ji·had·ica

Abu al-Qassam: Zarqawi’s right-hand man who stayed loyal to al-Qaida

Tore Hamming November 20, 2017

Everywhere Abu Musab al-Zarqawi went, Abu al-Qassam was with him. Even to prison. Abu al-Qassam was al-Zarqawi’s childhood friend, later his companion and finally his deputy. After spending more than 10 years in Iranian captivity, he was released in March 2015, but despite the Islamic State claiming to be the heirs of al-Zarqawi, it is now with al-Qaida that Abu al-Qassam’s loyalty lies.

Originally from Ramallah, Abu al-Qassam grew up in Zarqa, just north of Jordan’s capital Amman. It was here, in one of the city’s mosques – most likely al-Hussein bin Ali Mosque – that he one day as a young man met Abu Musab al-Zarqawi, who eventually would become the founder of al-Qaida in Iraq, the Islamic State’s predecessor. The two would go on to become close, even family.

He was born as Khalid Mustafa Khalifa al-Aruri in 1967, but it was as Abu al-Qassam or Abu Ashraf that he eventually became known in Jihadi circles. Little is known about his early years and the information available is conflicting. One story is that he worked for a Saudi organization, the IIRO, in 1991 before returning to Zarqa a year later. Perhaps it was then that he stumbled upon al-Zarqawi, one year his senior and who was back from Afghanistan after his first battlefield experience. Another account is that he in fact joined al-Zarqawi in Afghanistan. In any case, from 1993 the two were inseparable.

Like al-Zarqawi, Abu al-Qassam was imprisoned in Jordan on 29 March 1994 until March 1999 (another account is that Abu al-Qassam was released early as there was not enough evidence against him) in the ‘Bay‘at al-Imam’ case, referring to the group al-Zarqawi had established upon his return together with his mentor Abu Muhammad al-Maqdisi. As soon as they were released, however, it was not long before the two young Jordanians left for Afghanistan for a second time.

Zarqawi’s companion, deputy and brother-in-law

Upon arrival in Afghanistan, al-Zarqawi was approached by the senior al-Qaida member Saif al-Adl, who saw a great potential in the Jordanian. Al-Adl immediately wanted to start cooperation with al-Zarqawi, through logistical assistance and funding, but al-Zarqawi needed time to think it over. He had to consult with Abu al-Qassam. Some days later, Abu al-Qassam and Abdul Hadi Daghlas, Zarqawi’s other close companion, gave their blessing to Saif al-Adl’s proposal and from then on al-Qaida started to finance and support al-Zarqawi’s camp in Herat in western Afghanistan.

It was in Afghanistan at the camp in Herat that Abu al-Qassam married al-Zarqawi’s sister and assisted his emir in establishing a small Jihadi community, a mini society, that would lay the foundation for what is today known as the Islamic State. Abu al-Qassam not only acted as al-Zarqawi’s deputy but was also a commander at the camp. The two were so close that al-Maqdisi allegedly described Abu al-Qassam as al-Zarqawi’s shadow – everywhere he went, Abu al-Qassam went too.

The strikes against the US on 9/11 would eventually change that, however. In the aftermath of the attack, al-Zarqawi and his entourage were forced to flee in November 2001 as it became impossible to remain at the camp after the US invasion. But first the Jordanians had to go on a strenuous three-day trip to Kandahar to attend a meeting of high-ranking Jihadis that nearly cost their lives as the Americans bombed the building where the meeting was taking place. After intense battle in Kandahar and later in Tora Bora, al-Zarqawi’s group was forced to leave for Iran and it is likely that Abu al-Qassam was part of the group traveling to Iran at this point.

Whether Abu al-Qassam stayed on in Iran or followed al-Zarqawi to Iraqi Kurdistan in 2002 remains unknown, but it has been reported that he served as al-Zarqawi’s key liaison with Ansar al-Islam, the al-Qaida-affiliated group in Kurdistan that assisted with the relocation of al-Zarqawi’s group to Iraq. This work, however, probably took place in Iran and not in Kurdistan. Reportedly, Abu al-Qassam participated in an important meeting with people close to Mullah Krekar in August 2003 in Tehran, where it was agreed to set up training camps in Kurdistan. Interestingly, a Moroccan investigation into the March 2003 bombings in Casablanca claimed that Abu al-Qassam had helped finance the attack, thus indicating a role in the Iraq-based group’s external operations as well.

Abu Al Qassam

As is now well-known, the Iranian authorities were rather accommodating of Jihadi activities in their country and this was also the case with al-Zarqawi’s group, but for some reason this would suddenly change. Iranian police entered several hotels in Tehran, where al-Zarqawi’s people were known to reside, and it is likely that Abu al-Qassam was arrested as part of this crack down.

In Iranian prison, or house arrest, Abu al-Qassam would meet several familiar faces, among them Saif al-Adl, who had been responsible for the liaison between al-Qaida and al-Zarqawi’s group in Afghanistan. Several other senior al-Qaida figures and members of Usama bin Laden’s family were also in Iranian captivity.

Relocating to Syria

Abu al-Qassam spent approximately 12 years in prison before being released in March 2015 as part of a prisoner exchange deal. Besides Abu al-Qassam, four senior al-Qaida members were released, namely Abu al-Khayr al-Masri, Abu Muhammad al-Masri, Saif al-Adl and Sari Shihab. Initially there was doubt over the location of the five senior figures and even over how engaged they remained after so many years in prison. Al-Zarqawi’s death in 2006, while Abu al-Qassam was imprisoned, only raised questions regarding his dedication to Jihad. On several occasions, it was reported that the released al-Qaida senior members had relocated to Syria at the directive of Ayman al-Zawahiri to support Jabhat al-Nusra and the so-called Khorasan group. We now know that these reports were only partly true.

The first rumours surrounding Abu al-Qassam emerged in September 2015, saying that he had been chosen to lead a new al-Qaida group in Iraq (see here and here). This, however, was not correct and it is unlikely that Abu al-Qassam stayed long in Iraq if at all. Instead, we know that Abu al-Qassam relocated to northern Syria, but when exactly is unclear. A Jabhat al-Nusra supporter disclosed in September 2015 that a senior member released from Iranian house arrest had arrived in Syria on the orders to al-Zawahiri, but whether it was Abu al-Qassam or Abu al-Khayr is still a mystery.

Abu al-Qassam’s first appearance in Syria was reported in December 2015. This was at the same time as high-ranking Jabhat al-Nusra leaders Sami al-Uraydi and Iyad al-Tubaysi (aka Abu Julaybib) relocated from southern Syria to the north, possibly to meet up with Abu al-Qassam. According to al-Maqdisi, Abu al-Qassam joined the Coordination Committee in Syria (lajnat al-mutaba’a fi-l-Sham), which allegedly was responsible for the link between al-Qaida and its Syrian affiliate, although not under direct supervision of al-Qaida leader Ayman al-Zawahiri.

It would take some time before Abu al-Qassam himself would confirm his presence in Syria, but that he did in early 2017 in an eulogy for Abu al-Khayr, al-Qaida’s deputy and his longtime friend from their time in Iran. In his statement, Abu al-Qassam praises his fallen friend, extends his blessings to al-Zawahiri and promises to work to keep the Syrian Jihad on the right path.

Abu al-Qassam is arguably a man of action rather than of writing. His closeness to Zarqawi could testify to that, but we can also take Abu al-Qassam at his word. He begins several of his writings by saying that he is not at ease with a pen in his hand and unlike many of his Jihadi colleagues not a fan of writing on the internet. That said, since the beginning of 2017 – and corresponding with Abu al-Khayr’s death – Abu al-Qassam has become increasingly active.

In May, in a brief analysis of the situation in Syria authored together with his friend Sami al-Uraydi (who posts Abu al-Qassam’s statements on his Telegram channel), Abu al-Qassam outlined the role of Iran, Russia and Turkey in Syria, noting that Turkey is broadening its influence in Idlib and that the mujahideen needs to adapt to the situation. The best way of fighting the enemy, he claimed, is to initiate a guerilla war, which he defines as the next stage (al-marhala al-muqbila) in the struggle. Uraydi, also a Jordanian, added that the Jihadis in Syria are critically affected by the ongoing confusion, referring to the Jihadi infighting and the split with al-Qaida, and emphasizes that this has to be resolved immediately.

The following month, Abu al-Qassam was forced to his keyboard once again. The war of words between Hayat Tahrir al-Sham, previously known as Jabhat al-Nusra and Jabhat Fath al-Sham, and his good friend and senior ideologue Abu Muhammad al-Maqdisi were threatening the bond with al-Qaida sympathizers in Syria. Abu al-Qassam’s intervention, in which he argued that problems should be solved and not allowed to escalate and that al-Maqdisi should be respected despite one’s disagreement with him, was – as he promised Abu al-Khayr – an effort to safeguard al-Qaida’s Jihadi project in Syria.

Loyalty to al-Qaida

In early 2014, Abu al-Qassam was still imprisoned in Iran and could only witness the split between al-Qaida and the Islamic State and the ensuing fragmentation within the Jihadi environment from a distance. Ever since the rupture, the Islamic State has emphasized its ‘lineage’ from al-Zarqawi as a way to capitalize on his authority and legacy. According to the Islamic State itself, it is different from al-Qaida as it continued in the footsteps of its founder al-Zarqawi (and Usama bin Laden) while al-Qaida deviated after al-Zawahiri assumed control. Thus the Islamic State, and not al-Qaida, is the Zarqawist side in the intra-Jihadi civil war.

Is it surprising, then, that al-Zarqawi’s most loyal remaining companion chose to ally himself with al-Qaida and not the Islamic State after his release from prison? Initially it could be questioned whether Abu al-Qassam was still devoted to Jihad, and if so what group he remained loyal. This is no longer the case, however, as his recent involvement in the debate over the split between al-Qaida and its Syrian affiliate Hayat Tahrir al-Sham attests.

Both Abu al-Qassam’s own testimony and that of Sami al-Uraydi give the impression that he is indeed an active player on the Jihadi scene and that this loyalty is unequivocally with al-Qaida and Ayman al-Zawahiri. In his statement, Abu al-Qassam explains how he initially sanctioned Jabhat al-Nusra’s desire to split from al-Qaida, but later reversed after he became familiar with the position of two of al-Zawahiri’s deputies (Abu Muhammad al-Masri and Saif al-Adl). As is now well-known, Jabhat al-Nusra went ahead and separated from al-Qaida against the will of the group’s senior leaders. The testimonies provide valuable insights into the dealings with such issues within Jihadi groups and not least the role played by Abu al-Qassam, who participated in several of the meetings that were held prior to the decision.

Peace initiative

Of course, Abu al-Qassam’s closeness to al-Zarqawi and his later opposition to the Islamic State are not unique. Other people, such as Abu Julaybib, spent time in al-Zarqawi’s Herat camp and married one of al-Zarqawi’s sisters before eventually siding with Jabhat al-Nusra in its contest with the Islamic State. But the fact that Abu al-Qassam was Zarqawi’s very close friend and deputy, and now ranks as a senior al-Qaida member, can only be seen as a victory for al-Qaida.

While Abu al-Qassam’s exact role has not been revealed, it appears likely that he will try act as a unifying actor between the conflicting parties in the future. One recent example of such a role is his support to the scholarly peace initiative that was presented in late October, though so far this has produced no results.

 

Tore tweets at @torerhamming

Abu Ghaith and al-Qa’ida’s Dissident Faction in Iran

Vahid Brown March 11, 2013

With the recent arrest of Sulaiman Abu Ghaith (Abu Yusuf Sulayman Jasim Bu Ghayth), al-Qa’ida’s former spokesman and Bin Ladin’s son-in-law, there has been much speculation in the press about a group of senior al-Qa’ida figures who have spent much of the last decade in Iran. In this post I will revisit the writings of these men, all of whom appeared online in unusual circumstances at the end of 2010, and the light that their writings shed on the Iranian sojourn of this group of al-Qa’ida’s pre-9/11 senior leadership. Taken together, these sources suggest that these men constituted a dissident faction within al-Qa’ida, one which in recent years had become increasingly vocal in their criticism of Bin Ladin, Zawahiri, and the direction that the latter had taken al-Qa’ida since the September 11 attacks. It also emerges that Abu Ghaith, while not a member of this faction at the beginning of this period, had by 2010 joined this group in their efforts to correct the errors of al-Qa’ida’s ways.

In a 2007 study of al-Qa’ida’s leadership schisms, I discussed how disagreements over the advisability and religious permissibility of the 9/11 attacks had split the historical leadership of al-Qa’ida into two camps. Following the attacks and the American bombing campaign in Afghanistan in October of 2001, the pro-9/11 group, including Bin Ladin and Zawahiri, fled to Pakistan, while the anti-9/11 group ended up in Iran, where they were placed under house arrest by Iranian authorities. There were a couple of outliers to this explanation of the various trajectories of these leaders, however. Mustafa Abu al-Yazid (Shaykh Sa’id al-Masri) is described in the 9/11 Commission Report as having been among those opposed to 9/11, though he joined Bin Ladin and Zawahiri in Pakistan and eventually rose to the rank of commander of al-Qa’ida’s operations in Afghanistan and spokeman of the al-Qa’ida “General Command” before his death in a drone strike in Pakistan in May of 2010. The other outlier was Abu Ghaith, whose appearance in two famous videos released by al-Qa’ida via al-Jazeera following 9/11 left no question as to his support for those attacks, yet who ended up in Iran along with the most senior members of al-Qa’ida’s anti-9/11 faction.

The most important members of this latter faction were Sayf al-‘Adl, Abu Hafs al-Muritani, and Abu’l-Walid al-Masri. Sayf al-‘Adl (Muhammad Salah al-Din Zaydan al-Masri) was in charge of al-Qa’ida’s training operations in Afghanistan during the 1990s and, following the death of Abu Hafs al-Masri (Muhammad ‘Atif) in November of 2001, became the head of al-Qa’ida’s military committee, theoretically in charge of all of al-Qa’ida’s kinetic activities. In June of 2002 he sent an angry letter to Khalid Shaykh Muhammad (addressed here as “Mukhtar”) regarding the disastrous consequences that the 9/11 attacks had brought upon the organization and calling for an immediatie cessation of external activities.

Abu Hafs al-Muritani (Mahfouz Ould al-Walid) was the pre-9/11 head of al-Qa’ida’s shari’a committee, responsible for determining the religious legitimacy of its actions. According to the 9/11 Commission Report he presented Bin Ladin with a brief, backed by Qur’anic citations, arguing that the attacks would violate Islamic law.  More recently he has stated that in late 2001, after his objections were overridden by Bin Ladin, he submitted his resignation to the al-Qa’ida chief several weeks prior to 9/11 (on which more below).

Abu’l-Walid al-Masri (Mustafa Hamid) is something of an unusual case, as he was never a formal member of al-Qa’ida. An Egyptian journalist who joined the Haqqani network in Afghanistan in 1979, Abu’l-Walid was close to the al-Qa’ida leadership from the beginning and taught at al-Qa’ida camps in the 1990s, though he had been critical of Bin Ladin’s leadership abilities since at least 1989. He has been credited by two other senior al-Qa’ida figures with having helped convince Bin Ladin to redirect al-Qa’ida’s stategic focus from the “near enemy” to the “far enemy” – the United States – an issue I discuss most fully here (at p. 97f). Though not privy to al-Qa’ida’s internal disputes about the 9/11 attacks in late 2001, he has expressed nothing but the utmost contempt for those attacks in the years since, first as a grievous strategic blunder that played into the hands of the US and Israel, and more recently along the lines of “truther” conspiracy theories.

These three men, then, along with Abu Ghaith, several members of Bin Ladin’s immediate family, and a number of mid-level al-Qa’ida figures have until recently all been living in Iran, though there is conflicting information regarding the extent to which their freedom of movement had been restricted by Iranian authorities. (The most detailed account of their early conditions of confinement comes from Abu’l-Walid’s former wife Rabiah Hutchinson, who fled Afghanistan to Iran before leaving her then-husband and being repatriated to Australia in 2003). Up to 2009 little to nothing had been heard from any of them, though Sayf al-‘Adl’s operational activities popped up on the radar, so to speak, on a number of occasions during the 2000s, as mentioned here. The senior al-Qa’ida leaders among the group in Iran – Sayf, al-Muritani and Abu Ghaith – were entirely absent throughout this period from official al-Qa’ida messaging and propaganda production. As far as the rest of the world was concerned they had gone silent – until, that is, they all appeared on Abu’l-Walid’s website in late 2010.

According to his former wife, at the beginning of his stay in Iran Abu’l-Walid was under house arrest and denied any phone or internet access, but these restrictions must have eventually been relaxed, since in 2007 Abu’l-Walid began posting some of his older writings to an obscure blog. Abu Hafs al-Muritani has recently told al-Jazeera that their confinement in Iran went through several stages, with “the last stage being not house arrest but rather hospitality, albeit with some restrictions.” Beginning in 2009, Abu’l-Walid expanded his online activities, becoming a regular contributor to the Taliban’s Arabic-language online magazine al-Sumud. He also returned to issuing withering critiques of al-Qa’ida and its strategic and ideological failings, often cross-posting these essays to jihadi forums – much to the dismay of al-Qa’ida’s cyber-loyalists.

If the e-jihadis hadn’t liked what Abu’l-Walid had to say up to this point, in mid-November of 2010 he dropped a bombshell. In the middle of that year Abu’l-Walid had migrated his online activities from the blog to a new website, the now defunct mafa.asia. On November 15 he posted to the forums, as a mafa.asia exclusive, a lengthy new book by none other than al-Qa’ida’s former spokesperson Sulaiman Abu Ghaith, with an introduction by the former al-Qa’ida religious leader Abu Hafs al-Muritani. Entitled “Twenty Counsels on the Path of Jihad,” the text created a great deal of online consternation. Here were two of the most senior members of the organization’s historical leadership, who hadn’t been heard from in years, all of a sudden issuing new messages via the website of one of al-Qa’ida’s most notorious jihadi detractors.

And it wasn’t simply the method of distribution that caused alarm. Though not naming any names, Abu Ghaith’s book and al-Muritani’s introduction were clearly part of the genre of “revisions” or “recantation” texts (muraji’at), a growing body of literature by major jihadi figures offering mea culpas for former errors and diagnosing the ills besetting contemporary jihadi activism. Introducing the text as part of a planned “revival of jihadi education” series, Abu Hafs al-Muritani explains:

“I saw that after the last three decades [of jihadi experiences around the world], the jihadi arena lacked sufficient educational guidance, and was in great and dire need of this. There is nothing aside from what the martyred mujahid shaykh ‘Abdallah ‘Azzam left in some of his audio tapes and books … but this is not enough…. So it has become necessary to issue the like of this series of educational essays to correct the path, direct the activity, treat the illnesses, apply balm to the wounds, refine the hearts, and provide the field [of jihad] and its members what they need in terms of guidance to remind and assist them and to raise them to a level that befits them.”

Here is a man best known as having been among the most senior figures in Bin Ladin’s organization saying that no worthy guidance for jihad has come out since the days of ‘Abdallah ‘Azzam, who was assassinated in 1989 – not quite a ringing endorsement of al-Qa’ida’s more recent leadership capabilities, to say the least. That he would choose to launch his effort to “correct the path” from the opposition press, as it were, is a pretty clear indication that the Iranian faction had lost any hearing within al-Qa’ida central.

The book by Abu Ghaith that these remarks introduce is quite lengthy, extending to over a hundred pages, and it sounds the same notes as al-Muritani. At first glance it appears as a straightforward pamphlet of moral maxims and general operational rules of thumb for Islamist militants, illustrated with apposite anecdotes from Islamic scripture – something like a “Twenty Habits of Highly Effective Jihadis” self help book. But one need not read too closely between the lines to see the implied criticism of al-Qa’ida’s leaders. In its first line Abu Ghaith says that in his book “I have set forth the most important topics of guidance on which I feel that giving sincere advice (tanasuh) is a matter of grave importance for the jihadi leadership and members.” Sincere advice (nasiha) is a technical term in conservative Islamic discourses for formal criticism, often of a political nature; Bin Ladin’s early broadsides against the Saudi royal family in the 1990s were issued under the name of an “Advice (nasiha) and Reform Committee.” Nor is it difficult to connect the specific issues about which Abu Ghaith offers “sincere advice” to some of the more controversial aspects of Bin Ladin’s and Zawahiri’s leadership. The book speaks of the pitfalls of love of power, autocratic leadership, overemphasis on media activities, sectarian divisiveness, ideological fanaticism, and an unwillingness to work with a broader set of Islamist actors, including non-violent political groups (e.g., the Muslim Brotherhood). The journalist Jamal Isma’il pointed to some of the more obvious implied criticisms in an article in al-Hayat about Abu Ghaith’s book. Isma’il writes: “In a manner unprecedented in al-Qa’ida or the militant groups loyal to it, a new book by Sulayman Jasim Bu Ghayth … offers scathing criticism of al-Qa’ida leader Usama bin Ladin – without mentioning him by name – and the acts of jihadi groups, writing that ‘it is not permissible for one man to use the blood of others to experiment in what seems to him to be rightousness’.”

One month later, on December 17, 2010, Abu’l-Walid issued his own piece of sincere advice, though his was characteristically more direct. The title of the essay says it all, really: “Disbanding al-Qa’ida is the Best Option before Bin Ladin.” He again posted this on mafa.asia and the jihadi forums, though Shumukh, the forum most closely aligned with al-Qa’ida’s leadership, banned him from the message board and deleted his posts a week later. This was followed at the end of that month by a series of new messages from Sayf al-‘Adl – again, the first time that this al-Qa’ida leader had directly addressed the public since 9/11 – a series that I discussed at the time here. All of this was quite remarkable – a bloc of al-Qa’ida’s old guard emerging from years of silence only to undermine the legitimacy of their former employers – though it all unfolded to almost no notice in the West.

Since issuing these critiques in late 2010, this entire cast of characters has, so far as we know, left Iran. Sayf was reported to have been released from Iran in a prisoner swap arranged by the Haqqani network for an Iranian diplomat kidnapped in Pakistan, though the details surrounding that affair are still rather murky. Abu’l-Walid was repatriated to Egypt at the end of August of 2011. Abu Ghaith, as we now know, left Iran in January of this year. The last member of the faction, Abu Hafs al-Muritani, was transferred to Mauritanian custody from Iran in April of 2012 and released from jail in Mauritania last July.

Last October al-Muritani sat down for two lengthy interviews with al-Jazeera (parts one and two), shedding further light on the Iranian exile of al-Qa’ida’s dissident faction.  There is much of interest in this interview, but I will only highlight some of the statements that bear upon this post. In his interview, al-Muritani first directly addresses and confirms the 9/11 Commission Report’s characterization of him as having opposed the 9/11 attacks. When asked about his “revision” or “recantation” – i.e., the texts published by Abu’l-Walid in 2010 – he denies that his current position is a revision, stating that he had always objected to takfir (declaring other Muslims heretics) and indiscriminate violence. Aligning with other insider accounts, such as the autobiography of Fazul ‘Abdallah Muhammad, al-Muritani says that the debates within al-Qa’ida about the 9/11 attacks were not about the details of the operation – these were not known, even to the upper-level leadership – but rather over the idea of a violent attack on US territory itself. He also says that Abu Muhammad al-Masri, a senior member of al-Qa’ida’s military committee and also believed to be or to have been in detention in Iran, was of the faction opposed to the 9/11 attacks. Al-Muritani says that his objections to 9/11 were purely on religious grounds, and that ultimately it was due to the autocratic nature of Bin Ladin’s leadership that all the various objections expressed by his inner circle were dismissed and the attacks carried out. He says that he does not approve of the tactics of the branch of al-Qa’ida operting in northern Mali, saying that what they are doing is not the right way to establish an Islamic state. Regarding his stay in Iran, he says that an arrangement was made with the authorities whereby al-Qa’ida members committed to carrying out no attacks from within Iran, and he says that overall the treatment by the Iranians was good, though it had its ups and downs. Al-Muritani says that no Western or Arab governments were given access to him or other al-Qa’ida refugees, nor were they interrogated during their stay in Iran. He reiterates the criticisms from the “Twenty Counsels,” saying that the jihadi movements are wrong to denounce the political Islamist movements and that jihad means nothing if it is not the struggle of the community as a whole. He also repeats the criticisms of indiscriminate killing and sectarian devisiveness, saying that while holding some heretical views the Shi’a are nonetheless Muslims, contrary to the view taken by al-Qa’ida in Iraq under Zarqawi.

As with the statements issued through Abu’l-Walid’s blog in 2010, al-Muritani’s interview was not well-received by the online jihadi community. One of the main platforms of salafi jihadi pronouncements, the Minbar at-Tawhid wa’l-Jihad website, posted a lengthy denunciation of Abu Hafs for his “recantation,” refuting at length the “heresies” uttered by him in the interview (such as that the Shi’a are Muslims).  Ultimately, though, the interview simply confirmed what many on the forums had already suspected: that a group of the most famous leaders of the historical al-Qa’ida had soured on Bin Ladin, Zawahiri, and some of the more extremist tendencies of post-9/11 jihadism.

Finally, I would note that there was speculation in some of the initial reports about Sayf al-‘Adl’s release in 2009 that the Iranian diplomat prisoner swap had also included the release of Abu Ghaith and Abu Hafs al-Muritani at that time. Since we now know that wasn’t the case, it raises further questions about the current whereabouts of Sayf al-‘Adl. He, and his colleague Abu Muhammad al-Masri, may very well still be in Iran, or only recently released. I would imagine that it is the fates of these men that the US government is most eager to learn details of from Abu Ghaith, now that he is in custody.

New FFI Report on Jundullah

Thomas Hegghammer October 20, 2009

Not surprisingly, the recent bombing in Iran has received a lot of attention in the media and the security blogosphere (for good commentaries, see here, here, and here). But with a few exceptions, everyone has missed the new FFI Report by Audun Wiig. It is the best profile of Jundullah you will find in open sources, so go ahead and read it.

Visions of Afghan and Somali Emirates

Scott Sanford August 27, 2009

On 25 August 2009, the Global Islamic Media Front (GIMF) published a plea by Dr. John Boutros for Muslims to aid the jihadi cause. He stated, “Do not mourn because the Islamic Caliphate is imminent… Trust me, the US is one or two thrusts” away from crumpling. However, in order to make this happen Muslims must give aid to the jihadis.

Boutros claimed that the United States is weak due to the financial crisis, which is allegedly causing the rich states to consider separating from the Union. He stated that militarily the United States is vulnerable because it has so many soldiers in the mountains of Pakistan and Afghanistan, and in the suburbs of Baghdad, who are easy targets. In regards to the United States homeland he continued, “Hundreds of thousand of soldiers stationed in the streets of Washington and Los Angeles wait for a martyr to cross the continents carrying a nuclear, biological, or chemical bomb.”

He alleged that from al-Qaida’s viewpoint, things are much better. Somalia is becoming more peaceful and prosperous because the Shabab al-Mujahidin are instilling sharia law and in Afghanistan the Taliban control 80% of the country while coalition forces only leave their bases in armored vehicles in the other 20%. However, the Islamic State of Iraq has made many sacrifices, as has Ansar al-Islam, who gave up their bombs, snipers, and bases.

He then stated that given the current state of affairs, if the United States fell, “In a short period, the Taliban Emirate will be a great state encompassing Afghanistan, Pakistan, Kashmir, Turkistan, and a large part of Iran.” In the western area of the Islamic world, the Shabab al-Mujahidin will control all of Somalia, Djibouti, and Sudan after the US fall. Then, he maintained, there will be justice in the Afghanistan and Somali Emirates and in other areas like Iraq, Chechnya, Algeria, and Nigeria where things will either turn around for the already established emirates or the mujahidin will prevail.

He then gets to the point of his fairytale, “After your mujahid brothers sacrifice themselves and their funds on this path, will you be stingy in support and assistance? Will you be stingy in spreading the word? Will you be stingy in financial support after many operations are canceled because of a shortage of materials like what happened during operations within Denmark?”

The fanciful nature of this report is striking even for the GIMF and I am not sure what to make of it. Is this an indication that something structurally has changed within the GIMF? Or, is it simply an attempt to garner support and the editorial staff did not realize how unrealistic it sounds? Regardless of its meaning, if this is the grand strategy of budding al-Qaida strategists, I am not worried.

“The Iran Crisis and Its Effects on the Global Jihad”

Scott Sanford June 23, 2009

How will the Iran debacle affect al-Qaida? This was the question raised yesterday in a short strategic study titled “The Iran Crisis and Its Effects on the Global Jihad by Abu al-Fadl Madi (أبو الفضل ماضي), a Falluja forum member with so-called “great writer” status. He briefly outlined the situation in Iran claiming that the protests mark the end of the second period in Iran’s modern history, with the first ending in 1989. He called the new period the “Termination of the Rule of the Jurisprudent Theory.” He argued that the crisis could alter regional “balances, priorities, and strategies” and the “Global Jihadi Current” cannot ignore these events.

He described four possible outcomes of the Iranian protests. The first was the possibility of the regime defeating the opposition by force. He argued that this would increase Ahmadinejad’s power, giving him more leeway to negotiate with the West, but due to the protest he will fail in obtaining Western recognition of Iran as a regional and nuclear power. Abu al-Fadl believed that the West could try to help the opposition by striking Iran, which would create a 2003 Iraq-like scenario. He stated, “This is the best scenario possible for the jihadi movement” because they could benefit from the chaos and security void.

The second possibility was the opposition bringing down the current Iranian regime, which would lead to a new period of improved relations with the West. He argued that there would be better cooperation between the West and Iran on Iraq, Afghanistan, Syria, Hezbollah, Hamas, and nuclear issues. That is in addition to more cooperation with President Obama vis-à-vis the Israeli-Palestinian Peace Process. Finally, he fretted about the greater pressure al-Qaeda would face in Pakistan, Afghanistan, and Iraq. This is ostensibly the worst-case scenario for the jihadi movement.

The third option is the possibility of a stalemate between the two sides. He believed that in such a situation, not much would change for the “global jihad” and Iran would continue to support its current foreign proxies. This is also not an ideal situation for al-Qaeda espousing terrorists.

Finally, the fourth option he mentioned is the possibility of a settlement between the two sides. In this scenario, he believed that Khamenei would weaken considerably and Rafsanjani would emerge as the “Godfather of the Regime.” He estimated that Iran’s foreign policy would be more restrained and pragmatic in this scenario. Like options two and three, this option is unlikely to make the jihadi movement happy.
If, as Abu al-Fadl suggests, the geopolitical nature in the Middle East changes because of the Iran crisis, the question will become how will the jihadi movement react to the possibility of a weakened Hezbollah, Syria, or Hamas?  If the United States or Israel attacks Iran to help the protesters, handing al-Qaeda “the best scenario possible,” will the jihadi movement be strong enough to exploit that opportunity?  As events continue to develop on the ground in Iran, it will be interesting to watch the jihadis’ response.

The Denudation Of The Exoneration: Part 8

Will McCants November 28, 2008

In part 8, Sayyid Imam continues to hammer al-Qaeda for bringing disaster to the Middle East and for the hypocrisy of its leaders.  He

  • puts forward the odd claim that AQ lied to the U.S. about WMD in Iraq and about AQ ties with Iraq to push the U.S. to invade
  • observes that Iran and Syria have been the primary beneficiaries of AQ’s antics in Iraq
  • notes what any observer of the region already knows but rarely says: bashing the U.S. and Israel and talking about the Palestinian issue is great PR
  • offers an excellent explanation as to why AQ will not get a foothold in the Palestinian territories
  • claims that Bin Laden gave Saudi donations for jihad to Nawaz Sharif in support of his candidacy against Benazir Bhutto

Continuing…

Z claims that only the mujahids have thrawted the plans of the U.S.  That’s like Gamal Abdel Nasser’s slogan after the ’67 defeat that “no voice rises above the voice of battle” in order to silence his critics.

AQ brought the U.S. into the region and caused it to occupy Iraq and Afghanistan.  It gave the U.S. false information about WMD in Iraq and tying Iraq to al-Qaeda to give the U.S. the excuse to invade Iraq.  They did this to lure the U.S. into a battlefield where it could be destroyed.  But AQ killed far more Iraqis than it killed Americans.  It brought the U.S. in and excommunicated the people of Iraq solely to fulfill its desire to fight America.

Z claims that AQ thwarted the plans of the U.S. but the truth is the opposite.  Wherever AQ goes, it brings destruction to Muslims.

Those who have benefitted from the killing in Iraq are first Iran, then Syria.  Is Syria facilitating those who seek to fight in Iraq out its love for jihad, for the Iraqis, or for its own self interest?  Aren’t some of the leaders of AQ who are encouraging others to fight in Iraq located in Iran, particularly the son of UBL?  Is fighting for the interests of Syria and Iran a jihad?  Hasn’t Z previously paid his brothers to fight in Egypt in service of Sudanese intel?  Isn’t killing the Iraqis and demolishing their homes exactly what Jews are doing to Palestinians?  Is this jihad or even thwarting the plans of America?  Wasn’t Iraq part of the Abode of Islam under Saddam before the American occupation?  Didn’t al-Qaeda, at the hands of Zarqawi, trigger a sectarian civil war in Iraq by killing the Shia en masse?  Haven’t the Sunnis paid the ultimate price for this?  Killing the Iraqi Shia only strengthened their ties to Iran and facilitated Iranian involvement in Iraq, whereas it did nothing but weaken the Sunni position in Iraq.

Does the mentality that lost an actual Islamic state in Afghanistan really believe that an Islamic state will be established in Iraq and not just on the Internet?  Are the Islamic peoples to be test animals for Bin Laden’s and Zawahiri’s experiment?

No one is more pleased with al-Qaeda today than Iran and Syria.  All they have to do is turn a blind eye to the fighters who travel through their countries to blow themselves up, which serves Iranian and Syrian interests.

8) One of Z’s ignorant beliefs is that he proves the truth of what he says by pointing to the number of his followers.

Z says I heaped abuse on Bin Laden, but then he asks which of us has better understood reality and affected more of Muslim youth and masses? (Exoneration, p. 10)

The truth is known by its agreement with the Sharia, not by the number of its followers.

I have not called on anyone to follow me.  I am only relaying what I think is right according to the Sharia. 

Aren’t those who extol Bin Laden the same people that previously extolled Saddam Hussein?

Z’s words [ie the truth of what you say is proven by the number of your followers] indicate a fundamental aspect of his character: he has always been looking for fame and he is willing to get it by killing the innocent.

* One of the deceptions of Z is his trading on the Palestinian question

It is well-known that the fastest way to gain popularity among the Arab and Muslim masses is to bash the United States and Israel and talk a great deal about the Palestinian issue.  Nasser did it, Saddam did it, Ahmadinejad does it, as do others.  However, these people have actually done something for Palestinians, particularly Nasser, whereas Bin Laden and Z just talk.  Z even says in his Exoneration that “the slogan which the masses of the Muslim umma have understood and responded to well for 50 years is the slogan of calling for jihad against Israel.  Moreover, in this decade the umma is mobilized by the American presence in the heart of the Islamic world.” [I think this quote is from Knights but haven’t checked it yet]

Z and Bin Laden talk about Palestinian children being hurt but not about the death they bring to the children of Afghanistan.

* Why doesn’t al-Qaeda undertake operations in Palestine?

If Al-Qaeda is so interested in the Palestinian question, why hasn’t it undertaken operations against the Jews there?  There are two reasons.  First, killing Jews is not one of Bin Laden’s priorities.  Second, al-Qaeda is an organization without a state; wherever it is, it is a stranger.  One can’t carry out operations in a country without the help of some of the people in that country. 

Al-Qaeda has failed to ally with any of the Palestinian organizations for four reasons:

1) Palestinian organizations don’t trust Bin Laden.  There’s no room to explain here, but it is an old matter from the days of the Afghan jihad.

2) Al-Qaeda has nothing to offer Palestinian groups militarily since the latter are far more advanced.  Indeed, Al-Qaeda relied on the cadres of the Egyptian Islamic Jihad trained by the Palestinian groups in Lebanon from 1990 to 1992.

3) Different tactics with respect to the use of force.  Bin Laden uses blind force to kill as many people as possible, even if it leads to the destruction of his organization–“organizational suicide.”  Palestinian organizations, on the other hand, use limited force to make gains against the enemy while ensuring the survival of their organization.  They follow the traditional principles of guerrilla war, the “war of the flea and the dog.”  Bin Laden’s new way is the war of the elephant, which makes mass killing the goal.

4) Palestinian organizations don’t need Bin Laden’s money since they have their own resources, just as they are more politically sophisticated than Bin Laden.

This is why Al-Qaeda has failed to ally with Palestinian groups and failed to gain a foothold in Palestine.  That’s why Z in his recent statement called for the Bedouin of Sinai to engage in jihad in Palestine.  It’s just propaganda.

When the Palestinian organizations rebuffed al-Qaeda, Z started criticizing them. Z accused Hamas of killing Jewish children with their missiles.  Is this a rational person?  What about the innocents al-Qaeda has killed in Afghanistan, Iraq, Algeria, and elsewhere?  Is what is permitted for Al-Qaeda forbidden for Hamas?  Z is sad for Jewish children but kills Muslim children.

Z accuses Hamas of participating in elections on the basis of a secular constitution.  Why does Z criticize Hamas only?  Why not also criticize his shaykh Bin Laden?  Bin Laden paid a lot of money in support of Nawaz Sharif in parliamentary elections in Pakistan against Benazir Bhutto.  This was money for jihad that Saudis had give Bin Laden.  When I found out about this in 1992, I said to Abu Hafs al-Masri, who was the one who gave the money to Nawaz Sharif, “Abu Hafs! By God, Bin Laden is leading you to Hell!”

Document (Arabic): 11-27-08-al-masry-al-youm-denudation-part-8

Anti-Shia Graffiti In Gaza

Will McCants October 26, 2008

A member of the Faloja Forum, Abu Muhammad al-Rafhawi, has posted pictures of anti-Shia graffiti from Gaza that he claims was written by youth in the Qassam Brigades and the internal security forces.  I don’t know if this sort of graffiti is typical or if it reflects rising hostility toward Hezbollah and Iran among younger Hamas members, but it’s interesting nonetheless.

Document (Arabic): 10-24-08-faloja-anti-shia-graffiti-in-gaza

Jihadi Explains Iranian Realpolitik

Will McCants August 6, 2008

Abu `Abd al-Rahman `Atiyyat Allah (possibly this person) has written a new booklet titled Ru’ya kashifa in which he tries to convince his Jihadi brethren that Iran and Hezbollah are not working with the U.S. and Israel as part of a grand conspiracy to subjugate Sunnis. Rather, he argues, Iran and its cat’s paw Hezbollah are seeking hegemony in the region. Achieving it means supporting popular Muslim causes and making temporary alliances with ideological enemies or competitors. Below is a summary:

  • It is hard to analyze Shia states and groups because of their doctrine of dissimulation (taqiyya), or concealing one’s true beliefs. p.4
  • Dissimulation is permitted in Sunni Islam if you are in danger. But the Shia make a habit of it. p.5
  • Outwardly Iran and Shia groups stress Sunni-Shia unity; embrace causes that are important to Muslims, particularly the Palestinian issue; and put Iran forward as the only authentic Islamic state, which fills a void left by the absent caliphate. p.12-14
  • Inwardly, Shia sincerely believe in Islam, but it is an Islam of their own making, not true Islam; they believe they are the only true Muslims; and they are seeking to dominate the Islamic world. p.15-16
  • “The hostility between the Rejectionists [the Shia], America, and Israel is real hostility.” p.19
  • Those who believe there is no real hostility between Iran on one side and the U.S. and Israel on the other have bought into conspiracy theories, which are a regrettable flaw in our culture. p.19
  • The hostility of Iran toward the U.S. and Israel is partly religious, in that Shi`ism retains the religious hostility toward Christians and Jews found in the true religion, Sunnism. It is also due to Iran’s desire for power. p.19
  • Iran helped the U.S. in Afghanistan and Iraq because of its self-interest–the U.S. eliminated two of its enemies, the Taliban and Saddam. This is a good example of the opportunistic and circumstantial nature of Shia politics. p.21
  • The Shia make these kind of decisions because their greatest enemy is the Sunnis. They can live with Jews and Christians, but not Sunnis. Look how Iran treats its Sunni minorities, how Hezbollah behaves toward Sunnis, and how the Shia government in Iraq has dealt with Sunni Iraqis. p.21, 24
  • Contrary to what many Jihadis say, Hezbollah is not Israel’s collaborator. But Hezbollah will talk to Israel and work with it on a limited basis if it suits Hezbollah’s interests. p.22-3
  • The Shia are pragmatic. They are willing to work with anyone regardless of their stated beliefs. This includes working with Wahhabis. p.23
  • Hezbollah supports Palestinian militants to achieve the wider aims of Iran. It has adopted a popular cause to increase its popularity. It is also filling a leadership vacuum left by other Arab states who have failed to step up. p.32-3
  • Hezbollah is a tool of both Iran and Syria. It serves their interests and policies. p.36
  • Hezbollah prevents any Sunni resistance from setting up on the Lebanese border with Israel. It has cut deals with Syria, the U.S., and even Israel to retain its control of the area. p.36

Despite the excessive focus on dissimulation (which also plagues Western analyses of Shia politics) and the Iran-wants-to-rule-Sunnis argument (does it really want to rule Indonesia?), this is a good primer on Iran’s realpolitik in the Middle East and dovetails well with the findings of an excellent new book, The Limits of Culture. That `Atiyyat Allah has to chastise his fellow Jihadis for their conspiracy thinking and their overemphasis on cultural motives when analyzing state behavior shows that they are problems for the Jihadi analytical community. Same could be said for us.

abu-abd-al-rahman-atiyyat-allah-ruya-kashifa رؤية كاشفة

Iraq a Sinking Ship for al-Qaeda, Afghanistan the Lifeboat

Will McCants July 31, 2008

Earlier this week, I noted that members of the Hesbah forum are increasingly pessimistic about Iraq. And in May I wrote about the death of Sulayman al-`Utaybi, an al-Qaeda leader in Iraq who had left for Afghanistan after his dismissal from his post. Here’s what I wrote at the time:

That he headed straight for Afghanistan makes me wonder if this is a sign of things to come as AQ gets squeezed out of Iraq.

Now the Washington Post gives us further evidence that Iraq is a sinking ship for al-Qaeda and Afghanistan is the lifeboat, at least for the senior leadership. Amit Paley has written a well-sourced article on the departure of Abu Ayyub al-Masri (aka Abu Hamza al-Muhajer), the head of al-Qaeda in Iraq, for Afghanistan. Here’s what we learn from the article (sources in parentheses):

Foreign fighters

  • AQ is diverting new recruits to Afghanistan and Iraq. (U.S. officials)
  • The number of foreign fighters going to Iraq a year ago was 110/mo. Earlier this year it was 50/mo. Now it is 20/mo. (senior U.S. intel analyst)
  • The flow of most of AQI’s foreign fighters, money, and weapons is controlled by Badran Turki Hishan al-Mazidih (aka Abu Ghadiya), a Mosul native who is based in Syria. (U.S. intel officials)

AQI Leadership

  • Masri designated Abu Khalil al-Souri to run AQI when he left for Afghanistan. Souri came to Iraq in 2003. (Ansari, AQI leader in Fallujah)
  • Souri is one of 33 fighters, known as “the first line,” who came with Zarqawi in 2003. (Milehmi, senior AQI leader north of Fallujah)
  • Souri’s name is attached to a July 10 AQI communique, a document usually signed by Masri.
  • Masri has gone to Afghanistan twice before to meet with Jihadis and come back. (Milehmi, senior AQI leader north of Fallujah)
  • Masri went to Afghanistan to review situation of AQI with Bin Laden. (Qaisi, commander of AQI recruitment unit)

Route to Afghanistan

  • Masri went to Afghanistan through Iran (Ansari, AQI leader in Fallujah)
  • Masri and two others went into Iran on June 12 through border town of Zorbatia (Col. Abdullah, Iraqi intel official in Ramadi)
  • Masri went through Iran with 15 leaders (captured AQI member Abu Abeer al-Muhajer via an Iraqi police officer)

AQ Splinter Group

  • Abu Taha al-Lihebi is leader of an AQI group in eastern Anbar. He and his group split from AQI because Masri condoned attacks on the Awakening movement and on civilians, which lost the group support. (Abu Taha al-Lihebi)
  • Lihebi’s group disavows suicide ops to distinguish itself from AQI. (Abu Taha al-Lihebi)

It’s not surprising that Iran is a transit point to Afghanistan (see my previous posts on the Harbi group from Kuwait) or that Masri is consulting with al-Qaeda Central (another nail in the “leaderless jihad” coffin).  It’s also not surprising that AQI is losing support because its senior leadership decided to shit where it slept.

I am surprised that most of AQI’s material and human resources are so tightly coordinated by an AQ operative in Syria.  The Sinjar data suggests that the flow is more decentralized.

What also stands out to me is that the AQI splinter group renounced suicide ops to distinguish itself from AQI, an interesting turn for those who see the adoption of suicide bombings as either a natural result of being a devout Muslim or the result of militant groups competing to outdo each other.  In this case, competition is a factor, but it’s going the opposite direction.

Walking the Talk: Forum Members Travel to Afghanistan and Iraq (Pt. 3)

Will McCants July 6, 2008

Today we continue our look at a Kuwaiti cell and how its members transitioned from forum fighters to foreign fighters.

When we left off, Badr al-Harbi and Bawasil had returned to Kuwait from the front in Afghanistan via Iran, entrusted with a special mission by Abu al-Layth al-Libi, a senior al-Qaeda leader. They were delayed in carrying out their task by Iranian, and then Kuwaiti, security forces. The latter, according to al-Furqan al-Junubi’s account, had tortured them and confiscated their passports.

After being released, Harbi and Bawasil stayed in Kuwait a full year to complete their special mission: gathering money, clothes, and food for the Jihadis in Afghanistan. In this, they relied on their network of friends, many of whom were already committed to the cause. Yet Harbi and Bawasil’s efforts aroused the suspicions of other Jihadis, who wrote the brothers in Afghanistan and told them that they were spies. They even made films that portrayed Harbi and Bawasil in a negative light.

Upon completing their task, Harbi and Bawasil wanted to return to the front in Afghanistan, but their passports had been confiscated. Nevertheless, they were both able to get new passports. Harbi and Bawasil then went with their families to Mecca and returned without incident.

After returning to Kuwait, Harbi and Bawasil asked the Jihadis in Afghanistan about the route to the front. The Jihadis told them that it was “broken,” but this, al-Furqan al-Junubi comments, was only because they had believed the bad rumors that had been spread about Harbi and Bawasil.

Harbi suggested the two travel to Iraq instead, but he was hesitant to go because he was not sure he would be guaranteed a martyrdom operation. Harbi and Bawasil soon met a coordinator and obtained a guarantee of safe passage from him, but they did not end up using him.

At this time, Harbi decided he wanted to marry for the second time, but wasn’t sure it was right to do so as a mujahid. Bawasil assured him it was, and so he did.

One month after Harbi’s marriage, a message came from Abu al-Layth al-Libi vouching for the integrity of Harbi and Bawasil. This meant the two could now travel to Afghanistan. But personal circumstances prevented Harbi from traveling to Afghanistan with Bawasil, who was anxious to leave because the government was pursuing him.

Bawasil first went to the United Arab Emirates with one of his close cousins (on his mother’s side). The Jihadis (it is unclear if they were in the Emirates or Afghanistan) told Bawasil that they only wanted him and not his cousin, so the latter returned to Kuwait.

Bawasil had to wait four days in the airport because of snow in Iran (indicating that Iran again served as his transit point for Afghanistan). Bawasil succeeded in finding the brothers (presumably in Iran) and soon found a coordinator, but they had stopped using the old route.

Harbi waited four months to find new way to Afghanistan, but failed. It was around this time that Harbi met a Jihadi from Algeria who told him how to go to Iraq.

(To be continued….)

Some thoughts:

  • Al-Qaeda Leadership – Abu al-Layth al-Libi personally requested Harbi and Bawasil to gather funds and supplies for the Jihadis in Afghanistan. He also personally intervened in the rumor campaign against them.
  • Support Networks – The way Harbi and Bawasil went about accomplishing their task for Libi is instructive. Like Tupperware salespeople, they relied on their personal network of friends rather than reach out to anonymous donors. But this did not protect them from allegations of spying, a consequence of their mission’s secrecy. (This is a constant problem for clandestine terrorist groups–see Jake Shapiro’s work in this regard.) On another subject, Bawasil tried to bring his close cousin to Afghanistan, reinforcing the idea that friends and family of dedicated militants are more likely than others to be involved in the Jihadi Movement.
  • Security Lapse – The Kuwaiti government was monitoring the two militants, as indicated by Bawasil’s eagerness to escape their scrutiny. So how in the world did they regain their passports?
  • Transit – As in part 2, Iran is mentioned as a transit point to Afghanistan. But this time we have the added transit point of the UAE. Moreover, travel coordinators are twice mentioned, once with regard to Afghanistan, the other with regard to Iraq.
  • Family Life – Even though Harbi knows he will die as a martyrdom operative, he still wants to marry a second wife.

As I said last post, none of this is a big revelation (with the exception of Iran). But it really adds texture to the recent abstract debates about terror networks and helps to weigh their relative merits.

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