ji·had·ica

Proof that Sincere Sunnis Are Fighting in Tripoli, Lebanon

Ekhlaas member Abu al-Bara’ al-Shami uploaded this video as proof that sincere Muslim youth are fighting solely to protect their religion and coreligionists in Tripoli.  I don’t think it proves his point at all.  In fact, the video suggests something else: the young men are relishing a chance to play superhero.  That doesn’t mean they aren’t sincere, but it’s hard to believe that there’s not a little bit of this going on.  You be the judge:

Video: rpg-attack-in-bab-al-tabbana-tripoli

Trouble in Tripoli

Lebanon that is. Over the past few days, there has been fighting between the Jabal Muhsin and Bab al-Tabbana neighborhoods that has killed a handful of people and injured dozens. The former is predominantly Alawi and the latter is Sunni.

The clash has prompted confused speculation on Ekhlaas. No one is sure who is fighting or who to root for. Abu_3ubayda puts it best when he says, “The resistance now is spontaneous and unorganized. What has happened so far is improvised.”

One point of contention is the extent of Salafi involvement. Some members say that most of the Sunnis fighting are Salafis, while others deny it.

Bab al-Tabbana is said to be a stronghold of Salafism in Tripoli, where the puritanical Sunni movement has become powerful, if fractured, in recent years. Still, not every Sunni taking up arms in the neighborhood identifies as a Salafi.

Document (Arabic): 7-10-08-ekhlaas-truth-of-battle-between-sunnis-and-alawis-in-northern-lebanon

Prospects for Jihadis in Lebanon

Mahan Abedin has a revealing interview with Omar Bakri Muhammad in Asia Times Online. Omar Bakri was the head of al-Muhajiroun, a Jihadi group in the U.K. Soon after the 7/7 attacks, he left the U.K. for his home country of Lebanon, where he settled in Tripoli and now directs the Iqra Islamic Trust. Since Omar Bakri is an old hand in the Jihadi movement and plugged into the militant scene in Lebanon, his speculation on the prospects for transnational Sunni militants there is worth considering.

Omar Bakri doesn’t think Lebanon is a good environment for al-Qaeda for the following reasons:

(more…)

Fatah al-Islam Leader Threatens Hezbollah, U.S.-Friendly Sunnis

Shakir al-`Absi, the fugitive leader of Fatah al-Islam, has issued his second audio statement since the defeat of his organization at the hands of the Lebanese Army last year. In it, he claims that the U.S. knows that it cannot directly break the “power” (shawka–a favorite Jihadi term) of the Sunnis in the Middle East, so it is using proxies to achieve the same result. This is particularly the case in Lebanon. Firstly, the U.S. is working through Sunni proxies to take control of the state’s material and media resources. Secondly, it is deliberately empowering Iran and its rejectionist allies in the region. (“Rejectionists” is a pejorative term used for Twelver Shia, who reject the first three caliphs).

`Absi goes on to say that the Sunnis of Lebanon have no one to fight for them. Hezbollah is not serious about fighting Jews; they just want control of Lebanon. And the Lebanese Army abandoned the Sunnis when Hezbollah militiamen swept into their neighborhoods in May. This, despite the fact that these same Sunnis had supported the army’s crackdown on Fatah al-Islam last year.

Toward the end of his audio statement, `Absi addresses the “heroes of Islam” in northern and southern Lebanon and the “lions of Islam” in the Palestinian camps in Lebanon:

The time of separation has come. Now you will find the lions of monotheism suddenly attacking the enemies of God, no matter who they are–Jew, Christian, hateful rejectionist [Shia], or apostate.

He also menacingly warns: “The car bombs of Iraq and the brigades of martyrdom seekers are not far from the enemies of God, wherever they are.”

Jihadi Operations in Northern and Southern Lebanon

On Saturday, an Ekhlaas member asked, “Have Jihadi operations returned to striker the Crusader Lebanese Army?” His proof that it might be so are two pieces of that day’s news:

  1. There was an explosion at the intelligence headquarters of the Lebanese Army at Abdeh in northern Lebanon.
  2. The army killed a Palestinian suicide bomber at a military checkpoint outside the Ayn Hilweh Palestinian refugee camp in southern Lebanon.

The first incident has been claimed by Fatah al-Islam, the Lebanese Jihadi group that was crushed by the Lebanese Army in the nearby Nahr al-Bared Palestinian refugee camp last summer. The second incident does not seem to have made news yet in the English-language media, but it has received coverage in the Arabic press.  That the attacks came within hours of each other, one in the far north, the other in the far south, suggests coordination.

Bin Laden Statement Prompts Speculation on AQ Strategy in Palestine (Part 3)

In the final installment of the series, we’ll look at a piece of analysis from Ekhlaas member Abu Hamza 2005 titled, “A Modest Reading of al-Qaeda’s Strategy in the Levant [bilad al-sham]”. Abu Hamza begins by referring to Bin Laden’s 2007 statement, “To Our People in Iraq.” The statement, according to Abu Hamza, indicates that the Islamic State of Iraq is the nucleus of a future caliphate, but the caliphate will not be realized until the countries surrounding Iraq are defeated and Israel is destroyed. For this reason, Al-Qaeda “the Mother” (i.e. al-Qaeda Central) is very keen on expanding into the Levant and the other countries surrounding Israel. It also wants to establish branches in important global capitals, which can put pressure on foreign countries and scatter the focus of the enemy.

Abu Hamza says that he is certain that AQ cells are being created in the Palestinian territories, Syria, and Lebanon. Because of al-Qaeda in Iraq’s geographical proximity, ease of communication, and networks in these countries, it is in charge of overseeing the development of these cells. Abu Hamza also says that northern Sinai, in Egypt, is also very attractive for AQ, but he does not mention any links with AQI.

Abu Hamza argues that there have already been AQ ops in the countries surrounding Palestine:

– On 19 August 2005, 3 Katyusha rockets were launched from the Sinai toward Eilat and the Gulf of Aqaba.

– On 28 December 2005, 10 rockets were launched from Lebanon at towns in northern Israel.

– On 20 February 2006, two Palestinians were charged with trying to carry out a suicide attack in the French Hill area of Jerusalem on behalf of the global jihad.

As for Lebanon, Abu Hamza believes that AQ Central would be silly to enter the Lebanese political game at this time. The Sunnis are not ready to support a group like al-Qaeda, as witnessed by the bad end of Fatah al-Islam in Nahir al-Barid. (Abu Hamza relates that some observers believe that Fatah al-Islam was seriously negotiating with AQ about becoming a formal affiliate before it was crushed.) Since the fight in Lebanon is part of a larger strategic conflict between US/Israel and Iran/Syria, an escalation of the conflict will ultimately benefit the local Sunni militants. So AQ will watch from afar until the situation in Lebanon escalates to the point that the local Sunni civilians militarize and incline toward AQ to protect themselves (à la Iraq). Until then, Iraq is AQ’s top priority because it is the key to liberating Palestine.  Once the U.S. leaves Iraq, al-Qaeda will transfer its leadership there and shift its focus elsewhere.

I think Abu Hamza’s piece is appropriately titled since his estimation of AQ’s chances in the Levant are much more modest than the previous two items in the series.  In this, he seems to be more in sync with Zawahiri, who has tried to play down expectations of an attack on Israel.

As for the bit about AQ branches being established in important global capitals, it supports the argument that AQ attacks in Europe and the U.S. are meant support the mother organization’s goals in the Middle East.

Document (Arabic): 5-18-08-ekhlaas-modest-reading-of-aq-strategy-in-levant

New Bin Laden Message

If you read Ekhlaas’ sign-in page that I posted yesterday, you already know that Bin Laden has released a new message. Like his message last week, the new one is inspired by the 60th anniversary of Israel, but this time it is directed to the Muslim community, not the West. Here’s a summary:

Muslims, Bin Laden argues, will only reclaim Palestine from the Jews by fighting, not compromising, since the only law that matters today is “the law of the predator.” To fight a wolf, you have to be a wolf.

Before the twentieth century, the Ottoman empire protected Palestine from the rapacious Crusaders, but then Arab leaders like Sharif Husayn and Abd al-Aziz Al al-Saud worked with the British to destroy the empire, which removed Palestine’s protection. Since then, Western proxies in the region have prevented Muslims from reclaiming Palestine.

To reverse this situation, Muslims need to follow the example of Saladin. He obeyed the Qur’anic command to fight against disbelievers; he consulted with religious scholars on the subject of jihad; he fought against local Muslim rulers who worked with the Crusaders; and finally, he did not get permission from his opponent to fight him.

In contrast, Arab leaders are removing the Qur’anic verses on fighting from academic curricula; they have co-opted the ulama and only allow them access to the media to denounce jihad against the U.S. and its allies; they collaborate with the Crusaders and call those who fight them “excommunicating Kharijites;” and finally, the religious scholars in Saudi, led by a former revivalist leader, have made jihad conditional on the permission of the Saudi government.

To those who object to Bin Laden’s thesis by asserting that Hezbollah is fighting the good fight, Bin Laden hints that Hezbollah’s leader, Nasrallah, is beholden to the Iranians; otherwise, why didn’t Hezbollah liberate Palestine in its war with Israel two years ago? It was merely a war of self-defense. The fact that Nasrallah allows Crusader forces (UN peacekeepers) to protect the Jews indicates that he is not serious.

Others might object that there have been several wars fought against Israel to liberate Palestine. Bin Laden counters that none of the past wars were serious, except for the ’73 war; even then, Sadat only wanted to recapture the Sinai from the Israelis, not liberate Palestine.

Today, Israel is weak and only survives by the support of the West and its surrogates in the region. If Israel had to face what the Soviets faced in Afghanistan against the mujahids, it would completely crumble. But since it is surrounded by surrogates of the West, there is no way to get to Palestine without fighting against them, whether they be governments or parties. This will involve killing people who profess to be Muslims, just as Saladin did in order to liberate Jerusalem.

Several interesting things to note: First, Bin Laden is very bothered by the recent counter-ideology campaign of Arab governments in the Middle East, which consists of curricula reform, criticism by prominent religious scholars, condemnatory religious labels, and former Jihadi clerics in Saudi giving the right to declare jihad to the Saudi government. This last is an allusion to Salman al-Awda, who blasted Bin Laden in an open letter last Ramadan for bringing harm to the Muslim world.

Second, Bin Laden’s complaints about the media giving a platform to his clerical critics are part of a larger beef that Jihadis are having with the Arab media. Bin Laden echoes a popular sentiment in Jihadi circles when he says that the media is deliberately “trying to disfigure (the image of) the mujahids and weaken them.”

Third, the declaration that the Jihadis must fight their way through the surrounding countries to get to the occupied territories tallies with what Zawahiri said in a private letter to Zarqawi: expel the U.S. from Iraq, set up an emirate there, move to the neighboring countries, and then finally attack Israel. This puts Lebanon and Syria high on the list of new Jihadi theaters after the U.S. leaves Iraq.

Fourth, Bin Laden’s dismissal of Nasrallh and Hezbollah plays well to his Jihadi base, which hates the Shia, but it is poor politics given how popular Hezbollah and Nasrallah are in the region.

Document (Arabic): 5-18-08-ekhlaas-bin-laden-message

Lebanon in the Mouth of the Dragon: Why Aren’t the Salafis Fighting?

Ekhlaas member al-Sarim al-Shami (“the Stern Shami”) asks: Why aren’t the armed Salafi groups entering the fight in Lebanon? He is particularly critical of their religious leaders, who are sitting on their hands. Sarim acknowledges, as I wrote a few days ago, that some Ekhlaas members endorse this tactical neutrality in order to prepare for a larger battle against the state. But he retorts that there is no better time than now to begin “the holy war” (al-harb al-muqadassa) against the infidel foreign powers that are trying to shape the destiny of Lebanon. These powers know that conflict in Lebanon will only benefit “the sons of al-Qaeda,” so they are pushing their proxies to negotiate. They realize that if there is not a peaceful settlement, Lebanon “will become a second Iraq and (turn into) the Islamic State of Lebanon.”

Another Ekhlaas member, abu_3ubayda, disagrees. Armed Salafi groups should not enter the fray because it is merely a political dispute between al-Mustaqbal, Hezbollah, and Amal. It is not a battle to raise the banner of Islam. Moreover, the war is not caused by Sunnism or Shi’ism; if that were the case, then the situation would be different and there would be no way for the warring factions to reconcile because pious people on both sides would not agree to it.

Another member, Abu Suhayb al-Shami, agrees with Sarim for the most part, but does not think it is appropriate to criticize the Salafi religious scholars for not acting. No matter the near-term resolution to the crisis, he argues, Sunnis are now more receptive to al-Qaeda in Lebanon because of what happened (i.e. they will want AQ to defend them against Hezbollah).

Document (Arabic): 5-15-08-jihadis-debate-should-sunnis-fight-in-lebanon

Jihadica in the News

Mitchell Prothero of U.S. News and World Report gives a shout-out.  This paragraph is right on target:

But while such groups have received little support from Lebanon’s Sunnis in the past, their humiliating defeat last week by Hezbollah and the tensions that led to the clashes already had Beirut’s urbane and unarmed Sunni population looking to religious conservatives and rougher men from outlying regions like Tripoli, Akkar, and the Bekaa Valley, which all have significant militant communities.

I’ll try to post something this weekend on the different militant Sunni groups operating in Lebanon.

New Issue of Jannat Released

The May issue of the Jannat (“Paradise”) Journal has been released.  The monthly journal is a collection of short news stories on the global jihad and excerpts from online Jihadi discussion forums.  If you haven’t been following the latest goings on in the jihadosphere, this is a good place to look to get caught up.

Although Jannat covers most of the open conflict zones in each issue, it focuses heavily on the Palestinian territories, which means that’s where its producers likely live (Gaza would be a good bet).  Since it is critical of Hamas and hateful toward Hezbollah, it’s also safe to assume that its producers are Jihadi-Salafis of some sort.  Jihadis are trying to gain greater visibility in Gaza, but it has been tough given Hamas’s monopoly on Sunni Islamist violence there.

The headline story in this issue is the Shia march from Iran to Iraq to Syria to Lebanon to the Gulf and finally to Yemen (which seems pretty circuitous).  The headline screams that Hezbollah is appropriating Sunni Beirut and that the extermination of Fatah al-Islam (a Lebanese Jihadi group which rebelled against the government last summer) has paved the way for Hezbollah’s control of Lebanon.

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