ji·had·ica

What’s the Minbar doing in Moscow? (Part 3)

Joas Wagemakers July 13, 2010

In the previous two parts of this short series (here and here), we saw that the Jordanian radical ideologue Abu Muhammad al-Maqdisi and his website, Minbar al-Tawhid wa-l-Jihad, have been closely involved in efforts to support the mujahidun in the Caucasus by offering advice, translating books into Russian and encouraging and praising their efforts. We still don’t know why this is the case, however. In this final part of the series, we will try to answer that question.

The Shari’a Committee

To understand why al-Maqdisi and his website are so interested in the mujahidun in the Caucasus, we need to go back a few years to an interview that al-Maqdisi gave to the Jordanian newspaper Al-‘Arab al-Yawm, which was published on 5 July 2005. As regular Jihadica readers know, al-Maqdisi used his week-long release from prison in that year to criticise his former pupil Abu Mus’ab al-Zarqawi and to scold other jihadis for their – in his view – extremist and sometimes plain stupid actions in conflicts that they could never win anyway. He also mentioned that he wanted to set up a committee of religious scholars that could guide jihadi youngsters all over the world by giving them advice and fatwas. Although this latter piece of information was not widely reported at the time and was not acted upon by al-Maqdisi – he was quickly rearrested in 2005 and not released until 2008 – it is nevertheless highly interesting because he seems to have realised this goal of setting up such a committee in 2009.

Since September last year, Minbar al-Tawhid wa-l-Jihad has had a forum on which readers can ask al-Maqdisi and ten other scholars all kinds of questions related to Islam. Although many of these questions (collected in ten volumes so far) are about issues that have nothing to do with jihad, such as wearing trousers (vol. 5, p. 25) or determining the first day of Ramadan (vol. 2, pp. 5-6), many of them do deal with fighting and violence. Considering the context given above (i.e. that this forum was perhaps partly meant to prevent young jihadis from using too much violence), it is not surprising that several of these fatwas actually discourage questioners from using force. A question on Hamas’ Qassam Brigades in the Gaza Strip is answered with the advice to radical jihadis to remain patient and not to seek any confrontation with Hamas (vol. 1, pp. 1-2), notwithstanding the Shari’a Council’s strong disagreements with that movement. Another reply to a Belgian group called Shariah4Belgium advises that group’s members to support jihad elsewhere, but to refrain from using violence in their own country because of their weakness there.

So what is the Minbar doing in Moscow then?

The Minbar’s communique about the subway bombings in Moscow earlier this year, its interest in the Caucasus and its efforts to translate certain books into Russian should probably be seen as part of this wider plan by al-Maqdisi and certain like-minded scholars to support and encourage mujahidun who try to wage a “clean” jihad and to advise others on how to do that. In fact, if one were to take a look at the communique with which this series started as well as al-Maqdisi’s epistle about the Islamic Emirate in the Caucasus, it is striking that so much of these texts is spent praising the mujahidun for their eagerness to obtain knowledge, their supposed purity of arms, the situation in which they allegedly had no other choice than to use violence, their correct choice of victims etc., while hardly any attention is paid to their military prowess. The praise, in other words, seems to be caused not by the mujahidun‘s firepower but by their careful and considered use of violence and appears to be directed not just at the mujahidun in the Caucasus but also at other aspiring jihadis as if to tell them: “Take a good look guys, this is how you wage a proper jihad.”

The Shari’a Committee is only less than a year old and consists of relatively unknown scholars (apart from al-Maqdisi) and it remains to be seen whether its fatwas actually have the kind of influence that its authors want them to have. Still, throughout the past year, several new scholars have been added to the committee – sometimes with much fanfare – and if others (perhaps Abu Basir al-Tartusi?) join too, al-Maqdisi’s and the Minbar‘s efforts to stem the extremist tides of unlimited violence could pay off and have the potential to become an influential ideological force.

What’s the Minbar doing in Moscow? (part 2)

Joas Wagemakers June 3, 2010

In part 1 of this short series of posts, we saw that the Minbar al-Tawhid wa-l-Jihad website published a communique by the leader of the Islamic Emirate in the Caucasus, Dokku ‘Umarov, claiming responsibility for the attacks in Moscow on 29 March 2010. This was slightly odd since the Minbar mostly publishes books, articles and fatwas, not claims of responsibility for attacks committed anywhere. Although a quick glance at the website may give the impression that this is indeed an exception, a more detailed look reveals that it is part of a broader trend.

It appears that the Minbar has been involved in the conflict between Russia and the Islamic Emirate of the Caucasus for some time. For instance, the Jordanian owner of the website, Abu Muhammad al-Maqdisi, has written an epistle in support of the mujahidin in the Caucasus. In it, al-Maqdisi praises the supposed ideological purity, leadership and righteousness of the fighters in the Caucasus and writes that this group can serve as an example for other jihadi groups in the Muslim world. He speaks highly of their acts but especially of what he describes as their knowledge, their carefulness in applying takfir (excommunication of Muslims) and their unwillingness to deviate from tawhid (the unity of God) and compares them favourably with Hamas, another group fighting a non-Muslim enemy.

Advice

The group’s qadi (judge), Abu ‘Imran Anzur b. Aldar, has also asked al-Maqdisi for advice about Muslims working for the Russian government and to what extent the fighters in the Caucasus are allowed to co-operate with them. Abu ‘Imran observes that some Muslims are not very pious or fear for their lives but nevertheless sympathize with the fighters in the Caucasus and therefore use their positions in the Russian army or governmental circles, which Abu ‘Imran believes to be forces of unbelief, to secretly help the Islamic Emirate and wants to know how he should deal with this phenomenon. Al-Maqdisi’s rather general answer is that Muslims should show their true faith to others but their unwillingness to do so because they are weak or scared should not automatically lead to their excommunication. In fact, he maintains that these Muslims may be able to help further the cause of Islam as a whole and that this could be a good thing in certain situations.

The “mujahid leader” Abu ‘Imran also asked al-Maqdisi for advice about Muslim participation in the Olympic Games or the football World Cup. Interestingly, his question does not deal with the tight shirts and short trunks that athletes wear but concentrates on whether it is allowed to participate in sports while wearing clothes that prominently display the word “Russia” as well as Russian symbols. He also wonders whether the pagan Greek origins of the Olympic Games are acceptable in this respect and complains about youngsters who refuse to wear Nike clothes because that brand derives its name from a Greek goddess but who have no problem wearing shirts with the name of the “false god” Russia on it. One may wonder how relevant this question is for people who are busy waging a war against Russian troops, but al-Maqdisi treats it as a serious matter. He states that while participation in sports is not wrong in itself, it is in this context, although he is again careful not to brand those who do participate in the Olympic Games as infidels.

Russian

These two questions mentioned above are reportedly not the only times Abu ‘Imran asked al-Maqdisi for advice since he is said to been in touch with him about other things and has also asked for the latter’s books to be translated into Russian (see here). The Minbar’s involvement with the Islamic Emirate of the Caucasus is not limited to al-Maqdisi, however, since those running the website have been busy translating not just some of al-Maqdisi’s books but also some by ‘Abdullah ‘Azzam and others into Russian.

So now we know that the communique about the Moscow bombings was not an exception but was actually part of a greater involvement by the Minbar al-Tawhid wa-l-Jihad in the Caucasus. This still leaves one question: why?

To be continued…

What’s the Minbar doing in Moscow? (Part 1)

Joas Wagemakers May 4, 2010

Although I’m awfully late in paying attention to it, there is an interesting dimension to the Moscow metro attacks that occurred just over a month ago that is relevant for jihad watchers but has not been dealt with in the media or blogs as far as I know.

While attention has obviously focused on the attacks themselves and on the video claim of responsibility by the leader of the Islamic Emirate of the Caucasus, Dokku ‘Umarov, I have not seen any references to a written statement by the same man posted on the online jihadi library Minbar al-Tawhid wa-l-Jihad (the Pulpit of the Unity of God and Jihad).

This statement – and particularly the fact that it was posted on the Minbar, the largest jihadi online library – is interesting. It indicates a development of potentially great significance to the future of jihadi ideological production. This post is the first in a short series of posts I intend to write on this subject for Jihadica. First, let’s look at a translation of the communiqué itself, which is preceded by a statement by the Minbar:

Communiqué by the leader of the Islamic Emirate of the Caucasus Dokku Abu ‘Uthman about the Moscow Explosions

In the name of God, praise belongs to God and prayers and peace upon the messenger of God.

In support of our mujahidin brothers in the Caucasus, we publish this communiqué of which news agencies and satellite channels have not spread anything except that the mujahidin accepted responsibility for the operations. The reasons and justifications the mujahidin mention for perpetrating these operations – the most important of which is the massacre that the Russian intelligence apparatuses have committed with regard to the poor civilians in Chechnya, who do not have anything to feed themselves with nor earn anything except some wild garlic from the woods, where the criminals of the intelligence apparatuses executed a number of them with knives, abusing, maiming and disfiguring their corpses without [their having committed any] offence or crime – all of this and more of the crimes of the Russian regime that the media have not mentioned in the news on the Moscow explosions nor have been mentioned in the communiqué of the emirate [are reasons and justifications for the Moscow attacks]. On the contrary, [the media] were certainly content with the acknowledgement of the explosions by the mujahidin and avoided the justifications [given by the mujahidin] that reveal the crimes of the Putin regime.

That’s why we at the Pulpit of the Unity of God and Jihad see it as our duty to spread this translation [from the original Russian] of the communiqué by the leader of the mujahidin of the Caucasus, Dokku Abu ‘Uthman – may God protect him.

And God prevails in his purpose, but most people do not realise it [Q. 12: 21]

The Shari‘a Committee of the Pulpit of the Unity of God and Jihad

16 Rabi‘ II 1431 AH [1 April 2010 AD]

————————————————————————————–

Praise belongs to God, the lord of all being, prayers and peace upon our Prophet Muhammad, on his family and his companions and on those who follow his right guidance to judgement day.

Peace to all the mujahidin who wage jihad to establish the shari‘a of God in this world.

I am the leader of the mujahidin of the Emirate of the Caucasus, Dokku [Abu ‘Uthman] ‘Umarov. I announce this communiqué on 29 March 2010.

Everyone knows that on 29 March 2010 two operations took place in Moscow. They led to ruin for the unbelievers and they were a special message to the Russian intelligence.

These two operations were done on my specific order and – God willing – they are not the last operations.

With regard to these operations, I want to make clear why we did it:

As we all know, on 11 February, intelligence troops in Chechnya – more specifically, in the district of the village of Arshti – annihilated Muslims from among the poorest and weakest who were gathering wild garlic to keep themselves barely alive and to feed their families, where the criminal special forces of the FSB [the Russian Federal Security Service] killed these innocent civilians with knives and subsequently disfigured their corpses.

These people were indiscriminately annihilated by the Russian intelligence troops, maiming, abusing and ridiculing their slain bodies.

I believe that the operation that was done on my order was not committed against the poor and the weak of the unbelievers because they lived in the heart of Moscow.

That’s why any politician, journalist or person who accuses me of terrorism today because of this act stirs up disapproval and ridicule because I have never heard – not even once – that they accused Putin of terrorism, of killing innocent people and of other crimes like those that took place on 11 February.

I assure all Russians who send their troops into the Caucasus and support the security services that perpetrate bloodbaths that these operations will not be the last.

These operations will continue on your land.

We also declare that another operation will take place in answer to the killing of a group of mujahidin, also on 11 February. God willing, you will hear and see that soon.

That will be done in a different way and on a different scale, God willing.

That’s why I’m letting you know that the war will not be limited, nor will it continue to be watched quietly on your television screens, secluded from the crimes your troops led by Putin have committed on the land of the Caucasus. On the contrary, I am warning you that the war will reach your streets. You will feel it in your lives, in your families, in your spirits and in your skins, God willing.

God is great

The question that arises after reading this communiqué is: why is the Minbar posting a claim of responsibility about metro attacks in Moscow? In fact, why is it posting this statement at all? Isn’t this usually done on jihad forums? To be sure, the Minbar posts communiqués sometimes about various issues, such as statements eulogising “martyrs” (including Abu ‘Umar al-Baghdadi and Abu Hamza al-Muhajir), but posting claims of responsibility is not the site’s specialty at all. What is going on?

To be continued…

Magazine Update

Thomas Hegghammer February 12, 2009

It has been a good week for jihadi magazine buffs. There are new issues of Qadaya Jihadiyya and Tala‘i Khurasan, as well as two brand new magazines, Sawt al-Qawqaliz (sic) and Markaz Ansar al-I‘lam.

The newcomers are not particularly impressive and I do not expect them to last long in the fiercely competitive world of jihadi media. Sawt al-Qawqaliz seems intended as a mouthpiece for the Caucasus Emirate, and it is clearly the work of non-native Arabic speakers, for the language is full or errors and low on idiom. Incidentally, I cannot figure out what “Qawqaliz” is supposed to mean (suggestions anyone?). It could simply be a misspelling of Qawqaz, but how could they get the very name of the magazine wrong? In terms of content, the 24-page publication is almost entirely focused on Caucasian issues and does not even mention Gaza. The Shabab of Somalia are the only outsiders to receive a mention, though only at the very end. The PDF file is clumsily assembled and reads from the bottom upwards.

The 21-page Markaz Ansar al-I‘lam is more difficult to place geographically and the editors claim independence “from any organization, foundation or media front”. But there is very little original material here. It is basically a cut-and-paste job with old articles from the jihadi Internet and the mainstream press. Articles by a “young man from Gaza” and by Abd al-Bari Atwan give the magazine a certain Palestinian focus, but that is not surprising given the current political climate.

The fifth issue of Qadaya Jihadiyya is considerably more impressive than the newcomers. With its high-quality photos and witty editorial style, this is the Vogue Magazine of jihadi media. QJ is affiliated with the al-Yaqin media center, but it is not easy to place geographically. My guess is that the editors are based somewhere in the Levant, but it’s just a guess. The latest 21-page issue is devoted to Gaza and has an interesting strategic study which concludes that there was no clear winner in the latest war, but the final outcome will be decided by the next Palestinian elections. If Hamas gains political ground vis a vis Abu Mazen, Israel’s strategy will have failed.

The thirteenth issue of Tala‘i Khurasan is also well produced, and with its 90 pages it is one of the chunkier publications on the market. As its name suggests, it is produced by Arabs in Afghanistan, and it has several high-profile contributors, such as Sheikh Atiyat Allah, Mustafa Abu Yazid and Abu Yahya al-Libi. As such, it is perhaps the jihadi magazine with the closest links to al-Qaida Central, although not to Bin Ladin and al-Zawahiri. Interestingly, this issue does not have much material on Gaza. The cover story is a very interesting strategic study of the impact of 9/11 on Pakistan, and the rest of the magazine is devoted to either general jihadi culture or to Afghanistan-related developments. It is possible that most of the magazine was assembled before the Gaza debacle. The last issue came in October 2008, and many of the field reports in the current issue date from August and September 2008.

Here are the tables of contents:

Sawt al-Qawqaliz
•    Commander Dawud: “This year was a successful one for us”
•    A word from the Chechen leader Dokka Umarov on the establishment of the Caucasus Emirate
•    Shaykh Sa‘id Buryatski: “How I went out for jihad and what I saw in the Caucasus”
•    Yudugov: “The key to security in south Caucasus is hidden in the north Caucasus”
•    The infidels crushed … because of the union of the Muslims in the Caucasus
•    Commander Hussain:  All the Mujahidin received the decision by Commander Dokka on the Qawqaz Emirate with great joy
•    Experiences of brother Abu Umran
•    Letter from the Chechen leader martyr Abd al-Halim Saidulayev on the preparation to announce an Islamic state
•    Kazbak, the “Lion of Cherkessia”
•    The freedom of Chechnya is a matter of time
•    Everything starts with the small things
•    Students of Daghestan want a life governed by Sharia
•    When Muslims leave jihad, God punishes us.
•    The theory of the unity of religions is a notion of infidelity, atheism and heresy
•    The Emirate’s agency obtains recording of the collaboration of Zakayev with the infidel Russians
•    Martyrdom of Commander Walid in Ingushetia
•    Greetings to the Shabab in Somalia

Markaz Ansar al-I‘lam
•    The bedouin and politics
•    When victory is slow (Sayyid Qutb)
•    And the martyrs are taken from you (Hussain bin Mahmud)
•    Memoirs of a young man from Gaza
•    The smuggling will continue until its targets are reached (Abd al-Bari Atwan)
•    The Pakistani Taliban
•    The raid of love for the Prophet
•    The power is in firing (Abu Umar al-Kurdi)
•    Memories of the assassination of the martyr leader Khattab

Qadaya Jihadiyya
•    Gaza under Zionist siege and anti-Islamic silence (Suhayb al-Ghazzawi)
•    To the honourable scholars of the Muslim nation (Abu Abdallah al-Shafi‘i)
•    The Battle of Gaza: Who wins and who loses (Khalid Abd al-Rahman al-Nubi)
•    Palestine between the diplomacy of Hamas and the viciousness of the Arab regimes (Muadh al-Khuwsti)
•    Gaza facing a war more dangerous than the military one (Abu Taha al-Miqdad)

Tala‘i Khurasan
•    The impact of 9/11 on the crusader assault and the internal Pakistani front (Husam Abd al-Ra’uf)
•    Spend at your leisure (Sheikh Atiyat Allah)
•    Divine directions (Mustafa Abu Yazid)
•    Al-Zarqawi and the speech of memories (Abu Ubayda al-Maqdisi)
•    In the shadow of the quranic verse (Sheikh Mansur al-Shami)
•    Signs of victory emerging in Afghanistan (Sheikh Abdallah Sa‘id)
•    Field reports
•    The Ansar (Shakir Allah al-Kuwaiti)
•    Frostbite (Dr. Abu Abd al-Rahman al-Makki )
•    Witticisms from literary books (Ja‘far al-Tayyar)
•    Messengers of Destinies (Abu Ubayda al-Maqdisi)
•    Mother of believers Khadija bint Khuwaylid (Atiyat Allah Abu Abd al-Rahman)
•    If I were Bin Ladin I would declare it: The success of the strategy – part 1 of 2 (Abu al-Futuh al-Maghribi)
•    Abu Abdallah al-Shami: Journey of martyrdom (Abu Yahya al-Libi)
•    Reviving the hope – and how sweet the feeling of hope (Mujahid)

Document (Arabic): 02-02-09-faloja-sawt-al-qawqaliz-1
Document (Arabic): 02-08-09-faloja-ansar-al-ilam-1
Document (Arabic): 02-07-09-faloja-qadaya-jihadiya-5
Document (Arabic): 02-11-09-faloja-talai-khurasan-13

From the Ingush Front: Intel Units Paved the Way for a Better Jihad

Will McCants September 2, 2008

[Mike Honcho]  The Ingush State of the Caucasus Emirate released a statement last week via Kavkaz Center highlighting some its failures and successes since the 2nd Chechen War. While it contained the usual lip service to mujahidin unity and the need to expel the Russians from the Northern Caucasus, it also detailed how, even though outnumbered and outgunned, the establishment of Special Operation Groups (SOG) proved tremendously effective in eliminating apostates, hypocrites, and traitors.

The message begins with an admission of bad judgment, stating that the mujahidin realized they had been too lenient on some of their fellow Ingush who were employed in the Republic’s security and military services. Allegedly there was an unwritten agreement between the mujahidin and local security forces. The agreement was that as long as Muslims and resistance fighters were left alone, the focus of mujahidin attacks would be on the Russians and that state employees would not be bothered. However in 2002, the Ingush collaborators began to target, detain, kill, rape and torture Muslims. Even after these transgressions, the mujahidin claimed that they approached the local authorities to stop such policies, but the abuses continued. The mujahidin then discontinued the gentlemen’s agreement and actively pursued all enemies, Russian and Ingush.

The Ingush mujahidin also state that what has been most effective for their operations is the establishment of special intelligence units, called Special Operation Groups (SOG), which were responsible for collecting information and infiltrating the Ingush security apparatus. One of the groups successful initiatives is that they have also started (or stolen) a database full of the names of collaborators who work with the Russian Ministry of Internal Affairs. Apparently these units have served their purpose so well that they have Ingush police and politicians shaking in their boots. The local forces are now reportedly resorting to bribing the mujahidin with money and information in order for guarantees of personal security.

Interestingly, the message also refers to a centralized “Mukharabat of the Caucasus Emirate.” It now appears that this is the central command for all intelligence units throughout the Emirate, but with each ‘state’ in charge of its own collection efforts.

What is striking about this message and others written recently is that all of elements of the Caucasus Front seem to be in-lock step with their “unity” message. Both the Chechen Front and the Dagestani Front (Jamaat Shariat) released similar messages last week, detailing support for Dokku Umarov’s declaration and highlighting the preparedness and high morale of their forces. It looks as if Umarov is really pushing to retool the Caucasus Emirate into a highly effective fighting force, at least in word.

Although Umarov’s upbeat prognosis of the Emirate needs to be taken with a dose of salt, it make you wonder if the FSB’s declaration of imminent “al-Qaeda” attacks is, perhaps, somewhat credible.

8-29-08-Ingush-Front-SOG-kavkaz-center

Amir Hussein’s Message: Mujahidin are Unified

Will McCants August 27, 2008

[Mike Honcho]  Today Kavkaz Center released portions of a transcript from a June 12, 2008 video by the commander of the Shali Sector of the Caucasus Emirate Eastern Front, Amir Hussein (Hussein Gakaev).

Hussein is a Chechen with considerable fighting credentials, and his family has a long history of involvement in the resistance movement. During the last twelve years, he lost three brothers in the fighting, and had a sister kidnapped. His younger brother, Muslim Gakaev, is the Deputy Commander of the Shali sector. Prior to the formation of the Caucasus Emirate in late 2007, Amir Hussein was the Minister of Internal Affairs of the Chechen Republic of Ichkeria for several months.

The portion of the video transcribed had two main themes: one, that the mujahidin are unified, and two, that the services of the members of the so-called Chechen Government in-exile, which he calls the “London Criminal Group,” are no longer needed.

Amir Hussien states that after Dokku Umarov’s establishment of the Caucasus Emirate, rumors existed concerning dissension in the ranks of the mujahidin, which he categorically denies. He asserts that the mujhahidin are satisfied with this decision and will continue to support Umarov’s goals of establishing a unified Islamic Caliphate in the Caucasus. He reaffirms that Umarov made this decision according to the will of Allah, and therefore it is the path they must pursue.

Hussein also gives another reason why Umarov made the declaration: to unify the different units of mujahidin across all the republics of the Northern Caucasus. The mujahidin were fragmented and focused on their local struggles instead of consolidating their efforts across the whole region (reminiscent of the “Near” vs. “Far Enemy” strategy). There was no unity of command, and while they had successes, they were wasted in the bigger scheme of things. He then again tells us that “the mujahidin have accepted it [his decision] with great happiness.”

Amir Hussien then gives the Chechen Government in-exile, led by Ahmed Zakayev in London, a verbal thrashing. He warns them that there will be a cleaning of the ranks after the mujahidin victory. He then downplays their efforts at politics, calling them ineffective, and states that fighting is the only way to achieve their goals. Hussien also mocks them, calling them “actors” (clearly aimed at Zakayev, a former actor) and “window dressing.”

Perhaps they are re-issuing the transcript of the video for recruiting purposes or to assuage naysayers. Although judging from this article, it seems like they are reaching their numbers this summer.

Document (Russian): 8-27-08-amir-hussein-kavkaz-center

More Commentary on the Russian-Georgian Conflict from the Caucasus Emirate

Will McCants August 24, 2008

[Mike Honcho] This past week, the editorial board of the Caucasus Emirate asked the Chief of their Information and Analytical Service, Movladi Udugov to comment on the events in Georgia and the resulting challenges in relations between Russia and the West, as well as thoughts on the conflict from the leadership of the Emirate.

Udugov starts by stating that all sides in the conflict made serious miscalculations, with Georgia and the West making larger errors in judgment than the Russians. The West was fooled into thinking that because of its non-interference in matters concerning the Russian republics of the Northern Caucasus that Russia would not meddle in the affairs of the sovereign Southern Caucasus nations. Additionally, the West’s approval of the Russian campaign of terror against Muslims in the Northern Caucasus within the context of the “War on Islam,” combined with Russia’s newfound energy revenue, re-awakened the “imperial instinct” of Moscow’s leadership.

In fact, he claims the Chechen government (the Chechen Republic of Ichkeria at the time), warned Georgia and Azerbaijan in 1999 and 2000 that after Russia liquidated the sovereignty of Ichkeria, it will surely go after theirs. The Republics of the Northern Caucasus were a shield that protected Georgia and Azerbaijan. He also adds that the fighting by the mujahidin gave Baku and Tblisi time to strengthen their respective nations.

Georgia and Azerbaijan then showed their gratitude by initiating anti-Muslim and anti-mujahidin policies. Ugodov is particularly critical of Georgia and its treatment of Chechens in the Pankisi Gorge, where instead of granting the mujahidin refugee and a legalized status, Georgia forced them out. He strongly believes that without the withdrawal of Russian troops from lands of the Caucasus Emirate, the question of stability and security in the region will remain unsolved.

The conflict also demonstrated that the storming of Tskinvali on 8 August was unexpected by the Kremlin. However as a result of Russia’s overwhelming military response, NATO will speed up the process of naming Georgia and Ukraine members of the organization, an event which Moscow was seriously trying to prevent.

Towards the end of his statement, he summarizes with a list of conclusions:

1. The Western Alliance received a classic “Russian lesson:” you can’t trust any regime that occupies the Kremlin.

2. The configuration of forces and the political situation in the Caucasus has changed once more. The final arrangement of forces and political priorities for all participants of the conflict will become clearer in the near future.

3. Even with all of its blood lust and aggressiveness, Russia demonstrated weakness: they didn’t “ finish the enemy.”

4. The decisiveness and opportunism of Moscow will be directly proportional to the indecisiveness and alienation of the West.

5. There is no clear winner yet.

Document (Russian): 8-18-08 Kavkaz-Center-Udugov

War in Georgia Good for Jihadis

Will McCants August 10, 2008

The consensus on the forums is that Russia’s war with Georgia in South Ossetia is a boon for the Caucasus Emirate, a Jihadi group that seeks rule over the North Caucasus. According to its founder and self-proclaimed amir, Dokka Umarov, the emirate includes:

“Dagestan, Nokhchiycho (Chechnya), Ghalghaycho (Ingushetia), Iriston (North Ossetia), the Nogay steppe (includes parts of northern Chechnya, Dagestan and Stavropol district) and the combined areas of Kabarda, Bulkar and Karachay.” (see his proclamation)

Basically, all of these regions are north of Georgia in Russia.

On Ekhlaas, Shamil `Abd Allah opines that Russia’s incursion into Georgia will take pressure off the mujahids and turn Russia’s attention away from the Georgia-Chechnya border.  Quraysh1 cryptically observes that the war will “open the door of help to the mujahids by means of Georgia.”

On his website, popular Jihadi scholar Hamid al-`Ali writes that the war is really between the West and Russia.  American ambition crept up to Russia’s door and Russia responded.

The U.S. is interested in Georgia, `Ali argues, because it protects the oil pipelines that run from the Caspian Sea to Turkey.  Bush even sent Green Berets there in 2002 with the ostensible purpose of helping Georgia fight al-Qaeda elements in the Pankisi region.  But the real reason, `Ali maintains, was to train forces loyal to Washington so they could protect the pipeline.  If Russia now threatens this vital U.S. interest, then the war is a good thing.

As for the Caucasus Emirate, it has decided to wait and see how the war unfolds.

Document (Arabic): 8-8-08-ekhlaas-discussion-of-significance-of-war-between-russia-and-georgia

Interview with Umarov, North Caucasus Amir

Will McCants June 23, 2008

The attention of Western analysts today was focused on Abu Yahya al-Libi’s statement on Somalia. I read it and there’s not a lot there. Basically, Libi says keep fighting, no matter who is in power, until an Islamic state is established.

More interesting is Kavkaz Center’s newly-released interview with Dokka Umarov, the amir of the North Caucasus Emirate that he declared at the end of 2007. Here’s what stands out:

  • The decision to declare an emirate was not taken lightly and occurred after much debate.
  • Umarov acknowledges that he has taken a lot of heat from fellow travelers for aligning himself ideologically with al-Qaeda and declaring war on the world.
  • The mujahids do control some territory, but their control is not absolute. Therefore, he does not want his supporters rushing to form a state.

The two translations, Arabic and English, diverge over what sort of state Umarov is talking about. In Arabic, he says he doesn’t want his supporters rushing to form an “actual state” (dawla fi`liyya). In English, he says he doesn’t want them rushing to form a “virtual state.” The difference is significant and if anyone can download the video and make out the right translation, I’d appreciate it. (The links to the video are in the Arabic translation below.)

Document (Arabic): 6-22-08-ekhlaas-umarov-interview-arabic

Document (English): 622-08-ekhlaas-umarov-interview-english

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