ji·had·ica

No New Bin Ladens

Will McCants May 8, 2011

The title is both a prediction and a plea.  The prediction is that Bin Laden is sui generis and none of his successors will combine in one person the man’s organizational skills, media savvy, and personal charisma.

The plea is that experts on al-Qaeda resist the temptation to answer the media’s question, “Who Will Be the Next Bin Laden?”  Putting forward a name risks misunderstanding Bin Laden’s unique role and capabilities, which are not likely to be replicated in a single person.  It also risks elevating the global stature of others who might otherwise fail to win the international following that Bin Laden won.

Note that answering this question is different from answering the perfectly innocuous question, “Who Will Run al-Qaeda?”  That’s a question about an organizational role, not a person.  Leah has provided the best answer so far.

Readers may wonder why I am harping on experts and not the media. It is because the media relies on experts, who should resist the temptation to feed fear for the sake of fortune or advance a name to advance their own career.  In recent years, both impulses have led to a strange symbiosis in which AQ ideologues and Western experts feed off one another’s attention.  Watching the Watchers indeed.

Lest anyone think me holier than thou, I confess I am as susceptible to this temptation as the rest and I have not always resisted it well.  But I do try, particularly in this time of peril for AQ.  I don’t want to give the organization an assist.

To end on a high note, here’s a good example of how some AQ experts are doing the right thing.  And tomorrow I promise no more righteous finger but rather a post on some new Sayf al-`Adl letters.

Why Don’t Jihadi Orgs Tweet?

Will McCants April 30, 2011

I’ve been thinking for awhile about 1) why the social media of choice for jihadi orgs and media outlets is discussion forums and 2) why few to no jihadi orgs and media outlets have a Twitter or Facebook account (recent exception here).   (Marc Lynch first noted this phenomenon some time ago but I can’t find his post.)  Since Shaun Waterman raises the issue in a recent column, I thought I’d take a stab at explaining why.  Here are two hypotheses:

  1. Vulnerability:  Accounts on Twitter and Facebook are too easy to shut down.  You can flag an account to the administrators and they will remove it.  Jihadi orgs could set up new accounts but then they’d have to let their followers know where to find them.  By the time they do, the admins will be hip to the problem and move to close the accounts down again.  Compare this with the forums, which have multiple addresses and jihadis control membership.
  2. If It Ain’t Broke, Don’t Fix It:  Jihadis jumped on forums around 2005 and have perfected their use for pushing propaganda and building communities.  The system still works well for them, so why bother changing it (h/t Daniel Kimmage, who is now in ghayba).  Recent forum closures may make them question this inertia.

I know AaronW and others will have different takes, and I look forward to hearing them.  Just want to get the ball rolling.  Note that this is about organizations and not individuals supporters, many of whom have accounts on Twitter and Facebook.

Caveat lector: I am a complete Twitter neophyte and have managed to withstand the ridicule from friends and family for not having a Facebook page.

Update: The Translation Brigades on Ansar forum have translated Shaun’s article into Arabic (jihadi site). H/T Aaron Zelin.

Entering a new dimension – Jihad via Bluetooth (Part 2)

Nico Prucha March 22, 2011

In the first part we examined the structure of the data provided by the “Mobile Detachment” (Fariq jawwal al-ansar, FJA) media department of the Ansar al-Mujahideen Forum. As stated, in the second part we will take a closer look at the ‘mission statement‘ to understand the ambition of (re-) publishing indoctrinating jihadist materials with the intention of users being able to consume and disseminate this content by the means of one’s personal smart phone. One intention perhaps is the fact that your smart/mobile phone certainly is a highly personal gadget, which is rarely shared – unlike family household computers. The content on your mobile phone has a more private nature and allows you to quickly navigate and read through the jihadist materials without anyone noticing. The downside for jihadis, however, is an upside for the police, as the sympathizers are inspired to store incriminating content on their personal phones. That is probably the reason for including encryption software in the first data-package.

The Mission Statement

The FJA defines four sub-detachments in a posting that can be understood as a ‘mission statement’. A regular posting announced a “specialized detachment / unit (fariq) in the crafting and dissemination of all content, intended to run on mobile phones. The content [includes] knowledge (‘ilm), incitement (tahrid) and missionary work (da’wa) issued under the sponsorship of the Ansar al-Mujahideen forum’s administration.” The basic line is brokered into four simple categories, with the call of seeking support by any capable sympathizer within the forum:

1. “The fariq of audio-engineering: Engineering and dissemination of audio fragments of speeches and sermons given by the scholars and leaders. This includes recitations [of the Quran], poems, songs and other formats.

2. The fariq for transcripts: Selection, transcribing and publication of jihadist magazines, affecting stories, unique articles and the most important statements in a visible format or by any format that mobile phones support.

3. The fariq for designing propaganda pictures [‘Photoshop-Jihad’, examples here]: The design and dissemination of jihadi pictures and unique styling of any format supported by mobile phones.

4. The fariq of conversion and upload: The conversion of jihadist movies into any format supported by mobile phones [mostly 3GP] and by uploading parts [of the conversed videos].”

With the mobile phone turned to Jihad, each and any sympathizer can assume an active role in trying to disseminate jihadi content via Bluetooth to other devices. The goal is clearly described as “disseminating the jihadis’ mindset by the means of mobile phones (…) as well as developing the propaganda.” The fundamental principle of the FJA is to simply promote and spread chosen materials of jihad by all means. In this case, the modus operandi is sought that sympathizers are enabled by these data-packages to check their individual surrounding for Bluetooth enabled devices and hence blindly send out these catchy materials to unwary (primarily Arab) users. In some Arab countries, due to the harsh enforced segregation of the sexes, communicating and setting up  ‘secret dates’ has mainly turned to the use of modern technology. AQ in its never-ending endeavor is also always keen to capitalize on newest technology.

As described in the mission statement, “the jihadi forums rise up for the firebrand assaults and oppose the enemies of God, of His messenger, and of the believers with their hopeless attempt to wage war [against us] with our judiciary efforts by such means. These have progressed – slowly but surely –, all praise be God, with the development of the propaganda and by technical aspects. And this is the benefit of God. That’s what the brigades and media groups are about, who convey the methodology (manhaj) and the fundamentals of faith (aqida) of the pious Salafists.”

The FJA considers itself as yet another platform to disseminate, proselytize and hence protect the true version of religion. “What else are these projects than an answer to our noble scholars, stressing the need to develop the jihadi media.” The FJA concludes with the call to “thus help your brothers by whatever means you can” in order to counter any attempts of countering the jihadi narratives and by using every possibility.

Entering a new dimension – Jihad via Bluetooth (Part 1)

Nico Prucha January 24, 2011

In October 2009 the Arabic “al-Ansar al-Mujahideen Forum” offered a special data-package designed for mobile phones. Published by a newly created “Mobile Detachment“ the contents are aimed at sympathizers and adherents of jihadist principles. Provided with a special software the mobile users can access the documents or watch videos on their portable device while being able to send out these highly indoctrinating and radicalizing sources via Bluetooth to other, unwary, Bluetooth enabled devices. The data offered in these conveniently administrated packages provides nearly everything of the grand-genre of jihadist materials.

For the first part, a overview of these data-packages is provided, while for the future parts a closer look will be taken at specific documents and the “mission statement”. A total of five packages has been published up to date, with each remaining loyal to the same layout, logo and coherent file structure consisting of the following:

Programs: In this folder the program Symbian Blog is available to install on your Bluetooth capable mobile phone, including a Quran and a encryption software. By incorporating a specially designed operating system, these agitprop packages can be transferred to a mobile phone for re-dissemination via Bluetooth.

Audio: This section has three subfolders a) anashid, b) recitation of the Quran, c) speeches. The mix consists of indoctrinating politico-religious notions such as the “interview with Shaykh Abu Mus’ab al-Suri”, the “Biographies of the martyrs”, “There is nothing like Falluja”, or “Various Speeches by Shaykh Osama”.

Pictures: Here a great number of pictures are available for the user. Most pictures depict renown figures such as Jordanian Mujahideen commander Khattab in Chechnya, the 9/11 attacks or simply show various logos and in general the iconography of Jihad groups worldwide.

Videos: All the videos in this folder have been converted into the 3gp format, a playable version specially designated for mobile phones. For several years now, the jihad-videos are disseminated in multiple sizes and formats, one being 3gp. These include a video from the al-Malahim Media group by the Yemen based AQ branch. Videos also consist of “A martyr eulogizing another martyr” by the Somalia based Harakat al-shabab al-mujahideen, or al-Sahab videos showing the martyrdom operation against the Danish embassy in Pakistan.

Texts: The Arabic writings are offered in three formats: a) MS-WORD, b) Adobe Acrobat, c) Text-format. This guarantees that these texts can be read and made available via any mobile phone or computer by a simple standard text editor. The texts include all genres of the flourishing jihad literature. Predominantly the stories of slain Mujahideen and the testimonies of martyrdom operations are sought as a main driver of radicalization and indoctrination of these appealing role-models. Literature is offered telling the stories, once again, of outstanding and prominent jihadist figures and leaders from all over the world. This includes the biography and renown operations of Chechen commander Shamil Basayev, the architect of the Moscow theatre siege as well as the Beslan school massacre. The focus was clearly evident, as the case of the 5th data-package shows, which re-disseminated the martyrs biographies of fighters of the “Islamic State of Iraq”. Also complete electronic magazines are found in some data-packages, such as the Arabic language al-Sumud (“Resistance”) published by the Afghan branch of the Taliban or the Sada (“Echo”) of Jihad”. Another main element are the various statements, such as declarations and memorandum of the AQ offshoot in Africa, AQIM, or statements made by ISI claiming highly diverse attacks, military operations or simply refuting “lies made by the government of the Green Zone”. Handpicked books, transcribed sermons and interviews are, however, also among the files, which are deemed of great importance. These writings include ideological titles written by Hammud bin ‘Uqla al-Shu’aybi, “How to Prepare for your Afterlife” by newcomer-ideologue Khalid ‘Abd al-Rahman al-Husaynan or older documents such as “And Incite the Believers” by Saudi first-Generation AQAP member ‘Abdallah bin Muhammad al-Rushud.

The content of all data-packages is well chosen and partially comprises of new, up-to-date materials, but also capitalizes on older fundamental documents that are of ultimate importance in the jihadists’ mindset. The general aim by these packages are described in a “mission statement” that includes a invitation to join the endeavor of spreading jihadist materials and to “develop the jihadist media”.

 

Inspire 2

Thomas Hegghammer October 12, 2010

The second issue of the English-language jihadi magazine Inspire is out. Dina Temple-Raston, Jarret Brachman and Memri have already made some initial observations, but I’ll throw in my own for what they’re worth. 

For a start, the second issue confirms that the magazine is produced out of Yemen by Samir Khan, the online propagandist who was based in the United States until October 2009. As with the first issue, the magazine contains a mix of original material and reprints of older texts by Bin Ladin, Abu Dujana al-Khurasani, Abu Mus’ab al-Suri and others. Most of the new stuff is ostensibly written by Samir Khan himself, but there are a couple of new pieces by al-Awlaki as well. There are also numerous quotes from Western media, including several about the first issue of Inspire. 

Three things in the magazine struck me as noteworthy. First is the account by Samir Khan himself about the reasons and details of his move to Yemen (pp. 45-49).  The piece is interesting because we don’t have that many autobiographical texts by this notorious jihadi media mogul. By his own account he is in hiding in Yemen. He must have some kind of communication link with the AQAP organization, because the magazine includes pictures from the field and interviews with AQAP members. At the same time, Inspire contains less original material than AQAP’s Arabic-language magazine Sada al-Malahim, which suggests he is further removed from the organization than his colleagues over at Sada al-Malahim.

Second is the article by Anwar al-Awlaki criticizing “the Mardin Declaration”, a statement issued in April 2010 by a group of moderate clerics who had gathered in the city of Mardin to reinterpret a famous fatwa on jihad by Ibn Taymiyya (pp. 33-40).  The fact that al-Awlaki chooses to engage in this particular debate is very interesting because it suggests he and others in al-Qaida are concerned about these types of theological initiatives.

Third and most interesting is the set of articles that give specific operational advice to prospective activists based in the West (p. 51ff). There are suggestions for low-cost operations in the US soil, such as shooting sprees in restaurants catering for government workers (such as in Washington DC), and using trucks to mow down pedestrians on crowded streets. The latter tactic can be further refined, Khan suggests, by welding sharp blades to the front of the truck so as to create “the ultimate mowing machine.”

Perhaps most interesting are the advice on how to avoid detection:

  • Do not travel abroad for jihad – act on US soil instead.
  • Do not use mobile phones and the Internet for any jihad-related communication – if you have to, use coded language and encryption tools.
  • If you are clean stay clean – do not interact with other activists.
  • Do not access jihadi websites – get your jihadi propaganda fix from anti-jihadi monitoring sites such as MEMRI and SITE.

Obviously, someone who follows these guidelines is going to be extremely difficult to catch. The question is how many people are ready to act in this way. Khan’s strategy presupposes that individuals can aquire the motivation to die for the cause almost in a vacuum. However, in most historical cases, individuals only acquired this motivation after interacting with other radicals, going abroad for jihad, or accessing jihadi propaganda – all of which are activities discouraged by Samir Khan. Of course there have been exceptions, such as the Fort Hood shooter Nidal Malik Hassan, but even he was not completely “clean”, as evidenced by his email correspondence with Anwar al-Awlaki. Decentralized jihad is indeed a scary concept, but it does not necessarily work.

Quilliam Report

Thomas Hegghammer September 27, 2010

The Quilliam Foundation, a London based think tank, has released a very interesting new report by Muhammad Ali Musawi titled Cheering for Osama: How Jihadis Use Discussion Forums. It is one of the best introductions to the world of online jihadism that I have seen. It also points out some recent forum trends that should interest more seasoned observers.

How al-Sahab Works

Thomas Hegghammer November 2, 2009

If you are even remotely interested in this question, you simply have to read this post by Aaron at Haganah.

Coveters of Paradise

Scott Sanford October 19, 2009

In the continuing salafi-jihadi media barrage against Hamas, the al-Sumud Media entity released its inaugural edition of the journal “Coveters of Paradise”. The cover is adorned with a photo of the battle-scarred Ibn Taymiya Mosque, which is where Hamas waged a battle against the salafi-jihadi group Jund Ansar Allah in August. The journal mainly consists of reprints of articles written by others.

The Table of contents listed the following articles:

· The Opening Article – by the Believer in God

· The Piercing Pen and the Candid Word – by Abu al-Hasan Ghuraib

· Comments on the Speech of Sheikh Osama bin Laden – by Sheikh Abi Ahmad Abd al-Rahman al-Masri

· Golden Advice for the Ismail Haniyah Government – by Abu al-Nur al-Maqdisi

· Raising the Argument between the Martyred Sheikh Abi al-Nur al-Maqdisi and between Secular Hamas – by Sheikh Abi Ahmad Abd-al-Rahman al-Masri

· The 80 Year Old Ghost: The Muslim Brotherhood and the Condemnation of the Global Jihad – by the journalist Akram Hijazi

· You Kill a Man Who Says My Lord is God? Is there not Among You a Rightly Guided Man? – By Sheikh Abu Muhammad al-Maqdisi

· Hamas Kills One Seeking Protection in the House of God – by Doctor Hani al-Sibai

· As If They Wanted to Say, “Sorry Abd al-Naser, We Wronged You”: A Reflection on the Gaza Events – by Walid Yusuf

· Take Refuge in the People’s Lord from the Evil of What Hamas Did – by Muhammad Asad Buyud al-Tamimi

· We Lead with the One God and We Excommunicate with International Legitimacy – by Abd al-Aziz bin Naser al-Jalil

· Do not Grieve, the Islamic United States is at the Gates – by Doctor John Boutros

· Western Education is Forbidden [al-Buku Haram] and the Crime of the Villans: Between Cataracts of Blood and Media Collusion – by The Eagle’s Banner [Rayat al-‘Uqab]

· The Art of Fighting from a Motorcycle

· Smuggling

The journal does not provide any other identifying information except its own transliteration of al-Janna (Paradise) into English, which is “elgana”. Using “g” instead of the “j” indicates either the Egyptian dialect or another Arabic dialect heavily influenced by Egypt such as Gaza. Given the journal’s heavy focus on Hamas and Abu al-Nur al-Maqdisi, I think it is reasonable to assume that whoever compiled this journal is in Gaza or of Gazan origins.

Salafi-jihadi anti-Hamas rhetoric has existed for some time, but it seems that the amount of it has increased since Hamas killed Abu al-Nur al-Maqdisi. It will be interesting to see the effects, if any, this propaganda will have on Hamas, Gazans, international jihadis, and the West. I believe that Hamas will continue to oppose the salafi-jihadis, but if the organization weakens under international sanctions, will it attempt to appease the salafi-jihadis to maintain its Gaza power base? Again, I think it is unlikely, but what if Gazans, frustrated with Hamas, turn to salafi-jihadis and transform these jihadis into more than a marginal movement? Will international salafi-jihadis make a stronger effort to enter Gaza? Will these jihadis have a more receptive audience when they get there? Finally, how will Israel and the West react if its efforts against Hamas do manage to weaken the organization significantly and salafi-jihadis become more powerful?

Al-Qa’ida Publicy Cements Ties to the Tehrik-e Taliban Pakistan

Vahid Brown October 14, 2009

The official al-Qa’ida media outlet al-Sahab has released a flurry of videos in the past two weeks featuring leaders of the Tehrik-e Taliban Pakistan (TTP), both living and dead, in what amounts to a media campaign announcing their open alliance with Pakistan’s deadliest militant network.  On September 28, Zawahiri’s video eulogy for the slain TTP leader Baitullah Mehsud – the “role model of the youth” (ritha’ qudwat al-shabab) – was posted to the forums, followed two days later by a similar video message on the “martyrdom” of Baitullah starring Mustafa Abu’l-Yazid.  On October 2, al-Fajr Media distributed a third al-Sahab video eulogy for Baitullah, but this time featuring Wali ur-Rahman, the new TTP commander for the Mehsud tribal areas (an English transcript of which can be downloaded from here; links to all three videos can be found here).  

This series of al-Sahab celebrations of Baitullah, released two days apart over the course of a week, is itself a rather unusual concentration of al-Qa’ida media attention on a single non-al-Qa’ida member, and is totally unprecedented in terms of the al-Sahab air time devoted to the TTP.  Prior to these developments, the closest that al-Qa’ida came to officially signaling its ties to the TTP was in the release of an al-Sahab interview with Mullah Nazir shortly after he and Gul Bahadur joined Baitullah Mehsud to form the Shura Ittihad ul-Mujahidin this February.  Aside from the brief mention of Baitullah in that video, these recent releases are to my knowledge the first official al-Qa’ida communiqués to give any significant attention to the TTP and its leadership.

But that’s not all, folks. Yesterday, an Urdu newspaper reported that Aqil, alias Dr. Uthman, the sole surviving attacker in this weekend’s dramatic assault on the Pakistani Army’s General Headquarters in Rawalpindi , is the subject of an al-Sahab video released to a private television station in Pakistan, in which Aqil is shown receiving training in Waziristan and casing targets in Rawalpindi (Khabrain, 13 October 2009, pp. 6 and 8; article unavailable online, but there is an OSC translation).  And today, Pakistan’s ARY TV aired an al-Sahab video that they’d received, featuring TTP amir Hakimullah Mehsud, appearing alongside Wali ur-Rahman, in which both of them deliver statements to the people of Pakistan regarding their jihad against the state. (Ironically, both TTP leaders emphasize in the video that the TTP is not a servant of foreign masters, and that the TTP are “sons of Pakistan”).

While the close relationship between al-Qa’ida and the Pakistani Taliban has long been known, this release of multiple joint AQ-TTP messages from the al-Sahab production outlet is nonetheless extremely significant.  First of all, these developments indicate that al-Qa’ida has successfully seized the moment in the wake of the death of Baitullah to dramatically increase its influence over the TTP.  But this series of videos is perhaps also evidence of a decreasing willingness on al-Qa’ida’s part to remain in the shadows of its Pakistani partners as they unleash yet another bloody campaign of violence in Pakistan’s cities.  If so, this would represent a very important strategic shift in the thinking of al-Qa’ida’s senior leaders, who have thus far been content to provide largely anonymous guidance, training and force-multiplication assistance to their Pakistani jihadi allies.

UPDATE, 10/22/09: The video mentioned here as being aired in part by ARY TV on 14 October was distributed on the forums today by al-Sahab.  It is a little over thirty minutes long and, after opening invocations in Arabic, features Hakimullah and Wali ur-Rahman speaking in Urdu. There is no subtitling.

Information War in Gaza

Scott Sanford October 13, 2009

The “Department of Documents and Research” from the “Jihadi Media Elite,” a jihadi media production entity, has recently announced its “Series for God and then for History” publications. These productions are intended to “document the important events” in the jihadi world “that are considered historical turning points in the Ummah’s path and in the circle of conflict between truth and falsehood.”

The first installment is a book titled, “The Ibn-Taymiyyah Mosque Incident.” It deals with the violent August 2009 clash in Gaza between Hamas and Jund Ansar Allah, a group espousing salafi-jihadi ideology. The book is divided into several sections including jihadi “Statements” and “Hamas Statements” about the attack, “Articles Justifying Hamas’s Crime,” “Articles Regarding the Event,” “Photos,” and “Video.”

The book is a salafi-jihadi attempt to capitalise on the event and ensure the jihadi storyline of events is the dominant version. Including the statements from Hamas and various other pro-Hamas commentators is an effort to make the jihadi version more objective and credible, which would strengthen salafi-jihadi arguments against Hamas.

Due to current time restrictions, I will be reading the book in its entirety once this semester concludes. If I glean any useful information or analyses, I will share them at that time.

Latest Jihadica
Subscribe to receive latest posts
Follow us
Facebook Twitter Google-plus Pinterest

Copyright © 2026 Jihadica