ji·had·ica

The increasing extremism within the Islamic State

Tore Hamming November 19, 2016

This is the fifth Q&A of the interview series with Ahmed Al Hamdan (@a7taker), a Jihadi-Salafi analyst and author of “Methodological Difference Between ISIS and Al Qaida“. Al Hamdan was a former friend of Turki bin Ali, and a student of Shaykh Abu Muhammad Al Maqdisi under whom he studied and was given Ijazah, becoming one of his official students. Also, Shaykh Abu Qatada al Filistini wrote an introduction for his book when it was published in the Arabic language. The interview series contains contains five themes in total and will all be published on Jihadica.com. You can find the first Q&A here, the second here, the third here and the fourth here. This is the fifth and final part.

Tore Hamming:

A recent interesting development is the dismissal of Turki al-Binali from the IS Sharia Council [still not confirmed] allegedly due to his ‘moderate’ view on the ‘excuse of ignorance’ and Takfir al-Adhir. This could be interpreted as a defeat of the Bin’ali trend within IS and a victory for the so-called Hazimis (followers of Ahmed al-Hazimi). How do you interpret this development?

Ahmed Al Hamdan:

Extremism in Takfeer is the filthy germ which is found in every Jihadi group because of ignorance and impulsiveness and due to feeling oppressed and other such reasons. However, each group deals with this disease in different ways. There are those who take a gradual approach in dealing with it in which those who have extremism are made to undergo Shariah courses like what happened with a group of youth in Waziristan. The officials of Al Qaeda put them under a Shariah course to correct their thinking. (1) Or it would be by expulsion from the group like what happened when Shaykh Abu Mus’ab az-Zarqawi expelled a coordinator who made it a condition that a person should make Takfeer on the Saudi scholars like Bin Baz and Ibn Uthaymeen in order to be sent to Iraq for Jihad (2). But there are also groups who do not immediately deal with this disease or even try to treat it, and so it takes root and spreads inside the group, and then suddenly you see its leaders coming under pressure from a lobby of the extremists, and they get compelled to adopt their ideology, or they revolt against it as had happened with the GIA in Algeria when the group with Zaytouni carried out a coup against the leadership and took control of the group and then imposed their ideology on the group as a whole (3).

ISIS is amongst those groups that did not deal with this extremism from the beginning, and so it gradually spread within its ranks. I guess, without me being absolutely sure, that the leadership felt confused in front of its soldiers who used to exaggerate in Takfeer, and they were afraid to appear weak in front of them, and so they tried to get along with them so that they may prevent them from going further to the point of making Takfeer upon themselves, so that the issue will not aggravate soon to a situation of internal fighting.

  1. What prompts me to say this are several things amongst which are: They espoused certain matters relating to Takfeer and then suddenly they began to say that those who espoused this are deviated!
  2. What was stated by Abu Yazin Ash Shami – a member of the Shura council of Ahrar ash Sham – in the debate which took place between him and Abu Muhammad Al Adnani and a group of Shariah officials in ISIS after announcing their state in Sham, when one of those who were present there mentioned that we have become forced to be defensive and are under pressure from our soldiers after Sheikh Al-Zawahiri began to address Morsi with the title “Doctor” Morsi! So they are attacking and we are defending (4).

So it is clear that this group ISIS is trying to silence all of its soldiers who oppose them who are accusing them of being weak. Thus, their policies stemmed from reactions due to the behavior of these soldiers, and they confronted extremism with a counter-extremism.

However, before we speak about the issue of Takfeer on the ‘Aadhir’ we must clarify the concept, which states ‘There is no excuse for ignorance in the issue of major Shirk’.

Shaykh Muhammad ibn Abdul Wahhab explained the writings of some of the scholars before him saying that a Muslim who falls into major Shirk is not excused due to ignorance or misinterpretation. In fact, he is only excused in one case only and that is when he is compelled or really forced by the enemies. For example:

If I prostrate to a grave and supplicate to the dead person that is in the grave and I say to the dead person “oh Ali, make my matters easy for me and help me.”

From amongst the acts of worship which should be for Allah alone is prostration and supplication for needs which no one except Allah is capable of fulfilling. So when you stand and prostrate to other than Allah, this means that you have made someone else a partner with Allah in a matter that should not be made for anyone except for Allah alone.

So then now you have fallen into Shirk (by associating partners with Allah).

And if I am ignorant that this action is Shirk (associating partners to Allah), will Shaykh Muhammad ibn Abdul Wahhab excuse me for this ignorance? The answer is no. And if I did this due to a misinterpretation thinking that this person is an intermediary between me and Allah, will Shaykh Muhammad ibn Abdul Wahhab excuse me for this misinterpretation?  The answer is no.

But he will excuse me if a group of people came and threatened me with weapons and they were serious in their threats and I was unable to escape from them, and they said to me “prostrate to this grave or else we will kill you”. So here it is allowed to prostrate as long as you hate to do this action. And this is the only case in which I will be excused by Shaykh Muhammad ibn Abdul Wahhab.

But why will I not be excused in the first two cases? It is because Allah has warned from Shirk in a very clear manner in the Quran in verses which are easily understandable. So whichever person the Quran has reached, he has received the Hujjah (clear message) and it is not necessary to further clarify it for him. So based upon this, whoever the Quran has reached, he has received the Hujjah (the clear message).

So the matter of making Takfeer on a Muslim if he commits major Shirk is a matter which was agreed upon by the Salafi school (or as known in the west as the Wahhabis) generation after generation. It was only after the establishment of the third Saudi state (the current one) that this matter got reviewed again, and now we find different points of view (5). Despite that, some Saudi official religious figures still support this juristic view. For example:

  • the member of the committee of the senior scholars (Kibaar ul Ulama), Dr. Saalih al Fawzan, who has written an introduction to two books ‘Daabit Takfeer al Mu’ayyan’ and ‘Aarid al Jahl’ by Shaykh Rashid Abul Alaa, which are amongst the books which are being circulated in the Saudi prisons.
  • And also the member of the ‘presidency of scientific research, Fatwas, propagation and guidance’ (Riaasath al Buhooth al Ilmiyya wal Iftaa wa Da’wah wal Irshad), Shaykh Ibn Jibreen when he wrote an introduction to the book “Al Udhr Bil Jahl Tahta al Mihjar Ash Shari’e” by Shaykh Mad’hat al Farraj which is also one of the books circulated in the Saudi prisons.

So the Salafi schools and trends even if they conflict in some matters, they however are in agreement in the others.

But if every group and lobby within ISIS adopts this position of not excusing the ignorant person in the matters of major Shirk, then what is the problem? The disagreement is in one issue only, and it has a relation to the legitimacy of ISIS and its leader. It is the issue of Takfeer ul Aadhir (making Takfeer on the one who excuses the ignorant) and a series of chain Takfeer based on this.

Let us give an example: “Sulayman” does an act of Shirk and so he is a Mushrik Kaafir according to all these groups with no disagreement. However, “Ahmed” does not make Takfeer on this “Sulayman” because of some doubt he has in this matter. Here they get divided into two groups – The group with Turki Bin’ali says that Ahmed does not become a Kaafir except after clarifying the matter to him regarding Sulayman’s action of Shirk and the doubts have been removed and the matter has been explained to him. (This act of clarifying is known as providing the Hujjah).

So Turki Bin’ali says about the person who does not make Takfeer on a Mushrik or a Kaafir: “As for the one to whom it has become clear through evidences from the Sharia about the Kufr (disbelief) of a person and then he still did not make Takfeer on him, he is a Kaafir” (6). So it also becomes understood from this statement that the one to whom it has not become clear, it is not allowed to make Takfeer on him. The Hazimi group would immediately make Takfeer on Ahmed without any need to clarify the matter to him and remove the doubts. In fact, they even make Takfeer on the one who does not make Takfeer on him!!

The Shariah official of ‘the Islamic state’ in Yemen, Abu Bilal al Harbi who was one of those who had previously been close to al-Hazimi said “We are free from his latest Fitna (ordeal) which is to make Takfeer on the Aadhir (the excuser) and we believe that the one who excuses is not to be made Takfeer upon except after the matter has been made clear to him and the doubts have been removed. I asked al-Hazimi about chain Takfeer and he said it goes up to the third person (i.e. Takfeer is made till the third person in the series of the one who excuses the one who excuses the one who excuses the one who commits Shirk – i.e. three people in the chain of excusers) and I asked him for the evidence that it is made till the third person only and he gave me no evidence for that” (7).

How does this disagreement affect the legitimacy of ISIS and its leader?

– The Shia are Mushrikeen and Kuffar by the agreement of these people.

– Shaykh Ayman al Zawahiri does not make Takfeer on all the Shia. He excuses their general masses and because of this he himself is a Kaafir Mushrik according to the Hazimi wing.

– Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi addressed al Zawahiri previously saying “May Allah protect him” and as “the Shaykh the Mujahid”, and this means that he does not make Takfeer on him.

– So then he (Baghdadi) himself is a Kaafir..!

And if the leader is a Kaafir then it is not an Islamic state..!!

The second problem is that amongst many who do not speak the Arabic language and who speak in Russian and English, there is a matter that is spreading amongst them gradually, and appears to be taking root in them. And that is the issue of the Takfeer on the Aadhir (on the excuser). ISIS has been spreading their propaganda strongly in these two languages and also amongst many who come to them especially those who speak Russian who have engrossed themselves deeply into this innovation of making Takfeer on the Aadhir. And the ranks of these people are gradually growing stronger inside ISIS due to many people who have this belief entering ISIS. And they are divided into three groups:

  1. The first group is of those who have fought against ISIS (8).
  2. The second are those who have disassociated from ISIS and are trying to split from it (9).
  3. And a (third) group that is still within its ranks and spreading these thoughts.

Previously ISIS used a technique of eliminating the leaders of these people (10), but now it has gone out of control and these people who make Takfeer on the Aadhir have increased in large numbers, and it is difficult to deal with them all using the same method which was previously used when they were only a few.

Now we will deal with the final point, which is the statement attributed to ISIS regarding the issue of the Aadhir “the excuser” (11). The reality is that this statement does not agree with the bases of those who make Takfeer on the Aadhir, rather there are radical differences, such as:

  • In the first page it demonstrated the mistake in the arguments of those who make Takfeer on the Aadhir since those who make Takfeer on the Aadhir say that the Aadhir becomes a Mushrik by not making Takfeer on the one who does an act of Shirk, whereas the statement says that this argument is wrong because we don’t say that the one who does Shirk and the one who does not do it are equal, and this argument will necessarily lead to chain Takfeer.
  • In the second page ISIS forbade the use of certain terms such as “the foundation” and “necessary implications” in the meaning of “there is no God but Allah” and “Kufr bi Taghut” and the term “Takfeer on the Aadhir” whereas these terms are the central themes of those who propagate Takfeer on the Aadhir..!
  • And in the third page it says that the issue of Takfeer on the Aadhir is an issue which changes depending on the circumstances and it is not always the same. Sometimes the person who doesn’t make Takfeer on the Mushrik does not become a Kaafir because the matter is unclear and ignorance is widespread and propagation is weak and doubts are widespread. So here it is necessary to clarify the matter (i.e. provide the Hujjah), and if he still abstains from making Takfeer after the matter has been clarified then he will become a Kaafir. This is contrary to the beliefs of those who make Takfeer on the Aadhir who do not accept these kinds of excuses which can prevent Takfeer. Rather, they make Takfeer even on the one who abstains from Takfeer even at a time when ignorance is widespread, propagation is weak and doubts are common.
  • Also, in the third page, they said that there is an exception which is during a situation in which there is an Islamic state which preaches Tawheed and renounces Shirk “like our state now” (as per their claim). So here there does not exist anything that can prevent Takfeer on the one who does not make Takfeer on the Mushrikeen, because the matter has become clear (in an Islamic state). Even though both the groups would reach the same conclusion here, the arguments taken from the Shariah by both the groups to view the matter, are different. ISIS applies this ruling inside their borders only, which would mean that this is not applicable to those outside ISIS, because there the voice of Islam is not loud enough or there does not exist an Islamic state which calls towards renouncing Shirk and towards Tawheed, as per their claim. So based upon this, this ruling applies only in areas under their control and does not extend to the rest of the lands. And this is contrary to the arguments of those who make Takfeer on the Aadhir, who as we have stated in the previous point do not give any consideration to such differences in circumstances.
  • However, in the fourth page they used flexible terms which can take many meanings. They say in it that it is necessary for the preacher in the Islamic State to remove the doubts in abstaining from Takfeer on the Mushrikeen, but in the previous page they say that this is a clear and evident matter! So I do not know how this matter can be clarified to the people when it is already a clear matter! As if they are still dealing with it as if it is an unclear matter!!!

So ISIS has two solutions, and each one is equally difficult.

To formally adopt the belief of making Takfeer on the Aadhir in the form put forward by those who make Takfeer on the Aadhir. And by that they will have given to their opponents in the other Islamic groups such as Al Qaida the proof that they are extremists, who have no connection to the Jihadi methodology and its previous Shaykhs, in a clearer manner than before. This will weaken their propaganda amongst their supporters abroad. Or be silent or oppose this thinking, which will increase the numbers within its ranks by new members joining them or by being convinced of it, who will then become an obstacle for them, destroying them from the inside, whether they refrain from fighting or they fight against ISIS themselves for not adopting their view.

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Footnotes:

(1) – In fact Shaykh Usama Bin Ladin used to prohibit speaking about making Takfeer on the common soldiers. He said, “In an authentic Hadeeth from our Prophet, may prayers and peace be upon him, he said “If a person makes Takfeer on his brother, then one of them would definitely become a Kaafir”. If the one who has been called a Kaafir is indeed a Kaafir then it is over, and he is a Kaafir. But if he was not a Kaafir then it returns to the one who said it (on the one who made Takfeer). So this is a very, very, very severe warning against getting involved in this issue, especially in regards to Takfeer on a specific individual. So fear Allah, glory be to Him, and beware, and again beware…! Making Takfeer on the people is a very great sin, and from amongst the very major sins. So safeguard your tongues. And when we speak, if the speaker is from the people of knowledge and knows the rules of Takfeer, there is no problem if he speaks about this and clarifies it to his brothers, like when sometimes some people commit nullifiers of Islam. So it is detailed and sensitive issue. Sometimes a person may do an act of Kufr but he will still not be a Kaafir due to his ignorance or due to some compulsion. These are detailed issues and it is not easy for the brothers in general to learn it or specialize in it. But we normally speak on matters in general. So fear Allah and stay away from this matter, and busy yourselves by remembering Allah a lot and supplicating to Him and by acknowledging the blessings of Allah and being grateful for these blessings, until we meet Allah while He is pleased with us. So before you speak, think about what will be the consequences of this statement, and strive hard in obeying Allah and in Jihad for the sake of Allah. And fear Allah in those matters in which you do not have a deep knowledge. And to fear Allah means you should not boldly issue Fatwas. [“Faith defeats arrogance” at 58:00 minutes, by As Sahaab Media foundation]

The former Mujahid in Afghanistan and the ex-detainee in Guantanamo, Waleed Muhammad Al Haajj, said on his Twitter page: “The commander Shaykh Usama Bin Ladin, may Allah have mercy upon him, gathered all the Mujahideen at the Farooq military camp leaving only the guards at the gate when he had heard that some of the Mujahideen at the camp had made their main concern to say that such and such a person is a Kaafir and such and such a person is an apostate. So he gathered them together and said “Oh my sons, you came here to train and prepare, so do not concern yourselves with Takfeer, and leave it to the scholars”.

Links to the tweets:- (1 – 2)

(2) – A member of the Shariah committee of Al Qaeda in Iraq, Maysarah al Ghareeb said: “I met a brother from Sham who had recently entered Iraq. He told me about an incident that occurred to him, which in brief was that prior to his entry into Iraq he had met a brother who came from the Arabian Peninsula, at one of the guest houses. And while they were eating, the coordinator asked the brothers about their beliefs regarding Bin Baz and Ibn Uthaymeen, and it became clear to him that the brother from the Peninsula did not make Takfeer on them. So this host was surprised at that and he rebuked the brother, telling him that Shaykh Abu Mus’ab makes Takfeer on them both and that the one who does not make Takfeer on them will not enter the land of Jihad. At that, the brother asked in amazement “So you are stopping me from entering Iraq?” and the host said “Yes”, and he did what he threatened him of doing and he sent him back to where he had come from. But the brother who spoke to me was afraid and he did not say his opinion regarding the matter due to his fear that he also will be prevented from entering the land of Jihad and Ribat. I immediately raised the case to our Shaykh (Zarqawi), may Allah have mercy on him, especially since he had entrusted me to tell him everything that was happening in the field due to his fear that his followers may not be able to reach him because of him remaining hidden for the sake of security. So he became very much angry and threatened the one who attributed an opinion to him which he did not believe in, and ordered his deputy to investigate this matter and if it was found to be true, then to expel the host from the group. Then the Shaykh told me “It is true that I consider them as having misled the Ummah by their Fatwas, but I do not make Takfeer on them. By Allah, even if the brother from the Peninsula does not make Takfeer on (King) Fahad, I would still not prevent him from Jihad. Many have entered Iraq who do not make Takfeer on the Saudi government.” [Al Zarqawi as I knew him” –3/6 released by Al Furqan Foundation]”

(3) – Shaykh Atiyatullah who was at that time in Algeria spoke on the details of a coup led by Jamaal Zaytouni (Abu Abdur Rahmaan Ameen) against the leadership of the group by putting pressure on the media official to issue a statement under the name of the Shura council stating that the previous leader had been removed and Zaytouni has been appointed in his place and he spread it quickly to the battalions and to the brigades for the matter to become firmly established. Then he met with the actual leader and the Shura council and refused to step down saying “what will decide between me and you is killing”. So they stepped down and left their leadership to him to prevent bloodshed. (Refer to the book: “The Algerian experience”, by Atiyatullah, P.16)

(4) – Refer to “The details of the debate with the group ISIS” by Shaykh Abu Yazen ash Shami, with comments by the previous head of the Shariah office in Ahrar ash Sham, Shaykh Abu Muhammad as Saadiq P.6

(5) – From those major scholars during the period of the third Saudi State who adopted a somewhat different view are: Ibn As-Sa’adi who wrote on that in (Fataawa as-Sa’adi, P.447) and Ibn Uthaymeen in (Sharh Kashf Shubuhaat, P.37)

(6)– “Al Kawkab Ad-Durrie Al Muneer”, p.11, Sharh Nawaaqid Al Islam Al Ashrah, lesson 2 (50:00), Tawheed broadcast in the city of Sirte, 3rd August 2013

(7) – The letter: “Al Hazmi from a close look”, p.5, 5th August, 2014

(8) – For example Abu Mu’az al Aasmi, one of the former soldiers of ISIS who were imprisoned previously in the prison of Raqqa and fled after the US bombed it, wrote an article on 3rd October 2016 entitled “The reality of the clash at Aleppo and the cowardice of the soldiers of Al Baghdadi, the Taghut of Shaam”, and in it he mentioned about a fight that took place between this group and Baghdadi’s group in the city of Al Baab and then at a farm between Al Raii and Jarablus.

(9) – Al Aasmi also stated in the above mentioned article that “After Allah guided a group of Muhajireen brothers towards Tawheed in the city of Al Baab, in Aleppo, the security apparatus of the ‘Idols’ State’ began to plot against them after they saw that the call towards Tawheed had reached everyone and the one who has not been guided towards it would leave fighting until he gets clarification and searches for the truth”.

(10) – On 16th August 2014 a statement was published entitled “Aiding the imprisoned brothers in the Kaafirs’ Jahmiyyah State” in which it was stated that these:- “(Abu Ja’far al Hattaab, Abu Mus’ab At-Tunisi, Abu Usayd al Maghribi, Abul Hawraa al Jazaairi, Abu Khalid Ash-Sharqi, Abu Abdullah al Maghribi and Abu Umar al Kuwaiti) have been arrested by ISIS for making Takfeer on the Aadhir, and since the past two years their fate has been unknown, and it is likely they have been executed.”

(11) – It is the statement number 155, issued by Al Maktab al Maqreezi Li Mutaaba’ah Ad-Dawaween Ash-Shariea”, on 25th May 2016.

Tore Hamming:

Even in Jihadi circles the issue of takfeer [excommunication] is a delicate matter. Scholars and Jihadi leaders, including Usama bin Laden and Abu Yahya al-Libi, have continuously emphasised that takfeer should be applied extremely cautiously as it is a complicated matter that should be left for the knowledgeable people only to decide upon.

The use of takfeer is probably the main issue causing fragmentation between Sunni Jihadi groups, both now and in the previous decades. After the Jalalabad defeat in 1989, proponents of a more extensive use of takfeer started to appear, especially within the Algerian community, and it developed within the Groupe Islamique Armé in Algeria in the 1990s resulting in severe conflict between Jihadi groups and individuals.

I have myself described the disagreement within the Islamic State in a post here on Jihadica (See article), but due to the complexity of the matter, I have found myself confused on a regular basis trying to understand the Islamic State position on takfeer (and takfeer on the excuser). Ahmad Al Hamdan does a good job explaining the problem the Islamic State is facing internally as it seeks to avoid extremism in takfeer while, at the same time, managing its followers with an extreme on takfeer. Giving in to the extremists within its ranks could lead to self-destruction as prophesised by Nelly Lahoud.

Fatwa on the Permissibility of Killing an Ambassador

Joas Wagemakers September 21, 2012

I have to admit that it makes me feel rather uneasy choosing a title like this and writing a post about last week’s death of four staff members of the American embassy in Libya, including the ambassador himself, Christopher Stevens. Yesterday, however, a fatwa was published on the permissibility of killing ambassadors that I think Jihadica readers should know about.

Three questions

The fatwa, published by Abu l-Mundhir al-Shinqiti, is in response to three different questions by three different people. The first question deals with the permissibility of killing an ambassador who doesn’t approve of insults against Islam and has a positive attitude towards Muslims. For those readers thinking this is a direct reference to ambassador Stevens, who was apparently known for his affection for the Libyan people, think again. The person asking the question adds that he’s not talking about the American ambassador since “targeting American embassies in all corners of the world is permissible without them having insulted the Prophet”.

The second questioner wants to know if the post of ambassador can be compared with that of “messenger” (rasul), a job specified in Islamic law that is given to a representative of a non-Muslim country to bring a message to the rulers of the abode of Islam (dar al-Islam). Such a person was given some sort of aman (temporary protection) under Islamic law so that he could do his job safely. If there is indeed a parallel between a messenger and an ambassador, this could mean the latter is not allowed to be killed.

The third question is related to the second since it deals with the concept of ‘ahd (covenant). In the course of Islamic history, Muslim scholars have come up with ways to avoid calling all non-Muslim countries dar al-harb (the abode of war; i.e., those countries with which the Muslims are at least nominally at war). One of the alternatives they chose was dar al-‘ahd (the abode of the covenant), denoting countries with which the Muslim empire has a treaty. Such countries, Islamic jurists held,  should not be attacked since their treaty with the Muslims forbade fighting between them. Some modern scholars have argued that a visa can be seen as a modern equivalent of such a covenant or treaty and that persons who hold a visa or are citizens of a non-Muslim country are not allowed to fight these countries. Similarly, this questioner wants to know whether the ambassador’s legal status in Libya should have protected him from being attacked.

Messenger or ambassador?

While al-Shinqiti refers to an earlier fatwa of his for the third question, he does answer the first two questions. He denies the existence of any direct references to ambassadors in the sacred texts and also disagrees that ambassadors are the modern-day equivalents of the messengers dealt with in Islamic law. To prove his point, al-Shinqiti lists three differences between the two jobs. Firstly, an ambassador is a representative of a state that has sent him to do a job, while a messenger is simply a person sent with a message and nothing more.

Secondly, and closely related to the first argument, an ambassador has a whole range of tasks that his government sets for him, which depend on the relationship between the two countries. A messenger, by contrast, only brings a message and that’s it, al-Shinqiti states.

Thirdly, an ambassador is only dispatched to a country with which his own country has friendly relations. If these relations sour, ambassadors are called home. Messengers, on the other hand, could be sent to another country no matter what its relations with Muslims were like – peaceful, hostile or subject to a truce – and are therefore incomparable to ambassadors.

War on Islam

Because of the supposed differences between messengers and ambassadors, al-Shinqiti rejects any parallels between them and thus dismisses the argument that non-Muslim ambassadors cannot be killed by Muslims. Al-Shinqiti seems to believe, however, that this whole question of whether ambassadors are modern-day messengers is entirely beside the point with regard to ambassador Stevens.

In recent days, I have explained several times to people my conviction that the riots currently going on in the Middle East should be seen in the broader context of a) the dire political and socio-economic situation many Arabs are in; and, especially, b) the alleged war on Islam that is supposedly being waged by Western countries, in which the film “Innocence of Muslims” is perceived by many as simply the latest attack. I believe that the attacks on the American embassies have very little to do with Muslims’ rejection of images of the Prophet Muhammad as such, as some media would have us believe, but should be ascribed to the more specific factors mentioned by Will within the context mentioned above. In other words, if the Middle East had been a free and nice place to live and relations with America had been strong and widely supported by the people, I believe the reception of this film would have been entirely different.

The importance of this context is underlined by al-Shinqiti’s fatwa, which states that ambassadors are not only incomparable to messengers, but even if they were, it wouldn’t apply to the American ambassador. This is because the inadmissibility of killing messengers depends on them not being spies whose presence and jobs are damaging to Muslims. American embassies, al-Shinqiti claims, are not like other embassies. The Americans try to increase their influence in Muslim countries, wage war on Islam and spread “the democratic religion”, he contends, and all of this is planned from inside the American embassies.

There is no legitimate need for the presence of American embassies in Muslim countries, al-Shinqiti believes. On the contrary, he states, relations with the United States should be severed. Al-Shinqiti claims America has killed more Muslims than Israel and while Muslim states are always arguing for cutting ties with the latter, they don’t do the same with the former and, in fact, even assist the United States in its war on Islam. American embassies are expressions of a country that is at war with Islam and, he maintains, should be treated as such.

The Film

Not only does it not make any difference whether the American ambassador can be seen as a messenger or not; al-Shinqiti also states that whether such a person agrees or disagrees with the film “The Innocence of Muslims” is irrelevant since the country as a whole is responsible for that. American ambassadors, even if they disagree with the film, do agree with the “killing of Muslims in Iraq and Afghanistan that their government is engaged in”, with “the occupation of the lands of Islam” and with “the plundering of the revolutions of the Muslim countries”.

Interestingly, al-Shinqiti states that American embassies are not the biggest insult to the Prophet. That role is ascribed by him to “the deserting opportunists who reject violence and want to help the Prophet with words, not deeds, like [the famous Egyptian Muslim scholar Yusuf] al-Qaradawi and [former head of the IAEA Mohammed] El Baradei and others”.

“Killing all American ambassadors and destroying all American embassies won’t quench our thirst for those who have attacked the sanctity of our Prophet”, al-Shinqiti states. Muslims should therefore not show sympathy for the American ambassador and the other diplomats killed in Libya, as many did, and neither should they call for non-violence, as other Muslim scholars have done. Instead, al-Shinqiti insists, the proper response to the film is “to attack [American] interests, to attack their security, to attack their existence and to attack their economy because this is the language they understand”.

Just so you know.

A Note on Usama Bin Ladin’s 1998 Declaration of War: al-Kisa’i vs. al-Kasani

Sayeed Rahman February 24, 2011

[Editor’s note: I am very pleased to introduce a new guest contributor, Sayeed Rahman, a Yale PhD and a fellow with the Truman National Security Project.]

A number of translations analyze and annotate Usama Bin Ladin’s 1998 statement declaring war against the United States and her allies (see here, here, here, here and here). The original Arabic source for this declaration is the February 23, 1998 edition of the London based newspaper al-Quds al-`Arabi.  After citing Qur’anic verses and hadith to support the legitimacy of his call to arms, Bin Ladin and the other signatories cite four well-known post-formative Sunni Muslim jurists to bolster their claim that jihad is an individual duty (fard al-`ayn) when Muslim countries are attacked.  Among the scholars cited is an individual named “al-Kisa’i” and his work al-Bada’i`.  The identification of this al-Kisa’i has eluded American translators.  For reasons I discuss below, I believe this individual to be the Hanafi jurist `Abu Bakr Ibn Mas`ud al-Kasani (d. 1191) and the work referred to is his multi-volume legal compendium Bada’i` al-sana’i` fi tartib al-shara’i`.  This difficulty in identification goes back to the original al-Quds al-`Arabi article in which al-Kasani’s name is misspelled “al-Kisa’i.”  The omission of an alif and mistyping a hamza for a nun plausibly explain this error.    

Among the American translators of this work, Bruce Lawrence, in his reader on Bin Ladin (Messages to the World, p. 60) notes that “al-Kisa’i wrote his book in the 11th century, but very little is known about him outside of his work, which tells numerous stories from the time of the Prophet.”  Although he does not explicitly say so, it appears that Lawrence believes this al-Kisa’i to be the author of the Qisas al-anbiya’ (Tales of the Prophets), a collection of tales about prophets prior to Islam’s messenger, Muhammad.  When this al-Kisa’i lived is not known, but a common opinion holds that he composed the Qisas by 1200.  John Kelsay, in his chapter “Arguments Concerning Resistance in Contemporary Islam,” gives this al-Kisa’i a death date of 805 but offers no further information about him (Ethics of War, p. 69).  Kelsay’s assignment of 805 as his death date implies that he believes this al-Kisa’i is the Qur’an reciter and grammarian Abu al-Hasan `Ali al-Kisa’i (d. 805).  Raymond Ibrahim’s Al Qaeda Reader, which provides a glossary of terms and people mentioned in it, does not attempt to identify al-Kisa’i or his work.  Finally, the translation of this declaration in Al Qaeda in Its Own Words (p. 54) does identify al-Kasani as I have, but it provides no basis for its identification and its variance with those of the aforementioned authors. 

Can a definitive identification of this al-Kasani be made?  Lawrence’s identification of al-Kisa’i as the eleventh-century author of the Qisas and Kelsay’s identification of al-Kisa’i as a grammarian who died in 805 are both untenable for the following reasons:  al-Kasani’s Bada’i` treats individually obligatory jihad; his work was well-known to the signatories of this declaration; and finally, citing al-Kasani fits with the overall purpose of the 1998 declaration.

Al-Kasani’s Bada’i` has a long section explaining why jihad is generally a fard al-kifaya but ends with a short passage explaining when jihad becomes a fard al-`ayn (see 9:382 of the 2003 Dar al-Kutub al-`Ilmiyyah edition).  This indicates that al-Kasani is the author intended by the declaration and not al-Kisa’i.  Moreover, al-Kasani and his Bada’i` would have been familiar to the signatories of this declaration.  Abdullah Azzam (d. 1989), whose writings were certainly well-known to Bin Ladin and al-Zawahiri, cites al-Kasani’s Bada’i` in support of the obligation of individual jihad in a number of his works, and later writings by members of al-Qaida also cite al-Kasani’s Bada’i` for the same purpose.

Finally, it is clear that in this declaration Bin Ladin and other signatories are attempting to garner support for their position among Sunni Muslims worldwide by citing famous post-formative Sunni jurists.  The first is the well-known Hanbali jurist Ibn Qudamah (d. 1223) and his multi-volume legal work al-Mughni.  The second is al-Kasani and his work al-Bada’i`.  The third jurist noted is the Maliki jurist al-Qurtubi (d. 1273); the authors of the declaration claim that his legal exegesis of the Qur’an (tafsirihi), the famous Ahkam al-Qur’an, supports their position.  The fourth and final jurist cited is Ibn Taymiyyah (d. 1328), another Hanbali jurist, who is referred to by the honorific Shaykh al-Islam.  The text of the declaration provides a quote from Ibn Taymiyyah and cites “his selections” (wa-naqala dhalika…fi ikhityaratihi) as the source for this quote.  This is likely a reference to a selection of Ibn Taymiyyah’s legal positions available under variations of the title al-Ikhtiyarat compiled by a later Hanbali scholar named Abu al-Hasan `Ali al-Ba`li (d. 1400).  The function of citing these Sunni jurists is undoubtedly to appeal to all Sunni Muslims and to justify the reasoning of the signatories.  The authors of the declaration would gain no support for their position by citing non-jurists such as al-Kisa’i the compiler of stories or al-Kisa’i the grammarian.

A greater mystery than al-Kasani’s identity remains.  In an appeal to the entire Sunni Muslim world through the citation of esteemed Sunni jurists, why are representatives of only three of the four Sunni schools mentioned?  Two Hanbali scholars, a Maliki, and a Hanafi are referenced.  Why is there no mention of a Shafi`i jurist?  Without a doubt, the signatories of this statement knew the works of Shafi`i jurists that could be presented in support of their position.  That they neglected to cite even one such jurist might indicate that the declaration was rushed, a possibility that would shed light on the misspelling of al-Kasani’s name as well.  

 

Qaradawi on Jihad (3 of 3)

Nelly Lahoud October 28, 2009

Read part 1 and part 2

What does Youssef al-Qaradawi say about Jihad as an individual duty (fard ‘ayn), i.e., the kind of jihad that allows all Muslims, including women and minors, to take up jihad without seeking anyone’s permission?

This aspect is of particular interest for those of us interested in jihadi ideology. Jihadi ideologues believe that the classical defensive legal doctrine of jihad, i.e., jihad as an individual duty, applies today. In their minds, Muslims are being oppressed not just by ‘unbelievers’ but also by their own ‘apostate’ Muslim rulers. It is the Muslims’ duty (and right), they hold, to defend themselves against both.

That jihad today is an individual duty was pioneered by Muhammad ‘Abd al-Salam Faraj in his book al-Farida al-Gha’iba (The Neglected Duty [of Jihad]), it was later developed into a transnational agenda by ‘Abdallah ‘Azzam to mobilize Muslims to fight in Afghanistan and eventually translated into a global agenda by the leadership of al-Qa‘ida, most notably by Abu Mus‘ab al-Suri.

What is al-Qaradawi’s take on jihad as an individual duty?

According to the classical defensive legal doctrine of jihad, al-Qaradawi explains, if one part of the territory of Islam is invaded, all the inhabitants of this territory are bound to defend it. If they could not repel the invaders on their own, the duty falls on their neighboring Muslims; if the latter can’t repel the invaders, then the duty falls on the closest to them and so on, even if this eventually requires the support of fellow Muslims from the farthest corners of the earth.

Al-Qaradawi poses some sobering questions as to how this individual duty could be applied today: ‘should we make it incumbent upon Muslims from across the globe to move to the occupied territory?’, ‘how could all the merchants abandon their businesses?’, ‘how could life go on without all these people?’ If Muslims were to advocate such views, ‘we would effectively be seeking to interrupt life across all parts of the Islamic world … virtually advocating that most people should die so that the few may live.’ Such a suicidal attitude, he believes, is not in accordance with Islamic law or with rationality.

What’s to be done?

Al-Qaradawi believes that jihad as an individual duty entails that the responsibility of repelling the invaders is to be shouldered first and foremost by the inhabitants of the country that is invaded. They must do so following the authority of the state; in the event that the state is absent, then they must follow the authority of the group (jama‘a) to be chosen by influential and learned people (ahl al-hall wa-al-‘aqd). If the inhabitants of the invaded territory cannot on their own repel the attackers, the duty of the umma at large would be to assist them with all possible means. These include lending them financial and military aid, and if they are asked, sending them military personnel, especially military experts. Never, he asserts, should jihad be carried out under chaotic and unsupervised circumstances. Islam, he reminds his readers, commands Muslims to organize themselves at all times and to appoint leaders to oversee their affairs.

Notwithstanding the synthesis that al-Qaradawi offers his modern readers, some deeper issues remain unaddressed. Since al-Qaradawi appears to accept the legitimacy of the modern nation-state and international institutions such as the United Nations, what is the role of the faqih like himself when it comes to questions concerning war and peace? Should the faqih assume the role of a public intellectual whose duty is to offer advice to those in power but remain outside it, as many jurists did during the classical era?

Equally important, what is the role of other fuqaha’ on these issues? As it stands, al-Qaradawi appears to be implying that fiqh al-jihad, c’est moi. Surely, he doesn’t believe that he has the last word to say about jihad. At this stage though, he is not indicating how a deliberative process among jurists about contentious issues such as war and peace could come about.

More precisely, it would be useful to envisage a process that would allow jurists who espouse different and differing opinions, including those who sympathize with the jihadis, to advance their views independent of the state, have them debated with the aim of reaching consensus (ijma‘). Since such mechanisms are not in place, al-Qaradawi’s interpretation of jihad may not necessarily stem the tide of individualized jihad.

Qaradawi on Jihad (2 of 3)

Nelly Lahoud October 27, 2009

Read part 1

What does Youssef al-Qaradawi say about waging war against non-Muslims at least once a year as part of fard kifaya, a task some classical jurists believed was incumbent upon the ruler? Al-Qaradawi does not believe that the classical jurists reached a consensus on this matter.

Instead, he believes that their opinions were dictated by the circumstances of their time, namely ‘the relationship between the Islamic state and its neighbors that were constantly threatening it, especially Byzantium.’ Muslims then had to ‘engage in skirmishes along their borders every once and a while, to ensure the security of their borders and assert their presence.’

This, he believes is akin to ‘what scholars today call “preemptive war”, which they consider to be justifiable and lawful.’ (issue 7) Preemptive war is more controversial in international law than al-Qaradawi implies. Some Israeli and US military strategists though might agree with al-Qaradawi that preemptive war is lawful.

Though the modern (political science) reader might be forgiven to assume that al-Qaradawi, in part, shares some of the political values of the Realist school of thought – the school that emphasizes the security of the state over ethical and moral concerns – al-Qaradawi is nevertheless keen to add a moral dimension to the concept of offensive jihad in Islam. ‘What is it that Muslims seek to obtain through offensive jihad?’ He asks. ‘Is it a thirst for blood on the Muslims’ part, and an overwhelming desire to attack others? In other words: is jihad [nourished by] an oppressive power common to all empires across history, those which sought to swallow up everything around them’ (issue 25)?  The answer, he says, is a categorical ‘no’, and he devotes a section in which he argues that Islam and peace are one and the same.

However, al-Qaradawi laments that Islam ‘cannot prevent war’; that is why Islam commands its followers ‘to prepare for war’ so that they could be ready to fight their enemies when it is necessary for them to do so.The world has many Qabil(s) (Cain), he believes, and ‘is it possible’, he asks, ‘that all other people should take the same stand as his kind brother Habil (Abel)?’ That would not be sensible, in his mind. Instead ‘evil (sharr) must be repelled with evil’ (I suspect that al-Qaradawi inadvertently used the term ‘evil’ instead of ‘force’ (‘unf) in this context, for he must surely realize the implications of associating Islam and jihad with evil).

Thus, reminiscent of a Hobbesian view, al-Qaradawi believes that ‘reality reveals that life could not be made upright without a [coercive] power that would protect the truth, resist falsehood, impose justice, fight oppression and prevent the Cains from attacking the Abels of this world.’

In essence, the objective of war in Islam, he holds, is to repel attacks with force, whether such attacks are on the nation, its territory or its religion. Al-Qaradawi is keen to stress that it is the Muslims’ duty to repel attacks against the dhimmis (i.e., Christians and Jews), and also defend their rights to worship in their churches and synagogues. This, he believes, is because there is a mutual obligation between Muslims and dhimmis to defend each other (issue 27).

(to be continued)

Qaradawi on Jihad (1 of 3)

Nelly Lahoud October 26, 2009

(Editor’s note: I have the pleasure of introducing Nelly Lahoud, a political theorist working on Islamism. She has published several books and has a new one on jihadi ideology coming out next year. Nelly is on my wish list for guest bloggers, but she has not yet been able to join us for a more extended period of time. She has nevertheless taken the time to write the following piece for us. To my knowledge Nelly is the first scholar to have looked closely at the substance of Yusuf al-Qaradawi’s new book on Jihad).

Youssef al-Qaradawi’s recent book Fiqh al-Jihad (Jurisprudential Reasoning and Jihad), excerpts of which are available here, has received considerable attention in the Arabic press and for good reason.  Al-Qaradawi commands significant influence among Sunni Muslims in the Arab world and beyond, not least because he reaches a wider audience through his television shows on al-Jazeera (“Huda al-Islam” and “al-Shari‘a wa-al-Hayat”) and his two websites, one dedicated to his work, the other, Islamonline, designed to serve as a news service about the Muslim world, a religious guide to Muslims and a window to the Islamic faith and civilization to non-Muslims.

Controversies have not escaped al-Qaradawi: among those he has offended are Palestinians, Jews and Shi‘ites. Sometimes his statements generated controversies because he was misunderstood or misread; on other occasions, he might have purposely left his statements ambiguous perhaps to invite controversy.

In Fiqh al-Jihad, al-Qaradawi presents not just a synthesis of the legal opinions expounded by classical Muslim jurists on the issue of jihad, but also places them in the context of today’s reality, using modern political vocabulary to illustrate his points. In addition to addressing the Muslim community at large, including moderate and extremist political groups, al-Qaradawi explicitly states that he is keen for his book to reach a non-Muslim audience. More specifically, he wants his book to be translated so that military experts in the Pentagon can read it, he is keen to reach Muslim and non-Muslim public intellectuals, historians and politicians, Orientalists and those who promote inter-religious dialogue.

What is jihad then according to al-Qaradawi?

Building on the classical legal doctrine of jihad, al-Qaradawi distinguishes between offensive jihad (jihad al-talab) and defensive jihad (jihad al-daf‘). In the former case, jihad is to be considered as a communal duty (fard kifaya). This means that not all Muslims are required to take up jihad if enough of them volunteered to fight thus providing the desired security. In modern political realities, the concept of fard kifaya, according to al-Qaradawi, translates into ‘the umma possessing a military capacity armed with all the modern weapons that it requires … weapons that would compete with and even excel those of the enemies.’ The Muslim army should also spread its forces across any possible gaps or openings (land and sea) that might threaten its territory and people to keep the enemies in check, lest they consider attacking the Muslims (Issue 7, September 12, 2008).  This aspect, he explains, is intrinsic to the territorial sovereignty of the modern state and is a matter that all modern states agree upon.

(To be continued)

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