ji·had·ica

Did al-Maqdisi make a deal with the Jordanian regime?

Joas Wagemakers July 29, 2014

On 16 June, Abu Muhammad al-Maqdisi, the well-known Jordanian radical Islamic ideologue, was released from prison. In the six weeks since his release, many people have argued that there must have been some sort of deal between al-Maqdisi and the Jordanian regime that caused the latter to release him. This blog post looks into these claims.

A Secret Deal

The idea that al-Maqdisi has made a secret deal with the Jordanian regime is widespread. On Twitter, for example, several people expressed their suspicion about al-Maqdisi’s release, claiming that its timing amidst the turmoil involving the Islamic State (of Iraq and Sham, IS(IS)) could not have been a coincidence. Similarly, The Economist stated that al-Maqdisi was released only after “he had been persuaded to issue two fatwas declaring followers of ISIS as ‘deviants’ and telling them not to make attacks in Jordan”. The connection between al-Maqdisi’s release and his criticism of ISIS/IS as a reason for his being set free was also pointed out in the Jordanian media. ‘Umar ‘Ayasira, for instance, a regular columnist for the Islamist daily Al-Sabil, questioned the timing of al-Maqdisi’s release. Although he explicitly denies that al-Maqdisi made a deal with the authorities, he does claim that the shaykh’s critical views on the Islamic State serve the interests of the Jordanian government, which is concerned about that organisation’s rise in Syria and Iraq and therefore supposedly allowed al-Maqdisi to leave prison.

The latter closely resembles a general scenario I also suggested once. Writing in 2008 (after al-Maqdisi was released from a previous stay in prison), I stated that “Al-Maqdisi’s criticism […] could […] have a moderating influence on those committed terrorists who are unlikely to be swayed by anyone else. In practice, this policy would mean allowing al-Maqdisi to spread his ideas without interfering with him too much as long as he does not materially support terrorism. The drawback of such a policy is that, while possibly helping to moderate an extremely violent fringe among jihadists, al-Maqdisi’s still radical writings might simultaneously inspire a whole generation of new terrorists. Considering the fact that the Jordanian government apparently does not have a viable case to keep al-Maqdisi in prison, however, this policy of non-interference may be less unacceptable than it sounds.”

Evidence

Scenarios like these and rumours of a deal with the authorities beg the question: what is the evidence for this after al-Maqdisi’s latest release? I asked one person on Twitter who was convinced of a deal whether she had any proof of her suspicions or was simply extrapolating from other, seemingly similar cases in other contexts. Her answer was that she did not have any specific evidence at all and was simply drawing parallels with other cases that she had seen before. This is quite honest, of course, but it is typical of those who claim that al-Maqdisi made a deal with the Jordanian regime: they offer no proof whatsoever.

To be sure, a healthy dose of scepticism towards what goes on in Jordanian prisons and how this is related to the country’s politics is perhaps quite justified. This scepticism becomes slightly conspiratorial, however, if one keeps suspecting fire without even a hint of smoke. When I asked al-Maqdisi about this when I talked to him a few weeks ago, he obviously denied it, yet not by adamantly rejecting these claims; he simply shook his head in disbelief, disappointed about people’s willingness to believe such rumours. It is indeed unlikely that al-Maqdisi made a deal with the authorities, but we don’t have to take his word for it.

Criticism of ISIS/IS

One thing that most claims about al-Maqdisi’s alleged deal with the authorities mention is his criticism of ISIS/IS. Since the latter organisation may develop into a threat to Jordanian security because of the relatively large number of ISIS/IS-supporters within the kingdom, the idea is that al-Maqdisi’s release might contribute to keeping the Islamic State at bay and to moderating its adherents within Jordanian borders. Such an idea is certainly not entirely absurd and al-Maqdisi has indeed penned a few anti-IS articles since being released (see here and here) – widely reported in the Jordanian press (see here, here, here and here) – and did speak out against its supporters after the Jordanian radical thinker Iyad Qunaybi was attacked.

The problem with this reasoning, however, is that the regime does not need a deal with al-Maqdisi to get him to speak out against the Islamic State. In fact, al-Maqdisi has expressed (increasingly explicit) criticism of some jihadis in Syria and particularly ISIS since at least late 2013, long before he was released. This criticism ranged from advice to keep jihad and da’wa (missionary activities) unified (see also here), urgent calls to stop infighting among jihadis (see also here) and to refrain from engaging in fitna (chaos, strife) and clearly siding with al-Qaida leader Ayman al-Zawahiri to a clear disavowal of ISIS. In other words, al-Maqdisi’s condemnation of ISIS was part of a gradual process of advice he gave to jihadis in Syria, which in turn was not only rooted in his broader ideology but also – and more directly – influenced by the failure to successfully mediate between Jabhat al-Nusra and ISIS and his perception that the latter was mostly (if not entirely) to blame for this.

Timing

Yet if there was no deal, doesn’t that make the date of al-Maqdisi’s release – right in the middle of debates about ISIS and Jabhat al-Nusra – rather suspicious? Similar claims were made about al-Maqdisi’s release from prison in 1999 and 2005. With regard to the former year, it has been suggested that al-Maqdisi wrote a book in which he criticised what he considered excesses in takfir (excommunication) to get a more lenient prison sentence. As for 2005, several Jordanian journalists at the time suggested that al-Maqdisi had revised his radical views and that his 2004 and 2005 criticism of the alleged excesses committed by his former student and leader of al-Qaida in Iraq Abu Mus’ab al-Zarqawi played a role in his release then. Both claims are incorrect, however, as I have pointed out in detail elsewhere.

So what could explain al-Maqdisi’s release last June? Just like in 1999 (a royal pardon on the occasion of King ‘Abdallah II’s ascension to the Jordanian throne) and in 2005 (the regime acquitted him of the charges and had to release him), the immediate reason for al-Maqdisi’s release on 16 June was rather less conspiratorial than it seems: he had simply served his time in prison. Al-Maqdisi was arrested in September 2010 and was given a five year prison sentence. In Jordan, years in prison are not twelve, but only nine months long, making his sentence (5 x 9 months =) 45 months, which equals four years (48 months) minus three months. If one adds four years to September 2010 (September 2014) and subsequently subtracts three months, one simply gets to a release date in: June 2014. The fact that the Jordanian regime actually stuck to this release date instead of trying to keep al-Maqdisi in gaol a bit longer may have been inspired by the idea that al-Maqdisi might help dissuade a few more ISIS-supporters once he’s out, but it is clearly not evidence of any deal.

To deal or not to deal

All in all, it thus seems highly unlikely that al-Maqdisi has made a deal with the Jordanian regime to get released earlier. Even if the regime is willing to release a known radical scholar like him in order to allow him to fend off even more radical ideologues and militants, it is unlikely that they released him any earlier than necessary because of this. Given the fact that al-Maqdisi’s time had been served, the regime probably felt obliged to let him go, perhaps hoping that his ideological opposition against ISIS – a much more dangerous and immediate threat to Jordan than Jabhat al-Nusra, which al-Maqdisi does support – would serve them well. Whether al-Maqdisi’s freedom is actually going to contribute to greater security and stability in Jordan, however, remains to be seen.

Memo about Syria: Jihadis are people too

Joas Wagemakers September 6, 2013

Perhaps the most important reason mentioned by a lot of people why the United States should not bomb targets in Syria is that the possible downfall of President Bashar al-Asad’s regime may lead to a situation in which jihadis come to power, who may be even worse than the country’s current leader. Such fears are certainly justified. Yet we should also be careful not to exaggerate the threat that these men supposedly represent.  In this post, I look at a specific series of fatwas from the Shari’a Council of the Minbar al-Tawhid wa-l-Jihad that deals with the problems and questions that potential jihadis have (these, these, these, these and these), which shows that jihadis – their sometimes radical views notwithstanding – can be quite human too.

Refusing parents

Many of the questions that Abu l-Mundhir al-Shinqiti, the shaykh who has long been the sole scholar on the Shari’a Council, has to answer deal with questions related to the classical jurisprudence (fiqh) of jihad that go back centuries: “Am I allowed to wage jihad if I am in debt?”, “I am able to do jihad. Does that mean I have to?” etc. One of the questions that also falls into this category is that of parental permission. Quite a few budding jihadis ask whether it is allowed to go to Syria if their parents refuse to let them go. According to the classical laws of Islam, parental permission is needed for someone to wage offensive jihad.

It is obviously easy to make fun of such questions (“I want to kill Nusayris but my mum won’t let me. What should I do?”). I believe this misses the point of why these jihadis ask such questions, however. They seem to be motivated primarily by a great concern for what is going on in Syria – and aren’t we all? – and want to take armed action to stop it, but are afraid they will violate Islamic law at the same time.

Some youngsters admit to lying to their parents about their true intentions when going abroad and wonder whether this is allowed. Others clearly don’t want to go to Syria and mention that their parents won’t permit them either, but apparently feel compelled to ask the shaykh anyway, perhaps hoping that he will excuse them from their jihadi duty. For similar reasons, several questioners ask if it is okay if they just donate money to the jihad, without actually going to Syria themselves. One potential fighter even asks al-Shinqiti to tell him what legitimate excuses exist that allow him to refrain from waging jihad.

Unfortunately for some of these hesitant youngsters, shaykh Abu l-Mundhir points out to them that the jihad against the al-Asad regime is a defensive one, meaning that it is an individual duty (fard ‘ala l-‘ayn) for every able-bodied male Muslim. This, in turn, means that parental permission is not needed and that lying to them about this is permitted as well.

Family problems

Although al-Shinqiti comes across as someone whom one would perhaps not easily qualify as “a good family man”, he does take into account that problems at home may excuse one from waging jihad. Several questioners indicate that if they went to Syria, their parents would not be able to cope without them for financial reasons. Others state that their parents are old and need to be cared for, which these men will not be able to do from abroad. Still another questioner tells the shaykh that if he leaves for Syria to wage jihad, he fears his mother will die of grief and pain.

As mentioned, al-Shinqiti is somewhat more understanding of such problems. He encourages people to find others to take care of their parents and their (financial) needs, but also states that if this does not work the jihadis are allowed to stay home. He is less compromising with regard to marital problems – in the broadest sense of the word. One person wants to know if it is a sin to go off to Syria if it means leaving behind a sick child and a wife who is five months pregnant, a question that is posed several times in various forms. Another wants to wage jihad, but also wants to get married. Realising that he desires both, he asks al-Shinqiti what to do. There is even a person complaining that his family in his homeland have abandoned him financially, that he has no education and no job and that he wants to wage jihad, but that his wife starts crying every time the subject comes up.

Al-Shinqiti does not prove particularly helpful with regard to recalcitrant wives (“Try to go to the jihad together with your wife.”), but he does understand that spouses cannot simply be left to their own devices and therefore encourages the questioners to let them stay with their families if possible. He is much more accommodating, however, when it comes to the somewhat related problem of potential fighters wanting to finish their education. Some men point out that they study something that is useful to the jihad and that they themselves will also be of greater use if they are allowed to graduate. Abu l-Mundhir is quite forthcoming in this respect, allowing such youngsters to finish their studies, even if it means putting jihad on hold for the moment.

Attachment

Such expressions of doubt, hesitation and concern by jihadis obviously do not mean that we should dismiss fears about their goals and behaviour. The ideas of some of the men going to Syria are clearly problematic and there is indeed reason to fear sectarian strife and even all-out war between some of the various sects if the al-Asad regime should fall. The ideas about ‘Alawites expressed by some Jihadi-Salafi groups and scholars are quite explicit in this respect and do not bode well for the future.

At the same time, however, the fatwas mentioned above do show that those men wanting to join Jabhat al-Nusra and similar groups have plenty of other things on their mind besides jihad. In fact, quite a few fatwas betray their attachment to earthly things such as their families, their wives and children and even their careers. This, in turn – and without wanting to negate the real threat that some of these men may pose, means that they are  perhaps not the wide-eyed extremists hell-bent on world-wide jihad that some believe they are. In fact, they look surprisingly human in these fatwas and none more so than one questioner who asks:

“Is a mujahid who is killed fighting also considered a martyr if he is afraid to die?”

Yunis Khalis and Social Justice: an early political discussion in Nangarhar

Kevin December 18, 2012

Much of the secondary literature in the West depicts Professor Ghulam Niazi as the progenitor of the mujahidin movement in Afghanistan in the 1960s. For a variety of reasons this contradicts primary sources that focus more on the various resistance efforts elsewhere in Afghanistan during this period. Of course, the primary sources are also influenced by the political projects of their authors.

Take, for example, the case of Yunis Khalis. Khalis’s biographers are more interested in a narrative that gives their subject a prominent role in the fight against the Soviets than they are in writing about the creation of an Afghan Islamist movement initiated by Professor Niazi at Kabul University. On the other hand, the two mujahidin parties that trace their founding mythology directly to Professor Niazi (Hizb-e Islami (Gulbuddin) and Jami’at-e Islami) have also been remarkably successful at setting the terms of the historical debate about the origins of the Afghan mujahidin. So it should be no surprise that the Khalis literature reflects the importance of the political gatherings hosted by Yunis Khalis and other eastern ‘ulama, while the material linked to the Kabul Islamists emphasizes Professor Niazi.

It may be decades before it is possible to untangle the accounts that have already been published by eye witnesses to this chaotic period of Afghan history; so many of the principal actors have died that we will probably never know the full story. But while it is too early to offer a full depiction of the resistance activities in Nangarhar in the years before 1979, my recent research on the biographies of Yunis Khalis has given me some unexpected insight into the kinds of political discussions that were taking place in eastern Afghanistan before the mujahidin parties had fully formed. While Khalis did not take a major leadership role in the early days of the resistance movement, he was active in a variety of circles and led many discussion groups with students and others about political and religious issues. These meetings were generally much less public or contentious than the sometimes raucous activities organized by the Muslim Youth, but they were not without their own controversy.

At one such gathering at Nangarhar University in 1349/1970, a doctor (or medical school student–Khalis’s biographer Din Muhammad equivocates) spoke out on an issue that apparently touched one of Khalis’s nerves. According to Din Muhammad the doctor said that “Mullahs are up to no good when they preach against money or they teach children; they must not take money or a salary (Din Muhammad 2007, 32).” Although we do not get a full picture of this doctor or his argument, Khalis’s contemptuous response to him is fascinating and I include it here in its entirety:

I studied in private mosques, and I paid my own expenses for traveling to and fro for my education, and I worked in the mosques. There were very many students like me who did not even have full bellies, and we had no clothing, and we would go long distances barefoot to find teachers to educate us in the mountains. And you, the cost of your housing is paid, and you study in beautiful cultivated areas; to you living expenses have been given for passing the night in beautiful places. From among you doctors are made, and the national budget has decreased because of you, while nothing has been spent on me. Come, in the manner of a mullah I pledge to you that I take absolutely no money for being an imam, and I teach classes for children without such money. You, a doctor, come to me and pledge to me that you will write prescriptions for sick people without charge.  (Din Muhammad 2007, 32-33)

This argument at a gathering at Nangarhar University echoes a theme that Din Muhammad elaborates in his discussion of Yunis Khalis as a homeopathic healer: healers should serve the poor for no charge (Din Muhammad 2007, 224-226). Without having more information about other similar gatherings, it is hard to know the extent to which this discussion at Nangarhar University was typical. But even so, it reveals something about Khalis’s perception of himself, his own life story, and the role of social justice in his political ideology.

The critical importance of providing for the poor in the community is also discussed prominently in the context of Khalis’s decision to create a new housing development called Najm al-Jihad south of Jalalabad after the end of the Soviet-Afghan War (Din Muhammad 2007, 266-267). Din Muhammad explicitly states that the name for this neighborhood was chosen to reflect its connection to the famous Mullah of Hadda, also known as Najm al-Din Akhundzada. Today Khalis’s neighborhood is only a few kilometers west of the Mosque at Hadda, and future investigations may help to uncover whether Khalis’s connection to the famous Mullah of Hadda goes any deeper than his choice of a name for a housing development that was ostensibly designed in part for poor people, the disabled, and war widows.

The Khalis biographies should not be read as a coherent argument against Professor Niazi’s prominent position in the development of Afghan Islamism. However, they do offer important clues about the political activities of prominent ‘ulama in eastern Afghanistan in the 1970s who were only peripherally involved in the Kabul Islamist movement. In the process of depicting these largely informal discussion groups and gatherings, Din Muhammad goes out of his way to stress the critical role that social justice played in Khalis’s politics. Any serious conversation about the history of the Afghan mujahidin will always have to account for the better known activities of Professor Niazi’s protégés in the Muslim Youth and Jami’at-e Islami.

However, this story of Khalis’s argument with a doctor at Nangarhar University in 1349/1970 is a helpful reminder that the relatively cosmopolitan scene at Kabul University was not the only important site of political contention in Afghanistan in the 1960s and 1970s. It is too early to say who attended these kinds of gatherings in Nangarhar or what significance this participation may have had for the later development of the mujahidin movement, but as more sources are published these kinds of investigations promise to show us a much richer picture of the early days of the anti-leftist political resistance in eastern Afghanistan.

Article on Ideological Hybridization

Thomas Hegghammer November 18, 2009

I feel bad posting so many secondary sources and even worse plugging my own stuff, but I hope you will agree that this article is quite relevant to the issues Jihadica was set up to cover.

Jihadi Reactions to the Torture Memos

Thomas Hegghammer May 4, 2009

I found the jihadi reactions – or lack thereof – to the release of the CIA torture memos intriguing. You can read my take on this in Foreign Policy Magazine‘s Argument section. 

The bottom line is this: the damage caused by Guantánamo and Abu Ghraib is irreparable and the end of U.S. torture will not in itself make the United States safer from this generation of jihadists.

Update (6 May): The jihadis have not been completely silent on the torture memos. Brynjar and Christopher A. drew my attention to a couple of postings on Faloja (English) from last week and the week before.

Document: 04-24-09-faloja-handbook-of-torture 
Document: 05-01-09-faloja-polish-torture-prison

New Issue of Sada al-Malahim

Thomas Hegghammer January 19, 2009

Al-Qaida in Yemen (AQY) has released the seventh issue of its magazine Sada al-Malahim (SM), adding to the mounting evidence that the group is thriving. The slick 44-page publication contains no less than 30 articles by 23 different pen names. Many of the latter are no doubt invented, but the issue must be the work of a well-run media cell of a certain size. An undated picture on p. 16 showing 20 people training in the desert, as well as note on p. 12 inviting readers to submit questions to the journal’s gmail address, suggest that AQY is not about to collapse any time soon.

The front page story, “Gaza under siege by Arab rulers”, is quite interesting. The article hardly mentions Israel and America, but instead lashes out at the Arab regimes and government clerics for facilitating the siege by repressing the mujahidin. “[The rulers] incriminated anyone who merely thinks about liberating the holy sites, which can only be liberated by toppling these governments” [my emphasis] (p. 4). Heard this before? This is basically the good old “near enemy first” argument of the kind found in Ayman al-Zawahiri’s classic article “The road to Jerusalem passes through Cairo”. The statement adds to a number of other indications that AQY is considerably more regime-critical (and thus less pan-Islamist) than its Saudi counterpart al-Qaida on the Arabian Peninsula.

At the same time, AQY also advocates direct confrontation with the far enemy. In the text accompanying the magazine release, the Emir of AQY, Abu Basir, is quoted as saying “we are preparing to open training camps to send you [Palestinians] a generation of reinforcements.” There is in other words a tension in AQY’s ideological production between two strategies: one advocating confrontation with the near enemy and the other with the far enemy. A similar ambiguity, or hedging of bets, is also found in their operations, which have targeted both Westerners and the government. This lack of ideological clarity makes the group less predictable in the short run. But it may also constitute a liability in the long run, as it leaves prospective recruits in the dark as to what AQY is actually fighting for.

Here’s the table of contents (excluding poetry and purely theological pieces):

  • Gaza under siege by Arab rulers
  • Seven years of Crusader wars
  • The ruling on the soldiers and helpers of the Pharaoh of our time
  • The ruling on escaping from the tyrant’s prison and its persecution
  • The ruling on fighting the occupier
  • A dialogue among the deaf (who is debating whom?!) [on interreligious dialogue]
  • Stances on judges
  • How to reach [us]
  • The duty to confront or flee
  • Three years since the escape
  • The power is in firing [on firearms]
  • A word from sheikh Dr. Ayman al-Zawahiri
  • The departure of Bush and the arrival of Obama
  • North Africa and the coming hope
  • The message of Shafiq Ahmad Zayd “Abdallah al-Yamani”
  • The Lion of Jawf: Amir Huraydan
  • Victory over the investigators
  • The Mujahid sheikh Nassar al-Marsad
  • Al-Tayammum [Dry ablution] [on life in prison]
  • I would behave if let out of prison
  • Letter from the daughter of a mujahid
  • Preventing and treating colds
  • Letters from the readers

Document (Arabic): 01-19-09-faloja-sada-al-salahim-7

More on Online Recruitment

Will McCants October 14, 2008

Tim has a nice summary of a recent conversation between him, me, and Aaron about online recruitment.  Tim and I agree and I think Aaron does too, but he wants more rigorous metrics.  Fair enough.

Aaron observes that there are three things involved with radicalization:

  • Motivation (I’m willing to fight)
  • Association (I want people to fight alongside, both to steel my resolve and to help me carry out attacks)
  • Opportunity (I need places and means for carrying out an attack)

(Tim glosses these as Psychological, Social, and Organizational factors, which is helpful.)

Aaron goes on to say:

When we see so-called Internet jihadis who become active in real-world plots, they frequently come from the ranks of the forum activists, the guys who are more than just part of the Allahu Akbar chorus. It is through their online associations and the opportunities that the Internet provides that they are able to begin actually participating in the jihad.

Three thoughts:

  1. I agree that the Internet is a good tool for motivating people to fight.  But they are being motivated elsewhere (e.g. video links posted to mainstream forums).  By the time they join the Jihadi forums, they are already members of the Allah Akbar choir.
  2. The Jihadi forums are a terrible place to associate and find opportunities because no one trusts anyone else.  Take, for example, Abu al-Haytham’s meeting with another forum member.  A lot of distrust had to be overcome to make it happen.  And face-to-face contact was a necessity.
  3. Many (most?) of those who get involved in real-world plots were already supporting or engaging in operations before they joined the forums.

I wonder: Are there examples of people who were motivated solely through the Internet and found associates and opportunities solely through the Internet?  I know I’ve seen a few, but I couldn’t dig up any when asked recently.  I even re-read Petter Nesser’s compendious survey of all Jihadi arrests and attacks in Europe since the 1994 (due out soon in SCT) and still no luck.

Secondly, if there are examples, are they representative or exceptional?  None of these are rhetorical questions and I’m open to opining and anecdotal evidence.

Jihadis Apprehensive About the Future

Will McCants August 7, 2008

Jihadica reader Jallen asks some good questions about the pessimism of Jihadis regarding Iraq:

How long have forum members been pessimistic over Iraq? Is the pessimism widespread or just a few members in one forum? Is pessimism over Iraq matched by increased optimism over Afghanistan or are these independent?

It depends which forum you read. On Hesbah, there is a more frank discussion of the fortunes of al-Qaeda in Iraq (at least judging from the posts that leak out). This is probably because Hesbah is a closed forum full of old Jihadi hands, so members don’t have to be so guarded. The opposite is true on Ekhlaas, where newbies take turns one-upping each other with paeans to al-Qaeda. No one wants to be a downer.

But since the end of 2007, I’ve noticed a steady increase in posts on Ekhlaas that say, “Just wait, a major victory is right around the corner!” You wouldn’t write that unless you were worried that things weren’t going so well at the moment.

To give you a sense of the genre, here’s a summary of a post from a few days ago by forum member Murabit Muwahhid (Monotheist Frontier Fighter):

  • Everyone is in a state of anticipation these days.
  • There have been consecutive announcements of the martyrdoms of first and second tier al-Qaeda leaders.
  • People in Europe fear martyrdom operations there.
  • There have been a series of attacks on the Islamic State of Iraq and attempts to break its power.
  • There have been victories for the mujahids in Somalia and Yemen.
  • “Are we living in difficult days or are we and the world waiting for (even more) difficult days?”
  • Will the coming days be marked by more of our leaders dying, such that the U.S. will proclaim victory over terrorism?
  • Or will these victories be followed by major setbacks that will put the lie to their proclamations?
  • It looks like the coming days will be difficult for everyone.

The post has a more defiant tone:  We may be down, but we’re not out.  It is also ambivalent about the fortunes of the Jihadi community.  (And for those convinced that Jihadis are indifferent to news of their leaders’ deaths, take note.)

The morale of the forum fighters is the lowest I’ve seen it, at least among Jihadis who live in the Middle East. Afghanistan is a bright spot, but it doesn’t seem to offset the despair of Arab Jihadis, who can’t understand why al-Qaeda hasn’t gained traction in the Middle East.

The bleaker things look for the Islamic State in Iraq–the embryo of the new caliphal order–and the longer al-Qaeda goes without a major attack in Israel, the U.S., or its closely-allied countries, the more anticipation builds that al-Qaeda will do something spectacular. When it fails to deliver, morale wanes.

The al-Qaeda narrative that has developed since 9/11 is that it tricked the U.S. into invading the Middle East, where it got bogged down and bled dry.  Once the U.S. leaves and the Islamic State in Iraq is secure, al-Qaeda will move into Syria and Lebanon, and from there stage attacks on Israel.

But the failure of AQ in Iraq, the inability of AQ to strike in Europe and the U.S., and its lack of traction in the Middle East are interfering with the narrative and a new one has not emerged, at least not one that excites Arab Jihadis.  Like Murabit Muwahhid hints, it will take a major attack to reaffirm the narrative.

But circumstances at the moment allow the U.S. to create a counter narrative: al-Qaeda started in Afghanistan and it will end in Afghanistan.  With the death of the top leadership that ordered the attacks on America, the cycle will be complete.

Document (Arabic): 8-4-08-ekhlaas-are-the-coming-days-difficult

Jihadi Explains Iranian Realpolitik

Will McCants August 6, 2008

Abu `Abd al-Rahman `Atiyyat Allah (possibly this person) has written a new booklet titled Ru’ya kashifa in which he tries to convince his Jihadi brethren that Iran and Hezbollah are not working with the U.S. and Israel as part of a grand conspiracy to subjugate Sunnis. Rather, he argues, Iran and its cat’s paw Hezbollah are seeking hegemony in the region. Achieving it means supporting popular Muslim causes and making temporary alliances with ideological enemies or competitors. Below is a summary:

  • It is hard to analyze Shia states and groups because of their doctrine of dissimulation (taqiyya), or concealing one’s true beliefs. p.4
  • Dissimulation is permitted in Sunni Islam if you are in danger. But the Shia make a habit of it. p.5
  • Outwardly Iran and Shia groups stress Sunni-Shia unity; embrace causes that are important to Muslims, particularly the Palestinian issue; and put Iran forward as the only authentic Islamic state, which fills a void left by the absent caliphate. p.12-14
  • Inwardly, Shia sincerely believe in Islam, but it is an Islam of their own making, not true Islam; they believe they are the only true Muslims; and they are seeking to dominate the Islamic world. p.15-16
  • “The hostility between the Rejectionists [the Shia], America, and Israel is real hostility.” p.19
  • Those who believe there is no real hostility between Iran on one side and the U.S. and Israel on the other have bought into conspiracy theories, which are a regrettable flaw in our culture. p.19
  • The hostility of Iran toward the U.S. and Israel is partly religious, in that Shi`ism retains the religious hostility toward Christians and Jews found in the true religion, Sunnism. It is also due to Iran’s desire for power. p.19
  • Iran helped the U.S. in Afghanistan and Iraq because of its self-interest–the U.S. eliminated two of its enemies, the Taliban and Saddam. This is a good example of the opportunistic and circumstantial nature of Shia politics. p.21
  • The Shia make these kind of decisions because their greatest enemy is the Sunnis. They can live with Jews and Christians, but not Sunnis. Look how Iran treats its Sunni minorities, how Hezbollah behaves toward Sunnis, and how the Shia government in Iraq has dealt with Sunni Iraqis. p.21, 24
  • Contrary to what many Jihadis say, Hezbollah is not Israel’s collaborator. But Hezbollah will talk to Israel and work with it on a limited basis if it suits Hezbollah’s interests. p.22-3
  • The Shia are pragmatic. They are willing to work with anyone regardless of their stated beliefs. This includes working with Wahhabis. p.23
  • Hezbollah supports Palestinian militants to achieve the wider aims of Iran. It has adopted a popular cause to increase its popularity. It is also filling a leadership vacuum left by other Arab states who have failed to step up. p.32-3
  • Hezbollah is a tool of both Iran and Syria. It serves their interests and policies. p.36
  • Hezbollah prevents any Sunni resistance from setting up on the Lebanese border with Israel. It has cut deals with Syria, the U.S., and even Israel to retain its control of the area. p.36

Despite the excessive focus on dissimulation (which also plagues Western analyses of Shia politics) and the Iran-wants-to-rule-Sunnis argument (does it really want to rule Indonesia?), this is a good primer on Iran’s realpolitik in the Middle East and dovetails well with the findings of an excellent new book, The Limits of Culture. That `Atiyyat Allah has to chastise his fellow Jihadis for their conspiracy thinking and their overemphasis on cultural motives when analyzing state behavior shows that they are problems for the Jihadi analytical community. Same could be said for us.

abu-abd-al-rahman-atiyyat-allah-ruya-kashifa رؤية كاشفة

Poll of Potentional Foreign Fighters

Will McCants July 30, 2008

Periodically, Ekhlaas members poll the forum. Usually, the questions are inane (“How much do you love the Islamic State of Iraq?”). But a recent poll posted two months ago caught my eye. The voting seems to be coming to an end, so I’m posting the results.

The question is, “After you arrive in the theaters of jihad (God willing), where will you find yourself?” The respondents can choose from the following (quoting):

  1. in a martyrdom operation
  2. in the field of battle fighting the Crusaders [direct fighting]
  3. producing sophisticated weapons [traditional and non-traditional]
  4. in leadership positions [company commander – group commander]
  5. teaching a course on the Sharia
  6. in the media division
  7. something else

75 people responded, but only 46 directly answered the question. Some had multiple answers, so I only counted their first choices. Here’s how the results break down:

15 Martyrdom, 22 Fight, 3 Weapons, 3 Leadership, 0 Teaching, 1 Media, 2 Other. Some of the respondents couldn’t choose one and answered with a prioritized list. Others felt they could do several of things at once. For example, one said he could fight during the day and teach religious classes at night.

It’s interesting that so few of the respondents aspire to leadership positions or want to play supporting roles. Perhaps it’s because they are doing that now as forum fighters and feel that when they travel to the front, it’s time to fight. Or perhaps it’s peer pressure: no one wants to appear arrogant by claiming leadership or cowardly by choosing a non-violent option.

Document (Arabic): 6-28-08-ekhlaas-what-service-do-you-want-to-perform-in-theaters-of-jihad

(This is only the first page of the six pages of responses. Follow the numbered links at the bottom for the rest.)

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