ji·had·ica

Al-Qaida Advises the Arab Spring: The Case for al-Baghdadi

Joas Wagemakers September 21, 2013

The once fledgling Islamic State of Iraq has appeared to be going strong again since its leader, Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi, merged it with the jihadi efforts in Syria to become the Islamic State of Iraq and al-Sham (ISIS). Although this merger was apparently rejected by Abu Muhammad al-Julani, the leader of the Syrian Jabhat al-Nusra, at first, things now seem to be going smoothly. (See here for a recent report on Syria’s military opposition, by the way.)

Since the start of the ISIS in April of this year, much support for this state and al-Baghadi has been expressed among jihadis across the world. Not everybody seems to be convinced, however, and apparently some still see the need to criticise al-Baghdadi as a proper leader of the ISIS. For this reason, Abu Hummam Bakr b. ‘Abd al-‘Aziz al-Athari, one of the scholars who used to be on the Shari’a Council of the Minbar al-Tawhid wa-l-Jihad (and in theory still is) but now just publishes random articles every now and then, has written a tract in which he makes the case for swearing fealty to al-Baghdadi. As such, it gives interesting insight into the question of leadership of an Islamic state.

The man

Al-Athari starts his case by singing the praises of al-Baghdadi’s background. First of all, he writes, Abu Bakr al-Qurashi al-Husayni al-Baghdadi is a direct descendant of the Prophet Muhammad himself. Although this does not guarantee in any way that jihadis will like you – just think of the Jordanian and Moroccan royal families, who also claim to descend from Muhammad – it does give honorary status to al-Baghadi, which al-Athari stresses by citing hadiths in which the Prophet’s family is lauded.

Apart from al-Baghdadi’s family background, he is also a scholar of Islam according to al-Athari, having obtained an MA-degree in Qur’anic studies and a PhD in Islamic jurisprudence (fiqh) and having written a book on tawhid (the unity of God). This comination of Islamic knowledge and Prophetic descent makes him a special man indeed, al-Athari claims.

The mujahid

Al-Baghdadi’s qualities cannot just be found in his person, but also in his activities as a jihad fighter. He has taught at several mosques in Iraq, where he also served as an imam and preacher, al-Athari states, and he has led several jihadi groups. He is also a member of the Majlis al-Shura (consultation council) of the mujahidun and heads the shari’a and judicial councils of the Islamic State in Iraq.

Besides mentioning the many jobs al-Baghdadi has, al-Athari stresses that his leadership of ISIS was achieved through the pledge of fealty by the state’s Majlis al-Shura and the scholars in it, who agreed that al-Baghdadi should succeed the previous two leaders, Abu ‘Umar al-Baghdadi and Abu Hamza al-Muhajir, to become the new amir.

In his various capacities, al-Baghdadi has actively resisted the American invasion of his country “against his religion and his honour” and was instrumental in setting up and organising the Islamic State of Iraq, which was ruled on the basis of the Qur’an and the Sunna, al-Athari claims.

Throughout the period that preceded his leadership, al-Athari states, al-Baghdadi tried hard to listen to people, both young and old, in order to make Islamic rule pleasant for them. As such, he met with tribal representatives, jihadi groups and militias and called on all of them to pledge fealty to his predecessor.

The amir

Despite the man’s alleged abundant qualities, al-Athari dedicates several pages to “proving” that al-Baghdadi is indeed suitable for the job of amir. He lists ten conditions for leadership: the amir should be male, free, an adult, sound of mind, just, courageous, a descendant of the Prophet Muhammad’s Quraysh tribe, knowledgeable and suitable to lead the umma and serve its interests. Suffice to say, al-Athari believes that al-Baghdadi fits all the criteria.

Al-Athari then asks whether someone can actually be a good amir if not all Muslims have pledged fealty to him. He answers in the negative, stating that only the scholars responsible for this, the ahl al-hall wa-l-‘aqd, need to swear their loyalty to him and even they needn’t necessarily all agree on this. The idea that all members of the ahl al-hall wa-l-‘aqd should give their pledge of fealty (bay’a) to the amir is a Mu’tazilite idea, al-Athari claims, and the notion of popular support is derived from the concept of democracy. It will come as no surprise that al-Athari rejects both.

The fact that scholars from areas conquered by the ISIS may not necessarily endorse al-Baghdadi’s rule is no problem, al-Athari writes. These areas were not ruled by the shari’a, so the fact that al-Baghdadi’s state controls them now is great in and of itself, but even if these areas had been under shari’a rule, the consensus of the scholars is that the new ruler should be obeyed. The idea that al-Baghdadi is unknown to people and that this may hamper his ability to rule is false, al-Athari states, since he is not unknown at all. Even if this were the case, however, this would pose no problem to his leadership because individual people obviously do not have to know the leader personally to follow his rule.

Al-Baghdadi’s incomplete rule over Iraq and his lack of agreement with scholars in Syria about ISIS do not impede his leadership abilities either, according to al-Athari. The Prophet Muhammad did not rule everywhere on the Arabian Peninsula either and his leadership was certainly not in doubt. As for the scholars in Syria, al-Athari claims that the amir does not necessarily have to consult them to be allowed to incorporate this area into his state.

The caliph?

Al-Baghdadi’s descent of the Prophet Muhammad, his scholarly credentials and his actions as a mujahid who clearly builds his activities on the consensus of scholars and tries to work with others are the reasons why al-Athari believes he is such a great leader. He refutes all arguments that one may have against al-Baghdadi’s leadership and calls on Muslims in both Iraq and Syria to follow his lead and unite. In fact, al-Athari states that “we ask God that the time will come in which we will see our shaykh sitting on the thrown of the caliph”.

Much of this praise seems rooted in the idea that is also found in the work of Abu Muhammad al-Maqdisi and the Shari’a Council he started – of which, as mentioned, al-Athari is nominally still a member – namely that jihad should be legitimate, effective and fruitful. In other words, it should consist of exactly the type of scholarly sanctioned, thoroughly considered and widely consolidated actions that al-Baghdadi apparently engages in. Al-Baghdadi seems to combine the qualities of a thinker with those of a fighter and, in a nutshell, therefore seems to be precisely the type of “philosopher jihadi”, to use Nelly Lahoud’s phrase, that scholars like al-Maqdisi and al-Athari are searching for.

The Iraq Connection

Thomas Hegghammer December 15, 2010

A key question in the Stockholm investigation is whether Taymour Abdalwahhab was acting on behalf of the al-Qaida linked group “Islamic State in Iraq”. The question matters because if he was, then ISI is targeting Europe and can be expected to send more bombers.

First, let me stress that “acting on behalf of” means someting more than simply “training with”. Given Taymour’s Iraqi background, his recent trips to Jordan (and possibly Syria), and his own claim of having been to the Middle East for jihad, we can pretty much assume that he trained with Islamist militants in Iraq. What we are trying to find out is whether he was dispatched by ISI – i.e. whether the plot was initiated, directed and resourced by senior ISI operatives – or whether he simply attended a camp and then acted independently, in a manner comparable to Times Square bomber Faisal Shahzad.

There is some concrete evidence in favour of Taimour having a close ISI connection:

  • The photomontage on the Hanain forum presenting Taymour as “One of the knights [fursan] of the Islamic State of Iraq”
  • Taymour’s reference to “the Islamic State” in his martyrdom will
  • Taymour’s reference, in the same will, to having been a mujahid for “four years”

There is also some circumstantial evidence:

  • ISI leader Abu Umar al-Baghadi’s September 2007 statement calling for attacks in Sweden as punishment for the publication of cartoons of the Prophet Muhammad
  • The past involvement of other Swedish Muslims in ISI and its predecessors (see Brian Fishman’s excellent piece for details)

A more debatable piece of evidence is the early identification of Taimour Abdalwahhab on the Shumukh forum by a writer using the alias “Abu Sulayman al-Nasir.” As Aaron, Ibn Siqilli and Garbi point out in the comments to my previous post, the alias bears a striking similarity to the name of ISI’s War Minister Abu Sulayman al-Nasir li-DIn Allah. Could they be the same person? Personally I am sceptical. It is extremely rare (though admittedly not unheard of) for senior activists to use their real names on forums. Moreover, Abu Sulayman the forum writer has also issued audio statements threatening NATO. Why would ISI’s War Minister issue “rogue” statements outside of ISI highly streamlined propaganda framework?

On the other hand there is weighty evidence against Taimour acting on behalf of ISI:

  • The absence of a claim of responsibility from ISI proper, despite ISI being perhaps the world’s largest producer of jihadi propaganda
  • The absence of a post-attack martyrdom video, which is what groups with media wings tend to produce
  • The near absence of past ISI-directed plots in Europe. AQI was admittedly linked to the 2007 Glasgow and London attacks but the nature of those links have never been elucidated. Why would ISI conduct its first (or one of its first) major European attack in Sweden? Why not use Taymour to strike in Britain, a country that actually participated in the Iraq invasion and the country in which Taymour resided?

Of course it is still early, and an ISI claim or video could appear any time. However, in the absence of such documents, I lean toward the view that Taymour trained with Islamist militants in Iraq, but  was not on an ISI-directed mission. I share Aaron’s view that the case most resembles that of Faisal Shahzad, who trained in Pakistan but did most of the planning and organization himself.

This does not preclude the possibility that Taymour had a handful of helpers, in Sweden and/or in Britain. On this note, there is an interesting report in the Swedish newspaper Aftonbladet quoting the previous owner of the bombing vehicle as saying Taymour came to buy the car together with another man. The other man was a bit shorter, aged 45-50 and did not say very much.

A number questions remain, notably:

  • Who is the mystery man who came to buy the car with Taymour?
  • Is there a second person coughing on Taymour’s audio recording?
  • Why did Taymour choose to attack in Sweden when he lived in the UK?
  • Is it a coincidence that Taymour lived three streets away from Muhammad Qayum Khan?
  • Where exactly in the Middle East did Taymour travel between 2006 and 2010?
  • If ISI trained him, why are they not taking some form of credit?
  • If Taymour left a written message for his wife two weeks before the bombing, why does his wife say she didn’t know anything?

 

[PS: I am still unable to print forum posts to PDF, but I will do so as soon as I can] 

The Posts That Never Were

Thomas Hegghammer July 13, 2009

Apologies for the slow publication pace here at Jihadica, but deadlines and an upcoming house move mean I can only dream about serious blogging these days.

This does not mean forums are quiet. Every morning this past week I found things on the forums that deserved commentary. In a dream world, here’s what I would have written about had I had the time:

–    France is taking heat. Al-Qaida in the Islamic Maghreb published a statement declaring “France the mother of all evils”, and other posts fumed over the recent French plans to ban the niqab or the burka. I suspect the Americans and the Brits (who of course have long argued that France is the mother of all evils)  are happy to share the burden of jihadi attention. Unfortunately for the Anglo-Saxons, however, I don’t think the veil weighs nearly as heavy in the jihadi basket of grievances as military occupations.

–    Another one bites the dust. Exiled leaders of the Libyan Islamic Fighting Group told al-Quds al-Arabi on 2 July they are laying down their arms. The declaration is now being spun in the media as the first case of a group leaving al-Qaida. This is a misrepresentation of what’s happening but I can see why people want to spin it that way.

–    The non-strategic “Special strategic study”. The “Department for Historical Studies and Strategic Advice” of the “Falluja Think Tank” released a widely publicized “special strategic study” of the war between America and the jihadi movement. The title and the high-profile advertising had raised my expectations, but I was a little disappointed, mainly because it’s not a proper strategic study. It is a political analysis which stays at the macro-level and doesn’t offer much in terms of meso-level considerations and concrete recommendations that I associate with classics of jihadi strategic studies. It is still worth reading, though, and there is an intriguing note on AQ and nuclear weapons at the end. Scott might be covering the study it in more detail later this week.

–   Jihadis “twittering” about Swat and Helmand campaigns. The jihadi commentary and analysis of battles in Afghanistan and Pakistan is coming out so quickly it is close to twittering. Within days of the Helmand offensive there was a long Faluja thread reporting news from the frontline. The Swat debacle has been followed closely for a while, and there is now already a strategic study of the campaign. I haven’t read it yet but it looks very interesting.

–    The other American.  The Somalia-based Abu Mansour al-Amriki has released a new audio statement in English entitled “The beginning of the end” It lambasts Obama along well-known lines in very articulate native English. I agree with Evan that Abu Mansour beats Adam Gadahn on presentation skills. Abu Mansour’s tajwid is really impressive. The message is clearly intended for the mobilisation of US-based Muslims. As interesting as the message itself was the accompanying pictures of three other alleged Americans in Somalia, not least given the New York Times story about Shabab recruitment in America. By the way, Evan has a fantastic post on the Shabab on the CTBlog today.

–    Happy birthday ISI. Last Thursday was the 1000-day anniversary of the foundation of the Islamic State in Iraq, and the occasion was marked with banners on all the forums, but not much more.

–    Good Qaradawi or bad Qaradawi? Marc Lynch had a great post the other day on Yusuf al-Qaradawi’s latest book on jihad, which he thinks will undermine al-Qaida, more so than the recantations of Dr Fadl and others. Rob at the Shack disagrees, saying the side effect of Qaradawi’s stance is more legitimacy for regular national liberation struggles, which might actually cause more problems for the US in the long term. They are of course both right.

Finally there is this gem from the CBS Terror Monitor (hat tip: Cecilie), by an analyst who has clearly had enough forum watching (here’s a pdf if they remove it). Hoda you have my sympathy – there have been days where I have felt the same.

Have a great week everyone!

The Islamic State of Iraq in Gaza?

Scott Sanford May 18, 2009

On 15 May 2009, Falluja Forum contributor Wahj al-Rasas (Blazing Bullets) posted photos of leaflets the Islamic State of Iraq (ISI) supposedly distributed recently in Gaza. The leaflets claim that the recent announcement of Abu-Omar al-Baghdadi’s capture is a fabrication, the ISI does not know the identity of the person in the alleged photos of al-Baghdadi, and al-Baghdadi is doing just fine. The leaflets were signed by the “Ministry of Information / The Islamic State of Iraq” and the “the al-Shahid Abi-Mus’ab al-Zarqawi Brigade for Jihadi Media Jerusalem.”

The content of the announcement is not surprising, given al-Baghdadi has already released a statement refuting claims of his capture, and it is possible that the announcement is a forgery. However, if it is legitimate, it is interesting that the ISI would be so concerned about how Palestinians perceived the alleged al-Baghdadi capture – I have not seen a special ISI statement issued by a Somalia, North African, or Yemeni ISI branch. Additionally, it could indicate that the ISI is looking beyond Iraq and has already started activities in Gaza. It remains unclear whether or not these activities are merely for propaganda value, i.e. another attempt to connect the Palestinian issue to the wider global jihad, or an actual effort to build an ISI presence in Gaza. However, if it is the latter, the ISI faces a step uphill battle because, as I have argued previously, it is unlikely that Hamas will allow a competing organization to operate in Gaza freely.

Al-Baghdadi Speaks

Thomas Hegghammer May 12, 2009

A quick addendum to Truls’s post about Abu Umar al-Baghdadi: The Islamic State in Iraq has now broken the silence over al-Baghadi’s alleged capture.  It released a brief statement this morning dismissing the reported arrest and denying any knowledge of the man depicted on the photograph circulating in the media.

Shortly afterwards, Furqan media released an audiotaped speech by al-Baghdadi himself. In the 17-minute recording, entitled “Lying Agents”, al-Baghdadi referred briefly to the rumours of his own capture before delivering a long tirade against the Shiite-led government of Iraq. For more on the statements, see here, here and here.

It seems, then, that the latest arrest report was yet another false alarm, and that we are back to square one with regards to the al-Baghdadi puzzle.

Document (Arabic): 05-12-09-faloja-isi-statement-on-baghdadi
Document (Arabic): 05-12-09-falluja-baghadi-speech

Emirate of Confusion

Truls Tønnessen May 8, 2009

Editor’s note: I am delighted to introduce a new contributor, Truls Tønnessen, who is a FFI research fellow as well as a PhD candidate in History at the University of Oslo. He works on jihadism in Iraq and will be covering Iraq for Jihadica.

 

The alleged arrest of the emir of al-Qaida led Islamic State of Iraq (ISI), Abu Umar al-Baghdadi, has not incited a torrent of reactions on the jihadi web forums so far. Interestingly, the major Iraqi insurgent groups, including the ISI itself, have not commented upon the alleged arrest. 

There may be several reasons for this lack of reactions. One reason may be concern over security. A participant on the Falluja forum recently recommended his fellows not to comment on news concerning arrests of any leaders unless the information stems from reliable jihadi sources. One of his arguments was that their enemies may be putting forward a rumour in order to monitor the reactions on the jihadi websites, so as to determine whether they have arrested al-Baghdadi or not. 

However, the most important reason may be related to the confusion over the identity (and existence) of al-Baghdadi and his leadership role in the Islamic State of Iraq. I will not venture into the confusing debate over the identity of al-Baghdadi, but those interested in more details should check out these postings by the Long War Journal and Talisman Gate. 

Most of the reactions on the jihadi forums so far relate to the identity question. Several contributors have argued that the contradictory information from different Iraqi and US sources indicates that they don’t know who they have arrested. This is notably the view of Akram Hijazi who concludes that is it not possible to confirm Baghdadi’s arrest at this point. He writes that only a statement from the Islamic State of Iraq (ISI) may clarify the issue. However, Hijazi argues that it may take a while before ISI does so, especially if al-Baghdadi is in fact arrested, in order to protect his family and relatives.  

The question of al-Baghdadi’s identity is further complicated by his alleged position as Amir al-mu’minin or Commander of the faithful of the al-Qaida led Islamic State in Iraq. Al-Baghdadi has been presented as a member of the Quraysh (the Prophet’s tribe), presumably in an attempt to buttress his credentials. His alleged full name is Abu Umar al-Qurashi al-Husayni al-Hashimi al-Baghdadi. If al-Baghdadi has indeed been arrested, we will soon know his lineage. If he is not a Qurashi, the credibility of the Islamic State of Iraq will suffer. 

There is in other words much at stake here, which makes ISI’s silence all the more deafening.

 

Document (Arabic): 04-28-09-al-fallujah-baghdadi
Document (Arabic): 04-30-09-akram-hijazi

Back

Thomas Hegghammer March 26, 2009

I have been busy the past two weeks, but the jihadis have been busier. Bin Ladin has issued two audio statements, one proposing practical steps to liberate Palestine and the other about the treacherous government in Somalia. Al-Zawahiri warned against the forthcoming Crusader attack on Sudan, while Mustafa Abu al-Yazid has addressed the people of Pakistan. Abu Umar al-Baghdadi has spoken about the US plan to withdraw from Iraq, but he does not seem to get the same attention from the online community as his colleagues in Afghanistan. Abu Qatada has issued a statement from prison about the decision to extradite him to Jordan. Fatah al-Islam sharia officer Abu Abdallah al-Maqdisi has been taking questions since Monday, but nobody is allowed to ask about Shakir al-Absi or Asad al-Jihad2 (hmm).

On the magazine front, Sumud 33  has been out for a little while. Fortunately Sada al-Malahim 8 came out on Sunday so now Greg can sleep again. Turkestan al-Islamiyya 3 came out earlier this week, adding to the past month’s increasing flow of Uighur jihadi propaganda.

We have also seen the publication of a couple of unusual videos featuring Abu Muhammad al-Maqdisi, one with him delivering a funeral sermon in front of a crowd of several hundred people, and another showing him at a large wedding alongside half the jihadi community in Zarqa.  I suspect these videos are part of an attempt to bolster al-Maqdisi’s legitimacy by showing that he is enjoying freedom of movement and expression. By the way I highly recommend the 2-hour wedding video. It offers a fascinating inside look into the sociology of Islamism. It serves as a great illustration of a point I made in a recent article about Zarqa, namely that you cannot deradicalise entire communities. The film may depress you, but you might enjoy the songs.

I will be back soon with a report from the jihadi roundtable in Oslo.

Update (27 March): The Christian Science Monitor became the first Western newspaper to report on the Maqdisi controversy today – and Jihadica is mentioned.

Document (Arabic): 03-26-09-shouraa-mustafa-abu-al-yazid
Document (Arabic): 03-19-09-shouraa-abu-qatada-statement
Document (Arabic): 03-23-09-shamikh-abu-abdallah-al-maqdisi-qa
Document (Arabic): 03-22-09-shouraa-sada-al-malahim-8
Document (Arabic): 03-25-09-shouraa-turkestan-al-islamiyya-3
Document (Arabic): 03-12-09-faloja-maqdisi-fima-kuntum
Document (Arabic): 03-12-09-ansar-maqdisi-wedding-video

When Will Somalia’s Shabaab Movement Declare An Islamic State?

Will McCants November 16, 2008

That’s the question asked by a member of the Faloja forum.  Here are some of the answers:

 

  • Al-Yamami: The Shabaab will soon declare its allegiance to the Islamic State of Iraq (ISI); that’s why ISI’s head, `Umar al-Baghdadi, mentioned the movement recently.
  • Muhibb al-Muqrin: It will be become an emirate and remain so until the ISI returns to full strength after the occupiers leave Iraq at the end of the coming month.  It will then give its allegiance to the ISI.
  •  Buya`tu Allah: It is not in the Shabaab’s best interest to declare a state or to join al-Qaeda right now because it doesn’t want to face more enemies.
  • Al-Mu`tazz bi-Din Allah: It should declare a state after the Ethiopians withdraw from Somalia.
  • Qannas al-Dawla al-Islamiyya: It should declare an emirate soon.
  • Khayr Jubnd Allah: The Shabaab will declare a state after the occupiers have been driven from all of the important cities.
  • Abu Bakr al-Muhajir: I think that this business of declaring separate states and emirates will end and a single emirate or caliphate will be declared for the whole world.

 

As can be seen from above, the declaration of the “Islamic State of Iraq” has caused some confusion.  Does the “State” (dawla) part of the name mean that it is the nucleus of a future superstate, like previous Islamic superstates or empires (e.g. Dawla `Abbasiyya)?  If so, then other Jihadis groups should forgo setting up their own states and declare their allegiance to Baghdadi and the ISI.  Or does the the “Iraq” part of the name mean that the ISI is only a national entity, which is a little bothersome for Islamists since they reject nationalism? 

Document (Arabic): 11-15-08-faloja-when-will-somalia-declare-islamic-state

“The Painful Truth: Al-Qaeda is Losing the War in Iraq”

Will McCants October 1, 2008

That’s the title of a post by hamzacom on the Faloja forum.  In it, he draws an analogy with Afghanistan just after the U.S. invasion.  It was a time of defeat for the mujahids but now they are resurging.  The same will happen in Iraq.

Other forum members are predictably annoyed by hamzacom’s pessimistic title.  Abu `Umar al-Masri retorts that it is merely “a knight’s stumble,” not a loss.  Qannas al-Dawla al-Islamiyya (“The Islamic State’s Hunter”) is even more optimistic: “We will never lose the war as long as God is with us.”

Others share hamzacom’s pessimism but are nonchalant.  “If al-Qaeda has lost the war, what’s the problem?” Shabab Lubnan (“Youth of Lebanon”) states blithely.  “There really isn’t a problem.  There are a number of Jihadi groups that possess the idea of al-Qaeda even if they do not aid (the organization) publicly.  It is possible for these groups to launch a new war and to undertake the duty of jihad if al-Qaeda loses the war.”

The most sober commentator is Abu al-Fadl Madi, whose work we’ve been reading.  Abu Fadl believes the insurgency was largely comprised of members of the Iraqi army that the U.S. disbanded and left without a livelihood.  Now that the U.S. has started paying them off, they have stopped fighting and the insurgency has ended.  The only true resistance to the occupation was Zarqawi and his men; everything else was limited and spontaneous.  “The resistance will not return to Iraq,” Abu al-Fadl remarks, “until al-Qaeda returns to the theater of jihad.  But that won’t happen until after careful study of the lessons (learned).”

Document (Arabic): 9-4-08-faloja-member-believes-aq-is-losing-war-in-iraq

Zawahiri the XO

Will McCants September 11, 2008

The US military has given CNN letters that Zawahiri wrote in March 2008 to senior al-Qaeda commanders in Iraq (hat tip SK). Much of the content has been filtered through an MNFI spokesman so it’s hard to use CNN’s summary to assess al-Qaeda’s fortunes in Iraq. Nevertheless, since the summary fits with the bleak picture that has been emerging these past few months, it’s worth noting. I’ve rearranged the information for ease of reference:

Zawahiri letter to al-Qaeda in Iraq leader Abu Ayyub al-Masri, March 2008. Letter was captured in April during U.S. op that killed AQI Information Minister Abu Nizar. Abu Nizar was an intermediary between Masri and AQ Central. The letter was found on Abu Nizar’s person.

  • Leadership: Masri too isolated to keep watch of his operatives. Zawahiri questions Masri’s ability to lead AQI.
  • Poor Communication with AQ Central: Zawahiri concerned that he is not getting regular updates on Iraq. He is also not receiving regular communication from Masri.
  • Poor Recruits: Dissatisfied with poor quality of recruits for ops in Iraq
  • ISI’s Legitimacy: Questions manner in which the Islamic State of Iraq was established
  • ISI’s Blatant Propaganda: Unhappy that ISI is repackaging old footage of operations and claiming the ops are new. Also unhappy that ISI takes credit for ops carried out by other terror groups, like Islamic Jihad. Zawahiri writes: “The media policy for the Islamic State is using exaggeration, to the extent of lying.”

Zawahiri letter to Abu `Umar al-Baghdadi, March 2008

  • Relations b/n Zawahiri & Bin Laden: Zawahiri passing along advice from Bin Laden.
  • Offer of Assistance: Zawahiri asks what ISI needs to be victorious.

We know from an earlier set of captured documents reviewed by a Washington Post reporter that Masri went to Afghanistan this summer to speak with AQ leadership. From the tone of Zawahiri’s letter, it might have been a trip to the woodshed.

This is at least the second time that captured AQI documents have been given to CNN. But in both cases, the original documents have not been released for general scrutiny. If the people releasing them hope their contents will demoralize al-Qaeda supporters around the world, it would help to release the documents to the general public soon after the news stories based on them are published. Despite all the attention paid to Jihadi visual media, Jihadis themselves love texts.

Update: Bill Roggio at Long Wars Journal was given the documents by MNFI and has a more extensive summary of their content. He also says that the documents will be made available shortly on the Foundation for the Defense of Democracy’s website. The documents are now up and I’ll post a more detailed summary once I’ve read them.

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