part series on the website www.oealibya.com. You can find the first three chapters here, here and here. Unfortunately I don’t have the time to look at it in detail, but Jarret Brachman will be covering the story. He already has some interesting background info and analysis.

The text in itself is probably not a landmark work of Islamic jurisprudence, but it is important because it adds to what may now be called a corpus of treatises by former militants challenging al-Qaida on theological grounds. The trend started with al-Gamaa al-Islamiya in Egypt, continued with Dr Fadl and now it’s the LIFG’s turn. Credible MB figures like Yusuf al-Qaradawi have also chipped in. Of course, no one text is going to change the world, but put together, these treatises will constrain al-Qaida’s recruitment pool somewhat. The Libyan text has yet to make a big splash on the forums, though it is talked about. It will be very interesting to see if and how the AQ leadership will respond to the latest salvo.

Visions of Afghan and Somali Emirates

Scott Sanford August 27, 2009

On 25 August 2009, the Global Islamic Media Front (GIMF) published a plea by Dr. John Boutros for Muslims to aid the jihadi cause. He stated, “Do not mourn because the Islamic Caliphate is imminent… Trust me, the US is one or two thrusts” away from crumpling. However, in order to make this happen Muslims must give aid to the jihadis.

Boutros claimed that the United States is weak due to the financial crisis, which is allegedly causing the rich states to consider separating from the Union. He stated that militarily the United States is vulnerable because it has so many soldiers in the mountains of Pakistan and Afghanistan, and in the suburbs of Baghdad, who are easy targets. In regards to the United States homeland he continued, “Hundreds of thousand of soldiers stationed in the streets of Washington and Los Angeles wait for a martyr to cross the continents carrying a nuclear, biological, or chemical bomb.”

He alleged that from al-Qaida’s viewpoint, things are much better. Somalia is becoming more peaceful and prosperous because the Shabab al-Mujahidin are instilling sharia law and in Afghanistan the Taliban control 80% of the country while coalition forces only leave their bases in armored vehicles in the other 20%. However, the Islamic State of Iraq has made many sacrifices, as has Ansar al-Islam, who gave up their bombs, snipers, and bases.

He then stated that given the current state of affairs, if the United States fell, “In a short period, the Taliban Emirate will be a great state encompassing Afghanistan, Pakistan, Kashmir, Turkistan, and a large part of Iran.” In the western area of the Islamic world, the Shabab al-Mujahidin will control all of Somalia, Djibouti, and Sudan after the US fall. Then, he maintained, there will be justice in the Afghanistan and Somali Emirates and in other areas like Iraq, Chechnya, Algeria, and Nigeria where things will either turn around for the already established emirates or the mujahidin will prevail.

He then gets to the point of his fairytale, “After your mujahid brothers sacrifice themselves and their funds on this path, will you be stingy in support and assistance? Will you be stingy in spreading the word? Will you be stingy in financial support after many operations are canceled because of a shortage of materials like what happened during operations within Denmark?”

The fanciful nature of this report is striking even for the GIMF and I am not sure what to make of it. Is this an indication that something structurally has changed within the GIMF? Or, is it simply an attempt to garner support and the editorial staff did not realize how unrealistic it sounds? Regardless of its meaning, if this is the grand strategy of budding al-Qaida strategists, I am not worried.

Al-Maqdisi’s Online Library of Translated Jihadi Material

Scott Sanford August 2, 2009

On 2 August 2009, Abu Muhammad al-Maqdisi announced the opening of an English version of his jihadi library. In the announcement, he requested that Falluja Forum members spread the word regarding his new website and to send him any trustworthy translations.

The English website is similar to the Arabic site but it currently does not contain the same amount of content. It has translations of several of al-Maqdisi’s books, articles, and interviews such as the book “Democracy … A Relegoin [sic],” downloaded 45 times, and the article “Balancing Between Negligence and Paranoia,” downloaded 13 times.

It also has several non-attributed articles like “Advice for the Seeker of Knowledge,” downloaded 13 times, an interview with Abu Qatadah al-Filistini regarding Islam and democracy that was downloaded 11 times, and several books and articles by different authors under the headings “Paradise People Creed” and “The Absent Obligation.” Additionally, it has a series of lectures by Yusuf al-Uyayri titled, “Constants on the Path of Jihad” and two articles in Russian.

Beginning a library of translations in different languages is not just an attempt to replicate al-Maqdisi’s efforts with the Arabic library, which is quite extensive, but also to make it easier to spread the jihadi-Salafi ideology beyond Arabic speakers.

The Non-Strategic “Special Strategic Study”

Scott Sanford July 22, 2009

The “Falluja Think Tank” recently published the “Special Strategic Study of the Global Battle and the Jihadi Movement’s Place in It.” Like Thomas, I had high expectations, but was disappointed in the end because the study amounted to little more than general summaries of U.S. and jihadi history. However, the author did state that divine providence allowed 9/11 to happen, which caused the U.S. to abandon its principles of democracy and human rights.

The author started by establishing that the battle between the United States and the jihadis is religious in nature rather than geopolitical or for acquiring resources. He commented that today’s “crusaders” are not only supported by their governments, but also by the “dogmatists” like the Knights Templar and the Knights of Malta, who, he claimed, “resemble the mujahedeen because they fight for faith.”

He went on to chart America’s “path” to global dominance and then gave a history of the jihadi movement from colonialism until now. He broke the “Jihadi Path” into four distinct phases. The first was the “Popular Jihad” against colonialism that was marked by Moroccan ‘Abd-al-Karim al-Khattabi allegedly killing 25,000 “crusader” troops and capturing 20,000 others, including 95 generals and five marshals. I am not very familiar with Moroccan history, but the numbers sound highly exaggerated.

The second phase was the “Local Jihad” (الجهاد القطري) against the ruling regimes allied with the West, i.e. the near enemy. He made a point to exclude Hamas and the Moro Islamic Front because they deviated from the proper jihadi ideology.

The third phase was the “Regional Jihad,” which was the result of oppression at home that sent the jihadis elsewhere. He stated that Afghanistan was the ideal model for this because jihadis could go there, receive training, and go on to other battle fronts. He mentioned that jihadis still aid Kashmir, Somalia, the Philippines, Kosovo, Burma, and other places as well.

Finally, the fourth phase is the “Global Jihad,” which sprang from the “crusader invasion of the Arabian Peninsula” in 1990.

The meeting point of the American and jihadi paths, according to the author, was al-Qaeda drawing the U.S. into an asymmetrical conflict where al-Qaeda’s “stupid technology” (تكنلوجيا الجهل), i.e. suicide bombers, could check American technological superiority. September 11th marked the beginning of this conflict.

The author then identified two paths to victory for the jihadi movement. The first is the continuance and completion of the historical path already laid out through the previously stated four phases, while the second path is converting the West to Islam. I believe it is unlikely that either path will come to fruition. However, I have concluded that if the entire West were to convert to Islam, it should convert to Shi’a Islam in order to study the jihadi reaction.

In conclusion, the author stated that it was God’s will for 9/11 to happen because if the jihadis had conducted a nuclear attack, the whole world would be against them. However, the knee-jerk U.S. response to 9/11 and the human rights issues it raised allowed the U.S. to destroy itself without al-Qaeda taking the blame. He stated:

“If we substituted the 9/11 plan for the plan of targeting American nuclear reactors that al-Qaeda planners had previously abolished, its massive destructive damage could have reached a degree of existential disaster. If we were to have done that, America would be completely forgotten. However, the entire world would hate us for what we did to the exemplary system for human life and we would become enemies of the freedom and justice that America represents in the eyes of the people. It was God’s wisdom that struck America on its skull causing it to agitate, provoke, and anger without a care, exchanging the principle of peaceful coexistence in the shadow of the United Nations for the principle of either you are with us or against us. It caused America to substitute the principle of respecting sovereignty and referring to the Security Council for a principle of occupying two countries without physical evidence, and to exchange spreading democracy around the world to rejecting the votes of Palestinians who elected Hamas. His wisdom caused America to exchange the system of trade globalization for a system of occupying sources of raw materials, and to replace the principle of defending general freedoms and respecting human rights for the principles of Abu-Ghraib, Guantanamo, and secret prisons.”

While the “Special Strategic Study” was somewhat disappointing, the author does underline the importance, for the jihadis, of defeating America’s image abroad as a symbol of freedom. He also points out that the best way to defeat this symbol is to provoke America into destroying its own reputation. However, the author inadvertently highlights a jihadi weakness in that the jihadi ideology is too weak to destroy and replace American ideals. Only America can do that.

Abu al-Yazid Mending Fences with Hamas

Thomas Hegghammer July 10, 2009

It’s late, I know, but I couldn’t let Mustafa Abu al-Yazid’s interview with al-Jazeera go uncommented. I found it absolutely fascinating. My hat is off to Ahmad Zaydan for finding Mustafa and asking him excellent questions.

International media focused on the A-bomb remark, but this was neither a very significant or surprising part of the interview (here I agree with Dan Drezner). It was just a quick unrehearsed side comment in an answer to a question about the security of Pakistan’s nuclear weapons.

The most significant part of the interview was Abu al-Yazid’s endorsement of Hamas. “We support the sincere mujahidin in Palestine, even the mujahidin of Hamas. We support them and help them; they are our brothers; we and they have the same ideology and the same method,” Abu al-Yazid said. This is quite a different message from that of Ayman al-Zawahiri and Abu Muhammad al-Maqdisi, who have been relentless in their criticism of Hamas in the past few years.

Not surprisingly, this caused quite a debate on the forums (see also here and here), where Hamas has long been subject of criticism (see e.g. here, here and here).

Abu al-Yazid’s statement was clearly an attempt by al-Qaida to mend fences with the broader Islamist movement and reach out to a wider audience. His choice of podium was surely no coincidence, for he is well aware that most al-Jazeera viewers are sympathetic to Hamas.

It has been a while since I heard a top al-Qaida member speak as clearly and straightforwardly as Abu al-Yazid did here.  He gave simple and seemingly honest answers to questions about al-Qaida’s organizational structure in Afghanistan, attacks called off against the US, the issue of two Islamic emirates (Iraq and Afghanistan), and many other things. Rob at the Shack is also right that overall, Abu al-Yazid’s remarks were not outlandishly radical when seen from the Arab street (the nuclear remark apart, obviously).

With the Abu al-Yazid interview, al-Qaida undoubtedly regained some of the popular support lost over the past few years. It is a reminder of how good al-Qaida can be at PR when they want to.

Watch the whole thing, look at the extracts or read it – I guarantee you will not be disappointed.

Last Man Standing

Thomas Hegghammer July 3, 2009

I promised you more on Abd al-Aziz al-Julayyil, the Saudi author of the article on Obama being more dangerous than Bush. The reason I find al-Julayyil interesting is that he is among the last remaining Saudi sheikhs to play an active ideological role for the jihadi movement.

Back in the good old days of the early 2000s, there was a whole community of Saudi jihad scholars: Hamud al-Shu’aybi, Nasir al-Fahd, Ali al-Khudayr, Abd al-Rahman al-Jarbu’, Sulayman al-Alwan and many others (who all feature prominently in my forthcoming book). Around 2002 these guys were churning out pro-al-Qaida fatwas faster than you could say “al-wala’ wa’l-bara’”. But then came the 2003 terrorism campaign in Saudi Arabia, and most of them were sent to the cooler. This is why you have not heard from many radical Saudi clerics in the past five years. This is also why I have been arguing in the past years that the golden age of Saudi Arabia as an exporter of pro-al-Qaida theological treatises is largely over. While I think the argument generally holds, Abd al-Aziz al-Julayyil is now forcing me to qualify this claim.

So who is this person? According to his website, Abd al-Aziz bin Nasir bin Sa’d al-Julayyil grew up in Riyadh and studied pharmacology. He directed an Islamist publishing house called Dar Tayba li’l-Nashr wa’l-Tawzi’ for twenty years before becoming the director of their department of religious knowledge (‘ilm). He does not seem to have a formal religious education, but has studied privately under Abdallah bin Jibrin and Abd al-Rahman al-Barrak. Al-Julayyil is the author of at least ten books and studies, as well as hundreds of articles and fatwas on a variety of theological and political issues.

Al-Julayyil was always a slightly more moderate figure than the abovementioned scholars that I have called “the Shu’aybi school”. Stephane Lacroix tells me al-Julayyil was closer to the Sahwa (the centrist mainstream of Saudi Islamism), more specifically its “Sururi“ branch (named after Muhammad Surur Zayn al-Abidin). Indeed al-Julayyil does not (yet) have his own entry on the online reference library for jihadi literature, Minbar al-Tawhid, which suggests he is not part of the canon of jihadi ideologues.

Still, his hardline views on international political issues place him on the radical end of the Sahwist spectrum. In the heated political atmosphere of 2002 Saudi Arabia, al-Julayyil displayed sympathies toward the Shu’aybi school. He notably endorsed a statement by Nasir al-Fahd in June 2002 which lambasted Sahwist icons Salman al-Awda and Safar al-Hawali for signing the declaration entitled “How we can coexist”, which had been the conciliatory gesture in response to the statement by US intellectuals entitled “What we are fighting for”.

Al-Julayyil became famous in the jihadi community with his 2005 book “Jihadi Education in the Light of the Qur’an and the Sunna”, which has been widely disseminated on the forums. More recently, Abd al-Aziz al-Julayyil’s writings have surfaced in online jihadi magazines. His Obama article in the Taliban-affiliated al-Sumud is the least noteworthy, given that support for the Taliban – as opposed to al-Qaida – is not very controversial in Saudi Arabia. (Stéphane told me mainstream Sahwhists such as Nasir al-Umar have publicly praised the Taliban in recent years). More interesting is al-Julayyil’s appearance in Sada al-Jihad, a magazine, which is ideologically much closer to al-Qaida’s anti-western global jihadism.

Admittedly, al-Julayyil probably does not take commissions directly from these magazines; instead he posts his articles on his website, and then magazine editors reproduce them.  Moreover, none of what al-Julayyil is saying is particularly radical by global jihadi standards or by the standards of the Shu’aybi school in 2002.

But in 2009 he stands out as perhaps the most radical voice in the non-clandestine Saudi Islamist movement. And even if he is not directly in touch with editors of Sada al-Jihad, he operates one of the most radical personal websites of any Saudi sheikh. Finally, the very fact that Sada al-Jihad is printing al-Julayyil’s work – and not that of other Saudi sheikhs – suggests his role differs from that of other Sahwists.

Importantly, there is uncertainty as to whether or not al-Julayyil is in prison. On the one hand, his website lists his Burayda office address and phone number, as well as his lecture schedule (every Friday evening in the Prince Nayif Mosque (!) in al-Suwaydi in Riyadh). On the other hand, forum messages strongly suggest he is, or recently was, in prison.  When some of his articles were posted on Faluja and on his website in May, many readers’ comments included the expression “May God secure his release”, which is the standard phrase used of imprisoned mujahidin or ulama.

All this leaves two crucial questions unanswered: Is al-Julayyil in prison? And how is he able to write what he writes when other Saudi sheikhs are not? If any of you (Saud? Nawaf? Bernard? Stephane?) have more insights on this, I would love to know.

Why is al-Sahab Called al-Sahab?

Thomas Hegghammer June 15, 2009

This excellent question was raised in a comment to an earlier Jihadica piece. Since it probably interests a wider audience, I figured I should devote a separate post to it.

Most readers probably know that the word sahab means “clouds” and that it emerged as the name of al-Qaida’s media production company around 2002. But why would al-Qaida name the mouthpiece of global jihad after something as wishy-washy as a cloud?

The answer is that the word figures in a common epithet of God, namely مجري السحاب (mujri al-sahab) meaning “Mover of the Clouds”. The name usually features in the expression منزل الكتاب ومجري السحاب وهازم الأحزاب (munzil al-kitab wa mujri al-sahab wa hazim al-ahzab), “Revealer of the Holy Book, Mover of the clouds and Defeater of the clans”. This expression in turn occurs in a famous night prayer uttered by the Prophet Muhammad during one of his military expeditions.

As it happens, this is also the opening phrase of the 1998 Declaration of the World Islamic Front for Jihad against the Jews and the Crusaders . Bin Ladin must have been personally quite fond of this prayer, for it also appears in the 1996 Declaration of jihad against the Americans (see here, p. 140,), and at the very end of Bin Ladin’s December 1998 interview with al-Jazeera (see here, p. 176). It also appears in the letter left behind by the 9/11 hijackers (see here, p. 221).

With this in mind, the choice of al-Sahab as the name of al-Qaida’s media bureau makes perfect sense. The word goes back to the earliest days of Islam, evokes a difficult stage in the Prophet’s war against the infidels, echoes the opening of al-Qaida’s most important declaration, and suggests that the Almighty is behind the propaganda effort, since He is the “Mover of al-Sahab.” In my view it is a brilliant name.

I should mention that I haven’t seen this particular explanation in al-Qaida’s own publications (or anywhere else), but I am convinced I am on the right track. I welcome any alternative readings or additional insights from our readers. I would be particularly interested in hearing from the Islamologists among you about the connotations and classical use of the abovementioned prayer. Out of all the prayers uttered by the Prophet, why did Bin Ladin like this particular one?

Another issue for discussion concerns the precise circumstances of the foundation of al-Sahab. When and by whom exactly was it founded, and what was its first declaration? The accounts that I have seen and heard all provide different answers. I might post on this later if time allows.

The Gadahn Factor

Thomas Hegghammer June 14, 2009

Adam Gadahn aka Azzam al-Amriki has appeared in a new videotape focusing on Palestine. This is the latest in a massive 6-month media offensive by al-Qaida central to lay claim to the Palestinian cause and to discredit US president Obama.

It is not clear when the 35-minute tape was made; it mentions Obama’s April speech to the Turkish parliament, but not his recent Middle East tour. The 35-minute tape was probably recorded some time in April, for it is dated Rabi al-Akhir, which ended on 25 April, and there are no references in the speech to events after that. Gadahn looks as serious as ever; his beard has grown and his spoken classical Arabic has improved (although he is clearly reading from a teleprompter).

It is worth noting that he is speaking on a general topic (Palestine) as opposed to a US-specific one, and that he is introduced as Adam Yahya Gadhan and not Azzam al-Amriki. This suggest al-Qaida is trying to promote him as an ideologue in his own right, and not just as “the American guy”. Both Jarret and Evan both seem to think this is a bad idea seen from AQ’s perspective. I am not so sure.

Many have highlighted Gadahn’s anecdote about his Jewish grandfather and relatives in Tel Aviv. What I find more interesting about the tape is the way in which Gadahn goes “back to the basics” – outlining the principles of global jihadi doctrine in very clear terms – while offering original arguments and examples.

First, he places the United States on the top of the enemy hierarchy. “Responsibility for the continuation of suffering of the Palestinian people begins in the White House and ends in the palaces of the [Muslim regime] leaders who collude with the Jews and Christians.” In an interesting new line of argument, Gadahn blames Obama for the Gaza campaign, pointing to the fact that the campaign occurred after his election and that president-elects have access to classified briefings during the transition period.  Another original point is that Obama’s conciliatory speeches expressing good intentions toward Islam mean nothing, because even Israeli Prime Minister Netanyahu made a famously conciliatory speech in 1996.

Second, Gadahn explains the need for global operations and dismisses the nationalist approach to the Palestinian struggle. It is wrong, he argues, to distinguish between Zionist-Crusader interests within Palestine and Zionist-Crusader interests in the rest of the world. Why should Muslims limit their operations to Israel/Palestine when Israel attacks wherever she wants, such as in Sudan, Syria, Lebanon, Iraq and elsewhere?

Third, he dismisses the distinction between Israel, the United States and Europe. “How can we differentiate between those who kill Muslims in Palestine and those who defend those who kill Muslims in Palestine? [..] And how can we differentiate between those who kill Muslims in Palestine and those who kill Muslims in other places on earth, like Iraq, Afghanistan and Chechnya?” Aiming at Palestinian nationalists, he blasts the strategy of “ingratiating ourselves with [the US and Europe] in the hope that they will back our national cause, as some like to call it.” As far as Europe is concerned, the involvement of NATO in Afghanistan and the choice of Anders Fogh Rasmussen, Danish prime minister at the time of the cartoon controversy, as NATO secretary general, show that Europeans are enemies of Muslims. By the way, Fogh Rasmussen is mentioned no less than three times, thus setting new Danish record for the number of times referenced in an AQ statement.

Gadhan’s speech is relatively succinct, clear and commonsensical. What we are seeing here is basically Anglo-Saxon rhetorical principles applied to jihadi propaganda. We are also seeing new examples and arguments brought in to refresh the somewhat repetitive global jihadi rhetoric. Gadahn, in other words, is doing more for al-Sahab than improving their English translations.

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