While conducting some research today, I found that as of August 2009, the jihadi forum Tajdeed.org.uk is back. The website was one of the most prominent – if not the most prominent – jihadi discussion forum until it went down about a year and a half ago. The website’s administrator was and remains Muhammad al-Massari. After Ekhlaas and Faloja, it seems it is all the rage to bring back shut down jihadi forums.
On 14 September 2009, the Faloja Forums announced their return after they were knocked off the Internet three days previously. It seems the administrators have been researching methods to avoid permanent banishment from the Internet so the cat and mouse game will continue.
Additionally, Boraq has opened a new library dedicated to preserving statements of jihadi leaders. It currently houses over 150 documents organized by the entity that published the statements. The new site also has links to nine different Faloja addresses, six of which work. This site could become a valuable resource for researchers.
The Ikhaas forum that recently resurfaced just issued an explanation for its reappearance, only to close down again shortly afterwards. Site administrators claimed they kept the website down for the past year in order to “prevent the crusaders from entering and manipulating it.” They decided to go public again in commemoration of 9/11, but there was poor cooperation between the Global Islamic Media Front (GIMF) and the Fajr Media Center, who “produced dirty lies against our beloved site.”
The statement insisted that the site was not fabricated. Instead it counterattacked, stating, “It is not possible to guarantee the honor of the Fajr Media Center and the Global Islamic Media Front because they … initiated a campaign against our beloved site.”
The statement concluded saying that Ikhlaas would remain “concealed” until Fajr and the GIMF can confirm their honor, but it stated that the Ikhlaas “network” is prepared to call upon “the brothers” to “expel the crusaders from our lands.”
The authenticity of the Ikhlaas statement is difficult to assess. If someone else does control the site, this message is just another aspect of a well-orchestrated IO campaign designed to disrupt the jihadi message. However, if the Ikhlaas administrators, along with Fajr and the GIMF, really did botch the Ikhlaas return, then incompetence rules and a jihadi media war may be brewing. Either way, the future is not bright for jihadi media.
On 2 August 2009, Abu Muhammad al-Maqdisi announced the opening of an English version of his jihadi library. In the announcement, he requested that Falluja Forum members spread the word regarding his new website and to send him any trustworthy translations.
The English website is similar to the Arabic site but it currently does not contain the same amount of content. It has translations of several of al-Maqdisi’s books, articles, and interviews such as the book “Democracy … A Relegoin [sic],” downloaded 45 times, and the article “Balancing Between Negligence and Paranoia,” downloaded 13 times.
It also has several non-attributed articles like “Advice for the Seeker of Knowledge,” downloaded 13 times, an interview with Abu Qatadah al-Filistini regarding Islam and democracy that was downloaded 11 times, and several books and articles by different authors under the headings “Paradise People Creed” and “The Absent Obligation.” Additionally, it has a series of lectures by Yusuf al-Uyayri titled, “Constants on the Path of Jihad” and two articles in Russian.
Beginning a library of translations in different languages is not just an attempt to replicate al-Maqdisi’s efforts with the Arabic library, which is quite extensive, but also to make it easier to spread the jihadi-Salafi ideology beyond Arabic speakers.
A couple of Jihadi journals have been released recently. To get an idea of what they cover, I have roughly translated their tables of contents.
The Global Islamic Media Front released the 35th volume of “Sada al-Jihad” or “Echo of Jihad.” The table of contents includes:
“The Jihadi Movements and the Sweet Harvest – The Fruits of the Siege”
“Obama: A Repeat Copy of Bush”
“So We Understand the Balances of the Apostate Regime in Algeria”
“The Pakistani Regime and the Conflict with the Taliban: The Flight Forward”
“The Iranian Elections and Signs of the Iranian Program’s Regression”
“The Tragedy of the Muslims in Egypt’s al-Wadi al-Jadid Prison”
“The Fate of Karzai will be Worse than his Traitor Forefathers” by Qari Muhammad Yusuf the spokesman for the Taliban
“The Abandoners of Loyalty”
“Civil Strife: The Adaptation of Reality”
“Security Warnings (Negatives)”
The Turkistan Islamic Party released the fourth volume of the “Islamic Turkistan” journal. Its table of contents includes:
“The Sino-American Agreements Regarding Cooperation Between the two Countries for the Case of Pakistan and Afghanistan”
“Chinese and Pakistani Media Fraud and Its Reliance on Lying and Slander”
“A Statement by the Military Commander in Remembrance of the Communist Slaughter of Our Muslim Ummah in China and Urumqi”
“A Meeting with the Brother Abd-al-Haqq – The Leader of the Turkistan Islamic Party”
“From the Crimes of the Chinese Communist Regime: The Exposed Secret”
“The Muslim Turkistan People are Barred from [Receiving] a Passport”
“Our Martyrs: The Martyr Balal”
“Global Journalism”
“From the Quran’s Guidance: The Story of Saul and Goliath”
“War is Stratagem”
“Security and the Quran”
“The Islamic Ummah: A Body with no Spirit and Writing with no Clarity”
“The Beautiful Coverings Collapse and Display the Shameful Faces”
“Political Stratagems that the Chinese Practiced to Conquer the Turks”
“Save Turkistan Before it is too Late”
[Editor’s note: I am thrilled to introduce Einar Wigen, author of the recent FFI report on the IJU, as a guest contributor. Einar interned at FFI last summer and is currently a a student fellow at the Norwegian Institute for International Affairs (NUPI). A fluent Turkish speaker, Einar specialises in jihadism among the Turkics. Not many people produce world-class research as summer interns, so this guy is really someone to look out for in the future.]
The Turkic peoples have until now played a fairly peripheral role in global jihadism. They have not attracted much academic attention, and apart from the 2003 Istanbul bombings and the 2008 American Consulate attacks, operations carried out by Turkics have gained little attention. The Waziristan-based group Islamic Jihad Union (IJU) seems to be trying to change this (as Jihadica has suggested before).
The IJU broke off from the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan in 2001, and went for a while under the name Islamic Jihad Group. When the name changed in 2005, the group also assumed a new strategy, one that looked beyond Uzbekistan and focused more on global issues. This may also have involved a merger with other groups, as indicated in the “Union”. What binds the group together appears to be language, and it is primarily made up of Turkic-speaking members.
The number of IJU fighters has been estimated at between 100 and 200, the bulk of which comprises Uzbeks, who remain relatively anonymous compared to the Turks and Germans arriving in the camps. This makes it much smaller than the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan, which operates in nearby Southern Waziristan and is hosted by Baitullah Mahsud.
Although smaller than the IMU, the IJU maintains a higher profile through its use of the website Şehadet Zamanı. It is unclear whether this website is run by the IJU itself, or by a sympathiser with privileged access to the group. The website is in Turkish and presents news on the group’s operations and on other issues relating to Jihad. It is the most important of the Turkish jihadi websites, and is frequently referred to on other forums and jihadi websites.
The IJU is based in Mir Ali in North Waziristan, where it is hosted by the influential tribal leader Jalaluddin Haqqani. Until the latter was killed in an American drone attack in January 2008, the group was in contact with the centrally placed Libyan al-Qaida member Abu Laith al-Libi. Abu Laith seems to have exerted considerable influence over the group, seemingly pushing it to take its struggle beyond Uzbekistan and Afghanistan.
The group’s best known plot was the Sauerland Cell’s planned attack in September 2007. The group was led by a German convert called Fritz Gelowicz and consisted of at least one more German and two German Turks. The plan was to attack the Uzbek and the American Consulates and the Rammstein Airbase in Germany with hydrogen peroxide bombs, each equivalent of about 250kg of dynamite. The trial against the cell is still going on, and the four main suspects have pleaded guilty.
The Sauerland Cell was trained by the IJU in Waziristan, and while in Germany it was in contact with the IJU via email. Since the attack became known, more German recruits have turned up in the IJU’s camps. In March 2008, Germany got its first suicide bomber when the Bavarian Turk, Cüneyt Çiftçi, blew himself up at an American base in Afghanistan. Another German in the IJU is the convert Eric Breininger, who has become something of a celebrity on the IJU’s webpages. He has made several appearances in videos. In his rhetoric, Germany should expect attacks because of its close cooperation with Uzbekistan and for its involvement in Afghanistan. Breininger’s picture now hangs at every point of entry to the EU, and publicly at all German airports. It was long speculated that he may become a suicide bomber, but that has not happened so far.
Through its use of the Şehadet Zamanı website the IJU is becoming a hub in the Turkic network of jihadists. The spokes go to Germany, Turkey and obviously also to Uzbekistan. Such a development would seem to give al-Qaida a foothold among radicals of the Turkic peoples.
This excellent question was raised in a comment to an earlier Jihadica piece. Since it probably interests a wider audience, I figured I should devote a separate post to it.
Most readers probably know that the word sahab means “clouds” and that it emerged as the name of al-Qaida’s media production company around 2002. But why would al-Qaida name the mouthpiece of global jihad after something as wishy-washy as a cloud?
The answer is that the word figures in a common epithet of God, namely مجري السحاب (mujri al-sahab) meaning “Mover of the Clouds”. The name usually features in the expression منزل الكتاب ومجري السحاب وهازم الأحزاب (munzil al-kitab wa mujri al-sahab wa hazim al-ahzab), “Revealer of the Holy Book, Mover of the clouds and Defeater of the clans”. This expression in turn occurs in a famous night prayer uttered by the Prophet Muhammad during one of his military expeditions.
As it happens, this is also the opening phrase of the 1998 Declaration of the World Islamic Front for Jihad against the Jews and the Crusaders . Bin Ladin must have been personally quite fond of this prayer, for it also appears in the 1996 Declaration of jihad against the Americans (see here, p. 140,), and at the very end of Bin Ladin’s December 1998 interview with al-Jazeera (see here, p. 176). It also appears in the letter left behind by the 9/11 hijackers (see here, p. 221).
With this in mind, the choice of al-Sahab as the name of al-Qaida’s media bureau makes perfect sense. The word goes back to the earliest days of Islam, evokes a difficult stage in the Prophet’s war against the infidels, echoes the opening of al-Qaida’s most important declaration, and suggests that the Almighty is behind the propaganda effort, since He is the “Mover of al-Sahab.” In my view it is a brilliant name.
I should mention that I haven’t seen this particular explanation in al-Qaida’s own publications (or anywhere else), but I am convinced I am on the right track. I welcome any alternative readings or additional insights from our readers. I would be particularly interested in hearing from the Islamologists among you about the connotations and classical use of the abovementioned prayer. Out of all the prayers uttered by the Prophet, why did Bin Ladin like this particular one?
Another issue for discussion concerns the precise circumstances of the foundation of al-Sahab. When and by whom exactly was it founded, and what was its first declaration? The accounts that I have seen and heard all provide different answers. I might post on this later if time allows.
We have heard Bin Ladin and Zawahiri’s comments, and Marc Lynch and others will tell us how the Arab mainstream reacted. But what are the grassroot jihadis saying about Obama’s Mideast tour in general and his Cairo speech in particular?
Let me begin by lowering your expectations. For a start, we should not expect to see any positive reactions to Obama’s initiative, for anybody thus inclined would not be on the forums in the first place. Second, there is no tradition among jihadi strategists or pundits for parsing presidential speeches. They might pick up on a phrase (like Bush’s reference to a “crusade”) and use it for their own purposes. But generally these guys don’t listen to what America says – they watch what she does.
I should also add that Faloja, the main jihadi forum, has been down since this morning (as has Shuraa), so our ability to gage the reactions to the Obama’s speech is limited. Fortunately I surveyed Faloja for Obama-related material yesterday, and Shumukh, the no.2 forum, is up today, so we have something to work with.
Overall, there is quite a bit of chatter about the Obama tour, and four types of postings recur. First are the political messages which denounce the visit and present it as further evidence that Egyptian and Saudi governments and ulama have submitted to American dominance. “In honour of Obama’s visit to Saudi Arabia”, one member reposted the classic bookThe evident proofs of the infidelity of the Saudi state (1990) by Abu Muhammad al-Maqdisi. Other posts circulate the pictures of Saudi and American flags side by side. Yet others claimed Egyptians are suffering as a result of Obama visit, because the security barriers in Cairo “confined 18 million Egyptians to their homes” and because the Sultan Hasan mosque had to be closed for security reasons.
In a widely diffused and entertaining post, a contributor named “Abu al-Bashar” describes a daydream about Egyptian Salafi Ulama confronting Obama. The text is written like a short skit which goes something like this (loosely translated):
“Here are our ulama from Egypt: Sheikhs Yasir al-Barhami, Muhammad Hussain Ya’qub, Ahmad al-Sisi, Abu Ishaq al-Huwayni, Tal’at Zahran, Muhammad Hasan, Muhammad Ismail al-Muqaddam and Mahmud al-Misri. They hear about Obama’s visit to Egypt and decide to convene a meeting in which the following conversation takes place.
Ismail gets angry and says we have been silent for long enough.
Hasan asks: what about Obama? He is coming here to salvage relations with the Muslim world.
Al-Huwayni intervenes: But he’s coming here while is armies are killing Muslims in Iraq and Afghanistan and supports the Jews in their killing of Palestinians.
Burhami says: The bottom line is that Obama the pig is coming here to slaughter us and he smiles at us in the process.
Al-Sisi sayd: Sure, but Obama the pig is coming here, so what should we do?
After long discussions, the scholars announce their decision, which consists of two steps.
First, a statement, denouncing Obama’s visit. It would be distributed on the satellite tv stations and on the internet forums and on facebook, and in all newspapers and journals, in Arabic and English and French. Second, a demonstration on the day of the speech. All preachers and scholars and their students would go to the location where Obama will deliver his speech and show their opposition.
– The end –
Here Sheikh Muhammad Husain Ya’qub intervenes, saying ‘I retract my positions’.”
The final part is quite funny – even in a dream official ulama lack moral courage.
The second type of posts are strategic assessments in which writers try to second-guess the real purpose and implications of the visit. These posts are neither numerous nor sophisticated, and so far none of the serious jihadi strategists have weighed in. “Al-Munasir1” warns that part of the purpose of Obama’s visit to Egypt is to make final preparations for an international campaign against Sudan.
The third and most widespread type of post focuses on tactical issues such as the detailed program of Obama’s visit, the size and nature of his security attachment and the prospects of carrying out an assassination. One writer quoted the Saudi opposition abroad as saying observers and Saudi security officials fear for Obama’s life in Saudi Arabia. He argued that the recent shooting in Jubayl is indicative of a surge in pro-al-Qaida sentiment in the Kingdom. The fact that the perpetrators of the Jubayl shooting have not been caught further worried the authorities. Most responses to the post expressed hope that Obama be assassinated, but one commentator drily noted that Obama comes and goes as he wishes so long as the royal family is in power.
Another post by “Baghdad al-Khilafa” presented a more detailed “Plan for killing Barak Obama” in Egypt. It included a picture of Cairo university followed by the note: “the best way of killing Obama: Suicide belt, suicide belt, suicide belt.” Then followed detailed instructions on how to manufacture a suicide belt, including links to downloadable instruction videos.
The fourth type of posting consists of reproductions of articles from other, more mainstream Arab and Islamic media. These posts are interesting not so much for the debates they generate (usually very little), but because they tell us something about which voices the forum participants would at least consider listening to. So we find
– Abd al-Bari Atwan ‘s article “Our advice to Obama”
– An article by Mahmud Abduh Ali at Islamonline entitled “An examination of Obama’s position on the big issues that concern the Muslim world”
– An article from al-Jazeera.net on the Muslim Brotherhood’s reaction to the Obama visit.
– An article from Middle East Online entitled “Egyptians: No Ahlan wa Sahlan for Obama”, which cites a poll showing three quarters of Egyptians were skeptical of Obama’s visit.
Of particular interest is the posting of an article from Sabq News reporting that the Saudi Islamist Ayidh al-Qarni loved Obama’s speech. The article is posted by the same Baghad al-Khilafa who wanted Obama blown up, and he is naturally expressing dismay at al-Qarni’s reaction, to the point of declaring him an infidel. This triggers a debate, with several contributors objecting to the excommunication (takfir) of al-Qarni. “Brothers, don’t declare him an infidel, he is just a regime cleric”, writes “Asad al-Jazira”.
In my two days of surfing the forums I was able to find one single statement mildly favourable to the Obama administration. A contributor named “Khaldun Halwani” wrote in a comment to a post: “Let us hope that this is the beginning of a new direction that will serve Muslim interests. I would add that Foreign Secretary has started changing US policy toward the enemy of Islam, Israel.” But this is of course an isolated statement by an anonymous contributor and thus not indicative of anything.
There are in other words no big surprises in the forum reactions to Obama’s Middle East tour, although it is still too early to tell how the jihadi movement will adapt to these initiatives. Hopefully we will see more serious jihadi strategic studies of Obama’s PR offensive in the weeks to come. I will keep my eye out for them and keep you posted. If anybody sees anything interesting, please let me know.
Update: Parts of this post was reproduced on the Foreign Policy Blog on 5 June and on NPR.com on 8 June.
[Editor’s note: I am pleased to introduce another new contributor, Scott Sanford, who is a graduate student at George Washington University specialising in jihadism in the levant. Scott has guest blogged for Jihadica in the past, but now he is joining us on a more regular basis.]
“What is the Secret of the Falluja Forum’s Success?” This was the intriguing title of a recent post on Falluja presenting a detailed analysis of the web traffic to the forum itself. The contributor, named “Song of Terror”, broke the article into two parts: the first supplying the web analytic data and the second providing strategies and further analysis. While he claimed that jihadi propaganda efforts on the Internet are successful, the data does in fact not support his analysis.
Using data from Alexa.com, Song of Terror started by asserting that Fallujah is the most “successful” jihadi forum. Fallujah’s “Daily Reach”, the percent of global Internet users visiting Al-faloja.info, was up 42% from 0.00163% three months ago to 0.0022% on 27 April 2009. A majority of Fallujah’s users, 36.5%, were in Iraq. Algeria held the second spot with 9.1% followed by Egypt with 8.2%. Al-faloja.info’s traffic rank was 220 in Iraq, 759 in Georgia, and 821 in the Palestinian Territories.
Song of Terror reported that 19.64% of Fallujah’s visitors came from Google.com, 5.89% from Muslm.net, an Islamic forum that many militants frequent, and 5.56% from Youtube.com. He appeared to be disappointed with Youtube.com’s third place ranking and suspected that it would increase in the next “two weeks” because “a campaign to spread Fallujah’s link via [YouTube] continues in its infancy.” In fact, YouTube now has a new channel called FallujahTube that appears to be connected to this “campaign.” He also recommended that others who post videos on YouTube put the Fallujah link in the video description under the user name to make it more visible to users. He also claimed that the percentage reported for YouTube is inaccurate because other websites take videos from YouTube and post them elsewhere, which would make its percentage higher. As for Muslm.net, he stated that due to his own personal efforts posting Fallujah links on the website since 2007, it now holds the number two spot.
In regards to Google.com, Song of Terror claimed that Fallujah’s success is due to not requiring a login, which makes Fallujah searchable on Google. The top Google search terms leading to Fallujah were “The Fallujah Forums” written in Arabic and “al-faloja” written in English. He also noted that “proxy without installation” written in Arabic and “filezzz rapidleech” written in English lead visitors to the Fallujah Forums for technical advice. Indeed, a 10 May 2009 Google search of “proxy without installation” in Arabic revealed that the third link on the page connected to a Fallujah post about surfing the Internet without a proxy.
After visiting Fallujah, 14.85% of the visitors returned to Google, 5.46% returned to YouTube, 4.61% each went to Hanein.info and Muslm.net, and between 3.92% and 2.9% visited the upload sites Zshare.net, Rapidshare.com, and Archive.org. Song of Terror noted that this is evidence that Fallujah users use the website as a means to access videos.
In the second section of the post, Song of Terror outlined eight strategies and pieces of advice:
1. “Determine Your Goal,” which is “Winning the Battle of Hearts and Minds,” “Planting the seed of jihad in the hearts of the general Muslim population,” and “Transmitting the mujahedeen voice to the general population.”
2. “Choose the Means of Arriving to Your Goal,” which is using the Internet.
3. “Study the Field Data and the Means of Influence,” where he again stressed the importance of YouTube to the jihadi propaganda effort because of the supposed rising popularity of the Internet in the Middle East and because YouTube is the second most popular site in the world according to Song of Terror. He added that Falluja should not be the primary focus of propaganda efforts because many Arab countries ban the site.
4. Properly distribute one’s efforts to endeavors that yield the most results.
5. Remain flexible to adjust to the different characteristics of various websites.
6. This section dealt with security issues and Song of Terror added a link to a Fallujah post on how to use the Tor anonymity software. He also added links to several “Crusader websites” because they “distribute mujahedeen films”. It is unclear why he added this, but possibly, it is because jihadis could use links to videos on these sites as safe links that government censoring would not prevent.
7. The connection between the real world and the “hypothetical world.” Here it appears that Song of Terror was attempting to prove a connection to jihadi Internet propaganda efforts and the number of foreign fighters entering Iraq. In making his argument, he cited reporting from the Combating Terrorism Center at West Point, an unidentified Rand report, and al-Qaeda in Iraq reporting about their “martyrs,” which all supposedly concluded that most foreign fighters in Iraq are from Saudi Arabia, followed by Libya, Yemen, Syria, and Algeria. While he did not make his point explicit, it appears that he was insinuating that the movement of foreign fighters to Iraq from these Arab countries was proof of jihadi Internet propaganda success.
However, adding this point contradicts his entire argument that the Fallujah Forums are successful. Saudi Arabia placed tenth on the country list of Al-faloja.info users with only 2.5% of the site’s visitors being of Saudi origin. If Song of Terror’s correlation between Internet propaganda and the number of foreign fighters were correct, we would expect the number of Saudis entering Iraq to be much lower or the number of Saudi visitors on the Fallujah Forums to be much higher. Additionally, from the countries ranked above Saudi Arabia on the country list of Fallujah users – Algeria, Egypt, Turkey, Pakistan, Libya, the UAE, Georgia, and Jordan – we would expect more of these nationalities to enter Iraq or less of them to visit the Fallujah Forums. It is possible that many of Fallujah’s visitors have gone to Pakistan and Afghanistan instead of Iraq, but it is reasonable to assume, with the exception of Pakistan, that the numbers and nationalities of foreign fighters entering these countries would be similar to Iraq’s experience, which still negates Song of Terror’s analysis. Finally, according Song of Terror, nearly 50 Yemenis entered Iraq, but Yemen is not even listed on the country list of Fallujah users. According to his analysis, we would expect Yemen to hold a much higher position on the list. In short, his data does not add up and it does not support the theory that jihadi Internet propaganda alone determines the flow of militants to war zones.
8. “Strategies of Intellectual Penetration and Contradicting Psychological Conditioning.” In this final point, Song of Terror encouraged jihadi propagandists to distribute documentary programs supportive of jihadi ideology and to learn about “psychological conditioning” by mainstream Arab satellite stations such as al-Jazeera.
Song of Terror attempted to apply some quantitative analytical reasoning to verify the success and usefulness of the Fallujah Forums and jihadi efforts at Internet propaganda. However, the data does not support his analysis. One might even use his data to make the exact opposite argument, that jihadi Internet propaganda has relatively little effect on radicalization and recruitment.
Document (Arabic): 05-01-2009-falujah-traffic-ranking-1
Document (Arabic): 05-11-2009-fallujahtube-2
Document (Arabic): 05-10-2009-without-a-proxy-post-4
Document (Arabic): 05-11-2009-how-to-use-tor-5
We usually don’t cover English language jihadi media here at Jihadica, but the recent release of a new magazine entitled Jihad Recollections (JR) attracted my attention because it is produced by Fursan media and because it is so well done. The magazine fills a gap in the world of jihadi media, as the editorial states:
“We have acknowledged that the Arabic Jihadi media have surpassed the English community by light years. Many of our hard working brothers in the English Jihadi community – may Allah reward them with mountains of good deeds – usually limit themselves to translating works rather than developing their own. Henceforth, we have decided to take it upon ourselves to produce the first Jihadi Magazine in English.”
It is not quite true that this is the first jihadi magazine in English, but this is indeed the most serious one I have seen. It is seventy pages long and very nicely designed – in many ways it resembles an English version of Qadaya Jihadiyya. JR contains a lot of original material, including several articles in the strategic studies genre. Top stories include an analysis of “Obama’s questionable economic stimulus package” and “The political implications of the CIA’s scandal in Algeria”. There are also articles on “the science behind night vision technology”, “EMP grenade technology becoming a reality” and “The principles of guerrilla warfare”. This is not to mention “Staying in shape without weights” – essentially an introduction to Pilates training.
Articles are mostly in perfect idiomatic English and are quite well edited. One can only guess where it is produced, but the American spelling, the interest in the stimulus package and the frequent references to US sources suggest to me that this is the work of people who either live or (more likely) have lived in North America. The target audience is presumably Muslims in Europe and the US, perhaps also in Africa and Asia.
Jihadi Recollections sets a new standard for jihadi propaganda in English and it will be interesting to see how long they can keep going. It is hard to tell whether it will have big readership, but generally I think the importance of English-language propaganda tends to be overestimated by western analysts. I guess one indication would be if European jihadis suddenly start getting slender, flexible bodies.
PS:If you want more details, Jarret Brachman plans a 71-part article series on JR – one for every page of the magazine.
PPS: On the Arabic language magazine front, the 34th issue of Sumud and the 52nd issue of Hasad al-Mujahidin came out last week.
Update (8 April): The good news is my instinct was right, the bad news is I didn’t do my homework. Rusty at Jawa Report identified the editor of JR several days ago as a guy named Samir Khan who is based in Charlotte, North Carolina. Rusty adds further details here.
Document: 04-07-09-ansar-jihad-recollections
Document (Arabic): 03-31-09-shamikh-sumud-34
Document (Arabic): 03-30-09-shouraa-hasad-mujahidin-52