ji·had·ica

ISIS and Israel

Will McCants November 6, 2015

[Jihadica is pleased to welcome Dana Hadra. You can find her on Twitter @dhadra20. -ed.]

 

On October 23, 2015, ISIS released its first video in Hebrew addressing “the Jews occupying Muslim lands.” “Not one Jew will remain in Jerusalem,” a masked ISIS member warns. “Do what you want in the meantime, but then we will make you pay ten times over.” This video is the latest in a string of statements made by ISIS threatening to invade Israel and slaughter its citizens.

Does ISIS’s rhetoric match its strategic reality? Does it really have its sights set on Israel?

To be sure, Israel has seen an uptick in ISIS activity along its southern border in recent months. In July 2015 ISIS’s Egyptian affiliate “Wilayat Sinai” claimed responsibility for three rockets that exploded in southern Israel. The Gaza-based jihadist organization Sheikh Omar Hadid Brigade, which might have ties to ISIS, launched a rocket attack on the Israeli port city of Ashdod in May 2015.

ISIS itself makes the occasional threat. In February 2008, for example, Abu Omar al-Baghdadi, then leader of the al-Qaeda affiliated Islamic State of Iraq (ISI), announced his intention to oversee “the liberation of Al-Aqsa,” stating, “…we ask God and hope that the [Islamic State of Iraq] will be the cornerstone for the return of Jerusalem.” In widely circulated videos released in June 2014, an ISIS member states that Anbar is “only a stone’s throw away from Al-Aqsa Mosque.” In another video message released in July 2015, ISIS members threaten to “uproot the state of Jews,” which will be “run over by our [ISIS] creeping crowds.”  More recently, ISIS released a series of videos encouraging Palestinians to engage in lone wolf attacks against Jews. “Bring back horror to the Jews with explosions, burnings, and stabbings,” says one ISIS militant in a propaganda video, circulated with the hashtag “#The_slaughter_of_ Jews.”

Despite its threats, ISIS tanks won’t be rolling into the Holy Land anytime soon. Overthrowing the Israeli government is not a pressing priority for the ISIS high command. It’s more interested in taking over Sunni lands where state authority has broken down. Dabiq, ISIS’s English-language magazine, summarizes its strategy: weaken Muslim governments through terrorism, thereby creating security vacuums (literally, “chaos” or tawahhush). ISIS fighters will move in and  establish new state-like structures (idarat). So far, ISIS has stuck to this plan; its fighters are most active and successful in areas where there is a security void. Israel, which has one of the mightiest militaries in the Middle East, is the opposite of a security void.

Theologically, the defeat of Israel is also a low priority. Unusual for a Sunni group, ISIS is motivated by Islamic prophecies of the End Times—or at least pays a lot of lip service to them. Those prophecies envisage the conquest of Jerusalem and a war with the Jews as the final act in the End Times drama. ISIS is still in the first act, the reestablishment of the caliphate. It still has to spread the caliphate throughout the world and defeat the Christian infidels.

So despite its combative messaging, ISIS’s threats to storm Israel are empty, meant to recruit Muslims angry about the occupation rather than signal an invasion. ISIS is focused on consolidating its state and expanding it into Sunni Muslim lands; its gaze will remained fixed on Jerusalem but it won’t try to plant its flag there anytime soon.

What role does the Palestinian question play in global jihad?

Joas Wagemakers December 17, 2013

In policy circles as well as among both pro-Israeli and pro-Palestinian activists, the question of whether, how and why the Palestinian-Israeli conflict plays a role in al-Qaida’s global jihad is hotly debated. The reason for this is clear: pro-Israeli politicians and activists obviously don’t want to conclude that American support for Israel, for example, causes people to become jihadis fighting the US, while people with a more pro-Palestinian point of view are often keen to point out that there is a correlation between the two, presumably hoping for a more even-handed American approach towards the conflict.

Research

Despite the fact that this question has often come up in debates, suprisingly little research has been done on the connection between transnational or global jihad on the one hand and the Palestinian question on the other. To address this issue, Jihadica alumnus Thomas Hegghammer and yours truly have edited a special issue of the journal Die Welt des Islams about this subject. It includes several articles as well as extra documents that will surely be of interest to Jihadica readers.

In the first article, Thomas and I address the question of “The Palestine effect“: what role do Palestinians and the Palestinian question play among global jihadis? Are Palestinians overrepresented among al-Qaida members or not? What role have Palestinian played in the global jihadi movement since its beginning? How has the Palestinian question developed from one seemingly monopolised by Arab nationalists to a cause championed by global Islamists? Does Palestinian suffering serve as a recruitment tool for al-Qaida? You can read our answers here.

Palestinian Ideologues

The next four articles of our special issue are dedicated to one Palestinian jihad ideologue each. The first of these is written by Mark Sanagan, a PhD-candidate at McGill University in Montreal, Canada, on ‘Izz al-Din al-Qassam. Mark’s article (“Teacher, Preacher, Soldier, Martyr: Rethinking ‘Izz al-Din al-Qassam“) deals with al-Qassam’s Palestinian identity during his lifetime (he was killed in 1935 by the British) and his Palestinian legacy thereafter. Click here to read this fascinating article.

Thomas has written an article about the second ideologue dealt with in this issue, ‘Abdallah ‘Azzam. As many readers of Jihadica will know, Thomas has done extensive research on this man’s life, which becomes quite clear in this article, in which he shows that ‘Azzam is probably the most Palestinian of the ideologues dealt with in this special issue. We’ll have to wait for Thomas’ book on ‘Azzam for some time, but while waiting his article – which you can read here – is a good alternative.

As befits someone who’s written a book and many articles about him already, I dedicated my paper to Abu Muhammad al-Maqdisi’s Palestinian identity. While I have often heard (at conferences, sometimes during field work and even in peer review reports) that al-Maqdisi’s Palestinianness is quite important to him, no serious research has been done on this issue so far and the people saying this don’t always seem to know what they’re talking about either. Luckily, this has changed with the publication of my article, which you can read here.

Finally, Petter Nesser of the Norwegian Defence Research Establishment (FFI) in Oslo, Norway, has authored an article on the Palestinian identity of a radical ideologue who’s been in the news a lot lately: Abu Qatada al-Filastini. Although this man’s name actually means “the Palestinian”, thus suggesting that he may be quite aware (and perhaps even proud) of his national identity, Petter comes to some interesting conclusions about Abu Qatada’s loyalties and how he feels about his Palestinian background. You can read the article here.

Documents and Active Citation

One of the added features of our special issue of Die Welt des Islams is that we also included several translated documents that are related to the subject. Thomas has selected three texts by ‘Azzam about the Palestinian question (“The Defence of Muslim Lands“, “Hamas” and “Memories of Palestine“), which you can read here, here and here. I have chosen two texts by al-Maqdisi: one about his ideas on jihad and another on his criticism of Hamas (read them here and here). Petter added an interview with Abu Qatada and an article describing the latter’s explanation of why a jihad should be waged (see the full texts here and here). All of these documents help explain how these ideologues feel about the Palestinian question.

Finally, all authors of this issue have decided to engage in what is referred to as “Active Citation“. As many readers will know, the links to jihadi documents often break because websites are taken down. To prevent the publications to which we refer in the footnotes from disappearing or becoming hard to find, we have uploaded them to our dropboxes and have provided direct links to these documents. This is not only a sign of academic transparency, but it also ensures that readers will continue to be able to read these documents, even if the websites from which they originally came disappear. You can find the direct links to “The Palestine Effect” here and here. The direct links to Mark’s article on al-Qassam can be accessed here, while Thomas provides his links here. The links to the sources used in my article can be found here and Petter gives his here.

What all of this adds up to is a fascinating special issue of Die Welt des Islams on a subject that should be of interest to a broad spectrum of specialists, academics and policy makers. Anyone interested in global jihad, the Palestinian-Israeli conflict and/or Islamist ideology cannot afford to miss it.

Against Palestinian Reconciliation

Joas Wagemakers February 12, 2012

With the recent news of a Palestinian deal between Fatah and Hamas, which is supposed to result in a unity government in which both are represented, a long-standing feud between the two organisations looks like it is coming to an end. (Having said that, the prospects of Palestinian reconciliation have looked hopeful before, only to end in disappointment later on.)

Whatever the outcome may be, it seems obvious that, from a Palestinian point of view at least, the process of reconciliation is a good thing. One might think that this even applies to more radical Islamic groups in the Gaza Strip. Sure, these groups don’t exactly like Hamas and they probably hate the secular Fatah even more, but you might think that even they would agree that Palestinian infighting serves no purpose and that a united opposition against Israel is certainly better. Well, think again. In this post, I will look at a document called Palestinian National Reconciliation in the Balance of the Islamic Shari’a, prepared by the Shari’a Council of the Jama’at al-Tawhid wa-l-Jihad – Bayt al-Maqdis, one of the radical groups in Gaza.

Qur’an and Sunna

While the authors of the document acknowledge that division and conflict is bad and reconciliation and unity is commendable in Islamic tradition, they state that it should happen on certain conditions. One of these is that any reconciliation should conform to the Qur’an and the Sunna (the example of the Prophet Muhammad). Citing verses (Arberry’s translation) Q. 4: 59 (“[…] If you should quarrel on anything, refer it to God and the Messenger […]”), Q. 4: 65 (“But no, by thy Lord! they will not believe till they make thee the judge regarding the disagreement between them […]”) and Q. 42: 10 (“And whatever you are at variance on, the judgment thereof belongs to God”), the authors state that the Qur’an itself calls on Muslims to appeal to God and the Prophet for mediation. Instead, the document claims, Fatah and Hamas base their reconciliation on “man-made law” (qanun wad’iyya) and future “polytheistic elections” (intikhabat shirkiyya), which shows that their efforts are born in sin.

Legislation

This issue of “man-made laws” and elections is taken a step further by the authors, who point to the desired results of the Palestinian reconciliation: forming a new parliament and a government that “judges according something else than what God has sent down”. Citing Q. 42: 21 (“Or have they associates who have laid down for them as religion that for which God gave not leave?”) and Q. 5: 50 (“Is it the judgment of pagandom then that they are seeking? Yet who is fairer in judgment than God, for a people having a sure faith?”), the authors equate such “un-Islamic” legislation with the yasiq, the Mongol system of legislation that combined Islamic, Mongol and other laws–a system Ibn Taymiyya condemned in his day. The authors, unsurprisingly, condemn such a system of laws as “clear unbelief”.

Another bone of contention related to legislation is the authors’ claim that the Palestinian reconciliation is based on international laws and treaties that have been drawn up by international organisations such as the United Nations and the Arab League. Since these are, in the authors’ view, “infidel” organisations themselves, they are not to be followed. Moreover, isn’t the United Nations the organisation that has adopted a string of resolutions “that have destroyed Palestine and have allowed crimes against the Muslims, their houses and their possessions”? The international and regional support this reconciliation enjoys, the document suggests, shows you that it’s utterly wrong.

Recognition

The final obstacle that the authors discern in the Palestinian reconcilliation is the implicit recognition of Israel that it entails. They point out that Muslim scholars agree that jihad is an individual duty (fard ‘ayn) if a non-Muslim enemy occupies as much as an inch of Muslim land. Nevertheless, the authors state, Fatah is not ashamed to proclaim openly that they accept and recognise Israel’s right to exist and its right to live in freedom and security on “the lands occupied in 1948”. This is bad enough to the authors, of course, but Fatah’s reconciliation with Hamas at least implies that the latter will go along with this. Didn’t Hamas’s Khalid Mish’al himself talk about cooperating with Fatah “to realise the shared national goal”, which he mentioned as being the founding of “a free Palestinian state and complete self-determination on the land of the [West] Bank and the [Gaza] Strip with Jerusalem as its capital without any settler”? The authors seem to assume that this is not only a shared goal between Fatah and Hamas but also the latter’s final goal. If it is, the author’s suggest, Hamas is openly violating its duty to wage jihad against Israel.

What is interesting in all of this is the important role legislation plays. Many of the arguments (no recourse to Islamic law in reconciliation, no government on this basis, reliance on international law, support from regimes and organisations that apply “man-made laws”) focus on this issue and only one argument points to Fatah’s more conciliatory stance towards Israel. Only as an afterthought do the authors add the alleged betrayal of Palestinian President ‘Abbas by supposedly encouraging Israel to wage war on Gaza in late 2008 and early 2009. This portrays the Jama’at al-Tawhid wa-l-Jihad – Bayt al-Maqdis as pious and very concerned with doctrine, even to the point of apparently attaching more value to it than to political reconciliation. Whether this is going to be a very popular stance among Palestinians in general is highly doubtful.

Defending Failure in Gaza (Part 2)

Joas Wagemakers September 9, 2011

As we saw in the previous installment of this short series on jihadis in the Gaza Strip, the leader of the Jama’at al-Tawhid wa-l-Jihad, Abu al-Walid al-Maqdisi, was pretty defensive about his organization’s actions in his answers to questions from visitors of the Shumukh al-Islam forum. The rest of his answers indicate that the group may have grandiose plans and plenty of enemies against whom these may be applied but that in the end they are not really capable of living up to their own rhetoric.

Interestingly, one of the things Abu al-Walid mentions as – unfortunately – being an impossibility is expanding his activities to the Sinai desert in order to give his organization more strategic depth. This is the case because of “the heavy security oppression on everyone who is thought to have even the slightest link to Jihadi-Salafism” (question no. 16). Recent attacks on Israel possibly coming from this area suggest that this situation may have changed. The revolution in Egypt has made the security situation in the Sinai desert less strict, perhaps allowing groups such as Abu al-Walid’s to obtain the breathing space they so desperately need. When answering his readers’ questions in late 2010, however, none of this had occurred yet. Nevertheless, they provide context for the group’s actions today:

(more…)

Defending Failure in Gaza (Part 1)

Joas Wagemakers August 18, 2011

Will’s latest post suggested that at least one jihadi is quite critical of what al-Qa’ida is doing regarding the Palestinian question. Well, he’s not the only one. Late last year, the Shumukh al-Islam forum published a book of its Q&A sessions with a jihadi leader from Gaza, namely Abu l-Walid al-Maqdisi, the amir of the Jama’at al-Tawhid wa-l-Jihad and a member of the Shari’a Council of the Minbar al-Tawhid wa-l-Jihad. While most questioners praised Abu l-Walid and wished him well, many also asked critical questions that forced Abu l-Walid to defend what essentially boils down to his group’s failure to achieve any substantial successes. In a short series of posts, I intend to work my way through this book, thereby providing insight into the problems that jihadis in the Gaza Strip face.

Unity

The book has about 160 pages (there’s no pagination) and contains 292 questions. What is interesting is that a large number of them refer to the unity (or, rather, the lack thereof) among jihadi groups in the Gaza Strip; in fact, the very first question deals with this. Abu l-Walid doesn’t really get much further than saying there are efforts to unify groups from Gaza and that this has been discussed a lot. He stresses that jihadis in Gaza are suffering from a difficult security environment – presumably because of both Hamas and Israel – and that this hampers efforts to unify the groups.  Abu l-Walid might be right that the “servants of God” are weak because of the repression by “the enemies of God from among the Jews, the lords of secularism and the propagandists of democracy” (response to question no. 9), but it does not explain why jihadi groups are still working separately. Abu l-Walid later adds (in response to question no. 7) that the reasons for this lack of unity among jihadi groups in Gaza has nothing to do with major differences in ideology, and he even admits that there is no real Islamic legal obstacle that prevents them from uniting. They just have legitimate differences that keep them separate.

The fact that this question is repeated so often – with Abu l-Walid repeatedly referring back to his previous two answers – indicates that many questioners have strong feelings about it and are perhaps frustrated that the different groups have not united. One can hardly blame them. Apart from general factors, such as belonging to the same people and speaking the same language, the different jihadi groups operate in a relatively small piece of territory that they necessarily have to share; they have two common enemies (Israel and Hamas); and they share the same ideology. Given these circumstances, it is easy to see why many questioners are apparently frustrated at the lack of unity among them.

Hamas

Things are not looking up vis-à-vis Hamas, the ruling power in the Gaza Strip, either. Abu l-Walid states that cooperation between Hamas and Fatah can only increase the security pressure on jihadi groups since Fatah is experienced in cracking down on organizations and has the power and the means to do it (question no. 11).

Considering the jihadis’ apparent lack of fighting against Israel (see Will’s post again), one might assume that Abu l-Walid is a strong advocate of fighting Hamas, but he’s not. In response to a questioner asking why there are no military operations against the Hamas government, “knowing that most Salafi movements excommunicate this government,” Abu l-Walid states that the time is not ripe for that yet, given the weakness of the jihadi groups at the moment (question 14).

Beyond Gaza

The weakness argument is used often by Abu l-Walid, including to defend his group’s decision not to engage in activities beyond the Gaza Strip. He describes his group as “small” (question no. 18) and states that the security situation on the West Bank is difficult because of the “coalition” between “the [Palestinian] Authority and the Jews” (question no. 19).

One reader nevertheless advises Abu l-Walid to leave Gaza altogether: “Don’t you agree with me”, this questioner asks, “that Palestine has never been liberated throughout history except from the outside and not from within?” Abu l-Walid retorts that it is indeed difficult but not impossible and that patience, preparation, education, mobilizing people’s efforts, and setting up cadres are needed to make it work (question no. 35).

Whether these defensive answers are enough to satisfy Abu l-Walid’s readers is what we will see in the next installment of this series.

To be continued…

“Fatah al-Islam between Asad al-Jihad2 and al-Maqdisi”

Scott Sanford June 8, 2009

A post by an unknown author titled, “Fatah al-Islam between Asad al-Jihad2 and al-Maqdisi / Lessons and Considerations,” has been making its rounds through the various forums. The author offered a scathing critique of Fatah al-Islam (FI) and of recent comments by FI’s Sharia Officer, Abu Abdallah al-Maqdisi (not to be confused with the Jordanian ideologue Abu Muhammad al-Maqdisi). Using statements from Asad al-Jihad2 (AJ2), who is a possible al-Qaida (AQ) leader, the author argued that FI’s leadership lacked clarity in its mission and was too afraid to attack Israel.

In considering al-Maqdisi’s statements, the author concluded that al-Maqdisi:

  1. Is not in Lebanon
  2. Is not aware of the complex relationship between the Lebanese and the Palestinian refugees living in the camps
  3. Is not aware of the “sectarian balances” in Lebanon
  4. Is not aware of the extent of Hezbollah’s state building in Lebanon

He also criticized FI for not having Lebanese Sunni priorities when the organization started in 2006. He claimed, “The Sunni aspired to reach a balance with Hezbollah and were not looking to the Israeli danger.” These accusations echoed statements by AJ2, who the author claimed grasped the full picture of the various battles in Lebanon. AJ2 stated that when FI entered Lebanon, it quickly lost Sunni support because it “began provoking and targeting the weakest party in Lebanon, which was the Sunnis in the army and internal security. It lost the support of all the Sunni at the same time because of the slaughter that took place on elements of the army, who were sleeping or separated from their weapons.”

According to AJ2, at this point, FI had two choices. 1) Eliminate its Sunni enemies and establish an emirate in Tripoli before starting clashes with Hezbollah, which controls access to Israel. 2) Transform the Sunnis into a potent fighting force supported by a wide majority. However, AJ2 reported that FI did not have the opportunity to make any choice because it clashed with security forces too soon, causing the Nahr al-Bared siege. He claimed that the other jihadi groups in Lebanon did not support FI because it had lost popular support.

AJ2 also maintained that Syria is highly active in penetrating and disrupting jihadi cells in the Levant. He claimed that Hashim Minqara, the leader of the Islamic Unification Movement, and Najib Miqati, a former prime minister of Lebanon, gave former FI leader Shakir al-‘Absi to the Syrians. He singled out Minqara alleging that he not only helped capture al-Absi, but also helped Syria penetrate the jihadi groups to further Syrian relations with the Hariri family and to gather information to sell to the US and France. He stated that Syria had unsuccessfully tried similar operations with the Islamic State of Iraq.

According to the author, al-Maqdisi’s story largely confirmed that of AJ2, but al-Maqdisi also tried “to confirm the role of Fatah al-Islam in the leadership of al-Qaida in the Levant.” However, AJ2 stated that there were no organizational links between FI and al-Qaida in the Levant (AQL).

The author then offered lessons learned from al-Maqdisi’s statements and criticisms of these lessons. The first was the limitation for recruitment from secular Palestinian organizations that are close to Syria. Al-Maqdisi claimed that after al-‘Absi was released from prison in Syria, he contacted “the brothers” and “decided to carry out the plan” and “exploit” Fatah al-Intifada, the precursor to FI. He convinced members of Fatah al-Intifada to prepare for operations against Israel from Lebanon. Accepting all nationalities, he wanted to “transform the conflict with the Jews from a Jewish-Palestinian conflict to a conflict between the Ummah and the Jews.”

The author criticized this, stating “How could have al-‘Absi expected to establish all of these complicated operations, and include Arab mujahidin, without the attention of Syrian spies, or without Syrian intelligence attempting to plant its spies within the organization?”

The second lesson was the loss of FI’s priorities. The author stated that FI started training and sending fighters to Iraq, which represented a diversion from FI’s stated aims of attacking Israel. He then mentioned a FI desire to target the entire Levant. Finally, he stated that the last FI goal was establishing an Islamic emirate in northern Lebanon. He quoted al-Maqdisi, “After easily controlling the camp and gaining the loyalty of some of the Islamic groups, there was the idea of establishing an Islamic emirate in Tripoli as the key in the battle with the Jews and to assist their brothers in Iraq. It would also attract the downtrodden Sunni in Lebanon, who raced behind Hariri the apostate. Additionally, it would be for the sake of attracting Sunnis to Syria because the tyranny of the Baath Party forced them to fear themselves.”

The author countered, “What are the priorities of the organization? Fighting the Jews, combating the Syrian regime and besieging it, or supporting the mujahidin in Iraq with trained men?” He also asked how FI thought it could fight Israel, when it was trying to open a front with Syria. He added that if the goal was to train fighters and send them to Iraq, then why cause trouble with Syria. According to the author, regardless of what FI’s goal was, it was not taking a course of action that could have achieved any goal.

The third lesson was the danger of miscalculations. According to the author al-Maqdisi said, “The Fatah al-Islam leadership did not expect the Army to enter the [Nahr] al-Bared camp. It calculated politically that the clashes would last for two days or more and then there would be calm like what happened in Ain al-Hilweh.” He claimed that that the decision to enter the camps was taken internationally because they are linked to the UN. He also thought that Lebanon’s complicated politics would forestall the Army from entering the camp and that the US hastened the decision to enter because it learned about FI’s presence in the camp, and its strategy and future goals.

The author responded with a question about why FI did not fear the repercussions of a Lebanese Army attack, but feared what would happen if they carried out an alleged plan to abduct Israelis, which essentially states that FI was too scared to attack Israel.

Finally, al-Maqdisi supposedly claimed that it is best if a group does not announce its responsibility for terrorist attacks because the enemy does not know where to respond. The author thought that the idea was bad because anyone could use the group’s name for bloody acts.

Two developments from this story will be interesting to watch in the coming months. The first is the criticism of FI, which may evolve into another incidence of jihadis bickering amongst themselves. The second is the supposed announcement of AQL. AQ has long attempted to establish a presence in the Levant and many groups have claimed to be AQ syndicates. Over a year ago, AJ2 warned that AQ would announce its presence in the Levant after the US presidential elections and it would begin attacking Israel by 2010. It appears that he is keeping his word. However, I will believe AQ is an actual presence in the Levant when I see it due to the multitude of groups in the past claiming to be AQ and the difficult operating environment in the Levant, which is largely due to the lack of ungoverned spaces on the border with Israel. Nevertheless, al-Zarqawi managed attacks in Jordan and launched rockets into Israel, so an attack is not completely out of the question.

Gaza Galore in New Issue of Sada al-Jihad

Thomas Hegghammer January 28, 2009

The thirty-second issue of the ever so slick magazine Sada al-Jihad is out. Like the rest of jihadi media these days, it focuses on Gaza. Practically the entire 41-page journal is devoted to Palestine, and the front page features a close-up picture of the blood-stained face of a Palestinian child. However, the articles do not seem to contain many original viewpoints and analyses. They highlight the civilian suffering, the treason of the Arab leaders, and the futility of the moderate  Muslim Brotherhood approach. Much of this has been heard before.

But this does not mean the Gaza rhetoric is inconsequential. For many I am stating the obvious, but the Israeli assault on Gaza has greatly benefited al-Qaida propagandists and recruiters. In 2007 and 2008, the global jihadist message was losing some of its resonance, partly as a result of Iraq’s sectarian turn, bickering within the jihadi movement, and the absence of new symbols of Muslim suffering. Gaza reinvigorated the global jihadist movement and provided a much-needed new rallying cause. I do not doubt that we will soon feel its repercussions in the form of new recruitment and perhaps more violent activity. By the way, it is a relief to finally see Western officials such as Alan West publicly recognizing the connection between Palestine and global jihadism.

The last time Palestine caused a similar stir was during the early days of the al-Aqsa intifada, which was then accompanied by a massive increase in the flow of recruits to al-Qaida camps in Afghanistan. Today the impact will be somewhat more difficult to measure, since new recruits have fewer places to go, but I would not be surprised if we see an increase in the number of people trying to go to Iraq, Afghanistan and other jihad fronts.

We are also starting to see foreign volunteers making it to the battlefront in Palestine. Princeton Professor Bernard Haykel kindly brought to my attention the martyrdom biography of a Saudi fighter named Abu Muhammad al-Marri who was recently killed in Gaza. Although he is not the first Saudi to try to join the jihad in Palestine,  he is, to my knowledge, the first to die in combat there. The novelty is not that foreign jihadists want to fight in Palestine – they always wanted to – but rather that al-Marri made it through and was allowed to fight by the Palestinians. There are three ways to interpret this report: 1) as a fluke – al-Marri had a Palestinian wife so he may not have been seen as an outsider; 2) as reflecting a decision by Hamas to allow in a Saudi or two to embarrass the Saudis, or 3) as reflecting a strategic decision by Hamas to accommodate more foreign volunteers. Only time will show which one it is.

Meanwhile, here is the table of contents of Sada al-Jihad 32:

•    The Gaza war: if we lose, our enemies will benefit (leader)
•    Hamas: correct the basis and fear God, not people (by Abu Muhammad al-Maqdisi)
•    Gaza, attacked by the Jews and besieged by the apostates and the infidels (Abd al-Aziz al-Julayyil)
•    The Gaza massacre and the siege of the traitors (Ayman al-Zawahiri)
•    Gaza, a war that distinguished the ranks and uncovered positions (Sada al-Jihad special)
•    Reflections on the jurisprudence of jihad (part 2) (Muhammad al-Shaybani)
•    Believers are brothers (Abu Umar al-Baghdadi)
•    A call for jihad and to end the aggression on Gaza (Usama bin Ladin)
•    The lies of the blood profiteers are uncovered in the cities of Gaza and al-Ahya (Abu Taha al-Miqdad)
•    The great scandal (Ahmad al-Masri)
•    Will Palestinians understand those waging war on them? (Akram Hijazi)
•    Amir al-Shihri (Abu Hilal)
•    How do you confront an interrogator?
•    A call to the monotheists

Document (Arabic): 01-28-09-faloja-sada-al-jihad-32

Document (Arabic): 01-28-09-almoltaqa-saudi-martyr-in-gaza

Bin Laden And Zawahiri Not Sharing Talking Points

Will McCants January 14, 2009

It’s interesting to compare Bin Laden’s new statement on Gaza with Zawahiri’s of last week.  Of course the overarching message–jihad now!–is the same.  But unlike Zawahiri, Bin Laden doesn’t mock Obama, he doesn’t echo Zawahiri’s call for demonstrations in Egypt (Bin Laden says demonstrations are useless), and he takes a slightly more conciliatory view of democracy (electing a president, yes; man-made legislation, no).  Bin Laden is also more explicit about how to raise money to finance the jihad (hit up rich businessmen).

Bin Laden does echo Zawahiri in one important respect.  Zawahiri said that the U.S. withdrawal from Iraq is one of the “good omens” (basha’ir) of AQ coming to fight in the Palestinian Territories.  Bin Laden ends his message by saying that in this year there will be “omens” (tabashir, from the same Arabic root as basha’ir) of the receding of the Zionist-Crusader campaign.  Make of it what you will.

Here’s a summary:

  • Jihad is the only way to solve the problem in Palestine.  Appealing to the Security Council or local rulers won’t solve it.  The former want to hurt Muslims and the latter are agents of the West.
  • The leaders of Islamic movements who won’t call for a jihad in Palestine unless their rulers approve it are ducking their responsibility.  Jihad today is an individual duty, not dependent on the permission of rulers.
  • Engaging in demonstrations without weapons is useless.
  • You can win against the Zionist-Crusader alliance if you will just fight.  Look at what the mujahids did in Afghanistan against the Soviets.  Look at what the mujahids have done to the U.S., which is now bleeding human and financial resources.  It is in the midst of a financial crisis; its enemies don’t fear it and its friends don’t respect it.
  • Israel had to launch an attack on Gaza to protect itself by replacing Hamas with the Palestinian Authority.  It has done so now because the power of its chief sponsor, the U.S., is rapidly waning and because its major backers, Bush and the neoconservatives, are about to leave office.
  • Biden, Greenspan, and various world leaders have said the global economic system is on the verge of collapse.  The American intelligence community reports that U.S. influence will wane even more in the coming years.
  • Americans can’t continue to fight Muslims for several more decades.  Most Americans are displeased with what Bush has done.  He has bequeathed two wars to his successor, who can’t win them no matter what he does.  If he withdraws, it’s a military defeat.  If he continues, it deepens the economic crisis.
  • The open fronts of jihad “in the region” are Palestine, Iraq, Afghanistan, Waziristan, North Africa, and Somalia.
  • Muslims should support the jihad financially.  One wealthy businessman can pay for all the expenses of jihad on the open fronts.  I know many Muslim businessmen want to support the jihad financially, but they are worried about being discovered by America and its agents in the region.  This is not an excuse.
  • You cannot secure your rights by voting; they can only be secured through force.  Western countries themselves took their rights by force.  Look at the French Revolution.  Look at the American Revolution.
  • There can be no ballot boxes in our countries while tyrants rule them.
  • Muslims believe in electing presidents and offering him council.  But we do not believe in electing legilatures that create man-made laws.
  • We are in solidarity with you since we are fighting the same enemy.
  • “God wills that this year will reveal the signs of dawn and the omens of deliverance through the receding of the Zionist-Crusader reach.”

New Zawahiri Statement: Obama Is Killing Muslims In Gaza

Will McCants January 6, 2009

An audio statement by Zawahiri was just posted to the forums.  Here’s a summary:

  • Bin Laden swore he would keep fighting until Palestine and Muslim lands are free of foreign occupiers.
  • The Israeli attacks are Obama’s “gift” to the Palestinians before he takes office.  President Mubarak of Egypt is an accomplice in this slaughter since he has closed Egypt’s border with Gaza.
  • To the Muslims and mujahids in Gaza and Palestine: Al-Qaeda is with you.  We are attacking the American-Zionist Crusade wherever we can and we are quickly moving toward you.  The American withdrawal from Iraq heralds our approach toward you.
  • To the Muslims in Egypt: Strike and protest to force Mubarak to end the blockade.
  • To the Bedouins in Sinai: Help break the blockade.
  • To the Muslims of the world: American propaganda portrayed Obama as your savior but here he is “killing” Muslims in Gaza.  Demonstrating against these atrocities is not enough; you must engage in jihad.  Strike the American-Zionist Crusade everywhere.

Document (Arabic): 1-6-09-shamikh-zawahiri-on-gaza

Maqdisi Blasts Hamas

Will McCants January 6, 2009

Abu Muhammad al-Maqdisi, the leading Jihadi scholar in Jordan (and worldwide for that matter), has issued a statement on his website regarding Gaza.  In short: Hamas has let down the Muslim community and needs to step out of the way and allow the Jihadis there and abroad to take over the fight against Israel.  Maqdisi is particularly enraged by Hamas’ recent crackdown on the Army of Islam.  Here’s a summary of the highlights:

  • If not for tyrranical rulers and their armies, Muslims would be flocking across their countries’ borders to Gaza now on a jihad.
  • We’re not surprised by the failure of our feckless rulers.  We’re surprised by the leaders of Hamas, who spurn the Taliban, Jihadi clerics, and true monotheists [eg Army of Islam] while praising the Shia and its leaders [eg Hezbollah and Iran] and even secular governments that plot against Islam.
  • Some might say this is the time for solidarity and not reproaching others.  We say that there is no time like the present.  Neglecting to speak out is one of the main reasons the enemies have been ascendant.
  • Hamas is misleading Muslims with its glittering slogans, which blind people to their wayward goals and strategies, leading them down the path of criminals.
  • Hamas is selling out Islam and cozying up to tyrants.
  • Hamas started the bloodshed in Gaza several weeks ago when it killed members of the Army of Islam organization.  In this they brought joy to the Jews.
  • We support those who fight for pure monotheism, not democracy or nationalism.  We won’t stand in the way of those who want to fight for these things, but we won’t support them and we don’t want others to follow them.
  • Hamas needs to abandon democracy and return to pure monotheism.  It needs to stop hindering those who would fight under monotheism’s banner.

Document (Arabic): 12-29-08-tawhed-maqdisi-statement-on-hamas

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