ji·had·ica

The Non-Strategic “Special Strategic Study”

The “Falluja Think Tank” recently published the “Special Strategic Study of the Global Battle and the Jihadi Movement’s Place in It.” Like Thomas, I had high expectations, but was disappointed in the end because the study amounted to little more than general summaries of U.S. and jihadi history. However, the author did state that divine providence allowed 9/11 to happen, which caused the U.S. to abandon its principles of democracy and human rights.

The author started by establishing that the battle between the United States and the jihadis is religious in nature rather than geopolitical or for acquiring resources. He commented that today’s “crusaders” are not only supported by their governments, but also by the “dogmatists” like the Knights Templar and the Knights of Malta, who, he claimed, “resemble the mujahedeen because they fight for faith.”

He went on to chart America’s “path” to global dominance and then gave a history of the jihadi movement from colonialism until now. He broke the “Jihadi Path” into four distinct phases. The first was the “Popular Jihad” against colonialism that was marked by Moroccan ‘Abd-al-Karim al-Khattabi allegedly killing 25,000 “crusader” troops and capturing 20,000 others, including 95 generals and five marshals. I am not very familiar with Moroccan history, but the numbers sound highly exaggerated.

The second phase was the “Local Jihad” (الجهاد القطري) against the ruling regimes allied with the West, i.e. the near enemy. He made a point to exclude Hamas and the Moro Islamic Front because they deviated from the proper jihadi ideology.

The third phase was the “Regional Jihad,” which was the result of oppression at home that sent the jihadis elsewhere. He stated that Afghanistan was the ideal model for this because jihadis could go there, receive training, and go on to other battle fronts. He mentioned that jihadis still aid Kashmir, Somalia, the Philippines, Kosovo, Burma, and other places as well.

Finally, the fourth phase is the “Global Jihad,” which sprang from the “crusader invasion of the Arabian Peninsula” in 1990.

The meeting point of the American and jihadi paths, according to the author, was al-Qaeda drawing the U.S. into an asymmetrical conflict where al-Qaeda’s “stupid technology” (تكنلوجيا الجهل), i.e. suicide bombers, could check American technological superiority. September 11th marked the beginning of this conflict.

The author then identified two paths to victory for the jihadi movement. The first is the continuance and completion of the historical path already laid out through the previously stated four phases, while the second path is converting the West to Islam. I believe it is unlikely that either path will come to fruition. However, I have concluded that if the entire West were to convert to Islam, it should convert to Shi’a Islam in order to study the jihadi reaction.

In conclusion, the author stated that it was God’s will for 9/11 to happen because if the jihadis had conducted a nuclear attack, the whole world would be against them. However, the knee-jerk U.S. response to 9/11 and the human rights issues it raised allowed the U.S. to destroy itself without al-Qaeda taking the blame. He stated:

If we substituted the 9/11 plan for the plan of targeting American nuclear reactors that al-Qaeda planners had previously abolished, its massive destructive damage could have reached a degree of existential disaster. If we were to have done that, America would be completely forgotten. However, the entire world would hate us for what we did to the exemplary system for human life and we would become enemies of the freedom and justice that America represents in the eyes of the people. It was God’s wisdom that struck America on its skull causing it to agitate, provoke, and anger without a care, exchanging the principle of peaceful coexistence in the shadow of the United Nations for the principle of either you are with us or against us. It caused America to substitute the principle of respecting sovereignty and referring to the Security Council for a principle of occupying two countries without physical evidence, and to exchange spreading democracy around the world to rejecting the votes of Palestinians who elected Hamas. His wisdom caused America to exchange the system of trade globalization for a system of occupying sources of raw materials, and to replace the principle of defending general freedoms and respecting human rights for the principles of Abu-Ghraib, Guantanamo, and secret prisons.”

While the “Special Strategic Study” was somewhat disappointing, the author does underline the importance, for the jihadis, of defeating America’s image abroad as a symbol of freedom. He also points out that the best way to defeat this symbol is to provoke America into destroying its own reputation. However, the author inadvertently highlights a jihadi weakness in that the jihadi ideology is too weak to destroy and replace American ideals. Only America can do that.

Jihadi Explains Iranian Realpolitik

Abu `Abd al-Rahman `Atiyyat Allah (possibly this person) has written a new booklet titled Ru’ya kashifa in which he tries to convince his Jihadi brethren that Iran and Hezbollah are not working with the U.S. and Israel as part of a grand conspiracy to subjugate Sunnis. Rather, he argues, Iran and its cat’s paw Hezbollah are seeking hegemony in the region. Achieving it means supporting popular Muslim causes and making temporary alliances with ideological enemies or competitors. Below is a summary:

  • It is hard to analyze Shia states and groups because of their doctrine of dissimulation (taqiyya), or concealing one’s true beliefs. p.4
  • Dissimulation is permitted in Sunni Islam if you are in danger. But the Shia make a habit of it. p.5
  • Outwardly Iran and Shia groups stress Sunni-Shia unity; embrace causes that are important to Muslims, particularly the Palestinian issue; and put Iran forward as the only authentic Islamic state, which fills a void left by the absent caliphate. p.12-14
  • Inwardly, Shia sincerely believe in Islam, but it is an Islam of their own making, not true Islam; they believe they are the only true Muslims; and they are seeking to dominate the Islamic world. p.15-16
  • “The hostility between the Rejectionists [the Shia], America, and Israel is real hostility.” p.19
  • Those who believe there is no real hostility between Iran on one side and the U.S. and Israel on the other have bought into conspiracy theories, which are a regrettable flaw in our culture. p.19
  • The hostility of Iran toward the U.S. and Israel is partly religious, in that Shi`ism retains the religious hostility toward Christians and Jews found in the true religion, Sunnism. It is also due to Iran’s desire for power. p.19
  • Iran helped the U.S. in Afghanistan and Iraq because of its self-interest–the U.S. eliminated two of its enemies, the Taliban and Saddam. This is a good example of the opportunistic and circumstantial nature of Shia politics. p.21
  • The Shia make these kind of decisions because their greatest enemy is the Sunnis. They can live with Jews and Christians, but not Sunnis. Look how Iran treats its Sunni minorities, how Hezbollah behaves toward Sunnis, and how the Shia government in Iraq has dealt with Sunni Iraqis. p.21, 24
  • Contrary to what many Jihadis say, Hezbollah is not Israel’s collaborator. But Hezbollah will talk to Israel and work with it on a limited basis if it suits Hezbollah’s interests. p.22-3
  • The Shia are pragmatic. They are willing to work with anyone regardless of their stated beliefs. This includes working with Wahhabis. p.23
  • Hezbollah supports Palestinian militants to achieve the wider aims of Iran. It has adopted a popular cause to increase its popularity. It is also filling a leadership vacuum left by other Arab states who have failed to step up. p.32-3
  • Hezbollah is a tool of both Iran and Syria. It serves their interests and policies. p.36
  • Hezbollah prevents any Sunni resistance from setting up on the Lebanese border with Israel. It has cut deals with Syria, the U.S., and even Israel to retain its control of the area. p.36

Despite the excessive focus on dissimulation (which also plagues Western analyses of Shia politics) and the Iran-wants-to-rule-Sunnis argument (does it really want to rule Indonesia?), this is a good primer on Iran’s realpolitik in the Middle East and dovetails well with the findings of an excellent new book, The Limits of Culture. That `Atiyyat Allah has to chastise his fellow Jihadis for their conspiracy thinking and their overemphasis on cultural motives when analyzing state behavior shows that they are problems for the Jihadi analytical community. Same could be said for us.

abu-abd-al-rahman-atiyyat-allah-ruya-kashifa رؤية كاشفة

Prophetic Precedents for Various Types of Warfare

This one is for all those who believe that Jihadis act strictly according to the Qur’an and the Sunna.  It’s a detailed study by Abu al-Harith al-Ansari of the various types of warfare and the prophetic precedents for each.  There are 41 kinds in all, including “media warfare,” “economic warfare,” “secret warfare,” “war of attrition,” and so forth.  If you’ve ever needed to make the argument that Islamic scripture determines Jihadi behavior, this 278-page book is for you.

Of course, you’d still have a hard time explaining why a branch of al-Qaeda in Iraq recently broke with the organization and renounced suicide attacks.

abu-al-harith-al-ansari-irshad-al-saul-ila-hurub-al-rasul إرشاد السؤول إلى حروب الرسول

Al-Qaeda’s Ethics in War

An English-speaking woman, Umm Saad, has been translating some documents for the members of Ekhlaas. One of them is a story recounted by `Abd al-Rahman al-Faqir, a popular member of al-Hesbah. Faqir argues that what sets al-Qaeda apart from other insurgents is its obedience to Islamic law, even during warfare. To prove his point, he tells the story of an al-Qaeda commander (perhaps in Iraq) who schools a new recruit on the operational restrictions that Jihadis have to abide by.

Of course, this doesn’t often happen on the ground, which is while al-Qaeda has been taking a public relations beating lately and why Faqir relates his story.

Document (English): 6-11-2008-ekhlaas-abd-al-rahman-al-faqir-ethics-of-war-followed-by-al-qaeda

Qur’an Verse 9:29

The moderators at the Middle East Strategy at Harvard blog kindly allowed me to post some comments on Raymond Ibrahim’s article.  Since they have now closed the thread, I’ll finish my thoughts here.  Ibrahim has been arguing that the Qur’an contains very clear doctrines on warfare.  I disagree; this is where the Qur’an is most confusing, which is why later scholars had to come up with the doctrine of abrogation to explain away the contradictions.  Ibrahim retorted by citing verse 9:29, which is traditionally taken to be a justification for fighting Jews and Christians until they submit and pay a tax.

I responded to Ibrahim by saying that verse 9:29 does not support his position well since it is notoriously ambiguous.  He shot back that “(t)here is nothing ambiguous about 9:29—at least not to native Arabic speakers.”   For those of you that don’t know Arabic and might be inclined to believe someone who plays the native card, here is a literal rendering of the verse, minus any punctuation (which is not found in the Qur’an anyway):

Fight those who do not believe in God or in the Last Day and who do not forbid what God and His Messenger forbade and who do not acknowledge the religion of truth among those who were given the Book until they give the jizya out of hand while being submissive

The meaning of this passage may be completely apparent to any native speaker who has absorbed its medieval Muslim interpretation, but it is far from unambiguous to anyone unfamiliar with that tradition, native or not.  Taken on its face, it reads like a commandment to fight those who do not acknowledge Judaism and Christianity or perhaps to fight Jews and Christians who are not adhering to their scriptures, which are both very different readings from the traditional Muslim understanding of the verse.  Which goes back to my main point: the Qur’an is a bad place to look for clear doctrines on warfare.  This is not to say that the Qur’an doesn’t endorse fighting for religion or that it can’t be read as advocating total war; only that it cannot be held up as a clear exposition on these subjects.

If Ibrahim wishes to continue this discussion, I happily invite him to do so here.  I’m not hopeful, since he characterized my thoughts as “pedestrian,” but I thought I’d give it a shot.

Islamic Warfighting Doctrine and Jihadi Behavior

There is a well-worn rut of thinking which holds that Islamic doctrines of warfare determine Jihadis’ violent behavior. The doctrine functions like software on a computer: if you can identify the doctrines/software, you can predict behavior.

Raymond Ibrahim has posted a version of this argument at the MESH blog. Ibrahim is right to say that Jihadis of the Salafi stripe take the medieval Islamic teachings on warfare seriously (sometimes to their detriment, as Brynjar Lia has argued in a recent article).  But he is wrong to argue that studying these doctrines helps us understand, much less anticipate, the actions of Jihadis. I say this for five reasons:

1. The classical tradition Jihadis draw on is very contradictory. (I see that Bernard Haykel has already made this point in a comment on Ibrahim’s post.)  Which of the contradictory rulings is operative?

2. Cost-benefit analysis is an integral part of medieval Islamic thinking about warfare. For example, in medieval discussions of suicidal attacks, the majority says that although they are permissible, they may not be wise in a given circumstance (e.g. they will hurt the Muslim community, they will not result in any benefit to the Muslim armies). If this analysis is built in, then any doctrine of warfare is subject to curtailment.

3. Contemporary Jihadis disagree on tactics. For example, Zarqawi used to reject suicide ops against noncombatants until a mentor in Afghanistan changed his mind. If all Jihadis are running on the same software, why isn’t there consensus on this issue?

4. Academics who have studied specific instances of Jihadi violence have found that organizational imperatives, local politics, etc. strongly shape violent behavior (see, for example, Hafez’s Suicide Bombers in Iraq, or Hegghammer’s dissertation).

5. Most Jihadis accept the idea of “do unto your enemy as he does unto you,” so everything is on the table. If that’s the case, then it doesn’t matter whether the classical tradition sanctions an act or not.

6. Even if we say the tradition puts constraints on mujahids (which I think it does), its hard to see where these constraints are for Jihadis. They have maximally defined the scope of warfare, all the way out to WMD. With such wide latitude, why would learning the finer points of suicidal attacks help us understand their behavior?

All of this is not to say that doctrine doesn’t matter. Doctrine does play a great role in dehumanizing outsiders (which Ibrahim rightly alludes to), defining end goals (Islamic states), and prolonging violence (see Mike Horowitz’s work). I’m just arguing that it is not determinative in tactical or strategic matters.

Studying medieval Islamic doctrines of warfare does have one massive payoff:  If we can identify the rulings that contradict what the Jihadis are saying or doing, we can use them in information operations to paint Jihadis as illegitimate and outside of mainstream Islam. Of course, the Qur’an-is-software types will argue that the Jihadis are behaving like perfectly good Muslims.  But this opinion (which I sometimes share) does not help us discredit the Jihadis, which is one of the keys to destroying Jihadism; rather it makes their argument for them and alienates Muslims who might otherwise be well wishers.

One final point:  Ibrahim is outraged that deceit and an acceptance of collateral damage are acceptable in medieval Islamic doctrines of warfare.  Why is this outrageous?

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