ji·had·ica

Did Jordanian Intelligence Kill Abdallah Azzam?

Of the many fascinating details in the Sahab interview with Abu Dujana al-Khurasani, one made my jaw drop and break my self-imposed blogging ban. Abu Dujana says his Jordanian handler named another Jordanian intelligence official as the person responsible for the assassination of Abdallah Azzam in Peshawar in November 1989:

“This idiot confessed to me and told me, ‘if you go and kill any leader of the mujahidin, you’ll become a top man in Jordan, like my chief, Ali Burjaq’. According to Abu Zayd [Abu Dujana’s handler], Ali Burjaq, Director of Jordanian counterterrorism, is the man responsible for the murder of the shahid, as we reckon him, shaykh Abdullah Azzam in Peshawar 20 years ago.”   (translation by Adam Gadahn)

As you know, Azzam’s assassins have never been identified, and numerous theories have been suggested (CIA, Mossad, Usama bin Ladin, Ayman al-Zawahiri, Gulbuddin Hekmatyar, Khad, KGB to mention a few). However, I have not heard this particular claim before, despite having worked on a biography on Azzam for some time.

It’s hard to know what to make of it. Of course, Abu Dujana may have made it up to smear the Jordanian regime. But he could have made up worse things, and blaming Jordan exonerates the US, who usually takes the blame for Azzam’s death in the jihadi community. One might also ask why a handler would divulge such a secret to an asset he has only known for a few months. But Abu Dujana’s trajectory shows he clearly did inspire trust. The biggest problem I have with this claim is that I don’t see why Jordanian intelligence would have wanted to take out Azzam in 1989. Azzam neither organized nor called for militant activity against the Jordanian regime at the time.

Either the GID did the job for someone else, or Abu Dujana’s claim is false.

Is RAND in Bed with Extreme Takfiris?

As regular readers of jihadi literature know, the RAND Corporation is no friend of al-Qa‘ida. Supporters of the latter have a tendency to blame RAND for trying to destroy them and the rest of the world’s Muslims into the bargain. Although RAND is not alone in being perceived by jihadis as an almost conspiratorial observer of every move the jihadis make (West Point’s Counter Terrorism Center, as long-time readers of Jihadica know all too well, is another), it is probably the one that gets criticised most. (If you were not aware of this, see Jarret Brachman’s excellent post on this subject.) Recently, however, one Nur al-Islam posed a question relating to RAND that I had not seen before: Is there a connection between the RAND Corporation and extremists of takfir?

Takfir and takfiris

Takfir, as many readers will know, is the practice of excommunication, i.e. of declaring another Muslim to be an infidel (kafir). Traditionally, Muslim scholars have generally been careful to apply this concept in their dealings with other believers because of the drastic consequences it could have; according to the shari‘a (Islamic law), a Muslim who consciously and willingly abandons Islam or converts to a different religion may be killed. In recent times, many jihadis have argued in favour of a greater application of takfir, applying it to rulers of Muslim countries for not (fully) legislating on the basis of Islamic law. Since many (but certainly not all) jihadis claim applying the shari‘a is part and parcel of being a Muslim, they contend that rulers who refrain from doing so cease to be believers and are, in fact, infidels. Because of this, they subsequently claim that waging jihad against these rulers is legitimate.

According to most Muslim scholars (as well as probably the overwhelming majority of Muslims), this is a rather extreme application of takfir that will only bring about chaos and civil strife. Jihadis who apply takfir this way are therefore often referred to as takfiris or even extremists of takfir (ghulat al-takfir). These labels are fiercely rejected by many jihadis, however, who associate the term ghulat or ghulat al-takfir with Muslims who not only excommunicate political rulers for their failure to apply the shari‘a but also ordinary Muslims who have nothing to do with legislation whatsoever. In some cases, these ghulat even excommunicate entire societies. This latter group of Muslims (i.e. the ones who are willing to apply takfir to large groups of people) is referred to as “the extremists of takfir” even among jihadis and this is also how Nur al-Islam uses the term.

Annihilating global Jihadi-Salafism

One can justifiably wonder what on earth such extremists have to do with RAND. When I first read the title of this piece, I was rather hoping to find a highly intricate and complex reasoning that starts from a ridiculous premise but is nevertheless so logically argued that one is tempted to believe it all as the only possible outcome. This is often the case with jihadi writings, which are sometimes mistakenly dismissed as the rantings of crazy radicals but are actually often cleverly reasoned, despite their horrific message. Although this piece disappointed me in this respect, it is interesting nevertheless.

The author first gives the reader some general information about RAND and continues by stating that the enemy (i.e. RAND) wants to understand its enemy (i.e. jihadis) in order to fight them better. He then goes on, however, to claim that RAND has actively sought the help of other Muslims, including the scholars of al-Azhar in Cairo and the popular Egyptian preacher ‘Amr Khalid, to “annihilate global Jihadi-Salafism”. These were only second choices, however, since the author states that RAND had first asked other, non-violent Salafis to help them with this task but this had failed. He then asks whether RAND’s next step may be to asks extremists in takfir for their help in destroying (the less extreme and supposedly pure) Jihadi-Salafism. The author continues by pointing out that these extremists in takfir not only adhere to extremist teachings but have also done tremendous damage to Jihadi-Salafism by criticising scholars and activists who do stick to the true and correct teachings, like Abu Muhammad al-Maqdisi, Ayman al-Zawahiri and others, including a surprising number of Jordanian Jihadi-Salafis.

Smear campaign

At this point, it becomes clear what the author’s real intention is. He is not at all trying to criticise RAND, as so many jihadis have done before. His real aim is to attack the people he calls extreme takfiris for their criticism of the Jordanian Jihadi-Salafi community supportive of al-Maqdisi. This has been done before, as I have pointed out elsewhere, but Nur al-Islam takes the charge of extreme takfiris to a new level. He claims that, just like RAND tries to destroy Jihadi-Salafism worldwide, so do the extreme takfiris. The author states that these ghulat al-takfir may or may not be aware of RAND’s plans “but unfortunately the result is, in any case, the same”, namely that both of them try to “bring down” Jihadi-Salafism and its leaders.

The author’s seemingly critical piece about RAND thus turns out to be little more than what may be the start of a larger smear campaign against al-Maqdisi’s jihadi enemies. By even suggesting that these supposedly extreme takfiris may possibly be working with the widely-hated RAND, the author tries to undermine their credibility. To me personally, this charge seems a bit too far-fetched to be taken entirely seriously and I therefore doubt whether the accusation will be picked up by like-minded jihadis to frame their opponents as being in bed with RAND. Still, it would be interesting to see if the already impressive array of labels Islamists use to discredit each other is soon going to be joined by another one: Randis.

Midad al-Suyuf and al-Maqdisi: Sworn Enemies?

[Editor’s note: I am proud to introduce Joas Wagemakers as our new guest contributor. Regular Jihadica readers will know Joas as the world’s leading expert on Abu Muhammad al-Maqdisi; but as you will discover over the next few weeks and hopefully months, Joas’s expertise extends way beyond the Jordanian ideologue. A lecturer and PhD candidate at Radboud University in Nijmegen, Joas has published widely on jihadi ideology and is a rising star in the Middle East and Islamic studies field.]

In the past, Will (here and here), Brynjar (here) and Thomas (here) have written excellent posts on Jihadica about the Jordanian ideologue Abu Muhammad al-Maqdisi’s credibility problems. Just to refresh everyone’s memory: as a result of al-Maqdisi’s criticism of his former pupil Abu Mus‘ab al-Zarqawi’s extreme use of violence in Iraq in 2004 and 2005, some fellow jihadis accused him of reneging on his earlier, supposedly more radical beliefs and of betraying the mujahidin. This criticism was expressed particularly fiercely on the Midad al-Suyuf forum by contributors such as al-Mihdar, Layth Makka and especially al-Zarqawi’s brother-in-law, Abu Qudama Salih al-Hami.

Abu Qudama, a journalist who worked in the AfPak region during the fighting there in the 1980s, is said to be close to many of the mujahidin who fought there and particularly al-Zarqawi. It therefore seemed safe to assume that the reason for his hostility was al-Maqdisi’s criticism of al-Zarqawi. Abu Qudama’s hostility was expressed in several books, including The Truth of the Conflict between Shaykh al-Maqdisi and the Heirs of al-Zarqawi is Jihad in the Way of God, which were also posted on the Midad al-Suyuf forum, as well as some others. Indeed, if one were to visit the Midad al-Suyuf forum today and go to the “al-Siyasa al-Shar‘iyya” section, it would be easy to find recent threads dedicated to anti-Maqdisi themes. These include threads with titles such as “Why does Abu Qatada remain in prison while al-Maqdisi is released?”, “Shaykh al-Maqdisi is a scholar with the people of ignorance”, “When is al-Maqdisi going to wake up?” and “Al-Maqdisi and the internet… The means to realise the agreed upon goal… or only for fame?” These and other threads are highly critical of al-Maqdisi and make Midad al-Suyuf look like it is obsessed with al-Maqdisi since he criticised al-Zarqawi and doesn’t seem to take him very seriously anymore no matter what he does. Indeed, al-Maqdisi himself has dedicated an article to addressing the hostility he encounters on this particular forum. They give the impression, in other words, of being sworn enemies over their dispute about al-Zarqawi.

This impression may be wrong, however. Strangely enough, as late as 2008 al-Maqdisi’s writings were sometimes posted on the Midad al-Suyuf forum without any commentary or accompanied by praise, occasionally even by people like al-Mihdar, who would later criticise him severely. This change of tone from neutrality or even support for al-Maqdisi to downright hostility cannot be explained by simply pointing to al-Maqdisi’s criticism of al-Zarqawi; after all, this was expressed in 2004 and 2005, implying that if this was the reason, the change in attitude towards al-Maqdisi would have taken place earlier. This raises the question: what caused this change?

Umm Mus‘ab

The reason why Midad al-Suyuf turned sour on al-Maqdisi has a lot to do with the writings by Abu Qudama, which seem to have given the contributors to the forum the information on which they base most of their hostility. In 2007, he wrote a book called Knights of the Absent Duty, in which he describes his experiences with the mujahidin and especially displays his knowledge of al-Zarqawi. In the book, however, he is not very negative about al-Maqdisi at all and even describes his endurance under torture in a Jordanian prison, although he does indicate the differences between al-Maqdisi and his hero al-Zarqawi. Significantly, however, Abu Qudama points out that al-Zarqawi was killed in 2006 by an American attack because the latter’s wife, Umm Mus‘ab, wrote letters to family and friends in either Iraq or Jordan without her husband’s knowledge. He suggests that through these letters, Umm Mus‘ab must have (inadvertently) betrayed al-Zarqawi’s whereabouts, leading the Americans to the place where he was hiding. He states that this is the only way they could have known about this.

This implicit accusation of Umm Mus‘ab was apparently so offensive to al-Maqdisi that he claims to have written a letter to Abu Qudama in which he tells him that he shouldn’t defame Umm Mus‘ab and that this whole story is a lie since al-Zarqawi’s wife was not even in Iraq at the time so she couldn’t have known about her husband’s hiding place. Although al-Maqdisi has several writings on his website that briefly refer to Abu Qudama’s accusation, in none of them does he mention what Abu Qudama actually accuses Umm Mus‘ab of. He states that he didn’t mention this because he didn’t want to defame her any more than Abu Qudama had already done. Perhaps for the same reason, al-Maqdisi’s letter to Abu Qudama is also absent from his website.

According to al-Maqdisi, Abu Qudama got so angry with him over this letter that he started writing books condemning al-Maqdisi. Although he doesn’t say so explicitly, al-Maqdisi may suggest that all of Abu Qudama’s anger towards him isn’t about his criticism of al-Zarqawi at all but simply about his own anger over being reprimanded for supposedly falsely accusing Umm Mus‘ab. Although this information should be treated carefully since I do not know how Abu Qudama feels about this issue, it would explain why the Midad al-Suyuf forum turned increasingly hostile to al-Maqdisi.

This story may come across as nothing more than jihadi gossip. There is, however, some significance to it. Firstly, it shows how much influence one author knowledgeable about jihadis can have on a forum that was initially not unfavourably disposed towards al-Maqdisi. Secondly, it also shows how a man widely viewed as one of the most important radical scholars alive can quickly fall from grace among a small but dedicated group of people if targeted in the right way. Perhaps surprisingly, it appears that for some zealous jihadis al-Maqdisi’s large number of books and his prison credibility seem to count for little.

Shishani on Salafi-Jihadism in the Levant

On 29 June 2009, the Jordanian journalist Murad Batal al-Shishani published an article in al-Hayat titled “Salafi–Jihadism: A New Face in Jordan, Lebanon, and Syria’s Palestinian Camps.” The article talks about the new generation of “neo-Zarqawis” and the increasing radicalization of Palestinian refugees. This radicalisation, he argues, stems from the failure to resolve the Arab-Israeli Conflict, the deterioration of the PLO and its control over the refugee camps, the political ramifications of the Fatah-Hamas conflict, and rising poverty and unemployment. Al-Shishani states that attacks such as the 2008 incident in Jordan where Thaer al-Wahidi, a refugee from the al-Baq’ah refugee camp, assaulted a Lebanese classical music troupe, are emblematic of this phenomenon.

Al-Shishani argues that the Salafi-jihadi ideology in the refugee camps has come in three phases. The first was the establishment of the ideology in the mid-1980s. The establishment of ‘Usbat al-Ansar in the Ain al-Hilweh refugee camp in southern Lebanon was typical of this phase. According to al-Shishani, this period witnessed the beginning of nationalist groups using Islamic slogans and the establishment of Hamas and the Islamic Jihad.

Al-Shishani writes that the second phase was when the Salafi-jihadis started playing a larger role in sheltering and training non-Palestinian Salafi-jihadis. Al-Shishani cited the 2003 bombing of the McDonalds in Lebanon by the Yemeni Muammar al-Awami as an example of this development.

According to al-Shishani, the third phase is when the Salafi-jihadi ideology becomes the primary ideology for Palestinian youth in the camps. This phase is occurring now,  as individuals and small groups are increasingly taking up the ideology. Al-Shishani states that the members of this new generation “are described as ‘neo-Zarqawis,’” and are the legacy of the Levantine Salafi-jihadi current that Abu Musab al-Zarqawi started in his Afghan training camp in 2000. They believe the route to Israel is through Iraq. Al-Shishani maintains that this trend is regional, centering on Iraq, Syria, Jordan, and Lebanon, and it rejects the Salafi-jihadism of Abu Muhammad al-Maqdisi (more on the al-Maqdisi dispute here and here).

In describing the Salafi-jihadi situation in Jordan, al-Shishani states that the refugee camp in Irbid has become a transit point for foreign fighters headed to Iraq and this is important because commentators normally associate Salafi-jihadism in Jordan with the cities of Zarqa, Salt, and Maan in addition to Palestinians not living in camps and East Jordanians. According to al-Shishani, Irbid is where the leader of al-Wahidi’s cell, Shakir ‘Umar al-Khatib, recruited al-Wahidi and called on Palestinians to join “the fighters in Iraq and Lebanon.”

For Lebanon, al-Shishani agrees with Omayma Abdel-Latif, a research associate at the Carnegie Endowment’s Middle East Center, that Lebanon is “fertile ground” for radical Salafi organizations. The lack of official Lebanese control over the camps, due to a previous agreement between Palestinian factions and the Lebanese government, compounds this threat.

Unfortunately, due to the lack of information, al-Shishani does not provide many details of the situation in Syria except to say that there have been clashes between militants in the Yarmuk refugee camp and the Syrian government.

The study of Salafi-jihadism in the Levant often takes a backseat to that of Iraq and AfPak, and to that of Hamas and Hezbollah, but, as al-Shishani indicates, the ideology does have a persistent and dangerous following in the region. If the modicum of stability that Iraq currently enjoys holds after the US withdrawal, the next logical endpoint for the neo-Zarqawis would be the Palestinian Territories, where they could act as spoilers to any possible peace initiatives.

Back

I have been busy the past two weeks, but the jihadis have been busier. Bin Ladin has issued two audio statements, one proposing practical steps to liberate Palestine and the other about the treacherous government in Somalia. Al-Zawahiri warned against the forthcoming Crusader attack on Sudan, while Mustafa Abu al-Yazid has addressed the people of Pakistan. Abu Umar al-Baghdadi has spoken about the US plan to withdraw from Iraq, but he does not seem to get the same attention from the online community as his colleagues in Afghanistan. Abu Qatada has issued a statement from prison about the decision to extradite him to Jordan. Fatah al-Islam sharia officer Abu Abdallah al-Maqdisi has been taking questions since Monday, but nobody is allowed to ask about Shakir al-Absi or Asad al-Jihad2 (hmm).

On the magazine front, Sumud 33  has been out for a little while. Fortunately Sada al-Malahim 8 came out on Sunday so now Greg can sleep again. Turkestan al-Islamiyya 3 came out earlier this week, adding to the past month’s increasing flow of Uighur jihadi propaganda.

We have also seen the publication of a couple of unusual videos featuring Abu Muhammad al-Maqdisi, one with him delivering a funeral sermon in front of a crowd of several hundred people, and another showing him at a large wedding alongside half the jihadi community in Zarqa.  I suspect these videos are part of an attempt to bolster al-Maqdisi’s legitimacy by showing that he is enjoying freedom of movement and expression. By the way I highly recommend the 2-hour wedding video. It offers a fascinating inside look into the sociology of Islamism. It serves as a great illustration of a point I made in a recent article about Zarqa, namely that you cannot deradicalise entire communities. The film may depress you, but you might enjoy the songs.

I will be back soon with a report from the jihadi roundtable in Oslo.

Update (27 March): The Christian Science Monitor became the first Western newspaper to report on the Maqdisi controversy today – and Jihadica is mentioned.

Document (Arabic): 03-26-09-shouraa-mustafa-abu-al-yazid
Document (Arabic):
03-19-09-shouraa-abu-qatada-statement
Document (Arabic):
03-23-09-shamikh-abu-abdallah-al-maqdisi-qa
Document (Arabic): 03-22-09-shouraa-sada-al-malahim-8
Document (Arabic): 03-25-09-shouraa-turkestan-al-islamiyya-3
Document (Arabic): 03-12-09-faloja-maqdisi-fima-kuntum
Document (Arabic): 03-12-09-ansar-maqdisi-wedding-video

Q&A On Gaza

Asad al-Jihad2, who some claim is senior AQ member Hukayma, is taking questions on Gaza.  The Q&A session, modeled on that of Zawahiri, is open for four days of questions; AJ2 will give his answers soon after.  Individuals are allowed to ask five question and news orgs can ask ten.

One has to be careful not to read too much into these questions since some were probably posted by intel orgs.  But the concerns raised jive with everything else I’ve seen on the forums: what’s our stance on Hamas, who are the authentic Jihadi groups and why aren’t they doing more, and what do we do about Egypt and the Gulf countries?

I don’t have time to summarize them all, but one question directed to Asad al-Jihad2 struck me: “What is your view regarding the recent disclosure that Gaza is being annexed to Egypt and the West Bank is being annexed to Jordan?”

Maqdisi Blasts Hamas

Abu Muhammad al-Maqdisi, the leading Jihadi scholar in Jordan (and worldwide for that matter), has issued a statement on his website regarding Gaza.  In short: Hamas has let down the Muslim community and needs to step out of the way and allow the Jihadis there and abroad to take over the fight against Israel.  Maqdisi is particularly enraged by Hamas’ recent crackdown on the Army of Islam.  Here’s a summary of the highlights:

  • If not for tyrranical rulers and their armies, Muslims would be flocking across their countries’ borders to Gaza now on a jihad.
  • We’re not surprised by the failure of our feckless rulers.  We’re surprised by the leaders of Hamas, who spurn the Taliban, Jihadi clerics, and true monotheists [eg Army of Islam] while praising the Shia and its leaders [eg Hezbollah and Iran] and even secular governments that plot against Islam.
  • Some might say this is the time for solidarity and not reproaching others.  We say that there is no time like the present.  Neglecting to speak out is one of the main reasons the enemies have been ascendant.
  • Hamas is misleading Muslims with its glittering slogans, which blind people to their wayward goals and strategies, leading them down the path of criminals.
  • Hamas is selling out Islam and cozying up to tyrants.
  • Hamas started the bloodshed in Gaza several weeks ago when it killed members of the Army of Islam organization.  In this they brought joy to the Jews.
  • We support those who fight for pure monotheism, not democracy or nationalism.  We won’t stand in the way of those who want to fight for these things, but we won’t support them and we don’t want others to follow them.
  • Hamas needs to abandon democracy and return to pure monotheism.  It needs to stop hindering those who would fight under monotheism’s banner.

Document (Arabic): 12-29-08-tawhed-maqdisi-statement-on-hamas

Maqdisi Response To Abu Rumman Article

Abu Muhammad al-Maqdisi has released a statement on his website, Tawhed.ws, in which he responds to the questions of one of his followers about the Abu Rumman article I referenced yesterday.  Maqdisi denies being a revisionist but he is also clear that he is not an extremist and that he is trying to regain control of the dragon he unleased in his earlier writings.  

In his statement, Maqdisi finally names his main nemesis, the brother-in-law of Zarqawi’s wife.  I haven’t seen Abu Qudama’s book yet but I’ll try to track it down.

Here’s a summary:

Question 1: Abu Rumman says you are shunning Zarqawi’s supporters.  Is it possible to consider this part of the “revisions,” as he says?

Those of us who signed the statement are not dissociating ourselves from the brothers.  We are talking about a small group of ignorant people who haven’t studied at all, were not in prison with us, and who did not fight in a jihad.  The beliefs of these people are like the Khawarij of old because of their general excommunication of people.  They excommunicate anyone who does not clearly dissociate themselves form the government.  Moreover, many of them believe you can’t pray behind imams of mosques that are part of government-administered endowments.  Some are attributing these teachings to me and this is the source of my disagreement with them, not their support of Zarqawi.  Those of us who signed the statement are closest to Zarqawi and knew him best.  This statement is not a “revision” as is being talked about in the media because we never previously held to the awful tenets being circulated by this group.

Question 2: Is it true you called the youth to stay away from this group before talking to its members first?

I sat with them twice in their homes and discussed the excommunication of imams who run mosques that are part of government-adminsitered endowments.  We also discussed the excommunication of government employees for not dissociating themselves from the government.  I rejected these ideas.  I succeeded in turning one of them around in a meeting at my home, but he later reverted.  I have followed the online discussions about me and I’ve spent my precious time engaging these people in hopes that they will repent.  Some have but others have become worse.

Question 3: Abu Rumman says some of your earlier works were revisions and that they are at odds with the legacy of Zarqawi.

That is not true.  The Thalathiniyya is not a revision because I didn’t revise anything.  I also wrote it alone in Zarqawi’s presence.  The Waqafat was not just directed to Zarqawi but to the whole mujahid community. [see Joas Wagemakers’ comments on my post yesterday]

Question 4: What’s your opinion of the book Fursan al-Farida al-Gha’iba [Knights of the Neglected Duty] by Abu Qudama, the husband of Zarqawi’s sister?

He has slandered me and called me a liar based on what some of the extremists mentioned above are saying.  He wasn’t with us in prison and he’s talking about things he knows nothing of.  I have been criticized because of his book, which has been published on some of the forums.  People on the forums also published his slanders against the wife of Zarqawi.

Document (Arabic): 12-13-08-faloja-maqdisi-responds-to-abu-rumman-article

Maqdisi’s High-Wire Act

On December 4, Abu Muhammad al-Maqdisi–Zarqawi’s former mentor and one of the world’s most influential Jihadi ideologues–spoke briefly to the al-Ansar Paltalk chat group.  In his brief remarks, Maqdisi appears to distance himself from the Jihadi revisionists:

For you and me I prescribe the fear of God, working for the sake of this religion, and being its helpers in the time before the victory (al-fath).  God, powerful and mighty, says: “Those of you who spent and fought before the victory are not equal (to those who didn’t); you are greater in rank than those who spent and fought afterwards” (Q 57:10).  Today, brothers and friends, you see the nations assailing us and there is no doubt that we are like the Companions of the Prophet (PBUP) before the victory.  I beseech God to hasten the victory for the people of Islam and the people of monotheism.  

Action for the sake of the religion at a time like this…the one who aids (the religion) and tries to assist it, establish it, and raise its banners–there is no doubt that he is greater in rank than those who act after the victory.  I prescribe for you and for myself constancy in this religion and working to aid it and raise its banner and to always be concerned with steadfastness–to be steadfast in (the religion) and in the truth and to not turn back, turn toward those who retreat, or turn toward those who fall away.  We must always remember the hadith of the Prophet (PBUH): “A group in my umma will always manifest the truth.  Those who oppose them cannot harm them, neither can those who abandon them, until the command of God is fulfilled.” 

Despite Maqdisi’s appeals to constancy, I wouldn’t take his rhetoric at face value given that he has made clear efforts to shift the course of Jordanian Jihadism in a different direction, as I and Abu Rumman have pointed out.  Maqdisi’s primary audience is militants, so he has to engage in a very careful balancing act.  Compare this to Sayyid Imam, who can dispense with such subtleties since Jihadis are not his primary audience.

Document (Arabic): 12-5-08-shamikh-transcript-and-audio-of-maqdisi-paltalk-session

Maqdisi’s Moderation

Several days ago, I wondered why Abu Muhammad al-Maqdisi–Zarqawi’s mentor and one of the most influential Jihadi ideologues alive–was being criticized or defended from criticism on the forums.  And last week, I speculated as to the reason his site, Tawhed.ws, has been allowed to go back up.

We now have part of the answer.  According to members of several forums, a statement is circulating in Jordan that renounces takfirism, especially as exercised by a small group from the city of Zarqa’ (Zarqawi’s hometown).  One of the signatories of the statement is Maqdisi.  

If Maqdisi signed the statement, it’s big news seeing as he’s the father of modern takfirism (excessively excommunicating other Muslims).  It also represents a further repudiation of Zarqawi (he had already broken with him over his harsh tactics in Iraq).  Although the statement is far short of the revisions of Sayyid Imam, it’s a step down the road and will cause another convulsion in the Jihadi Movement.  Indeed, judging from the amount of posts on the forums defending Maqdisi against the libelous charge of signing the document, many a Jihadi foot soldier will have his heart broken if it’s true.  (See the recommendations from the intro to the Atlas for the power of this sort of ideological repositioning.)

Not everyone is buying it of course.  On Hesbah, for example, some think the statement and Maqdisi’s signature is a confection of the Jordanian government or the Muslim Brotherhood.  However, others say that it represents his true views.  Of the latter group, Muhibb Amir al-Shuhada’ is the most witty: 

He is against the extremists among the takfiris…who excommunicate people for stopping at traffic lights because tyrants had put them there!

Document (Arabic): 10-27-08-hesbah-confusion-over-maqdisi-signature-to-statement-against-extremism-in-takfir

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