ji·had·ica

Al-Qa’ida and the Afghan Taliban: “Diametrically Opposed”?

Vahid Brown October 21, 2009

Mullah Omar’s Afghan Taliban and al-Qa’ida’s senior leaders have been issuing some very mixed messages of late, and the online jihadi community is in an uproar, with some calling these developments “the beginning of the end of relations” between the two movements.  Beginning with a statement from Mullah Omar in September, the Afghan Taliban’s Quetta-based leadership has been emphasizing the “nationalist” character of their movement, and has sent several communications to Afghanistan’s neighbors expressing an intent to establish positive international relations.  In what are increasingly being viewed by the forums as direct rejoinders to these sentiments, recent messages from al-Qa’ida have pointedly rejected the “national” model of revolutionary Islamism and reiterated calls for jihad against Afghanistan’s neighbors, especially Pakistan and China.  However interpreted, these conflicting signals raise serious questions about the notion of an al-Qa’ida-Taliban merger.

The trouble began with Mullah Omar’s message for ‘Eid al-Fitr, issued on September 19, in which he calls the Taliban a “robust Islamic and nationalist movement,” which “wants to maintain good and positive relations with all neighbors based on mutual respect.”  Mullah Omar further stated that he wishes to “assure all countries that the Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan … will not extend its hand to jeopardize others, as it itself does not allow others to jeopardize us.”  A week later, Abu Muhammad al-Maqdisi, one of the most influential living Salafi jihadi ideologues, released an angry rebuke to these “dangerous utterances” of the Taliban amir, pointing out that they were of the same order as Hamas leader Khaled Mashal’s statement that the Chechen struggle is a Russian “internal matter.” For a person of Maqdisi’s stature to equate the Taliban with Hamas, especially in light of the recent jihadi media onslaught  against Hamas for its “crimes” against the Jund Ansar Allah, is an extremely serious charge.  Maqdisi ends his statement with the hope that he has misunderstood Mullah Omar’s message and that some clarification from the Taliban leadership will be forthcoming; more on this below.

A week after the Maqdisi message was posted, al-Sahab issued Ayman al-Zawahiri’s eulogy for Baitullah Mehsud (on which, see my earlier post). Midway through that speech, Zawahiri turns to the Palestinian issue, arguing that the mujahidin in Palestine should destroy the “laws of Satan” being imposed upon them, among which he singles out the notion that there should be “national unity with the traitors and those who sold out the religion and the homeland.” He goes on to lambast Hizbullah as representing a model of “turning jihad into a national cause,” a model which “must be rejected by the umma, because it is a model which makes jihad subject to the market of political compromises and distracts the umma from the liberation of Islamic lands and the establishment of the Caliphate.”

On October 6, Abu Yahya al-Libi’s al-Sahab video, “East Turkestan: The Forgotten Wound,” was released, which calls for support for the defensive jihad in northwestern China, one of those neighbors with whom Mullah Omar expressed a hope for “good and positive relations.” As in Zawahiri’s Baitullah eulogy, al-Libi emphasizes the dangers of dividing the umma into nations and ethnicities. He says that “East Turkestan [Xinjiang, China] is part of the Islamic lands that cannot be divided”; that it is the duty of all Muslims to support the Uighurs in their fight against the Chinese state; and that all who would appease China are “apostates.”  In these messages, then, both al-Libi and Zawahiri are denouncing, in the strongest possible terms, a political strategy being enunciated by the Taliban’s supreme leaders.

A week later, on October 12, Jordanian jihadi writer Ahmad Bawadi posted an exchange of correspondence that he’d recently had with the editors of the Taliban’s al-Sumud magazine. Bawadi, without naming names, points out that Mullah Omar’s ‘Eid message had engendered significant controversy, leading some to say that the Taliban supported making the same sort of compromises as Hamas.  The “clarification” sent in response by al-Sumud and posted by Bawadi pretty much dodged the question. Amid some tortuous sophistry about words being like a double-edged sword, the al-Sumud editors defended Mullah Omar’s position by comparing it to the Prophet Muhammad’s divide-and-conquer strategy of distinguishing between different groups of enemies: What’s wrong, as-Sumud asks, with saying we don’t want to fight the Buddhists (read: China) now, since the aim is to divide them from the Christians (read: ISAF/NATO forces) in order to weaken the latter?  Regardless of how one reads the al-Sumud  “clarification,” any doubts that the controversies were causing the Quetta Shura to rethink its public relations strategy were laid to rest the following day, when the Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan issued an open letter to the Shanghai Cooperation Conference, reiterating verbatim the “neighborly” sentiments from Mullah Omar’s ‘Eid message.  The SCO, it should be pointed out, includes China, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan, all countries that are directly targeted by al-Qa’ida-allied groups based in Pakistan’s tribal areas.

All of this has sparked a great deal of heated argument and anxious hand-wringing on several jihadi forums, but for reasons of space I’ll just single out one thread from the al-Hisbah forum. On October 14, “al-Najjar,” in a post entitled “Mullah Omar and Zawahiri Diametrically Opposed: A plan, a problem, or…?!,” contrasts the neighborly outreach of Mullah Omar’s ‘Eid message with the aforementioned statements about the “laws of Satan” in Zawahiri’s Baitullah eulogy, and ends by asking Zawihiri, “Oh our Shaykh, how is it that these are ‘Satanic laws’ when they are essentially the same as what has been mentioned by Mullah Omar, the Commander of the Faithful, to whom the mujahidin in Afghanistan and Pakistan have pledged their allegiance?”  A later poster, “Abu Azzam 1,” adds that Mullah Omar’s messages imply some level of recognition of the United Nations, an organization which al-Qa’ida has unequivocally labelled as “infidel,” and that these opposing moves seem to him to signal “the beginning of the end of relations between al-Qa’ida and the Taliban.”  Another forum participant, “Abu Salam,” agrees, writing yesterday that “this is a clear indication that al-Qa’ida and the Taliban movement are not of one mind, and that al-Qa’ida may turn on the Taliban in the near future.”  We shall see.  But one thing is clear: the recent shift in the Quetta Shura’s strategic communications is not to al-Qa’ida’s liking, and it is raising serious concerns among the broader Salafi jihadi movement about the religio-political legitimacy of the Afghan Taliban’s leadership.

Al-Qa’ida Publicy Cements Ties to the Tehrik-e Taliban Pakistan

Vahid Brown October 14, 2009

The official al-Qa’ida media outlet al-Sahab has released a flurry of videos in the past two weeks featuring leaders of the Tehrik-e Taliban Pakistan (TTP), both living and dead, in what amounts to a media campaign announcing their open alliance with Pakistan’s deadliest militant network.  On September 28, Zawahiri’s video eulogy for the slain TTP leader Baitullah Mehsud – the “role model of the youth” (ritha’ qudwat al-shabab) – was posted to the forums, followed two days later by a similar video message on the “martyrdom” of Baitullah starring Mustafa Abu’l-Yazid.  On October 2, al-Fajr Media distributed a third al-Sahab video eulogy for Baitullah, but this time featuring Wali ur-Rahman, the new TTP commander for the Mehsud tribal areas (an English transcript of which can be downloaded from here; links to all three videos can be found here).  

This series of al-Sahab celebrations of Baitullah, released two days apart over the course of a week, is itself a rather unusual concentration of al-Qa’ida media attention on a single non-al-Qa’ida member, and is totally unprecedented in terms of the al-Sahab air time devoted to the TTP.  Prior to these developments, the closest that al-Qa’ida came to officially signaling its ties to the TTP was in the release of an al-Sahab interview with Mullah Nazir shortly after he and Gul Bahadur joined Baitullah Mehsud to form the Shura Ittihad ul-Mujahidin this February.  Aside from the brief mention of Baitullah in that video, these recent releases are to my knowledge the first official al-Qa’ida communiqués to give any significant attention to the TTP and its leadership.

But that’s not all, folks. Yesterday, an Urdu newspaper reported that Aqil, alias Dr. Uthman, the sole surviving attacker in this weekend’s dramatic assault on the Pakistani Army’s General Headquarters in Rawalpindi , is the subject of an al-Sahab video released to a private television station in Pakistan, in which Aqil is shown receiving training in Waziristan and casing targets in Rawalpindi (Khabrain, 13 October 2009, pp. 6 and 8; article unavailable online, but there is an OSC translation).  And today, Pakistan’s ARY TV aired an al-Sahab video that they’d received, featuring TTP amir Hakimullah Mehsud, appearing alongside Wali ur-Rahman, in which both of them deliver statements to the people of Pakistan regarding their jihad against the state. (Ironically, both TTP leaders emphasize in the video that the TTP is not a servant of foreign masters, and that the TTP are “sons of Pakistan”).

While the close relationship between al-Qa’ida and the Pakistani Taliban has long been known, this release of multiple joint AQ-TTP messages from the al-Sahab production outlet is nonetheless extremely significant.  First of all, these developments indicate that al-Qa’ida has successfully seized the moment in the wake of the death of Baitullah to dramatically increase its influence over the TTP.  But this series of videos is perhaps also evidence of a decreasing willingness on al-Qa’ida’s part to remain in the shadows of its Pakistani partners as they unleash yet another bloody campaign of violence in Pakistan’s cities.  If so, this would represent a very important strategic shift in the thinking of al-Qa’ida’s senior leaders, who have thus far been content to provide largely anonymous guidance, training and force-multiplication assistance to their Pakistani jihadi allies.

UPDATE, 10/22/09: The video mentioned here as being aired in part by ARY TV on 14 October was distributed on the forums today by al-Sahab.  It is a little over thirty minutes long and, after opening invocations in Arabic, features Hakimullah and Wali ur-Rahman speaking in Urdu. There is no subtitling.

Blackwater in Pakistan

Qandeel Siddique September 11, 2009

A growing number of news reports from Pakistan are voicing concern over the alleged presence of the controversial security contractor Blackwater (or Xe) in Pakistan. The latest online edition of banned Urdu newspaper Zarb-e-Momin (linked to the outlawed al-Rasheed Trust) also issued an article on this topic.

After briefly outlining Blackwater’s history, columnist Aurya Maqbool Jan argues that the most shocking aspect of the firm is that it operates under the cover of NGOs and charity organizations in areas where Americans wish to carry military operations:

“It asks a few educated individuals to engage in welfare activities in the area; while this facade is being maintained guerrilla-like soldiers sneak their way in.”

In Pakistan, Jan claims, Blackwater headquarters are situated in the University Town area of Peshawar, and the NGO cover used by the firm is that of “Creative Associates,” an organization involved in development work in the tribal areas.

“Driving dark colored armed vehicles, wearing even darker shades, carrying heavy weapons, they come out of their cars only during traffic jams in order to protect the important personalities sitting in it. […] Under the pretext of providing protection to NGOs and its American staff members they enter their target area, and soon thereafter envelop entire regions under their influence.”

Jan suggests that retired army officials, bureaucrats, journalists and workers of human rights organizations in Pakistan may already have been hired to realize Blackwater aims in Pakistan.

Jan reminds his readers that Blackwater has been accused of “murder, kidnapping, (and) sexual violence.” He draws a comparison with Iraq whose people are “very familiar” with Blackwater activities; because NGOs were spying for Blackwater in “all Iraqi cities”, and “killed Iraqis everyday.”

The writer warns that if the Pakistani people does not turn away these “unwelcome guests”, Pakistan could turn into another “Falluja or Najaf”.

Jaysh-e-Mohammed on Madrasas

Qandeel Siddique September 3, 2009

In the latest edition of al-Qalam, the weekly online magazine of the Pakistani militant group Jaysh-e-Mohammed, columnist Naveed Masood Hashmi lashes out at Hillary Clinton for linking madrassas, or religious seminaries, to suicide bombings. In an article entitled “Hillary, Madaris and Hanging/Execution,” Hashmi asks: “… who is she [Hillary Clinton] to accuse Pakistani madrassas of sponsoring suicide attacks?” and wonders if the US ambassador to Pakistan, N. W. Peterson, will offer an apology to the Pakistani people for this immensely “provoking” statement made by their Secretary of State.

The author delves into a lengthy praise of madrassas, their popularity and social benefits, and goes on to emphasize that at no point during the long and glorious history of madrassas did they produce terrorists or encourage suicide strikes. Instead, he argues, it is the U.S. that is to blame for the ongoing suicide missions in Afghanistan and Pakistan:

“After 9/11 when U.S. forces invaded Afghanistan, they not only made the Muslims there victims of their viciousness, but also ensured that their slave, Pervez Musharraf, enact the same barbarity in Pakistan’s tribal areas […] So, it wasn’t madrassas that created suicide bombers, rather they were borne of American evil-doing and are thirsty for vengeance.”

Therefore, Hashmi advises, the solution is not to change Pakistan’s education sector with the help of American dollars or the propaganda being played out by Pakistani “liberals” or any schemes such “devilish minds” can concoct. Instead, the only fool-proof method of preventing suicide bombings is to alter US policy:

“If the Secretary of State stops accusing madrassas of propagating extremism and tells the Pentagon and White House to end their brutality against Muslims… then I can assure you, suicide bombing shall cease.”

Visions of Afghan and Somali Emirates

Scott Sanford August 27, 2009

On 25 August 2009, the Global Islamic Media Front (GIMF) published a plea by Dr. John Boutros for Muslims to aid the jihadi cause. He stated, “Do not mourn because the Islamic Caliphate is imminent… Trust me, the US is one or two thrusts” away from crumpling. However, in order to make this happen Muslims must give aid to the jihadis.

Boutros claimed that the United States is weak due to the financial crisis, which is allegedly causing the rich states to consider separating from the Union. He stated that militarily the United States is vulnerable because it has so many soldiers in the mountains of Pakistan and Afghanistan, and in the suburbs of Baghdad, who are easy targets. In regards to the United States homeland he continued, “Hundreds of thousand of soldiers stationed in the streets of Washington and Los Angeles wait for a martyr to cross the continents carrying a nuclear, biological, or chemical bomb.”

He alleged that from al-Qaida’s viewpoint, things are much better. Somalia is becoming more peaceful and prosperous because the Shabab al-Mujahidin are instilling sharia law and in Afghanistan the Taliban control 80% of the country while coalition forces only leave their bases in armored vehicles in the other 20%. However, the Islamic State of Iraq has made many sacrifices, as has Ansar al-Islam, who gave up their bombs, snipers, and bases.

He then stated that given the current state of affairs, if the United States fell, “In a short period, the Taliban Emirate will be a great state encompassing Afghanistan, Pakistan, Kashmir, Turkistan, and a large part of Iran.” In the western area of the Islamic world, the Shabab al-Mujahidin will control all of Somalia, Djibouti, and Sudan after the US fall. Then, he maintained, there will be justice in the Afghanistan and Somali Emirates and in other areas like Iraq, Chechnya, Algeria, and Nigeria where things will either turn around for the already established emirates or the mujahidin will prevail.

He then gets to the point of his fairytale, “After your mujahid brothers sacrifice themselves and their funds on this path, will you be stingy in support and assistance? Will you be stingy in spreading the word? Will you be stingy in financial support after many operations are canceled because of a shortage of materials like what happened during operations within Denmark?”

The fanciful nature of this report is striking even for the GIMF and I am not sure what to make of it. Is this an indication that something structurally has changed within the GIMF? Or, is it simply an attempt to garner support and the editorial staff did not realize how unrealistic it sounds? Regardless of its meaning, if this is the grand strategy of budding al-Qaida strategists, I am not worried.

Hijazi Comments on New AFPAK Strategy

Scott Sanford August 16, 2009

On 28 July 2009 the popular jihadi blogger Akram Hijazi initiated a series of articles under the title, “The Power of God in the Great Empires.” He titled the first installment “The American Strategy in Afghanistan,” the second “Dismembering the Strategy,” the third “Strategic Crisis and NATO’s Humiliations,” and the fourth, which is the last and not yet published, “The Realities of the Taliban’s War.”

In the first article, Hijazi questions if there ever really was an American strategy in Afghanistan and he asserts that observers will have to wait and see how the new strategy will play out given Afghanistan’s history as the “Graveyard of Empires.” However, his tone is not optimistic. He then continues to describe the evolution of the US Afghanistan strategy by quoting from US public officials and Western media. The strategy he describes is basic counterinsurgency, increased troop levels, and eliminating safe havens in Pakistan.

Hijazi’s second article starts by stating that the old strategy was to destroy al-Qaida and the Taliban, but instead they have become stronger. He claims that the strategic logic for the US is “killing and destruction, nothing else. This is barbarism, not strategy…. This barbaric logic is what the US and its allies have implemented, through targeting civilians, in frantic attempts to eliminate al-Qaida and the Taliban from [their] popular embrace.” Hijazi continues that after seven years of failure the US decided to change its strategy from killing civilians to protecting them in addition to helping the Afghan government impose its will in Afghanistan. Finally, he states that the new strategy is an attempt to plug the holes in the old strategy, which respected nothing about Afghanistan and built a corrupt central government lacking institutions, infrastructure, a military, or capabilities.

He cites the debate (see here) in the US on whether or not US forces should continue its counterinsurgency efforts in Afghanistan. He mentions calls for a withdrawal from the AFPAK region because al-Qaida is no longer a strategic threat to the US, which means Afghanistan and Pakistan also are not strategic threats. With this he implies that the US is engaged in the region for ulterior motives, which are to divide Muslim lands. Supporting his first implication, he makes a second point stating that the fight against al-Qaida is futile because it is not a nationalist organization or political entity controlling territory.

He also attacks other Arab and Islamic organizations, claiming that for the global jihadi movement, the age of patriotic, nationalist, leftist, and Islam-nationalist battles is over because they have failed. He adds that the “great powers” will not return to Muslim lands because if they do, “domesticated Arab armies or those who claim ‘Islam is the solution’” [the Muslim Brotherhood], will not oppose them; rather, the jihadis will.

According to Hijazi, the US will attempt to implement its strategy on three levels. First, on the military level, Hijazi indicates that the US prompted Pakistan to engage the Taliban in the Swat Valley in order to isolate the area from Afghanistan and deprive the movement of people and supplies between the two counties. Additionally, he states that US analysts believe the Iraq model is appropriate for Afghanistan despite historical, geographic, and environmental differences. Hijazi maintains that efforts to turn tribes against al-Qaida and the Taliban are evidence of this belief, which is really an effort to turn the tribes against each other. He concludes that the changing US military strategy is an indication of increasing Taliban power.

Second, on the civilian or cultural level, he posits that the US has no civilization or history and is not aware of the history of other nations or civilizations such as Afghanistan. As such, the US only knows how to revert to violence and force in dealing with others. He adds that the US military is undergoing a cultural shift from traditional concepts of warfare to counterinsurgency. He concludes with two questions that imply the supposed brutality inherent in the American psyche: 1) If the US does not achieve its goals through protecting populations, will it use force against all who oppose its goals? 2) Will the US also use this force against civilians under its protection?

Finally, on the political level, Hijazi states that the US wants stability and change. However, he believes it will fail in achieving these goals because the US is like someone who “prepares for the trip but misses the train.” He adds that the US wants a “non-centralized” government where every Afghan state would be like its own country and that non-centralization is really an attempt to sow local discord.

Hijazi concludes his report with several statements confirming supposed military, civil, and political gains the Taliban have made recently, which, he states, are indications of the Taliban’s rising power.

Hijazi’s overall message is that the US continues to blunder, while the Taliban are making great strides. His subtle assertions that al-Qaida and the Taliban are better at protecting Muslims indicate that his audience is politically minded Muslims who have not yet aspired to global jihad. Hijazi’s references to common anti-American grievances, such as the perceived use of excessive force and sowing of discord among Muslims, support this assumption. Moreover, he says nothing of al-Qaida’s targeted campaigns against civilians.

Finally, Hijazi’s remarks on the public debate regarding counterinsurgency and the future structure of the US military are interesting. His insistence that the real US strategy is creating discord among Muslims may be an indication that the shift in US policy is worrying jihadis. Similar statements by other jihadi ideologues would add credence to the effectiveness of the new plan.

My next posts will outline part three and, if available, part four of Hijazi’s report.

Jihadis Report Baitullah Mehsud Alive

Scott Sanford August 12, 2009

On 10 August 2009, Abdullah al-Wazir, a “jihadi correspondent” for the Shumukh forums, stated that his “private sources in Pakistan” have denied the death of Baitullah Mehsud. These “sources” maintained that Mehsud is in good health and remains operational.

Al-Wazir added that he requested an official video or statement regarding the matter, but did not elaborate on whether such a release is pending.

This corroborates Bill Roggio’s reporting at the Long War Journal that Pakistani claims of Mehsud’s death are suspect.

A Swat Rebel Speaks (part 2)

Qandeel Siddique August 7, 2009

In my previous post we saw how Commander Hafizullah viewed the struggle of the Swati Taliban. Later in the video, he says some interesting things about how the militants acquire support, money and weapons.

By feeding off the social and economic frustrations of the local populace in the tribal belt, the Swati militants may have managed to garner a certain amount of local support. For example, by taking over the Minogra emerald mine in Swat, the TTP offered the poor locals an income. Similarly, after seizing the Shamozai and Gujjar Killi mines, the Taliban employed a large number of local labourers. Speaking with a BBC Urdu journalist, a Taliban commander and caretaker of the mines said:

“Every year the government would deceitfully claim that the mine business was suffering a loss and therefore nothing could be offered to the locals; whereas, in reality, all the profit was going in the pockets of officers and ‘bigwigs’ […] Two months ago when we took control of this area… and we opened the doors for the local workers… and 1/3 of the proceeds go to the Taliban while 2/3 is distributed to the workers.”

Funding: The support of the locals is, according to Hafizullah, extended to providing the TT-S with money:

“Everyone knows that when Maulana Fazlullah asks for chanda (donations) through his FM channel, then, within minutes 1-2 crore (10-20 million) chanda is raised.”

In addition to such donations, stealing (vehicles and weaponry) from the infidels is cited as another source that has allowed TT-S to engage in a protracted battle against the army.  He gave no mention of support from their Waziristani counterpart or external actors.

ISI link: As was mentioned in As-Sahab’s introductory section on Hafizullah, he was previously linked with the ISI, most probably during his fight in Kashmir and Afghanistan. However, he severed all relations after his arrest in 2004. In response to the question “What message do you have for organizations working under the auspice of the ISI as in Kashrmi, etc.?” Hafizullah responds:

“We would ask them to discontinue fighting for the ISI. It is not the lower ranks who are aware of their links to the ISI, rather only the upper echelons are privy to such information – and they are the ones earning money in the crores. Their weapon supply comes from the ISI. We want them to join the TTP for Allah and to attain paradise.”

True to tradition, Hafizullah ends the interview by requesting the locals to “give us their young for jihad. And the elderly and women pray for them and for Islam to reach every corner of the world.”

And finally, “Our jihad will continue till doomsday.”

A Swat Rebel Speaks (part 1)

Qandeel Siddique August 5, 2009

Since May this year the Pakistani Army has been engaged in fierce combat in the Swat valley against a branch of the Pakistani Taliban. Who are the rebels and what do they want? A recent urdu-language video by al-Sahab features an interview with a Pakistani Taliban commander named Hafizullah. It offers useful insights into the Tehrik-e-Taliban-Swat’s ideology. In this two-part post I will take a closer look at the interview.

The video starts with a profile of Hafizullah: “Hafizullah hails from the Swat valley of Pakistan and has for the past 13 years been involved in the jihads in Afghanistan, Kashmir and now Pakistan. He received his early military training in 1996 Afghanistan, after which he fought with the Taliban on four different fronts – Kabul, Bagram, Bamyan, and Charykar. After the US invasion of Afghanistan, he was put exclusively in charge of the Bagram front. Previously affiliated with Pakistan’s intelligence agency, Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI), Hafizullah switched allegiance after the said agency incarcerated him in 2004 (for over two years). A sympathiser of the Lal Masjid in Islamabad, he was involved in the movement to avenge the 2007 army raid on the mosque, and became active in the jihad for nifaz-e-shariat in Swat – namely the Tehrik-e-Nifaz-e-Shariat-e-Mohammadi (TNSM) (Movement for the Enforcement of Sharia).”

Lal Masjid: The Pakistan army’s Operation Silence on Lal Masjid in July 2007 seems to remain a motivating factor behind the uprising of jihadi activities in Swat. When asked “When did the Swat Taliban emerge in this region?” Hafizullah replies “One of the initial reactions to Lal Masjid took place in Swat, so it was two years ago that we started militancy here – since then we have been involved in jihad.”

Sharia: The enforcement of Sharia law is repeatedly underlined as the key reason for the jihad in Swat:  “Since 1992 we have been fighting for this [Shariat]. We aim to establish Shariat in the world; that is why we sent fighters to Afghanistan and Kashmir.”

In response to the question “who is your preferred target and on what basis?” Hafizullah answers “anything or anybody coming in the way of Sharia” – that is, the murtad fauj or “apostate army” which has been “removed from the sphere of Islam.”

It should be remembered that the TNSM has been active in Swat since the early 1990s, and establishing Sharia in the valley has been their primary objective. Although the Swat militants give allegiance to Baitullah Mehsud and call him their Emir, the TTP movement in this region is shaped by its own history and local politics, and retains a unique flavour separating it from the Waziristani Tehrik. TNSM’s old agenda to enforce Sharia in Swat seems to be its cardinal goal, one which possibly overshadows that of carrying out jihad in Afghanistan or a defensive jihad against the Pakistani state. The recent peace agreement with Swat militants centred on the establishment of Sharia law.

Guerrilla war: Hafizullah boasts carrying out at least 25 fidayeen attacks inside Swat, while some operations were also conducted in Islamabad and Peshawar.

He also boasts their success in fighting the military; “Our first major battle was in Imam Dheri […] In Charbagh their (dead) bodies were left with us while they ran away. In Khwazakhel… we captured 50 vehicles loaded with ammunition.” Rebel acquisition of army equipment, including night vision goggles, launchers, and RPG 7s, occurs on a daily basis in Swat.

Hafizullah describes the militants’ recent retreat in the face of the Pakistani army’s advance as an important “tactic” of guerrilla warfare: “they [army] comes and wastes their weapons, shooting in the dark, and then go away thinking they have been victorious […] and once their attacks have subsided, we lay down mines, carry out fidayeen attacks, and inflict maximum damage upon them.”

Furthermore, Hafizullah boasts greater territorial control over the “apostate army” and blames the “Jewish-controlled media” for exaggerating the army’s success in the region.

“As you have now seen, you know who is more victorious […] most roads are under our control and they cannot pass without our permission.” He specifies that of the four primary routes to Swat, three are under the control of the Taliban – namely, via Dir, Malakand and Buner.

Defensive jihad/“murtad fawj”: Pakistan is viewed as one of the few countries in the world to have caused tremendous damage to Islam on a vast scale, and is blamed for the ongoing war in neighbouring Afghanistan as well by strengthening the enemy; “Pakistan has been providing them with logistics, equipment, etc., as well as spy planes who leave from their bases inside Pakistan to attack in Afghanistan.”
The image conjured of the Pakistani army is that of a vicious, un-Islamic enemy who destroys mosques, kills innocent tribesmen/its own people, and even steals from them.

“You never hear of planes flying to India or other enemies, but when Pakistani army] planes do fly, it’s to attack its own people. It’s always Muslims, be it our Arab or Afghan friends.

The majority killed by these infidels are the locals. Their first target is always mosques. […] They know that mosques are a symbol of Islam and Muslims, and therefore set out to attack Islam. For example, in Swat, I would say at least 40 or 50 mosques have been attacked. The other day in a village in Matta they killed 14 children and women along with a mosque.

Wherever they have gone, they have killed children, women and the elderly who have nothing to do with the Taliban. And they have looted their homes where ever they may have found something valuable, e.g. gold, watches, stereos…”

Local support: The Swati Taliban claims to have the locals on their side: “… We are children of these people and they are our own. We live like brothers. We have a healthy relationship with them where they give us food and shelter, and we cooperate on matters. We are always in touch with the locals and share with them their burdens/grievances. We have built roads [for the Swati people] where in over 60 years the government could not. The locals are happy with us. They no longer need to pay tax to the government. We have build pipelines and provided water to people. […] Also we resolved decade-long rivalries that had been going on and which the government failed to bring about peace. The Taliban have appointed ulema to solve these cases and bring peace.”

The Swati Taliban assumes the role of a surrogate government by providing its citizen’s basic amenities – roads and water. And of course justice, which the locals feel deprived of, believing that the Pakistani government time and again ignores the developmental needs of this region. On top of this, the commander conjures a horrific picture of the Pakistani army; he pins the blame for collateral damage during warfare on the military – not only do they take innocent lives, they also steal from peoples’ homes. These are the words and imagery the Taliban deliver in places they conquer, thus feeding on the vulnerabilities of the locals who have lost their relatives or friends in the ongoing, or been displaced or disoriented by it.

I will cover the rest of the video in a forthcoming post.

The Posts That Never Were

Thomas Hegghammer July 13, 2009

Apologies for the slow publication pace here at Jihadica, but deadlines and an upcoming house move mean I can only dream about serious blogging these days.

This does not mean forums are quiet. Every morning this past week I found things on the forums that deserved commentary. In a dream world, here’s what I would have written about had I had the time:

–    France is taking heat. Al-Qaida in the Islamic Maghreb published a statement declaring “France the mother of all evils”, and other posts fumed over the recent French plans to ban the niqab or the burka. I suspect the Americans and the Brits (who of course have long argued that France is the mother of all evils)  are happy to share the burden of jihadi attention. Unfortunately for the Anglo-Saxons, however, I don’t think the veil weighs nearly as heavy in the jihadi basket of grievances as military occupations.

–    Another one bites the dust. Exiled leaders of the Libyan Islamic Fighting Group told al-Quds al-Arabi on 2 July they are laying down their arms. The declaration is now being spun in the media as the first case of a group leaving al-Qaida. This is a misrepresentation of what’s happening but I can see why people want to spin it that way.

–    The non-strategic “Special strategic study”. The “Department for Historical Studies and Strategic Advice” of the “Falluja Think Tank” released a widely publicized “special strategic study” of the war between America and the jihadi movement. The title and the high-profile advertising had raised my expectations, but I was a little disappointed, mainly because it’s not a proper strategic study. It is a political analysis which stays at the macro-level and doesn’t offer much in terms of meso-level considerations and concrete recommendations that I associate with classics of jihadi strategic studies. It is still worth reading, though, and there is an intriguing note on AQ and nuclear weapons at the end. Scott might be covering the study it in more detail later this week.

–   Jihadis “twittering” about Swat and Helmand campaigns. The jihadi commentary and analysis of battles in Afghanistan and Pakistan is coming out so quickly it is close to twittering. Within days of the Helmand offensive there was a long Faluja thread reporting news from the frontline. The Swat debacle has been followed closely for a while, and there is now already a strategic study of the campaign. I haven’t read it yet but it looks very interesting.

–    The other American.  The Somalia-based Abu Mansour al-Amriki has released a new audio statement in English entitled “The beginning of the end” It lambasts Obama along well-known lines in very articulate native English. I agree with Evan that Abu Mansour beats Adam Gadahn on presentation skills. Abu Mansour’s tajwid is really impressive. The message is clearly intended for the mobilisation of US-based Muslims. As interesting as the message itself was the accompanying pictures of three other alleged Americans in Somalia, not least given the New York Times story about Shabab recruitment in America. By the way, Evan has a fantastic post on the Shabab on the CTBlog today.

–    Happy birthday ISI. Last Thursday was the 1000-day anniversary of the foundation of the Islamic State in Iraq, and the occasion was marked with banners on all the forums, but not much more.

–    Good Qaradawi or bad Qaradawi? Marc Lynch had a great post the other day on Yusuf al-Qaradawi’s latest book on jihad, which he thinks will undermine al-Qaida, more so than the recantations of Dr Fadl and others. Rob at the Shack disagrees, saying the side effect of Qaradawi’s stance is more legitimacy for regular national liberation struggles, which might actually cause more problems for the US in the long term. They are of course both right.

Finally there is this gem from the CBS Terror Monitor (hat tip: Cecilie), by an analyst who has clearly had enough forum watching (here’s a pdf if they remove it). Hoda you have my sympathy – there have been days where I have felt the same.

Have a great week everyone!

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