ji·had·ica

A Jihadi Homeopath

Kevin December 4, 2012

[Editor’s note: We are very pleased to welcome Kevin Bell to Jihadica. Kevin has lived in Afghanistan and Tajikistan for a number of years and recently wrote a master’s thesis on Yunis Khalis for Princeton’s Near Eastern Studies Department. He’s hunting for a job in Afghanistan–probably not for long given his proficiency in Pashto. You can follow him on Twitter @allegorycave]

Yunis Khalis is best known for his role as the leader of the Hizb-e Islami (Khalis) mujahidin political party, and as a host to Osama bin Laden in 1996 in Jalalabad. However, even a cursory review of the various Khalis biographies written in Pashto reveals that there was far more to his life, interests, and influence on Afghan politics than might be indicated by a discussion limited to his role as a jihadi leader.

I extensively discuss many of these new perspectives about Khalis in my forthcoming report from the Combating Terrorism Center, but some of the most interesting episodes from the biographical literature are unfortunately not included in that study. The most fascinating and unexpected of these is Din Muhammad’s account of Yunis Khalis’s “medical practice” as a homeopathic healer.
Din Muhammad begins by pointing out that Yunis Khalis’s curriculum as a madrasa student in pre-partition India included exposure to Greek medical texts, but Khalis’s real introduction to the theory and practice of medicine began after he went into exile in Pakistan in 1974. Shortly after Khalis arrived in Pakistan he spent some time living in the home of Mawlawi Salim in Kurram Agency. Mawlawi Salim was already an established medical practitioner who wrote books about homeopathic healing in Urdu from his home. Khalis spent some time perusing these and asking Salim questions about the more challenging parts of the text before he traveled to Peshawar where the majority of the mujahidin leadership then resided. By this time Khalis had acquired enough knowledge to begin his own research and he began to practice homeopathy independently after buying some books and medicines from the bazaar in Peshawar.

In order to substantiate his account of Khalis’s knowledge of medicine, Din Muhammad eagerly recounts two incidents where he witnessed the effectiveness of Yunis Khalis as a healer. Although we immediately notice that the illnesses/wounds that Khalis heals in these two anecdotes are neither dramatic nor life threatening, Din Muhammad’s point is not that Khalis was a miracle worker. Once he establishes that Khalis actually understood something about medicine, Din Muhammad uses this to make a larger point about Khalis’s character: he was generous with his time, skills, and treasure, and he did not charge the poor for his services. This is a theme which Din Muhammad picks up elsewhere, such as in his account of the construction of Khalis’s new neighborhood of Najm al-Jihad south of Jalalabad for widows, orphans, and disabled mujahidin after the end of the Soviet Afghan War.
We are right to question the possible bias of authors like Din Muhammad who have such a clear personal connection to their subject matter. However, it is easy enough to argue that the state of our knowledge of Yunis Khalis is so poor that even accounts of him that are semi-hagiographical in nature deserve real attention. He is a key figure in the history of both the development of the Haqqani Network and the growth of the Eastern Shura (aka Jalalabad Shura) in the mid 1990s.

But ultimately, that has nothing to do with why I enjoyed reading this particular subsection of Din Muhammad’s biography. This account of Khalis as a homeopath reminds us that there are systems of knowledge and ways of approaching learning in the Afghan frontier that are both vital and important to local communities, and almost totally unanalyzed in the West. Considering that I have only scratched the surface of the extant primary source material about Yunis Khalis and other major Afghan mujahidin leaders, I expect that further study will reveal even more surprising and interesting addenda to our understanding of the history of Afghan Islamism.

Decade of Fear

Will McCants September 11, 2011

As is the case for many others, the tenth anniversary of the 9/11 attacks has made me reflect on their impact over the past decade. To this end, Michelle Shephard‘s Decade of Fear has been indispensable. A very personal account of her journalistic efforts to chronicle the war on terrorism over the past decade, Michelle weaves the weft of her narrative over the warp of New York just after 9/11; Somalia after the rise of the Islamic Courts Union and, later, the emergence of al-Shabab; Pakistan after the rebound of the Taliban and al-Qaeda; and Yemen at the formation of al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula and the retreat of President Saleh.

Michelle’s account puts a human face on the knotty legal, ethical, and political problems the United States and its allies have grappled with as they tried to stop al-Qaeda and its supporters: torture for information, overthrowing stable governments who might align with terrorist groups, rendition, entrapment, collateral damage, and indefinite detention. There are also the less “kinetic” but  no-less-knotty problems like countering radicalization online in multi-cultural societies that value free speech.

What struck me most about Michelle’s account was her juxtaposition of violence and inanity. Hassan Aweys, the head of a group allied with al-Shabab in Somalia, covets Michelle’s boots. Hamid Gul, the former head of Pakistan’s ISI and sponsor of some of the United States’ worst enemies in the region, does not know who Tony Soprano is but, upon being told, empathizes with his bifurcated psyche. The white-polo-and-khaki-wearing Abu Jandal, UBL’s chief bodygaurd, is gracious to Western journalists while explaining that Bin Laden didn’t target the civilians in September. “He simply hit targets, and civilians happened to be around.” Kitch and karaoke permeate Guantanamo, along with euphemisms to describe poor detainee treatment.

Wisely, Michelle does not try to resolve the contradictions or unravel the knots. But she is hopeful that the Arab Spring and the death of bin Laden will take the wind out of the sails of the global jihadi movement and help the United States and its allies put the threat in perspective so they can abandon some of their worst counterterrorism tools. Me too.

AQ’s Enabler

Will McCants July 19, 2011

Don Rassler and Vahid Brown have written one helluva report on the Haqqani network, the folks who have been providing aid and sanctuary to AQ Central for decades. Based on thousands of pages of primary source documents–many not previously released to the public–Rassler and Brown explain how the Haqqanis did (and do) it.

Still not sure you want to read it? The authors borrow network analysis tools from Renaissance Studies to show how the Haqqani network functions. C’mon.

Uighur Jihadism

Thomas Hegghammer November 30, 2010

Uighur jihadism is one of the most understudied sub-topics in our field, so I was thrilled to read this report on the Islamic Party of Turkestan by the independent consultant Kirk Sowell. Don’t be fooled by the lack of an institutional stamp; this is a really strong piece of research – easily the best study I have seen on the topic.

The report was published before the seventh issue of Turkistan al-Islamiyya, but you can download the latest issue from one of these links.

Preview: Autobiography of a German Jihadist

Thomas Hegghammer May 5, 2010

The memoirs of Erik Breininger, the German jihadist who was allegedly recently killed in Waziristan, have reportedly appeared online. I haven’t seen them myself yet, but if their authenticity can be established, we are dealing with an extremely valuable document. Jihadica will bring you more details soon.

Aafia Siddiqui

Qandeel Siddique February 24, 2010

Shortly before Aafia Siddiqui was convicted on 3 February, the magazine Nawai Afghan jihad published an article about the Siddiqui case. In the article, entitled “Rescuing the Prisoners”, a certain Umm Hamam writes about Muslims around the world who have been imprisoned by “infidels”.

Previously, numerous references have been made to the Aafia Siddiqui case by different jihadi groups, including  Jaish-e-Mohammad on their weekly online magazine, Al-Qalam. The “arrest/torture of our innocent, Muslim sister by the infidel” rhetoric plays on the honor code and anti-western sentiments of young Pakistani men whom militant leaders aim to attract and recruit. Siddiqui was brought up again in a recent joint interview by Hakimullah Mehsud and Wali-ur-Rehman in October 2009; the video ended with the question “who will rescue our sister Dr Aafia Siddiqui from these Christian barbarians?” That the new TTP leadership continues to use Siddiqui as subject matter to appeal to their audience shows the extent of her importance to the Pakistani jihadi propaganda mill.

In “Rescuing the Prisoners” Hamam builds on this propaganda by talking about the “thousands of Muslim sons and daughters rotting in infidel jails,” including Palestinians, Uzbeks, Russians and Pakistanis, and the religious duty of Muslims to save these prisoners.

Excerpts from the Quran and Hadith are used to this end; the Prophet Mohammad has apparently given unequivocal importance to this order when he stated that “whosoever rescues a prisoner from the infidel, I become that prisoner.” Further, “if a Muslim woman is arrested in the east, it is the duty of every Muslim in the west to save her.”

The author singles out Aafia Siddiqui, who has “her hopes hitched on us Muslims now.”  Examples are given of “Fatima and Noor” who in their letters from Abu Ghraib prison claimed: “every day 10 U.S. soldiers assault/abuse us at one time.”

The author ends by appealing to all Muslims to pursue jihad until “all Muslims brothers and sisters have been rescued from infidel jails, Muslims territories have been returned to us, countries who have shamed us have been avenged, and the name of Allah has been raised high throughout the world. “

Justifying Jihad against Pakistan

Qandeel Siddique February 19, 2010

The January/February 2010 issue of Nawai Afghan Jihad included an article by Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan spokesman, Azam Tariq, entitled “The Reality of the Waziristan Operation.”

Azam Tariq mainly talks about the recent military operation in Waziristan and the complicity of Pakistani politicians and special forces (SFs) in importing and waging America´s war on Pakistani territory.

Like most TTP leaders, Azam underlines that theirs is a “defensive” jihad against the Pakistani regime.  The image created is that of a hapless group being provoked into fighting an unwanted jihad. That is, against its own volition, the TTP must fight the Pakistani state and army.

While the cardinal enemy, and “target of all jihadi struggles”, is the U.S. for it sits at the helm of all infidel nations, Pakistan´s “secular rulers” and their shameless submissiveness to the U.S. has left the TTP no choice but to fight the “domestic” infidels first.  The question, then, Azam sarcastically asks, is: “Where do the mujahidin find that elusive Aladin´s lamp which will enable them to ignore the infidel´s (U.S.) puppets in Pakistan and go straight after the beast itself?”

Azam explains that incriminating the Pakistani government and army are certain “ground realities,” encapsulated here as follows:

•    Drone strikes: Pakistani airspace for a long time has been give to the U.S. so to carry out such attacks.
•    Spies captured by the TTP have confessed to the involvement of Pakistani SFs in distributing SIM cards on ground. That is, the drone missile strikes would not be possible without the help of the Pakistani Army.
•    Americans are always landing at Islamabad airport with instructions/orders for the GoP.
•    Pak Army´s Military Intelligence (MI) spy service supports Blackwater, and “everyone knows” that Blackwater is behind the bomb attacks on bazaars, markets and the public.
•    Obama has clearly stated that America´s victory/defeat in Afhganistan depends heavily on Pakistan. Pakistani political parties – PPP, ANP, MQM – have all risen to the occasion, offering themselves up to the Americans.

Azam also denies claims pertaining to the “success” of military operation in Waziristan. He alleges that all areas to have been “cleared” by the Army, including Mehsud territory, are false. In fact, the mujahidin are engaged in a fierce battle with the SFs in those very areas, inflicting great damage on the latter. With regards to the “innumerable” mujahidin to have reportedly been killed, Azam claims that only 20 mujahidin have so far been “martyred.” The remaining victims, he writes, were “women, children and the elderly.”

Hittin Magazine: China – Friend or Foe?

Qandeel Siddique December 23, 2009

The latest issue of Hittin magazine includes an article titled “China – friend or foe?” by Qari Abdulhadi that centers on the “injustice” committed by China on Muslims, which he argues is unprecedented in history. While the details of this injustice have been hidden from the media, the writer maintains that the growing jihadi activities in China, and the struggles of the mujahidin in Afghanistan and Pakistan, have rendered it difficult for China to keep its true face as the “enemy of Islam” hidden from the public.

While the author accuses the entire umma of referring to China as a “friend” and “brother”, he singles out Pakistan, where diplomatic relations with China have been given a status “even higher than the Himalayas.” Similarly, when listing the responsibilities of the umma with regards to aiding the mujahidin in East Turkistan, neighboring countries – with special emphasis on Pakistan – are said to bear the brunt of the duty.

Abdulhadi presents a list of recommendations, which include the following:
1.    Muslim should correct their misconceptions of China, and recognize the shrewd face of China and its animosity towards Islam.
2.    Make room for the Turkistani mujahidin in their prayers
3.    Expose the heinous face of China and the sufferings of Turkistani Muslims in all religious circles
4.    Spread and contribute to the online journal Turkistan al-Islamiya as it is important for the growth of the Turkistani mujahidin
5.    It is the duty of those with the financial means to help the Turkistani mujahidin

Abdulhadi then offers a brief encyclopedia style description of East Turkistan, with special emphasis on its Islamic history. It notes that since the 17th century at least 40 “jihad-style” movements have emerged in the region, each seeking autonomy from China and the establishment of an Islamic state. Abdulhadi alleges that since 1949, the proportion of Muslims in the region dwindled from 90% to 40% due to efforts of the Islam-hating Chinese regime. These efforts have included limiting the teaching of Uighur language in schools, using East Turkistan as the experimental ground for nuclear testing, and arresting/killing young Muslim activists.

The foundations for the Hizb-e-Islami Turkistan were laid by Sheikh Hassan Makhdoom, aka Abu Mohammad Turkistan, who was trained in Afghanistan and killed by the Pakistani security forces in Waziristan in 2003. The current leader of the group is Sheikh Abdul Haq, who led the movement out of its long spell of silence by carrying out attacks in China against SFs and government employees during the 2008 Olympics.

The June 2009 factory incident in Guangdong province, which resulted in the death of “over 200 Muslims,” and the ensuing violence in East Turkistan, is presented as being symbolic of the “new wave of violence against Turkistani Muslims.” The banning of “beards and veils,” airing a film about the Prophet Mohammad, and denying visas to Uighurs to leave China to “perform Hajj, or go to Pakistan” are also examples of the Chinese state’s “anti-Islamic attitude.”

The bottom line, the writer notes, is that, like all other infidel states, China cannot be a friend of Muslims.

New Interview with Jalaluddin Haqqani

Qandeel Siddique November 19, 2009

The latest issue of Nawai Afghan Jihad includes an interview with Jalaluddin Haqqani.  The interview is centered on American policy in Afghanistan and the danger America poses to the world. Little mention is made of the Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan or the role of Pakistani extremists in Afghanistan.

To a question regarding the “propaganda unleashed by the Karzai government” that jihadi activity along Afghanistan’s border with Pakistan is planned and plotted in Pakistan, Haqqani gives a rather diplomatic response: “there are passionate young men from the tribal areas who have inherited the jihadi gusto of the past (fighting the British and Soviets) and who were martyred on Afghan soil. We acknowledge and appreciate their jihadi engagement.”

Asked to comment on the signs of a changing US policy towards Afghanistan – especially, for the Karzai government to initiate “dialogue” with the Taliban – Haqqani denounces this as sheer propaganda and maintains that the “pretext” of dialogue will be used by Americans to realize its political goals, including “spreading an atmosphere of distrust amongst the mujahideen.” In fact, such heavy reliance on propaganda warfare is symptomatic of an “enemy who is losing in battle.”

The truth is, he says, that the US is “connivingly promoting its own strategy by using dialogue as a cover. In order to have a dialogue, the terms and conditions of the various parties concerned need to first be discussed. However, they believe that only they are entitled to having any conditions. The Emirate’s policies and terms with regards to dialogue are clear – the key one being that all occupying forces leave Afghanistan.”

Haqqani repeatedly refers to the US as a nation who has imposed its “arrogance and terrorism” on the whole world, and especially Afghanistan, where the root of all problems is American presence and influence.  “It is America who is targeting innocent people and putting their security at risk, and imposing a secular and corrupt government on the people of Afghanistan. A government whose notoriety – profligacy, involvement in drug smuggling, and looting of its own people – was made public by the US itself.”

However, despite his harsh views of the US, Haqqani displays a certain sympathy for Obama, suggesting that the latter “protect his people from the fire Bush pushed him into.”

In response to a question regarding his preoccupation with jihadi activities outside of the Emirate, Haqqani reassures his audience that the allegation is entirely false and a figment of the enemy’s imagination. He says “I am currently engaged with leading jihadi operations in the Khost and Paktika provinces.”

Pakistani Jihadis on Kerry-Lugar Bill, Nobel Prize

Qandeel Siddique October 23, 2009

Blackwater and the Kerry-Lugar Bill appear to be recurrent themes in Urdu jihadi literature. Militant scribes are chipping in on the hot topics of mainstream Pakistani media, dangerously aligning their grievances with those of the public – specifically, the latter’s anti-US sentiments. While opinion may be torn on the use of military operations in Pakistan, Pakistanis from all walks of life appear united in perceiving the US as an enemy. A recent Gallup survey, for example, revealed that 59% of Pakistanis saw the US as the biggest threat to Pakistan. 11% thought the Taliban.

The latest issue of the monthly Nawai Afghan Jihad has two articles on the Blackwater in Pakistan. In “Why this hullabaloo surrounding Blackwater?” by Talha Abu Bakar, the author argues that Blackwater has been active in Pakistan for years, and there is a reason for “letting this genie out of the bottle” at this point in time. In particular, he cites the Kerry-Lugar Bill as the key bone of contention, leading a horde of apostates – Pakistani politicians, journalists, newspapers and TV channels, and retired army officials – to betray their “American masters” and expose Blackwater.

Apparently, these apostates had long been serving American interests in Pakistan; however, “despite their faithfulness they were distrusted by their masters.” The seemingly harsh conditions attached to the Kerry-Lugar Bill symbolize a shift in US approach towards its “Pakistani slaves,” thus jerking the latter’s chain.

The author warns that the US embassy in Islamabad is fast turning into a “mini Pentagon.” The recent attacks on the Marriott Hotel in Islamabad Pearl Continental in Peshawar are justified because they were being used as “regional headquarters” by America and Blackwater.

“Talibanization or Blackwaterization?” by Hamza Abdur Rehman bemoans the sad state of affairs in Pakistan and its capitulation to the US; the country has reached such depths of dishonor that, unlike Iraq and Afghanistan, where Blackwater asked for permission, they need not bother in the case of Pakistan. “Even to breathe we will need to first ask the US embassy and Blackwater.”

While Pakistan has been forced to fear Talibanization because it “challenges the writ of the government,” Blackwater operates freely for it “works within the sphere of that very writ.”

Jaish-e-Mohammad’s Al-Qalam magazine last week issued an article on the Kerry-Lugar Bill,  where author Naveed Masood Hashmi complains that every word of the Bill insults Pakistanis and ridicules the independence of Pakistan as a nation.

The Jaish also appears to be irked by President Obama’s Nobel Peace Prize triumph; Talha Saif offers a satirical imaginary account of the award ceremony in this week’s Al-Qalam:

“Order, Order, Order…”, he begins; “People throughout the world are known to have delivered many a kind of jokes and protests but there are 3 persons in particular who have come a knocking at our ‘court of justice’ claiming to be more deserving of the Nobel Peace Prize than Barack Obama. They are Ehud Barak, Narendera Modi and Pervez Musharraf.”

He goes on to outline the main “accomplishments” of Barack Obama which earn him the Nobel Peace Prize:
•    Spreading Blackwater activities to Pakistan
•    Continuing Bush’s war in Iraq and Afghanistan
•    Over 30 drone attacks in Pakistan
•    Killing of over 100 innocent women and children
•    Establishing world peace by attacking a wedding in Afghanistan, killing more than 70 ‘terrorist’ children, women and the elderly.
•    Pressuring the Pakistani government to carry out military operations in Swat, killing countless people.”

All the other candidates – Ehud Barack, Narendera Modi and Pervez Musharraf – are asked to state their reasons for deserving the Nobel Peace Prize. Ultimately, Pervez Musharraf, who unlike all the others killed his own people, is declared “most worthy”, forcing Obama to renounce his prize.

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