ji·had·ica

Jihadis Respond to Hamas Attack on Jund Ansar Allah

Scott Sanford August 20, 2009

The forums are ablaze with postings regarding the 14 August 2009 Hamas attack on the Ibn Taymiya Mosque that Jund Ansar Allah (JAA), a group espousing Salafi-jihadi ideology, controlled.  Hamas assaulted the mosque in response to JAA leader Abd al-Latif Musa, AKA Abu al-Nur al-Maqdisi, declaring an Islamic emirate in Gaza and general JAA criminal activity. Not surprisingly, commentators are condemning Hamas’s actions and linking these actions to a larger Muslim Brotherhood and Iranian conspiracy to combat Salafi-jihadis.

Akram Hijazi claimed that Hamas has distorted the facts surrounding Salafi-jihadi groups. He maintained that through its violent targeting of Salafi-jihadis like the Army of Islam, whom Hamas also largely destroyed in September 2008, and now the JAA, Hamas is effectively practicing takfir against its fellow Muslims. In regards to the declared Islamic emirate, Hijazi stated that anyone who “read the emirate announcement well” knows that it was very general, for all of Palestine, and did not threaten Hamas’s authority. Hijazi exonerated JAA from any accusations Hamas has made against the group and he declared Hamas as the real criminal group in Gaza.

Hijazi also railed against Hamas in a second article stating that the Salafi-jihadis are not against pious Hamas members, but rather they are against Hamas hypocrites and liars. He used Ahmad Yassin and Abd al-Aziz al-Rantisi, both former Hamas leaders who Israel assassinated in 2004, as examples of good Hamas members. He went on to claim that the Salafi-jihadis were the first to attack former Fatah chief in Gaza Muhammad Dahlan, the Oslo Accords, and Mahmud Abbas.

These assertions are important because Hamas members consider Yassin and al-Rantisi good leaders, but now Hijazi is linking these leaders with the Salafi-jihadi movement, of which Yassin and al-Rantisi were not a part. In short, Hijazi is attempting to hijack the legacy of these leaders from Hamas to the Salafi-jihadi cause, giving latter more credibility. His comments about Dahlan, Oslo, and Abbas reiterate this point because Hamas is famous for its opposition to these Fatah symbols, not the Salafi-jihadis who played a minor, if any, role in opposing Fatah and its goals.

Hijazi was not the only commentator who attempted to lure rank-and-file Hamas members towards Salafi-jihadism. Hani Siba’i, a radical preacher in the UK, claimed the Muslim Brotherhood and Hamas have strayed from the right path and true Islam. He encouraged ordinary Hamas members to turn against the group by adjusting its slogan of “death in the path of God” to “death in the path of the man-made parliament.”

It is not surprising that jihadi commentators are condemning Hamas for its attack against the JAA. However, their attempts to exploit this event to their advantage by luring Hamas members away from the movement are interesting. To do this, propagandists are linking Hamas symbolism and achievements to Salafi-jihadism and reaching out to rank-and-file members. As long as Hamas remains in control of Gaza, this attempt will not likely achieve many results. However, if Hamas starts to lose control, either physically or ideologically, Salafi-jihadis may see a boon in recruitment, which will mean more violence in Gaza and against Israel.  

Shishani on Salafi-Jihadism in the Levant

Scott Sanford July 2, 2009

On 29 June 2009, the Jordanian journalist Murad Batal al-Shishani published an article in al-Hayat titled “Salafi–Jihadism: A New Face in Jordan, Lebanon, and Syria’s Palestinian Camps.” The article talks about the new generation of “neo-Zarqawis” and the increasing radicalization of Palestinian refugees. This radicalisation, he argues, stems from the failure to resolve the Arab-Israeli Conflict, the deterioration of the PLO and its control over the refugee camps, the political ramifications of the Fatah-Hamas conflict, and rising poverty and unemployment. Al-Shishani states that attacks such as the 2008 incident in Jordan where Thaer al-Wahidi, a refugee from the al-Baq’ah refugee camp, assaulted a Lebanese classical music troupe, are emblematic of this phenomenon.

Al-Shishani argues that the Salafi-jihadi ideology in the refugee camps has come in three phases. The first was the establishment of the ideology in the mid-1980s. The establishment of ‘Usbat al-Ansar in the Ain al-Hilweh refugee camp in southern Lebanon was typical of this phase. According to al-Shishani, this period witnessed the beginning of nationalist groups using Islamic slogans and the establishment of Hamas and the Islamic Jihad.

Al-Shishani writes that the second phase was when the Salafi-jihadis started playing a larger role in sheltering and training non-Palestinian Salafi-jihadis. Al-Shishani cited the 2003 bombing of the McDonalds in Lebanon by the Yemeni Muammar al-Awami as an example of this development.

According to al-Shishani, the third phase is when the Salafi-jihadi ideology becomes the primary ideology for Palestinian youth in the camps. This phase is occurring now,  as individuals and small groups are increasingly taking up the ideology. Al-Shishani states that the members of this new generation “are described as ‘neo-Zarqawis,’” and are the legacy of the Levantine Salafi-jihadi current that Abu Musab al-Zarqawi started in his Afghan training camp in 2000. They believe the route to Israel is through Iraq. Al-Shishani maintains that this trend is regional, centering on Iraq, Syria, Jordan, and Lebanon, and it rejects the Salafi-jihadism of Abu Muhammad al-Maqdisi (more on the al-Maqdisi dispute here and here).

In describing the Salafi-jihadi situation in Jordan, al-Shishani states that the refugee camp in Irbid has become a transit point for foreign fighters headed to Iraq and this is important because commentators normally associate Salafi-jihadism in Jordan with the cities of Zarqa, Salt, and Maan in addition to Palestinians not living in camps and East Jordanians. According to al-Shishani, Irbid is where the leader of al-Wahidi’s cell, Shakir ‘Umar al-Khatib, recruited al-Wahidi and called on Palestinians to join “the fighters in Iraq and Lebanon.”

For Lebanon, al-Shishani agrees with Omayma Abdel-Latif, a research associate at the Carnegie Endowment’s Middle East Center, that Lebanon is “fertile ground” for radical Salafi organizations. The lack of official Lebanese control over the camps, due to a previous agreement between Palestinian factions and the Lebanese government, compounds this threat.

Unfortunately, due to the lack of information, al-Shishani does not provide many details of the situation in Syria except to say that there have been clashes between militants in the Yarmuk refugee camp and the Syrian government.

The study of Salafi-jihadism in the Levant often takes a backseat to that of Iraq and AfPak, and to that of Hamas and Hezbollah, but, as al-Shishani indicates, the ideology does have a persistent and dangerous following in the region. If the modicum of stability that Iraq currently enjoys holds after the US withdrawal, the next logical endpoint for the neo-Zarqawis would be the Palestinian Territories, where they could act as spoilers to any possible peace initiatives.

The Gadahn Factor

Thomas Hegghammer June 14, 2009

Adam Gadahn aka Azzam al-Amriki has appeared in a new videotape focusing on Palestine. This is the latest in a massive 6-month media offensive by al-Qaida central to lay claim to the Palestinian cause and to discredit US president Obama.

It is not clear when the 35-minute tape was made; it mentions Obama’s April speech to the Turkish parliament, but not his recent Middle East tour. The 35-minute tape was probably recorded some time in April, for it is dated Rabi al-Akhir, which ended on 25 April, and there are no references in the speech to events after that. Gadahn looks as serious as ever; his beard has grown and his spoken classical Arabic has improved (although he is clearly reading from a teleprompter).

It is worth noting that he is speaking on a general topic (Palestine) as opposed to a US-specific one, and that he is introduced as Adam Yahya Gadhan and not Azzam al-Amriki. This suggest al-Qaida is trying to promote him as an ideologue in his own right, and not just as “the American guy”. Both Jarret and Evan both seem to think this is a bad idea seen from AQ’s perspective. I am not so sure.

Many have highlighted Gadahn’s anecdote about his Jewish grandfather and relatives in Tel Aviv. What I find more interesting about the tape is the way in which Gadahn goes “back to the basics” – outlining the principles of global jihadi doctrine in very clear terms – while offering original arguments and examples.

First, he places the United States on the top of the enemy hierarchy. “Responsibility for the continuation of suffering of the Palestinian people begins in the White House and ends in the palaces of the [Muslim regime] leaders who collude with the Jews and Christians.” In an interesting new line of argument, Gadahn blames Obama for the Gaza campaign, pointing to the fact that the campaign occurred after his election and that president-elects have access to classified briefings during the transition period.  Another original point is that Obama’s conciliatory speeches expressing good intentions toward Islam mean nothing, because even Israeli Prime Minister Netanyahu made a famously conciliatory speech in 1996.

Second, Gadahn explains the need for global operations and dismisses the nationalist approach to the Palestinian struggle. It is wrong, he argues, to distinguish between Zionist-Crusader interests within Palestine and Zionist-Crusader interests in the rest of the world. Why should Muslims limit their operations to Israel/Palestine when Israel attacks wherever she wants, such as in Sudan, Syria, Lebanon, Iraq and elsewhere?

Third, he dismisses the distinction between Israel, the United States and Europe. “How can we differentiate between those who kill Muslims in Palestine and those who defend those who kill Muslims in Palestine? [..] And how can we differentiate between those who kill Muslims in Palestine and those who kill Muslims in other places on earth, like Iraq, Afghanistan and Chechnya?” Aiming at Palestinian nationalists, he blasts the strategy of “ingratiating ourselves with [the US and Europe] in the hope that they will back our national cause, as some like to call it.” As far as Europe is concerned, the involvement of NATO in Afghanistan and the choice of Anders Fogh Rasmussen, Danish prime minister at the time of the cartoon controversy, as NATO secretary general, show that Europeans are enemies of Muslims. By the way, Fogh Rasmussen is mentioned no less than three times, thus setting new Danish record for the number of times referenced in an AQ statement.

Gadhan’s speech is relatively succinct, clear and commonsensical. What we are seeing here is basically Anglo-Saxon rhetorical principles applied to jihadi propaganda. We are also seeing new examples and arguments brought in to refresh the somewhat repetitive global jihadi rhetoric. Gadahn, in other words, is doing more for al-Sahab than improving their English translations.

When Hamas is not Islamic Enough (Part 1)

Scott Sanford May 27, 2009

On 4 May 2009, Abu Yunis al-Abbasi wrote an article critiquing Hamas’s supposed “neglect” in implementing strict sharia law in Gaza. He claimed that his article was a response to a lecture that two alleged Hamas jurisprudents, Mazen Haniyah and Wael al-Zard, gave to the student council at the Islamic University in Gaza. His critique provides excellent insight into many of the issues takfiris have with Hamas since it took power in Gaza.

Al-Abbasi started his article emphatically stating, “Our demand is sharia rule, it is not a demand for implementing boundaries only,” implying Hamas is only employing partial sharia law and that will not do. He stated that sharia law is important for five reasons:

  1. Protecting Islam by punishing those who leave it with death
  2. Protecting oneself by punishing aggression with “reprisal”
  3. Protecting the mind by punishing aggression upon it with 80 lashes, an example of violating the mind is drinking alcohol
  4. Protecting honor from slander with the punishment of 80 lashes
  5. Protecting money from stealing with the punishment of amputation

Al-Abbasi claimed that a common question regarding Hamas’s use of law is, “Isn’t this implementing the provisions of sharia?” He replied that the need to ask such a question proves that Hamas is not employing full sharia law, which is “a great defect.” However, he did provide several of the examples al-Zard gave allegedly demonstrating how Hamas has employed many aspects of sharia such as “jihad and martyrdom …  steadfastness in the face of a series of struggles, and banishing drugs and debauchery.” He cited four reasons why these claims are incorrect. First, he maintained that Hamas achieved most of its accomplishments before it seized power in Gaza.  Therefore, the accomplishments could not be a result of sharia. Second, he stated that Hamas’s assertion that it was steadfast “in the face of a series of struggles” is incorrect because it is based on nationalism, not sharia. Third, in regards to Hamas and drugs, he mentioned that every government fights drugs and that Hamas is using temporal laws to fight drugs instead of God’s law. He complained that Hamas does not attempt to right the supposed other wrongs in society like makeup, unveiling, and “shameless parties.” Finally, he faulted Hamas for supposedly using many sources of law, like the Bible and Torah, as well as the Quran. He claimed that this is grounds for being an infidel and furthered his point by stating that the Mongols and the Jahiliyah period Arabs, presumably all infidels, used varied sources as well.

Allegedly, al-Zard stated that if Hamas ruled by sharia, the results would be negative. Al-Abbasi responded by citing evidence that when Muhammad was surrounded in Medina during the Battle of the Ditch, he did not give up Islam. Al-Abbasi continued, “Who ordered us to rule by sharia? Was it not God? Therefore, it is not permissible for us to fear anyone when we implement it because he who orders us to implement sharia will defend us and will not surrender us to our enemy when they fight and make war upon us.” It is possible that when al-Zard spoke of the negative results from implementing sharia, he was speaking about the probable negative repercussions to Hamas’s popularity. Gazans may be conservative, but there is little evidence that they aspire to a Taliban-like state as al-Abbasi proposes.

Al-Abbasi continued his attack with four responses to al-Zard’s supposed commentary that implementing sharia is not possible because Hamas is not powerful enough. First, he claimed that executing temporal law also requires power and since Hamas has enough power to implement temporal law, there is no reason for the organization to not employ sharia. Second, he maintained that since the Hamas government is independent it should be able to institute sharia, even if it is under siege. He cited the Taliban’s destruction of the Buddha statues in 2001 as evidence of a government under siege that was still able to assert its authority using sharia. Third, he maintained that if Hamas can defeat Israel, it could implement sharia. Finally, he claimed that the Taliban, the Islamic State of Iraq (ISI), and the Shabab al-Mujahideen all successfully implemented sharia. Thus, Hamas can too. Again, al-Abbasi ignored the popular backlash that resulted due to the Taliban and the ISI supposedly ruling by sharia law.

Finally, al-Abbasi countered al-Zard’s supposed claims that Hamas has found a middle way in Islam by “feeding the hungry, not amputating the hand of the thief.” He stated, “Islam is the religion of moderation, without a doubt. However, moderation is not limited to whims and temperaments. Rather, it is bounded by legal guidance from the Quran and the Sunnah.” Unlike Hamas, takfiri organizations are not known for their charitable work, another reason why they generally are not very popular in the communities they wish to rule.

This summary of the first half of al-Abbasi’s argument illustrates some of the ideological differences between Hamas and takfiris. (Look here for Abu Muhammad al-Maqdisi’s take on Hamas.) Al-Abbasi was emphatic in stating that Hamas has not implemented what he considered sharia law and that the organization does not intend to do so anytime soon, which he believed is a mistake. Thus far, al-Abbasi has refused to consider that the extreme nature of the ISI and al Qaeda makes them unpopular in the Arab world. This lack of retrospection will lead like-minded individuals and groups to new failures and will make it difficult for them to achieve a large following in the Palestinian Territories.

The Islamic State of Iraq in Gaza?

Scott Sanford May 18, 2009

On 15 May 2009, Falluja Forum contributor Wahj al-Rasas (Blazing Bullets) posted photos of leaflets the Islamic State of Iraq (ISI) supposedly distributed recently in Gaza. The leaflets claim that the recent announcement of Abu-Omar al-Baghdadi’s capture is a fabrication, the ISI does not know the identity of the person in the alleged photos of al-Baghdadi, and al-Baghdadi is doing just fine. The leaflets were signed by the “Ministry of Information / The Islamic State of Iraq” and the “the al-Shahid Abi-Mus’ab al-Zarqawi Brigade for Jihadi Media Jerusalem.”

The content of the announcement is not surprising, given al-Baghdadi has already released a statement refuting claims of his capture, and it is possible that the announcement is a forgery. However, if it is legitimate, it is interesting that the ISI would be so concerned about how Palestinians perceived the alleged al-Baghdadi capture – I have not seen a special ISI statement issued by a Somalia, North African, or Yemeni ISI branch. Additionally, it could indicate that the ISI is looking beyond Iraq and has already started activities in Gaza. It remains unclear whether or not these activities are merely for propaganda value, i.e. another attempt to connect the Palestinian issue to the wider global jihad, or an actual effort to build an ISI presence in Gaza. However, if it is the latter, the ISI faces a step uphill battle because, as I have argued previously, it is unlikely that Hamas will allow a competing organization to operate in Gaza freely.

Back

Thomas Hegghammer March 26, 2009

I have been busy the past two weeks, but the jihadis have been busier. Bin Ladin has issued two audio statements, one proposing practical steps to liberate Palestine and the other about the treacherous government in Somalia. Al-Zawahiri warned against the forthcoming Crusader attack on Sudan, while Mustafa Abu al-Yazid has addressed the people of Pakistan. Abu Umar al-Baghdadi has spoken about the US plan to withdraw from Iraq, but he does not seem to get the same attention from the online community as his colleagues in Afghanistan. Abu Qatada has issued a statement from prison about the decision to extradite him to Jordan. Fatah al-Islam sharia officer Abu Abdallah al-Maqdisi has been taking questions since Monday, but nobody is allowed to ask about Shakir al-Absi or Asad al-Jihad2 (hmm).

On the magazine front, Sumud 33  has been out for a little while. Fortunately Sada al-Malahim 8 came out on Sunday so now Greg can sleep again. Turkestan al-Islamiyya 3 came out earlier this week, adding to the past month’s increasing flow of Uighur jihadi propaganda.

We have also seen the publication of a couple of unusual videos featuring Abu Muhammad al-Maqdisi, one with him delivering a funeral sermon in front of a crowd of several hundred people, and another showing him at a large wedding alongside half the jihadi community in Zarqa.  I suspect these videos are part of an attempt to bolster al-Maqdisi’s legitimacy by showing that he is enjoying freedom of movement and expression. By the way I highly recommend the 2-hour wedding video. It offers a fascinating inside look into the sociology of Islamism. It serves as a great illustration of a point I made in a recent article about Zarqa, namely that you cannot deradicalise entire communities. The film may depress you, but you might enjoy the songs.

I will be back soon with a report from the jihadi roundtable in Oslo.

Update (27 March): The Christian Science Monitor became the first Western newspaper to report on the Maqdisi controversy today – and Jihadica is mentioned.

Document (Arabic): 03-26-09-shouraa-mustafa-abu-al-yazid
Document (Arabic): 03-19-09-shouraa-abu-qatada-statement
Document (Arabic): 03-23-09-shamikh-abu-abdallah-al-maqdisi-qa
Document (Arabic): 03-22-09-shouraa-sada-al-malahim-8
Document (Arabic): 03-25-09-shouraa-turkestan-al-islamiyya-3
Document (Arabic): 03-12-09-faloja-maqdisi-fima-kuntum
Document (Arabic): 03-12-09-ansar-maqdisi-wedding-video

Magazine Update

Thomas Hegghammer February 12, 2009

It has been a good week for jihadi magazine buffs. There are new issues of Qadaya Jihadiyya and Tala‘i Khurasan, as well as two brand new magazines, Sawt al-Qawqaliz (sic) and Markaz Ansar al-I‘lam.

The newcomers are not particularly impressive and I do not expect them to last long in the fiercely competitive world of jihadi media. Sawt al-Qawqaliz seems intended as a mouthpiece for the Caucasus Emirate, and it is clearly the work of non-native Arabic speakers, for the language is full or errors and low on idiom. Incidentally, I cannot figure out what “Qawqaliz” is supposed to mean (suggestions anyone?). It could simply be a misspelling of Qawqaz, but how could they get the very name of the magazine wrong? In terms of content, the 24-page publication is almost entirely focused on Caucasian issues and does not even mention Gaza. The Shabab of Somalia are the only outsiders to receive a mention, though only at the very end. The PDF file is clumsily assembled and reads from the bottom upwards.

The 21-page Markaz Ansar al-I‘lam is more difficult to place geographically and the editors claim independence “from any organization, foundation or media front”. But there is very little original material here. It is basically a cut-and-paste job with old articles from the jihadi Internet and the mainstream press. Articles by a “young man from Gaza” and by Abd al-Bari Atwan give the magazine a certain Palestinian focus, but that is not surprising given the current political climate.

The fifth issue of Qadaya Jihadiyya is considerably more impressive than the newcomers. With its high-quality photos and witty editorial style, this is the Vogue Magazine of jihadi media. QJ is affiliated with the al-Yaqin media center, but it is not easy to place geographically. My guess is that the editors are based somewhere in the Levant, but it’s just a guess. The latest 21-page issue is devoted to Gaza and has an interesting strategic study which concludes that there was no clear winner in the latest war, but the final outcome will be decided by the next Palestinian elections. If Hamas gains political ground vis a vis Abu Mazen, Israel’s strategy will have failed.

The thirteenth issue of Tala‘i Khurasan is also well produced, and with its 90 pages it is one of the chunkier publications on the market. As its name suggests, it is produced by Arabs in Afghanistan, and it has several high-profile contributors, such as Sheikh Atiyat Allah, Mustafa Abu Yazid and Abu Yahya al-Libi. As such, it is perhaps the jihadi magazine with the closest links to al-Qaida Central, although not to Bin Ladin and al-Zawahiri. Interestingly, this issue does not have much material on Gaza. The cover story is a very interesting strategic study of the impact of 9/11 on Pakistan, and the rest of the magazine is devoted to either general jihadi culture or to Afghanistan-related developments. It is possible that most of the magazine was assembled before the Gaza debacle. The last issue came in October 2008, and many of the field reports in the current issue date from August and September 2008.

Here are the tables of contents:

Sawt al-Qawqaliz
•    Commander Dawud: “This year was a successful one for us”
•    A word from the Chechen leader Dokka Umarov on the establishment of the Caucasus Emirate
•    Shaykh Sa‘id Buryatski: “How I went out for jihad and what I saw in the Caucasus”
•    Yudugov: “The key to security in south Caucasus is hidden in the north Caucasus”
•    The infidels crushed … because of the union of the Muslims in the Caucasus
•    Commander Hussain:  All the Mujahidin received the decision by Commander Dokka on the Qawqaz Emirate with great joy
•    Experiences of brother Abu Umran
•    Letter from the Chechen leader martyr Abd al-Halim Saidulayev on the preparation to announce an Islamic state
•    Kazbak, the “Lion of Cherkessia”
•    The freedom of Chechnya is a matter of time
•    Everything starts with the small things
•    Students of Daghestan want a life governed by Sharia
•    When Muslims leave jihad, God punishes us.
•    The theory of the unity of religions is a notion of infidelity, atheism and heresy
•    The Emirate’s agency obtains recording of the collaboration of Zakayev with the infidel Russians
•    Martyrdom of Commander Walid in Ingushetia
•    Greetings to the Shabab in Somalia

Markaz Ansar al-I‘lam
•    The bedouin and politics
•    When victory is slow (Sayyid Qutb)
•    And the martyrs are taken from you (Hussain bin Mahmud)
•    Memoirs of a young man from Gaza
•    The smuggling will continue until its targets are reached (Abd al-Bari Atwan)
•    The Pakistani Taliban
•    The raid of love for the Prophet
•    The power is in firing (Abu Umar al-Kurdi)
•    Memories of the assassination of the martyr leader Khattab

Qadaya Jihadiyya
•    Gaza under Zionist siege and anti-Islamic silence (Suhayb al-Ghazzawi)
•    To the honourable scholars of the Muslim nation (Abu Abdallah al-Shafi‘i)
•    The Battle of Gaza: Who wins and who loses (Khalid Abd al-Rahman al-Nubi)
•    Palestine between the diplomacy of Hamas and the viciousness of the Arab regimes (Muadh al-Khuwsti)
•    Gaza facing a war more dangerous than the military one (Abu Taha al-Miqdad)

Tala‘i Khurasan
•    The impact of 9/11 on the crusader assault and the internal Pakistani front (Husam Abd al-Ra’uf)
•    Spend at your leisure (Sheikh Atiyat Allah)
•    Divine directions (Mustafa Abu Yazid)
•    Al-Zarqawi and the speech of memories (Abu Ubayda al-Maqdisi)
•    In the shadow of the quranic verse (Sheikh Mansur al-Shami)
•    Signs of victory emerging in Afghanistan (Sheikh Abdallah Sa‘id)
•    Field reports
•    The Ansar (Shakir Allah al-Kuwaiti)
•    Frostbite (Dr. Abu Abd al-Rahman al-Makki )
•    Witticisms from literary books (Ja‘far al-Tayyar)
•    Messengers of Destinies (Abu Ubayda al-Maqdisi)
•    Mother of believers Khadija bint Khuwaylid (Atiyat Allah Abu Abd al-Rahman)
•    If I were Bin Ladin I would declare it: The success of the strategy – part 1 of 2 (Abu al-Futuh al-Maghribi)
•    Abu Abdallah al-Shami: Journey of martyrdom (Abu Yahya al-Libi)
•    Reviving the hope – and how sweet the feeling of hope (Mujahid)

Document (Arabic): 02-02-09-faloja-sawt-al-qawqaliz-1
Document (Arabic): 02-08-09-faloja-ansar-al-ilam-1
Document (Arabic): 02-07-09-faloja-qadaya-jihadiya-5
Document (Arabic): 02-11-09-faloja-talai-khurasan-13

Gaza Galore in New Issue of Sada al-Jihad

Thomas Hegghammer January 28, 2009

The thirty-second issue of the ever so slick magazine Sada al-Jihad is out. Like the rest of jihadi media these days, it focuses on Gaza. Practically the entire 41-page journal is devoted to Palestine, and the front page features a close-up picture of the blood-stained face of a Palestinian child. However, the articles do not seem to contain many original viewpoints and analyses. They highlight the civilian suffering, the treason of the Arab leaders, and the futility of the moderate  Muslim Brotherhood approach. Much of this has been heard before.

But this does not mean the Gaza rhetoric is inconsequential. For many I am stating the obvious, but the Israeli assault on Gaza has greatly benefited al-Qaida propagandists and recruiters. In 2007 and 2008, the global jihadist message was losing some of its resonance, partly as a result of Iraq’s sectarian turn, bickering within the jihadi movement, and the absence of new symbols of Muslim suffering. Gaza reinvigorated the global jihadist movement and provided a much-needed new rallying cause. I do not doubt that we will soon feel its repercussions in the form of new recruitment and perhaps more violent activity. By the way, it is a relief to finally see Western officials such as Alan West publicly recognizing the connection between Palestine and global jihadism.

The last time Palestine caused a similar stir was during the early days of the al-Aqsa intifada, which was then accompanied by a massive increase in the flow of recruits to al-Qaida camps in Afghanistan. Today the impact will be somewhat more difficult to measure, since new recruits have fewer places to go, but I would not be surprised if we see an increase in the number of people trying to go to Iraq, Afghanistan and other jihad fronts.

We are also starting to see foreign volunteers making it to the battlefront in Palestine. Princeton Professor Bernard Haykel kindly brought to my attention the martyrdom biography of a Saudi fighter named Abu Muhammad al-Marri who was recently killed in Gaza. Although he is not the first Saudi to try to join the jihad in Palestine,  he is, to my knowledge, the first to die in combat there. The novelty is not that foreign jihadists want to fight in Palestine – they always wanted to – but rather that al-Marri made it through and was allowed to fight by the Palestinians. There are three ways to interpret this report: 1) as a fluke – al-Marri had a Palestinian wife so he may not have been seen as an outsider; 2) as reflecting a decision by Hamas to allow in a Saudi or two to embarrass the Saudis, or 3) as reflecting a strategic decision by Hamas to accommodate more foreign volunteers. Only time will show which one it is.

Meanwhile, here is the table of contents of Sada al-Jihad 32:

•    The Gaza war: if we lose, our enemies will benefit (leader)
•    Hamas: correct the basis and fear God, not people (by Abu Muhammad al-Maqdisi)
•    Gaza, attacked by the Jews and besieged by the apostates and the infidels (Abd al-Aziz al-Julayyil)
•    The Gaza massacre and the siege of the traitors (Ayman al-Zawahiri)
•    Gaza, a war that distinguished the ranks and uncovered positions (Sada al-Jihad special)
•    Reflections on the jurisprudence of jihad (part 2) (Muhammad al-Shaybani)
•    Believers are brothers (Abu Umar al-Baghdadi)
•    A call for jihad and to end the aggression on Gaza (Usama bin Ladin)
•    The lies of the blood profiteers are uncovered in the cities of Gaza and al-Ahya (Abu Taha al-Miqdad)
•    The great scandal (Ahmad al-Masri)
•    Will Palestinians understand those waging war on them? (Akram Hijazi)
•    Amir al-Shihri (Abu Hilal)
•    How do you confront an interrogator?
•    A call to the monotheists

Document (Arabic): 01-28-09-faloja-sada-al-jihad-32

Document (Arabic): 01-28-09-almoltaqa-saudi-martyr-in-gaza

Bin Laden And Zawahiri Not Sharing Talking Points

Will McCants January 14, 2009

It’s interesting to compare Bin Laden’s new statement on Gaza with Zawahiri’s of last week.  Of course the overarching message–jihad now!–is the same.  But unlike Zawahiri, Bin Laden doesn’t mock Obama, he doesn’t echo Zawahiri’s call for demonstrations in Egypt (Bin Laden says demonstrations are useless), and he takes a slightly more conciliatory view of democracy (electing a president, yes; man-made legislation, no).  Bin Laden is also more explicit about how to raise money to finance the jihad (hit up rich businessmen).

Bin Laden does echo Zawahiri in one important respect.  Zawahiri said that the U.S. withdrawal from Iraq is one of the “good omens” (basha’ir) of AQ coming to fight in the Palestinian Territories.  Bin Laden ends his message by saying that in this year there will be “omens” (tabashir, from the same Arabic root as basha’ir) of the receding of the Zionist-Crusader campaign.  Make of it what you will.

Here’s a summary:

  • Jihad is the only way to solve the problem in Palestine.  Appealing to the Security Council or local rulers won’t solve it.  The former want to hurt Muslims and the latter are agents of the West.
  • The leaders of Islamic movements who won’t call for a jihad in Palestine unless their rulers approve it are ducking their responsibility.  Jihad today is an individual duty, not dependent on the permission of rulers.
  • Engaging in demonstrations without weapons is useless.
  • You can win against the Zionist-Crusader alliance if you will just fight.  Look at what the mujahids did in Afghanistan against the Soviets.  Look at what the mujahids have done to the U.S., which is now bleeding human and financial resources.  It is in the midst of a financial crisis; its enemies don’t fear it and its friends don’t respect it.
  • Israel had to launch an attack on Gaza to protect itself by replacing Hamas with the Palestinian Authority.  It has done so now because the power of its chief sponsor, the U.S., is rapidly waning and because its major backers, Bush and the neoconservatives, are about to leave office.
  • Biden, Greenspan, and various world leaders have said the global economic system is on the verge of collapse.  The American intelligence community reports that U.S. influence will wane even more in the coming years.
  • Americans can’t continue to fight Muslims for several more decades.  Most Americans are displeased with what Bush has done.  He has bequeathed two wars to his successor, who can’t win them no matter what he does.  If he withdraws, it’s a military defeat.  If he continues, it deepens the economic crisis.
  • The open fronts of jihad “in the region” are Palestine, Iraq, Afghanistan, Waziristan, North Africa, and Somalia.
  • Muslims should support the jihad financially.  One wealthy businessman can pay for all the expenses of jihad on the open fronts.  I know many Muslim businessmen want to support the jihad financially, but they are worried about being discovered by America and its agents in the region.  This is not an excuse.
  • You cannot secure your rights by voting; they can only be secured through force.  Western countries themselves took their rights by force.  Look at the French Revolution.  Look at the American Revolution.
  • There can be no ballot boxes in our countries while tyrants rule them.
  • Muslims believe in electing presidents and offering him council.  But we do not believe in electing legilatures that create man-made laws.
  • We are in solidarity with you since we are fighting the same enemy.
  • “God wills that this year will reveal the signs of dawn and the omens of deliverance through the receding of the Zionist-Crusader reach.”

New Zawahiri Statement: Obama Is Killing Muslims In Gaza

Will McCants January 6, 2009

An audio statement by Zawahiri was just posted to the forums.  Here’s a summary:

  • Bin Laden swore he would keep fighting until Palestine and Muslim lands are free of foreign occupiers.
  • The Israeli attacks are Obama’s “gift” to the Palestinians before he takes office.  President Mubarak of Egypt is an accomplice in this slaughter since he has closed Egypt’s border with Gaza.
  • To the Muslims and mujahids in Gaza and Palestine: Al-Qaeda is with you.  We are attacking the American-Zionist Crusade wherever we can and we are quickly moving toward you.  The American withdrawal from Iraq heralds our approach toward you.
  • To the Muslims in Egypt: Strike and protest to force Mubarak to end the blockade.
  • To the Bedouins in Sinai: Help break the blockade.
  • To the Muslims of the world: American propaganda portrayed Obama as your savior but here he is “killing” Muslims in Gaza.  Demonstrating against these atrocities is not enough; you must engage in jihad.  Strike the American-Zionist Crusade everywhere.

Document (Arabic): 1-6-09-shamikh-zawahiri-on-gaza

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