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The Strategic Effects of 9/11, Part 5: The Jihadi Domino Theory

Will McCants September 23, 2008

Continuing…

  • Why did al-Qaeda attack the U.S.?  Was it to drive the U.S. out of the Middle East?  Or was it to strike the far enemy for the sake of destroying the near enemy (i.e. regimes in the Arab and Islamic world)?
  • Regardless of the intent of al-Qaeda’s leaders, the sequence of events gives weight to the second possibility, which could also be termed the Domino Scenario.
  • According to a 2007 article by George Friedman, Bin Laden saw a rare opportunity after the fall of the USSR to begin re-establishing the worldwide caliphate.  But, says Friedman, armed groups can’t establish empires.  They can, however, seize a state and use it to begin to establish an empire.  UBL realized that Afghanistan wasn’t the ideal place for this because of its geographical position and its weakness.
  • Based on Zawahiri’s pre-9/11 writings, Friedman believes that UBL wanted to topple local regimes and replace them with Islamic ones.  He was looking to do this in Egypt because it leads the Islamic world.
  • Friedman says the two goals of the attacks were 1) to prove to Muslims that the US could be attacked and suffer great harm, and 2) to provoke a U.S. response.  Whatever the U.S. chose to do in response, Muslims would win.  If the U.S. failed to respond, it would look weak.  If it attacked, it would be engaged in a crusade.
  • The authors of a report from Decision Supports Systems, Inc. written two months after 9/11 understood al-Qaeda’s intent.  The study says that before 9/11, AQ attacked three targets without sufficiently provoking the US: civil, diplomatic, and military.
  • Based on al-Qaeda’s statements before 9/11, DSSI wrote that al-Qaeda was trying to provoke the U.S. into a conflict with it.  After the 9/11 strikes, the U.S. responded in the manner planned by al-Qaeda.
  • According to DSSI, AQ wanted to provoke the U.S. into a large military invasion of the Middle East so AQ could destroy its military and upset the geopolitical balance of power.
  • The DSSI report argues that the greatest indicator that this was AQ’s strategy is the fact that its operatives assassinated Ahmad Shah Massoud, the commander of the Northern Alliance.  AQ knew that when the US retaliated for 9/11, it would work through tribal proxies because the U.S. does not like to get its hands dirty.  Thus, AQ had to kill the most effective leader of those trbies.
  • As the DSSI study concludes, as long as the U.S. continues to behave in predicable ways, al-Qaeda can anticipate its responses and plan accordingly.
  • According to the DSSI study, there are three possibilities after 9/11.  1) The U.S. intervention in the Middle East provokes uncontrolable violence in the Middle East which will make it ungovernable in the long term.  2) The U.S. sends more troops to stabalize the situation but its presence polarizes Muslims and puts strain on its allies in the region, particularly the Gulf states and Pakistan.  The government of Pakistan could become unstable and AQ or its allies could get control of its nukes by infiltrating the security apparatus or overthrowing the government.   The collapse of these states will create security vaccuums that AQ or its allies will fill, giving them control of oil and nukes.  3) AQ could choose to destroy oil production in the MIddle East, forcing the U.S. to look elsewhere to meet its energy needs.

[Update: All of DSSI’s publications can be found here.]

Walking the Talk: Forum Members Travel to Afghanistan and Iraq (Pt. 4)

Will McCants July 8, 2008

When we left Harbi, he had met a Algerian Jihadi who told him how to get to Iraq.

According to Furqan al-Junubi’s account, Harbi and two other Kuwaitis–Abu Salih (`Abd Allah Salih al-`Ajami), and Abu Talha (Nasir) al-Dawsari–pledged to go to Iraq and die there. They called this “The Pledge of the Houris” (the virgins promised to those allowed to enter Paradise–martyrs are a shoe in). Al-Miskin al-Muhajir was with them, but he could not go due to personal circumstances (he was able to go to Afghanistan latter–see part 1).

I haven’t been able to find much on Dawsari, but there’s plenty on `Ajami. He was actually being held in Guantanamo until the U.S. transferred him to Kuwaiti custody in 2005; the Kuwaits acquitted him of all charges. By the time `Ajami met Harbi, he was married, had one child, and was financially comfortable. Those who knew him thought he had been rehabilitated.

After several days, the three men departed for Iraq. Junubi relates that Harbi left behind a large house, eight children (now ten), and a substantial sum of money. (Harbi was a car salesman.  From the looks of this, he also seems to have been a racing enthusiast. You can see Harbi at the 0:38 mark.)

Before Harbi left, Junubi, the author of our account, wrote and wished him well. Harbi replied that they would soon meet in Paradise. Harbi’s response was dated April 5, 2008, which is probably after he had left Kuwait (one of his traveling companions, `Ajami, died in late March).

Junubi relates that the three men wen to Iraq through a coordinator, but he doesn’t say where their transit point was. It has now come to light that the men went through Syria. Indeed, one of the last photos of Harbi was taken by himself on the flight to Syria.

According to press reports, `Ajami called his family from Syria to tell them where he was headed and why. The next time they would hear news of him was when they received an anonymous call informing them that `Ajami had carried out a suicide bombing. Harbi’s family got the same call a few weeks later.

According to a Furqan video that was posted on June 21, `Ajami carried out a March 23 suicide attack on the Harmat neighborhood of Mosul. A little over a month later, Harbi carried out an April 26 attack on the Tel al-Rumman police station in Mosul. (Bill Roggio at Long War Journal has a good summary of the contents, based partially on Nibras Kazimi’s analysis).

The video is over 30 minutes long and tedious in parts, but many of the useful bits can be viewed here. Harbi is the bearded, long-haired man in the center of everything (his coiffure and beard seem to be deliberately modeled on that of Khattab, a Jihadi commander in Chechnya that Harbi emulated, according to Junubi).

The first clip you see is that of Harbi talking about jihad and then chanting a nashid (hymn) with his brethren (notice the childrens’ voices in the background). The next clip is Harbi standing next to the vehicle he will use to blow himself up. After that is his attack on Tel al-Rumman, followed by `Ajami’s attack on the Harmat neighborhood. Last is Harbi again leading a group chanting a hymn.

In the full video, Harbi gives his final testament (wasiyya), summarized here. In it, he criticizes a hardline Kuwaiti Salafi scholar, Hamid al-`Ali, for badmouthing the Islamic State of Iraq. He then explains to his family that he decided to leave for Iraq because the Companions of Muhammad did not choose to sit with their families when fighting was called for.  (Harbi may have been feeling a little guilty–Junubi tells us that his mother was very ill when he left.) Harbi then chastizes other Jihadis for sitting behind their computers and doing nothing.

At the end of his testament, Harbi stands next to his car bomb. As he pats the explosive tank, he says:

I have everything: a house, a car, two wives, and eight children. But now I find happiness in my heart that I did not find in any other place.

There’s a lot to talk about here and it probably deserves a separate post, but just few closing thoughts to end the series:

  • A mixture of indignation, glory seeking, camaraderie, and promise of eternal reward motivated Harbi and `Ajami to pledge themselves to die in Iraq. Since both had been detained and likely treated harshly, they may have been motivated by a desire for personal revenge as well.
  • Syria is the transit point for our group, as it is for many other Gulfis seeking martyrdom in Iraq. But note that it is an Algerian Jihadi, not a local Kuwaiti, that informs the Kuwaiti group of the route.
  • After reading Junubi’s account, one Ekhlaas member asked 1) why Harbi went to Iraq rather than Afghanistan and 2) why he chose to be a martyrdom operative when he had enough experience to be a trainer. In other words, why didn’t a skilled Jihadi like Harbi put his talents to better use. Junubi answers that Harbi went to Iraq because it is much easier to travel there than to Afghanistan. Moreover, many go to Iraq because it is close by. On the second question, Junubi discloses that Harbi had thought about becoming a coordinator but decided he wanted to die a martyr and not fight (presumably since the latter did not guarantee martyrdom).

Document (Arabic): 6-26-08-ekhlaas-furqan-al-junubi-story-of-harbi-and-bawasil

Walking the Talk: Forum Members Travel to Afghanistan and Iraq (Pt. 3)

Will McCants July 6, 2008

Today we continue our look at a Kuwaiti cell and how its members transitioned from forum fighters to foreign fighters.

When we left off, Badr al-Harbi and Bawasil had returned to Kuwait from the front in Afghanistan via Iran, entrusted with a special mission by Abu al-Layth al-Libi, a senior al-Qaeda leader. They were delayed in carrying out their task by Iranian, and then Kuwaiti, security forces. The latter, according to al-Furqan al-Junubi’s account, had tortured them and confiscated their passports.

After being released, Harbi and Bawasil stayed in Kuwait a full year to complete their special mission: gathering money, clothes, and food for the Jihadis in Afghanistan. In this, they relied on their network of friends, many of whom were already committed to the cause. Yet Harbi and Bawasil’s efforts aroused the suspicions of other Jihadis, who wrote the brothers in Afghanistan and told them that they were spies. They even made films that portrayed Harbi and Bawasil in a negative light.

Upon completing their task, Harbi and Bawasil wanted to return to the front in Afghanistan, but their passports had been confiscated. Nevertheless, they were both able to get new passports. Harbi and Bawasil then went with their families to Mecca and returned without incident.

After returning to Kuwait, Harbi and Bawasil asked the Jihadis in Afghanistan about the route to the front. The Jihadis told them that it was “broken,” but this, al-Furqan al-Junubi comments, was only because they had believed the bad rumors that had been spread about Harbi and Bawasil.

Harbi suggested the two travel to Iraq instead, but he was hesitant to go because he was not sure he would be guaranteed a martyrdom operation. Harbi and Bawasil soon met a coordinator and obtained a guarantee of safe passage from him, but they did not end up using him.

At this time, Harbi decided he wanted to marry for the second time, but wasn’t sure it was right to do so as a mujahid. Bawasil assured him it was, and so he did.

One month after Harbi’s marriage, a message came from Abu al-Layth al-Libi vouching for the integrity of Harbi and Bawasil. This meant the two could now travel to Afghanistan. But personal circumstances prevented Harbi from traveling to Afghanistan with Bawasil, who was anxious to leave because the government was pursuing him.

Bawasil first went to the United Arab Emirates with one of his close cousins (on his mother’s side). The Jihadis (it is unclear if they were in the Emirates or Afghanistan) told Bawasil that they only wanted him and not his cousin, so the latter returned to Kuwait.

Bawasil had to wait four days in the airport because of snow in Iran (indicating that Iran again served as his transit point for Afghanistan). Bawasil succeeded in finding the brothers (presumably in Iran) and soon found a coordinator, but they had stopped using the old route.

Harbi waited four months to find new way to Afghanistan, but failed. It was around this time that Harbi met a Jihadi from Algeria who told him how to go to Iraq.

(To be continued….)

Some thoughts:

  • Al-Qaeda Leadership – Abu al-Layth al-Libi personally requested Harbi and Bawasil to gather funds and supplies for the Jihadis in Afghanistan. He also personally intervened in the rumor campaign against them.
  • Support Networks – The way Harbi and Bawasil went about accomplishing their task for Libi is instructive. Like Tupperware salespeople, they relied on their personal network of friends rather than reach out to anonymous donors. But this did not protect them from allegations of spying, a consequence of their mission’s secrecy. (This is a constant problem for clandestine terrorist groups–see Jake Shapiro’s work in this regard.) On another subject, Bawasil tried to bring his close cousin to Afghanistan, reinforcing the idea that friends and family of dedicated militants are more likely than others to be involved in the Jihadi Movement.
  • Security Lapse – The Kuwaiti government was monitoring the two militants, as indicated by Bawasil’s eagerness to escape their scrutiny. So how in the world did they regain their passports?
  • Transit – As in part 2, Iran is mentioned as a transit point to Afghanistan. But this time we have the added transit point of the UAE. Moreover, travel coordinators are twice mentioned, once with regard to Afghanistan, the other with regard to Iraq.
  • Family Life – Even though Harbi knows he will die as a martyrdom operative, he still wants to marry a second wife.

As I said last post, none of this is a big revelation (with the exception of Iran). But it really adds texture to the recent abstract debates about terror networks and helps to weigh their relative merits.

Walking the Talk: Forum Members Travel to Afghanistan and Iraq (Pt. 2)

Will McCants July 2, 2008

On Monday, we looked at the case of al-Miskin al-Muhajir/asdasd99, who finally made his way to Afghanistan. Miskin had hoped to go to Iraq in April with a group from Kuwait, but unnamed obstacles stood in his way. We don’t yet know the fate of Miskin, but we do know what happened to this earlier group.

The story begins with Abu `Umar Badr al-Harbi, 36, from Kuwait. According to a friend of his, al-Furqan al-Junubi, Harbi was the oldest of his brothers and very close to his mother. He became “committed to the path (of jihad)” at the age of 14.

During his military service in Kuwait, Harbi met his best friend, al-Bawasil. Bawasil was at the beginning of his commitment to jihad when 9/11 happened. Both men rejoiced at the attack and were impressed that someone had been able to strike so deep inside the U.S.

One day, Harbi came to Bawasil and convinced him of the duty to undertake jihad. By 2004, both men were encouraging others to also take up arms. Many people said they were being foolish or accused them of being spies; others said there was no permanent jihad or banner to fight under.

In 2005, Harbi and Bawasil met the followers of Shaykh `Amir Khalif, the co-leader of a militant network in Kuwait, but they didn’t get to meet him before he died.

Soon after meeting Khalif’s followers, they learned of a way to go to Afghanistan through Iran. Both men were worried that it was a trap. Bawasil went first to make sure the way was secure. After arriving safely, he spent two weeks in Afghanistan with the mujahids before returning to Kuwait.

Upon Bawasil’s return, he told Harbi of the glories that awaited him on the front.  The two then began preparing for to go to Afghanistan for a longer period of time. They trained themselves physically and psychologically, studied some Islamic legal subjects pertaining to their endeavors, and gathered money.

Together with their friend Abu Khalid al-Kuwaiti, Bawasil and Harbi went to Iran by airplane and then made their way to Afghanistian. They stayed there three months training and guarding the front line.

While there, Abu Layth al-Libi (a high-ranking, now-deceased al-Qaeda member) entrusted them with a special mission in Kuwait. The mission was so secret that not even Abu Nasir al-Qahtani, another high-ranking AQ member, knew of it and was puzzled when the men refused his request for them to stay.

Harbi and Bawasil tried to return to Kuwait via Iran, but Iranian security forces imprisoned them for several days because they had lost their passports. They were finally released and returned to Kuwait, but the Kuwaiti security forces imprisoned them for twelve days, tortured them, and took their passports.

To be continued…..

In part 3 we’ll look at Harbi and Bawasil’s special mission and their preparations for another trip to the front. Some of the details already sound familiar if you’re read up on the foreign fighter literature. What stands out to me is the role that Iran plays as a transit point between Kuwait and Afghanistan. A few days ago, I noted that the Saudis are claiming that a Jihadi in Iran is directing a large network of militants in the Kingdom. By itself, this doesn’t mean much given the source. But here we have an insider remarking that Iran is a transit point for Jihadis going to fight in Afghanistan. That’s worrying.

There’s been a lot of talk about Syria’s role as a transit point, but it’s still unclear from the open source materials if it’s ignorance, benign neglect, or something more sinister.  It looks like Iran presents the same puzzle.

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