ji·had·ica

66 Important Jihadist Twitter Accounts (part 2)

In our earlier post, together with Ali Fisher we detailed and assessed 66 accounts listed by Shumukh al-Islam jihadi Forum member Ahmad ‘Abdallah as ‘important jihadist’ members on twitter. We looked primarily at the users individually, using the data of these 66 accounts to create this infographic to give our readers an overview of these users.

In this post we focus on what we are able to find out about them as a group and provide an interactive network map to show the links between these advocated ‘important jihadist’ twitter accounts.

Relational dynamics

Analysing the relational dynamics between these accounts as a group and those who choose to follow them is a key part of understanding the online strategies of The most important jihadi and support sites for jihad and the mujahideen on Twitter”.

As we identified previously, the accounts had been categorized in different types by Ahmad ‘Abdallah. This underlines the diverse range of information, which was recommended to further the jihadist endeavour in general. In addition to understanding the specific accounts, the data can be used to analyse the network of individuals who follow the 66 ‘important jihadist’ accounts. The relationships are important as they influence the way individuals search for information, what they find and the behaviours they adopt.

We began by identifying the followers of the 66 ‘important jihadist’ accounts. If each of these accounts were followed by a different group of Twitter users, then this would mean that collectively they were reaching 1.8 million users. However, @mujtahidd alone is followed by over 1.1 million followers, and the real number following the remaining important jihadi accounts is much lower than 700,000. This is because some users follow more than one of the ‘important jihadist’ accounts. Using network analysis, we found that the network following one or more of these accounts (excluding @mujtahidd) was 377235 users and 852948 follower/following relationships. The image below represents the network of important accounts and their respective followers. Each Twitter account is represented by a dot, and those with a follower / following relationship are connected by a line.

The graph (above) shows the network of users identified to be following at least one of the ‘important jihadist’ accounts (excluding @mujtahidd). The colours have been used to highlight the groups of users who follow the same users (or same combination of the 66 ‘important jihadist’ accounts). A quick view of the network image reinforces the previous observation that most of the users are following only one or two of these high-profile accounts in the jihadist online media mind-set. The importance of this combined approach is the ability to analyse the combinations of accounts which users have chosen to follow.

For example, this view of the network shows the concentration of user names near the bottom of the image, (highlighted in red) indicating that there are a number of accounts with fewer followers where the overlaps in follower groups are more pronounced. The Jabhat al-Nusra twitter account (discussed in greater detail here) also has a number of followers in common with the cluster of users highlighted.

Focusing on the Network of the 66 ‘important jihadist’ Accounts

In addition to the potential to look at the followers of the 66 accounts claimed to be ‘most important’ by the Shumukh al-Islam posting, their profiles and time zones, the relationships between these specific 66 accounts can also provide analysts with insights. For example, JbhatALnusra, WaleedGaj2002, AsadAljehad2 are most frequently followed by the 66 ‘important jihadist’ accounts. Conversely, SaveArakan4, Mhaajrr, housse_100, and alassra2012 appear on the list of the 66, but few other ‘important jihadist’ accounts follow them.  The ranking (shown below) is based on frequency of being followed by the 66 ‘important’ accounts are also reflected in the eigenvector calculations for the network. The relationships between the 66 accounts are shown in the image below, and be explored in greater detail by clicking on the image, which will open the interactive version. When using the interactive image, clicking on a node will focus on the connections of that user, double click to open the twitter account of that user.

Please note that the interactive image works best in the Chrome Browser.

The network as a whole represents 958 relationships between the 66 ‘important jihadist’ users with a network diameter of 5 (the distance between the furthest two nodes calculated on the directed graph). The network density is 0.2 on the directed graph (1 would represent a complete graph, where all connections would exist).

Key nodes in the network

In our previous post, we emphasized “we are analyzing these accounts that are defined in this [Shumukh al-Islam] posting as most important for jihadi sympathizers, but it does not necessarily mean that the individual Twitter accounts are an integral part of this worldview.” In this follow-up work, however, we, perhaps not surprisingly, found that the majority of the connected accounts are hard core jihadi media activists. From the above listed, we shall have a look at some of the high-profile hard core jihadist Twitter accounts.

As we analysed JbhatALnusra previously (here, here),  let’s have a look at

@WaleedGaj2002

The account has over 45,000 followers while only following 387. Apparently this is the account of “former Guantanamo detainee and eyewitness of the Qila-e-Jangji massacre in Afghanistan” Walid [Muhammad] al-Hajj, from Sudan. According to his latest tweets, he still seems to be on the same page as the mainstream al-Qa’ida jihadis are, appraising Bin Laden and being cherished by other Twitter members for having known the shaykh personally. For further details, here is an interview with al-Jazeera. He was released in 2008. His leaked file is available via The New York Times.

@Strategyaffairs

This is a prolific and quite industrious jihadi media activists with over 100,000 followers and just over a little of 4,000 tweets. He is also active in most classical jihadist forums as ‘Abdallah bin Muhammad. Occasionally he has tweeted statements by the Yemeni AQAP prior to the ‘official’ broadcast within the forums and contextualized as well as posted the statements both within the forums and Twitter. Other Shumukh al-Islam members, for instance, used his Twitter-input to further the AQAP statements within the forum raising @Strategyaffairs status in general (example).

@EYADQUNAIBI

Doctor Iyad Qunaybi is somewhat of a rising star within the radical on- and offline scene. He is active on all social media outlets and his videotaped speeches are also transcribed and published within the jihadist forums. He rose to fame within this subculture in the past year and a half during the troubled times in Egypt and also responded to the jihadi affairs of life in general. By being included on Abu Muhammad al-Maqdisi’s database tawhed.ws, his standing was boosted. Few of his writings and audiobits are available on his author page on tawhed.ws under Iyad al-Qunaybi. His input is valued, re-tweeted and re-disseminated within the forums, on Facebook, and further published on sites such as justpaste.it, see here for example.

@as_ansar

This is the official Twitter account of the bi-lingual Shabakat al-Ansar al-Mujahideen. The main forum is in Arabic and down and out for some time now. The English forum works. With the main forum gone for the while being, this is a good example on how Twitter has become a tangible alternative to the media driven jihadists, for the Twitter accounts remain alive and very active with their over 26,000 followers, untouched by any disruptions of the forums. The YouTube link above is an “invitation to Muslims to visit the forum” and recommends and instructs the use of Tor to conceal one’s identity online.

@Al_nukhba

This account could be described as a jihadi media hub. The members, active on the forums for years, are highly committed and regularly produce transcriptions of jihadist media productions. This is naturally very helpful for any analyst but is also quite a service for the jihadi audience. Usually speeches of main leaders and ideologues as well as major video productions of as-Sahab, al-Malahem etc. are transcribed and can be conveniently downloaded as a PDF or Word document. For a first hand impression on the quantity and quality of this media department’s work, check out their contributions on the Shumukh al-Islam forum here.

On their main website data collections and videos can be downloaded and also searched for. It is a well built and maintained datawarehouse for extremist content that is first and foremost uploaded and disseminated via the classical forums. The Twitter account has about 6,000 followers, over 500 tweets, and is following no one.

This had been one of the pioneer jihadi Twitter accounts and advertised their social media passion as early as 2009. Perhaps the name nukhbat al-I’lami al-jihadi, “the Jihadi Media Elite”, stems from Abu Mus’ab al-Suri’s “Message to the British and European Peoples and Governments regarding the Explosions in London”, July 2005, where he outlined the Internet as the most important medium to propagate and spread the jihadists demands and frame of reference in general. He referred to “the jihadi elite” residing in Europe to partake in this venture.

The ‘betweenness’ calculation highlights those users through which the shortest paths across the network most frequently pass. These users are often found near the centre of the network image. From the perspective of ‘betweenness’, in addition to some of the users mentioned above, also appear to have an important role bridging between different elements of the network.

To provide some additional insight in this, here is some basic information on

@Caucasusaffairs

The name of this account is program, everything related to the Caucasus, the Caucasus Emirate (analysis) with the focus on Chechnya is published here in mainly Arabic but also Russian. With over 44,000 followers while following over 400 and about 8,000 tweets this account is a valuable asset besides the main forums and their pertaining subsections. It mainly retweets the Arabic language media outlet “Echo of Caucasus” which is one of the main media hubs in Arabic for many years. You may note the four fingered black hand on the yellow background, a symbol to the Rabaa al-Adawiya protest camp whereby many pro-Mursi citizens were killed in Egypt recently. For more on this topic, check out the fantastic Closer blog here. The use of this icon in the Chechen context is yet another attempt by the media savvy jihadists to globalize their agenda and serves as proof for the repeated claim of the “war against Islam”. In the meantime this icon has been further ‘jihadised’ by adding the typical black banner, see here for example.

What does this tell us?

The density of the network has two results. First it creates mutually reinforcing clusters of information which can crowd out other perspectives and contribute to the development of a zeitgeist, or a new electronic propaganda frontier, as discussed in relation to activity of Jabhat al-Nusra.

Second, the density of the network tends to protect it against basic disruption strategies, for example the removal or suspension of individual accounts. As Paul Baran’s work On Distributed Communications has demonstrated only a small level of redundancy is required to build a communications systems to withstand heavy enemy attacks. Although this work was done in the context of the 1960s and was particularly focused on challenges faced in the 1970s, the insight provided by the study also relates to online activity and the need for more complex strategies to disrupt dense communication networks.

The ‘Who’s Who’ of the Most Important Jihadi Accounts on Twitter?

In this part of our series for Jihadica on the Jihadi Twitter phenomenon, Ali Fisher and Nico Prucha take a closer look at 66 Twitter accounts recommended by a Jihadi online forum user.

To be clear, we are analyzing these accounts that are defined in this posting as most important for jihadi sympathizers, but it does not necessarily mean that the individual Twitter accounts are an integral part of this worldview.

A posting on the Shumukh al-Islam forum recently provided a “Twitter Guide” (dalil Twitter). This ‘guide’ outlined reasons for using Twitter as an important arena of the electronic ribat; identified the different types of accounts which users could follow; and highlighted 66 users which Ahmad ‘Abdallah termed The most important jihadi and support sites for jihad and the mujahideen on Twitter”.

We mentioned this guide in our first post kicking off the series on Jihadica. In this post we intend to clarify the meaning of Ahmad ‘Abdallah’s Twitter guide, published at end of February 2013 on Shumukh al-Islam. We will then analyse the data on the twitter accounts which he claimed to be the most important within the overall jihadi context. An overview of this data is also available in our infographic, 66 Important Jihadis on Twitter (click here or the image for the full size):

In both this post and the infographic we have used ‘Jihadi Accounts on Twitter’ as shorthand for those named in the unwieldy ‘the most important jihadi and support sites for jihad and the mujahideen on Twitter’. It is not the intention of this post to discuss whether, or not, the 66 users should be considered jihadis, but to identify the accounts recommended in the guide to using Twitter in the jihadist context, recommend in the forum thread.

Twitter as the “electronic ribat”

Twitter, for Ahmad ‘Abdallah, has an important role as an electronic ribat. Following a classical rhetoric and it’s comprising meaning, Ahmad ‘Abdallah terms “Twitter one of the arenas of the electronic ribat, and not less important than Facebook. Rather, it will be of much greater importance as accounts are rarely deleted and its easier to get signed up”, without providing a phone number as ‘Abdallah writes. The advantage is that you can follow anyone without having to be accepted as a friend as on Facebook, but “you will see all of their postings just as on Facebook.”

A note on the term ribat in contemporary jihadist mindset

To translate and conceptualise the Arabic term ribat can be very contentious. The term is frequently referred to in both jihadist videos and in print literature in the context of religiously permissible warfare; in a modern meaning it could loosely be translated as “front”.

Ribat is prominent due to its reference in the 60th verse of the eight chapter of the Qur’an, the “Surat Al-anfal” (“the Spoils of War”). It is often used to legitimise acts of war and among others found in bomb making handbooks or as part of purported theological justification in relation to suicide operations. Extremist Islamists consider the clause as a divine command stipulating military preparation to wage jihad as part of a broader understanding of “religious service” on the “path of God.”

Ribat as it appears in the Qur’an is referenced in the context of “steeds of war” (ribat al-khayl) that must be kept ready at all times for war and hence remain “tied”, mostly in the Islamic world’s border regions or contested areas. In order to “strike terror into [the hearts of] the enemies of Allah” (Ahmed Ali), or “to frighten off [these] enemies of God” (see below), these “steeds of war” are to be unleashed for military purposes and mounted (murabit – also a sense of being garrisoned) by the mujahidin.

The relevant part reads, according to the translation by M.A.S. Abdel Haleem:

“Prepare against them whatever forces you [believers] can muster, including warhorses, to frighten off [these] enemies of God and of yours, and warn others unknown to you but known to God. Whatever you give in God’s cause will be repaid to you in full, and you ill not be wronged.” (8:60).

Ribat has two main aspects in contemporary jihadist thinking. First, the complete 60th verse of the Qur’an is often stated in introductions to various ideological and military handbooks or videos. While some videos issue ribat in connection with various weapons and the alleged divine command to “strike terror into the hearts of the enemies.”

In the past years, the ribat has migrated and expanded into the virtual “front”, as the murabit who is partaking in the media work has been equated with the actual mujahid fighting at the frontlines.

Types of account important for jihad and the mujahideen on Twitter

As the Twitter ‘guide’ states;

“Today I have summarized for you all of the renowned accounts in support of jihad and the mujahideen that convey their news or are in their favour; some are official accounts [by jihadi groups or brigades], some of which are accounts by scholars, ideologues, and supporters. We ask you for your support, even if just by following them.” In general, Ahmad ‘Abdallah lists five different types:

–        “Accounts by Media and News Foundations” referring to all Twitter accounts maintained by the official jihadi media outlets such as Fursan al-Balagh li-l i’lam (@fursanalbalaagh) or the Ansar al-Mujahideen Forum (@as_ansar).

–        “Accounts by Scholars and Writers” meaning stars such as the London-based Hani al-Siba’i (@hanisibu) or Muhammad al-Zawahiri (@M7mmd_Alzwahiri) or the notorious Abu Sa’d al-‘Amili (@al3aamili), to list a few.

–        “Accounts by members of jihadist forums and brothers and sisters supporting the mujahideen.” This is a good example of ‘hybrid’ users, active inside the jihadi forums and social media. These accounts operate independent of the forums and remain active even when the forums are down – this means that there is no gap and no disruption of jihadi content being disseminated when the forums should be down or out.

–        “Accounts supporting the mujahideen in Syria (al-Sham al-‘izz wa-l-jihad)”. This includes media activists in support of prisoners (@alassra2012) and campaigns by the Ansar al-Sham (@7_m_l_t) a charity regularly requesting money and support (financial, logistical, personnel) in general.

–        “Various accounts”, this section includes activists such as the “unofficial account of Minbar al-Tawhed wa-l-Jihad” (@MinbarTawhed); Israeli Affairs (@IsraeliAffairs); or the high profile account Mujhtahid, “the divulging secrets of the Al Salul” an insulting reference to the ruling Saudi family (@mujtahidd).

The posting is concluded with the signature “Abu ‘Abdallah al-Baghdadi” and his own twitter account (@Ahmed_Abidullah).

“The most important jihadi and support sites for jihad and the mujahideen on Twitter”

We took the profile data for the 66 accounts listed by Ahmad ‘Abdallah to discover who these important users are individually and what we could find out about them as a group. One of the first elements in the data users tend to look at is the number of followers an account has. While not a measure of influence, it does give an indication that users have heard of the account and that they may be interested in seeing more of their content.

Of the important jihadi, identified by Ahmad ‘Abdallah, @mujtahidd – has over a million followers, but this an exception, next most followed are @IsraeliAffairs – around 180,000 followers – and @1400year – around 30,000 followers.

Who are these users?

 

Mujtahid is an Islamic term of jurisprudence, a “legist formulating independent decisions in legal or theological matters, based on the interpretation and application of the four usul”, according to Hans Wehr. It can also simply mean “industrious, diligent.”

His bio on Twitter merely consists of two Arabic names, Harith and Hummam, and his email (mujtahidmail@gmail.com). The two names also serve as a code relating to the saying of prophet Muhammad who stated these two names as of the most dear ones to God and to him (besides ‘Abdallah and ‘Abd al-Rahman). Hummam means lion and Harith cultivator. As location he simply entered: The world.

Some Twitter members claim that @mujtahidd is a “known whistleblower inside the #Saudi government”.

 

@IsraeliAffairs – has about 180,000 followers and is the next most followed account,

in his bio, he writes:

“I am Muslim, my citizenship is Arab, I work on behalf of my country which is every span of hand on earth; raising on it the Adhan [the call to prayer]!  [I am] diplomat, translator, researcher in Israeli affairs…”

@1400year – has about 85,000 followers, the third most followed account.

The Arabic name of this account is gharib fi wadanihi – “the stranger in his own country”; the sentiment of gharib is a reference to a mental passageway as the ‘true’ believer considers himself somewhat as a foreign object in this world, associating oneself to the early Muslims who had been perceived as such strangers in their historical context by their social environment. Stranger or estranged is used here in the context of Palestine and the Israeli occupation.

When the data was captured for this post his bio stated:

“The man in the picture is Rachid Nekkaz, a French millionaire of Algerian origin, who opposes France’s ban of the niqab. He said to the Muslimat of France to wear the niqab and I will pay the fine, I am honored by placing his picture [on my account].”

His updated bio, however, as shown in the screen grab above, states:

“The demise of Israel may be preceded by the demise of [Arab] regimes that made a living on the expense of their own people, laughing at them, destroying the societies (…).”

@1400year also has a YouTube account with 1,830 subscribers and 437,243 views. The links across platforms allows users to more effectively create their zeitgeist. This is similar to the way jihadist groups such as Jabhat-al-Nusra are using Twitter to disseminate links to video content shot on the battlefield in Syria and posted for mass consumption on YouTube, as we outlined in an article for the CTC Sentinel recently.

Of the remaining accounts, 32 of the 66 accounts listed have between 5,000 and 100,000 followers (click to enlarge):

The mean number of followers is 28,220 but this is heavily influenced by the three accounts with the greatest number of followers. The median number of followers is much lower 5377.

What language do they use?

The majority (56%) use Twitter in Arabic with 41% using English and 3% using French. The language of an account was determined from that listed in the twitter profile data.

Where are the accounts located?

Few users write meaningful locations in the ‘location’ field on their Twitter profile, and fewer still enable geotagging of Twitter content. However, a surprisingly high number of people tend to set the clock in their timezone, to either the correct timezone – or to a timezone in which they would like to appear to be.

Casablanca was the most common location account holders used to signify their time zone. It does not mean they are in these specific cities but it does provide an indication of the area of the world with which they associate.

Note on why using time zones can be useful:

In short, humans are creatures of habit, they like the clock to show the time – either where they are or with the location with which they mentally associate. For example, following the 2009 Presidential election in Iran, there was a brief campaign for users to show support for the protesters by changing their location to Tehran, perhaps only to confuse Iranian authorities. This strategy had more than a few problems, as Evgeny Morozov pointed out at the time. One of the more notable issues, which is relevant in this context, is the failure of the less savvy Twitter users to change the time zone as well as the location. Another problem with this strategy was the tendency of slacktivists  to use different tags, such as #helpiranelection, to those used by protesters or ‘digital insiders’ (#GR88, #Neda, #Sohrab), discussed in detail here. (The activities of slacktivists are discussed by Evgeny Morozov here) As a result, interaction on Twitter was predominantly characterised by a series of local conversations rather than a one global debate, an issue discussed in greater detail here.

When did the important jihadi accounts join Twitter?

Although one jihadi account has been active since 2009, many of the important jihadi accounts were created during 2012. This data echoes the shift away from discussion on forums and toward social media, lamented by Abu Sa‘d al-‘Amili in his recent essay on the state of global online jihad (discussed here).

The data also shows little tendency for accounts that have been active for a long time to have more followers than those created more recently.

On what day and month did the most important Jihadi accounts for Ahmad ‘Abdallah create twitter accounts? This data indicates Friday, though Thursday and Sunday are not far behind. Equally, accounts were most frequently created in June and December.

Do these accounts all speak to the same followers?

If each of the 66 ‘important jihadi’ accounts were followed by a different group of Twitter users this would mean collectively they were reaching 1.8 million users. However, @mujtahidd alone is followed by over 1.1 million followers, and the real number following the remaining important jihadi accounts is much lower than 700,000.  This is because some users follow more than one ‘important jihadi’ account. Using network analysis, we found that the network following one or more of the important jihadi accounts (excluding @mujtahidd) was a little over 370,000 users and 850,000 follower/following relationships.

As one may expect from an online social environment, many users follow one or two accounts, while a very few follow many of the ‘important jihadi’ accounts. The graph below demonstrates a close approximation of a ‘power law’ curve (this discussion hints at why power law / logarithmically normal distribution might be a useful way to approximate user ranking).

Of those users who follow on of the 66 important jihadi accounts (minus @mujtahidd), 34% follow more than one important jihadi account. However, of the users which follow more than one important jihadi account, 45% only follow two accounts. These can be thought of as casual followers.

At the other end of the scale there are 109 users who follow fifty or more of the important jihadi listed and 504 users that follow 40 or more. These are the more engaged followers.

Engaged followers of ‘important jihadi’ accounts

Knowing that a user is particularly engaged in following the same accounts as were deemed important in the Twitter guide, does not necessarily indicate any political affiliation – not least because of the number of CT scholars actively following these accounts (and perhaps some of those using Quito / Hawaii as a time zone).

It is however, instructive to consider the aggregated traits of the group as a whole, for example, of the 504 users who follow forty or more important jihadi accounts, what language do they use?

Unsurprisingly given the dominant languages used by important jihadi accounts, Arabic, English and French are the most frequently used languages. In addition, there are a small number of users who use Twitter in other languages, Indonesian, Spanish, Dutch and German.

From the aggregated profile data, a similar question can be asked about where in the world these engaged users appear to be.

Using the location users have designated to set time on their twitter account, the cultural importance of appearing (at least) in the Arabian Peninsula. Similar to the data on the 66 ‘important jihadi’ the engaged followers tend to have most frequently created accounts in 2012, equally, apart from a small number of exceptions, these users each have a small number of followers.

What does this tell us?

The ‘important jihadi’ accounts, as one may expect, tend to tweet in Arabic. They are followed by a network of around 300,000 people (if @mujtahidd is excluded) most of whom are casual observers.

There are, however, somewhere between 500 and 1000 more engaged followers. These users tend to be Arabic speaking, have created accounts in the last year to 18 months, have relatively few followers and appear to have a greater tendency to identify with the Arab peninsular than the 66 ‘important jihadi’ accounts.

In a follow-up post we’ll look at the network of the 66 ‘important jihadi’ accounts to see if there are groups within the 66 which tend to follow each other. This may reveal a relatively dense network indicating a high degree of mutual awareness within the network. On the other hand, it may reveal a sparse network, which could indicate a low awareness of each other, a decision not to follow other users on twitter – reflecting a use of twitter as a ‘broadcast’ mechanism, or that while the Twitter guide indicated the account as important within the jihadi context, the user actually has other interests, affiliations or tendency to establish follower relationships with users outside what Ahmad ‘Abdallah thought of as the jihadi context.

Fatwa calling for the death of the director, producer, and actors involved in making the film “Innocence of Muslims”

Yesterday, Ahmad ‘Ashush published a fatwa on the jihadist forums where he “decrees and calls on all Muslim youth in America and in Europa to fulfill this inescapable obligation. Namely, to kill the director, producer and the actors and anyone who helped to promote this film.” The fatwa was published by the relatively new al-Bayan media group that has established itself in the jihadist forums since the turmoil in Egypt. The media group acts in parallel to the al-Faruq media battalion, which has in the meantime published several videos showing Egyptian cleric Ahmad ‘Ashush with other renowned jihadist scholars in Tahrir, such as Muhammad al-Zawahiri or Marjan Salim (videos here and here). Ahmad ‘Ashush first surfaced in the al-Shumukh forum a while ago with a lengthy interview talking about the Hizb al-Nur (here) and established himself as an Islamic authority clearly adhering to the “jihadist torrent” while his – as of now – few writings are online over at al-Maqdisi’s Minbar al-Tawhid wa-l-Jihad website (here).

This fatwa, however, is not unique and certainly nothing new from ‘Ashush. In July, the German GIMF department (probably courtesy of Austrian-Egyptian leader Muhammad Mahmud, aka Abu Usamah al-Gharib) posted a German translations of ‘Ashush’s article “an outcry… Supporting our prophet” (German). This was a direct reaction by ‘Ashush to events in Germany demanding the death of those who insulted the prophet by showing the Danish Muhammad Cartoons, attacking both the German government as well as demanding the beheading of the defamers in Europe. A violent clash preceded ‘Ashush’s reaction when salafist-jihadists in Germany clashed with police in Bonn and Solingen in May this year. ‘Ashush wrote: “There are free youth among the Muslims, living in Europe, who became angry for the prophet. They went out to defend his honor. The Germans beat, humiliated and arrested them. So, where are you in support of them?”

The German-language propaganda departments had plenty of new materials and produced videos and published reaffirming translations justifying violence in support of the prophet. Again, GIMF published a German translation of al-Maqdisi’s writing “The Drawn Sword against those who Insult the Lord, the Religion or the Messenger of God” (Arabic and German). This is based on the historical writing of Ibn Taymiyya, available on al-Maqdisi’s site here.

The protests that turned violent were directed against a German ultra-rightwing minority party “PRO-NRW” who succeeded in instigating the German salafists by showing the Muhammad cartoons on billboards. With the police in the middle, the salafists counter-demonstration turned violent and led to many arrests. In a video entitled “In Reih und Glied standen sie für Rasulullah” (They stood in a single file for the messenger of God – here, note the Arabic opening nasheed) violence to defend the honor of the prophet is further justified and sanctioned, depicting the salafists as ‘true’ believers and real men. Shortly after, Abu Ibraheem (Yasin Chouka), one of the German propagandists of the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan called for the “death of Pro-NRW”, re-affirming the obligation to “kill those, who insult the prophet, no matter if they are Muslims or disbelievers.” (here)

Two similar writings of Ahmad ‘Ashush – the ‘Muhammad-movie-fatwa’

In his self-entitled fatwa yesterday, ‘Ashush repeats basic sentiments he had addressed as a response to the insult of the prophet in Germany. In both legal decrees, ‘Ashush cites the Qur’an (al-Ahzab: 6):

“The Prophet has a greater claim on the faithful than they have on themselves, and his wives are (as) their mothers.” (trans. by Shakir)

‘Ashush seeks to act as a high-profile ideologue, citing in length the hadith and drawing on Ibn Taymiyya. “Killing them [the movie affiliates] is a duty for every capable Muslim. The killing of the aforementioned is prescribed by Islamic law (…).” Stating two examples, Ka’b ibn al-Ashraf, a Jew, that Ibn Taymiyya in detail analyzed and a woman who had insulted the prophet, ‘Ashush makes his case clear that “the prophet had commanded the killing of al-Ashraf” as well as the killing of a woman, as stated later. For ‘Ashush this serves as proof that anyone “offending the prophet, even Muslims, are sentenced to death for this.” Independent of Muslim or non-Muslim, man or woman, the blood of those insulting Muhammad must be shed. “For this is the ruling of the prophet”. ‘Ashush recounts the hadith of a female companion who on the account of a blind man insulted Muhammad and was subsequently put to death for her insults. The blind man had been her husband and he was the one who had killed her with his knife. He then stated to Muhammad the reason: “o messenger of God, I am her husband and she insulted you often (…) yesterday she insulted you and I took a knife and stabbed her in her stomach (…). The messenger replied: “so then witness her blood shed””.
This hadith, for ‘Ashush, provides enough argumentation to oblige Muslims to act accordingly, listing four key arguments:

  1. As the man had been blind and a companion of the prophet most aware of the shari’a, the woman insulting the prophet had been killed. She had been his wife, killed by him.
  2. Referring to the citation of the Qur’an, the prophet has a greater claim on the faithful than anyone else – even if this woman has children, or is the wife of a companion, she must be executed for her insult.
  3. This accounts for no matter what standing of position her children have;
  4. Or her position being a companion of the prophet, being in his service. “Killing her for insulting the prophet is pleasing for God, the Lord of the Worlds.”

Following a typical jihadist rhetoric, ‘Ashush repeats his statements of his writing in response to the insulting of the prophet in Germany, asking where the true scholars of Islam are, refuting the ‘state-owned’ ‘ulama’.


Entering a new dimension – Jihad via Bluetooth (Part 2)

In the first part we examined the structure of the data provided by the “Mobile Detachment” (Fariq jawwal al-ansar, FJA) media department of the Ansar al-Mujahideen Forum. As stated, in the second part we will take a closer look at the ‘mission statement‘ to understand the ambition of (re-) publishing indoctrinating jihadist materials with the intention of users being able to consume and disseminate this content by the means of one’s personal smart phone. One intention perhaps is the fact that your smart/mobile phone certainly is a highly personal gadget, which is rarely shared – unlike family household computers. The content on your mobile phone has a more private nature and allows you to quickly navigate and read through the jihadist materials without anyone noticing. The downside for jihadis, however, is an upside for the police, as the sympathizers are inspired to store incriminating content on their personal phones. That is probably the reason for including encryption software in the first data-package.

The Mission Statement

The FJA defines four sub-detachments in a posting that can be understood as a ‘mission statement’. A regular posting announced a “specialized detachment / unit (fariq) in the crafting and dissemination of all content, intended to run on mobile phones. The content [includes] knowledge (‘ilm), incitement (tahrid) and missionary work (da’wa) issued under the sponsorship of the Ansar al-Mujahideen forum’s administration.” The basic line is brokered into four simple categories, with the call of seeking support by any capable sympathizer within the forum:

1. “The fariq of audio-engineering: Engineering and dissemination of audio fragments of speeches and sermons given by the scholars and leaders. This includes recitations [of the Quran], poems, songs and other formats.

2. The fariq for transcripts: Selection, transcribing and publication of jihadist magazines, affecting stories, unique articles and the most important statements in a visible format or by any format that mobile phones support.

3. The fariq for designing propaganda pictures [‘Photoshop-Jihad’, examples here]: The design and dissemination of jihadi pictures and unique styling of any format supported by mobile phones.

4. The fariq of conversion and upload: The conversion of jihadist movies into any format supported by mobile phones [mostly 3GP] and by uploading parts [of the conversed videos].”

With the mobile phone turned to Jihad, each and any sympathizer can assume an active role in trying to disseminate jihadi content via Bluetooth to other devices. The goal is clearly described as “disseminating the jihadis’ mindset by the means of mobile phones (…) as well as developing the propaganda.” The fundamental principle of the FJA is to simply promote and spread chosen materials of jihad by all means. In this case, the modus operandi is sought that sympathizers are enabled by these data-packages to check their individual surrounding for Bluetooth enabled devices and hence blindly send out these catchy materials to unwary (primarily Arab) users. In some Arab countries, due to the harsh enforced segregation of the sexes, communicating and setting up  ‘secret dates’ has mainly turned to the use of modern technology. AQ in its never-ending endeavor is also always keen to capitalize on newest technology.

As described in the mission statement, “the jihadi forums rise up for the firebrand assaults and oppose the enemies of God, of His messenger, and of the believers with their hopeless attempt to wage war [against us] with our judiciary efforts by such means. These have progressed – slowly but surely –, all praise be God, with the development of the propaganda and by technical aspects. And this is the benefit of God. That’s what the brigades and media groups are about, who convey the methodology (manhaj) and the fundamentals of faith (aqida) of the pious Salafists.”

The FJA considers itself as yet another platform to disseminate, proselytize and hence protect the true version of religion. “What else are these projects than an answer to our noble scholars, stressing the need to develop the jihadi media.” The FJA concludes with the call to “thus help your brothers by whatever means you can” in order to counter any attempts of countering the jihadi narratives and by using every possibility.

Entering a new dimension – Jihad via Bluetooth (Part 1)

In October 2009 the Arabic “al-Ansar al-Mujahideen Forum” offered a special data-package designed for mobile phones. Published by a newly created Mobile Detachment the contents are aimed at sympathizers and adherents of jihadist principles. Provided with a special software the mobile users can access the documents or watch videos on their portable device while being able to send out these highly indoctrinating and radicalizing sources via Bluetooth to other, unwary, Bluetooth enabled devices. The data offered in these conveniently administrated packages provides nearly everything of the grand-genre of jihadist materials.

For the first part, a overview of these data-packages is provided, while for the future parts a closer look will be taken at specific documents and the “mission statement”. A total of five packages has been published up to date, with each remaining loyal to the same layout, logo and coherent file structure consisting of the following:

Programs: In this folder the program Symbian Blog is available to install on your Bluetooth capable mobile phone, including a Quran and a encryption software. By incorporating a specially designed operating system, these agitprop packages can be transferred to a mobile phone for re-dissemination via Bluetooth.

Audio: This section has three subfolders a) anashid, b) recitation of the Quran, c) speeches. The mix consists of indoctrinating politico-religious notions such as the “interview with Shaykh Abu Mus’ab al-Suri”, the “Biographies of the martyrs”, “There is nothing like Falluja”, or “Various Speeches by Shaykh Osama”.

Pictures: Here a great number of pictures are available for the user. Most pictures depict renown figures such as Jordanian Mujahideen commander Khattab in Chechnya, the 9/11 attacks or simply show various logos and in general the iconography of Jihad groups worldwide.

Videos: All the videos in this folder have been converted into the 3gp format, a playable version specially designated for mobile phones. For several years now, the jihad-videos are disseminated in multiple sizes and formats, one being 3gp. These include a video from the al-Malahim Media group by the Yemen based AQ branch. Videos also consist of “A martyr eulogizing another martyr” by the Somalia based Harakat al-shabab al-mujahideen, or al-Sahab videos showing the martyrdom operation against the Danish embassy in Pakistan.

Texts: The Arabic writings are offered in three formats: a) MS-WORD, b) Adobe Acrobat, c) Text-format. This guarantees that these texts can be read and made available via any mobile phone or computer by a simple standard text editor. The texts include all genres of the flourishing jihad literature. Predominantly the stories of slain Mujahideen and the testimonies of martyrdom operations are sought as a main driver of radicalization and indoctrination of these appealing role-models. Literature is offered telling the stories, once again, of outstanding and prominent jihadist figures and leaders from all over the world. This includes the biography and renown operations of Chechen commander Shamil Basayev, the architect of the Moscow theatre siege as well as the Beslan school massacre. The focus was clearly evident, as the case of the 5th data-package shows, which re-disseminated the martyrs biographies of fighters of the “Islamic State of Iraq”. Also complete electronic magazines are found in some data-packages, such as the Arabic language al-Sumud (“Resistance”) published by the Afghan branch of the Taliban or the Sada (“Echo”) of Jihad”. Another main element are the various statements, such as declarations and memorandum of the AQ offshoot in Africa, AQIM, or statements made by ISI claiming highly diverse attacks, military operations or simply refuting “lies made by the government of the Green Zone”. Handpicked books, transcribed sermons and interviews are, however, also among the files, which are deemed of great importance. These writings include ideological titles written by Hammud bin ‘Uqla al-Shu’aybi, “How to Prepare for your Afterlife” by newcomer-ideologue Khalid ‘Abd al-Rahman al-Husaynan or older documents such as “And Incite the Believers” by Saudi first-Generation AQAP member ‘Abdallah bin Muhammad al-Rushud.

The content of all data-packages is well chosen and partially comprises of new, up-to-date materials, but also capitalizes on older fundamental documents that are of ultimate importance in the jihadists’ mindset. The general aim by these packages are described in a “mission statement” that includes a invitation to join the endeavor of spreading jihadist materials and to “develop the jihadist media”.

 

Al-Maqdisi’s Online Library of Translated Jihadi Material

On 2 August 2009, Abu Muhammad al-Maqdisi announced the opening of an English version of his jihadi library. In the announcement, he requested that Falluja Forum members spread the word regarding his new website and to send him any trustworthy translations.

The English website is similar to the Arabic site but it currently does not contain the same amount of content. It has translations of several of al-Maqdisi’s books, articles, and interviews such as the book “Democracy … A Relegoin [sic],” downloaded 45 times, and the article “Balancing Between Negligence and Paranoia,” downloaded 13 times.

It also has several non-attributed articles like “Advice for the Seeker of Knowledge,” downloaded 13 times, an interview with Abu Qatadah al-Filistini regarding Islam and democracy that was downloaded 11 times, and several books and articles by different authors under the headings “Paradise People Creed” and “The Absent Obligation.” Additionally, it has a series of lectures by Yusuf al-Uyayri titled, “Constants on the Path of Jihad” and two articles in Russian.

Beginning a library of translations in different languages is not just an attempt to replicate al-Maqdisi’s efforts with the Arabic library, which is quite extensive, but also to make it easier to spread the jihadi-Salafi ideology beyond Arabic speakers.

Jihadi Spam

On 15 May 2009, the Jihadi Brigades of Internet Incursion, which appear to be a part of the Shumukh Forums, announced a successful “incursion” of over 250,000 email addresses. Their announcement stated:

We bring good news to the Islamic Ummah of the continuation of the electronic jihadi media raids in support of the truth in a time of disgrace and shame. Your brothers in the Jihadi Brigades of Internet Incursion have targeted 265,612 email addresses belonging to citizens of the Arabian Peninsula and surrounding countries … with emails containing Usama bin Laden’s “Practical Steps to Liberate Palestine,” which the al-Sahab Foundation for Media Production published. The emails were distributed as follows:

Saudi Arabia – 102,785 emails

Egypt – 54,500 emails

Iraq – 27,222 emails

Yemen – 20,373 emails

Kuwait – 15,755 emails

Oman – 12,031 emails

Bahrain – 8,336 emails

Qatar – 6,096 emails

The announcement went on to state that the Jihadi Brigades of Internet Incursion have reached 2.6% of their targeted email addresses and membership registration for anyone wishing to join the group is still open.

I have seen this group make similar announcements in the past, but do not know who is on their email distribution list, or how effective it is. Do to the large numbers of emails, some people are likely to read the email and maybe even watched the video, but, based on the way I treat unsolicited email, I doubt that this method would be very successful in recruiting large numbers to their cause.

More on Online Recruitment

Tim has a nice summary of a recent conversation between him, me, and Aaron about online recruitment.  Tim and I agree and I think Aaron does too, but he wants more rigorous metrics.  Fair enough.

Aaron observes that there are three things involved with radicalization:

  • Motivation (I’m willing to fight)
  • Association (I want people to fight alongside, both to steel my resolve and to help me carry out attacks)
  • Opportunity (I need places and means for carrying out an attack)

(Tim glosses these as Psychological, Social, and Organizational factors, which is helpful.)

Aaron goes on to say:

When we see so-called Internet jihadis who become active in real-world plots, they frequently come from the ranks of the forum activists, the guys who are more than just part of the Allahu Akbar chorus. It is through their online associations and the opportunities that the Internet provides that they are able to begin actually participating in the jihad.

Three thoughts:

  1. I agree that the Internet is a good tool for motivating people to fight.  But they are being motivated elsewhere (e.g. video links posted to mainstream forums).  By the time they join the Jihadi forums, they are already members of the Allah Akbar choir.
  2. The Jihadi forums are a terrible place to associate and find opportunities because no one trusts anyone else.  Take, for example, Abu al-Haytham’s meeting with another forum member.  A lot of distrust had to be overcome to make it happen.  And face-to-face contact was a necessity.
  3. Many (most?) of those who get involved in real-world plots were already supporting or engaging in operations before they joined the forums.

I wonder: Are there examples of people who were motivated solely through the Internet and found associates and opportunities solely through the Internet?  I know I’ve seen a few, but I couldn’t dig up any when asked recently.  I even re-read Petter Nesser’s compendious survey of all Jihadi arrests and attacks in Europe since the 1994 (due out soon in SCT) and still no luck.

Secondly, if there are examples, are they representative or exceptional?  None of these are rhetorical questions and I’m open to opining and anecdotal evidence.

How Online Recruitment Works

In a feeble attempt to live up to Jihadica’s new billing as the “most dangerous” website monitoring Jihadis online, I thought I’d post some thoughts on what role Jihadi forums play in recruitment and radicalization.

The usual characterization of online recruitment goes like this: some hapless Sunni Muslim starts poking around online, discovers Jihadi propaganda, and upon watching or reading it becomes radicalized and ready to fight.

It is certainly the case that some Sunni Muslims see or read online Jihadi propaganda about Muslim suffering at the hands of the West and decide they need to do something about it.  Why some respond and not others is a complicated issue that I won’t deal with here.  What I’m interested in is the mechanics of the propaganda’s delivery and how its effects are sustained.

Firstly, we don’t have a lot of examples of Muslims who were radicalized online and remained radicalized without meeting face-to-face with committed militants or like-minded acquaintances who could reinforce their new worldview.  Moreover, the pattern seems to be face-to-face radicalization first, followed and compounded by online material.  There are exceptions, but I think the general trend points in the direction I’ve indicated.

Secondly, online recruitment is not happening on the forums.  I have seen no evidence of new members being persuaded that fighting is the right thing to do; that would be preaching to the choir.  What I have seen is a lot of Jihadi missionary activity on more mainstream Muslim discussion forums.

Take for example a recent posting on the Shumukh (“Pride”) forum by member Abu Dharr al-Makki.  Makki announces the formation of an “Incitement Brigade” whose members will join other forums and, cloaked in proxy-provided anonymity, post recruitment material.  He provides a long list of such forums and suggests each member be responsible for five them.  There are lots of other examples of this type of outreach, but Makki’s post is enough to make my point.

So here’s my basic model: Jihadi forums are good for creating and storing propaganda material.  Mainstream forums are where online recruitment, if any, is happening.  But even if the recruitment is effective, the recruits still need some face time with committed militants or other recruits to remain radicalized; ingesting more propaganda or joining Jihadi forums isn’t enough.

Document (Arabic): 7-21-08-shamikh-recruitment-brigade-and-list-of-forums-for-dawa

Training for the Lone Jihadi

Ekhlaas member Dir` li-Man Wahada (Armor for One Who Was Alone) has written a brief guide for the Jihadi initiate to consult in preparation for the coming al-Qaeda strikes.  His purpose, he says, is to enumerate the general strategic framework of al-Qaeda so the initiate will be able to implement the organization’s vision locally, either by himself or in a small group.

The initiate must prepare himself in three respects: religiously, intellectually, and physically.

For the religious aspect, he must read:

  • تنبيه الراحل إلى أهم ما يحتاجه من المسائل (Informing the Traveler of the Most Important Issues He Needs to Know) by `Izz al-Din al-Maqdisi
  • حقيقة الحرب الصليبية الجديدة (The Reality of the New Crusader War) by Yusuf `Uyayri (or `Ayiri–have we decided yet?)
  • الباحث في حكم قتل أفراد وضباط المباحث (An Inquiry Into the Ruling of Death upon Soldiers and Officers of the Security Forces) by Faris Al al-Shuwayl al-Zahrani

For the intellectual and security aspect, he must read:

  • موسوعة أبي زبيدة الأمنية (The Security Encyclopedia of Abu Zubayda)
  • دعوة المقاومة الإسلامية العالمية (Call for the Global Islamic Resistance) by Abu Mus`ab al-Suri.  (“Reading the book will fill several weeks.  Don’t fail to complete it and don’t skip sections.”)

For physical preparation, the individual should at least do the following:

  • Exercise no less than three times a week for at least half an hour.  Beginners should join sports clubs.
  • Run outdoors at least once a week.
  • For those who can, swim on the days you are not exercising.
  • Avoid difficult exercises in the first few weeks to avoid injury.
  • Exercise less during Ramadan.

Dir` cautions those who take up this program to keep their Jihadi interests to themselves.  Dir` also acknowledges that some of the Jihadis think reading these books takes too much time; he counters that if they don’t know why they are fighting, they will merely be brigands.

This curriculum is similar in some respects to one we looked at in June.

Document (Arabic): 8-17-08-ekhlaas-how-individual-can-prepare-for-coming-jihadi-stages

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