ji·had·ica

Al-Qa’ida and the Afghan Taliban: “Diametrically Opposed”?

Vahid Brown October 21, 2009

Mullah Omar’s Afghan Taliban and al-Qa’ida’s senior leaders have been issuing some very mixed messages of late, and the online jihadi community is in an uproar, with some calling these developments “the beginning of the end of relations” between the two movements.  Beginning with a statement from Mullah Omar in September, the Afghan Taliban’s Quetta-based leadership has been emphasizing the “nationalist” character of their movement, and has sent several communications to Afghanistan’s neighbors expressing an intent to establish positive international relations.  In what are increasingly being viewed by the forums as direct rejoinders to these sentiments, recent messages from al-Qa’ida have pointedly rejected the “national” model of revolutionary Islamism and reiterated calls for jihad against Afghanistan’s neighbors, especially Pakistan and China.  However interpreted, these conflicting signals raise serious questions about the notion of an al-Qa’ida-Taliban merger.

The trouble began with Mullah Omar’s message for ‘Eid al-Fitr, issued on September 19, in which he calls the Taliban a “robust Islamic and nationalist movement,” which “wants to maintain good and positive relations with all neighbors based on mutual respect.”  Mullah Omar further stated that he wishes to “assure all countries that the Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan … will not extend its hand to jeopardize others, as it itself does not allow others to jeopardize us.”  A week later, Abu Muhammad al-Maqdisi, one of the most influential living Salafi jihadi ideologues, released an angry rebuke to these “dangerous utterances” of the Taliban amir, pointing out that they were of the same order as Hamas leader Khaled Mashal’s statement that the Chechen struggle is a Russian “internal matter.” For a person of Maqdisi’s stature to equate the Taliban with Hamas, especially in light of the recent jihadi media onslaught  against Hamas for its “crimes” against the Jund Ansar Allah, is an extremely serious charge.  Maqdisi ends his statement with the hope that he has misunderstood Mullah Omar’s message and that some clarification from the Taliban leadership will be forthcoming; more on this below.

A week after the Maqdisi message was posted, al-Sahab issued Ayman al-Zawahiri’s eulogy for Baitullah Mehsud (on which, see my earlier post). Midway through that speech, Zawahiri turns to the Palestinian issue, arguing that the mujahidin in Palestine should destroy the “laws of Satan” being imposed upon them, among which he singles out the notion that there should be “national unity with the traitors and those who sold out the religion and the homeland.” He goes on to lambast Hizbullah as representing a model of “turning jihad into a national cause,” a model which “must be rejected by the umma, because it is a model which makes jihad subject to the market of political compromises and distracts the umma from the liberation of Islamic lands and the establishment of the Caliphate.”

On October 6, Abu Yahya al-Libi’s al-Sahab video, “East Turkestan: The Forgotten Wound,” was released, which calls for support for the defensive jihad in northwestern China, one of those neighbors with whom Mullah Omar expressed a hope for “good and positive relations.” As in Zawahiri’s Baitullah eulogy, al-Libi emphasizes the dangers of dividing the umma into nations and ethnicities. He says that “East Turkestan [Xinjiang, China] is part of the Islamic lands that cannot be divided”; that it is the duty of all Muslims to support the Uighurs in their fight against the Chinese state; and that all who would appease China are “apostates.”  In these messages, then, both al-Libi and Zawahiri are denouncing, in the strongest possible terms, a political strategy being enunciated by the Taliban’s supreme leaders.

A week later, on October 12, Jordanian jihadi writer Ahmad Bawadi posted an exchange of correspondence that he’d recently had with the editors of the Taliban’s al-Sumud magazine. Bawadi, without naming names, points out that Mullah Omar’s ‘Eid message had engendered significant controversy, leading some to say that the Taliban supported making the same sort of compromises as Hamas.  The “clarification” sent in response by al-Sumud and posted by Bawadi pretty much dodged the question. Amid some tortuous sophistry about words being like a double-edged sword, the al-Sumud editors defended Mullah Omar’s position by comparing it to the Prophet Muhammad’s divide-and-conquer strategy of distinguishing between different groups of enemies: What’s wrong, as-Sumud asks, with saying we don’t want to fight the Buddhists (read: China) now, since the aim is to divide them from the Christians (read: ISAF/NATO forces) in order to weaken the latter?  Regardless of how one reads the al-Sumud  “clarification,” any doubts that the controversies were causing the Quetta Shura to rethink its public relations strategy were laid to rest the following day, when the Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan issued an open letter to the Shanghai Cooperation Conference, reiterating verbatim the “neighborly” sentiments from Mullah Omar’s ‘Eid message.  The SCO, it should be pointed out, includes China, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan, all countries that are directly targeted by al-Qa’ida-allied groups based in Pakistan’s tribal areas.

All of this has sparked a great deal of heated argument and anxious hand-wringing on several jihadi forums, but for reasons of space I’ll just single out one thread from the al-Hisbah forum. On October 14, “al-Najjar,” in a post entitled “Mullah Omar and Zawahiri Diametrically Opposed: A plan, a problem, or…?!,” contrasts the neighborly outreach of Mullah Omar’s ‘Eid message with the aforementioned statements about the “laws of Satan” in Zawahiri’s Baitullah eulogy, and ends by asking Zawihiri, “Oh our Shaykh, how is it that these are ‘Satanic laws’ when they are essentially the same as what has been mentioned by Mullah Omar, the Commander of the Faithful, to whom the mujahidin in Afghanistan and Pakistan have pledged their allegiance?”  A later poster, “Abu Azzam 1,” adds that Mullah Omar’s messages imply some level of recognition of the United Nations, an organization which al-Qa’ida has unequivocally labelled as “infidel,” and that these opposing moves seem to him to signal “the beginning of the end of relations between al-Qa’ida and the Taliban.”  Another forum participant, “Abu Salam,” agrees, writing yesterday that “this is a clear indication that al-Qa’ida and the Taliban movement are not of one mind, and that al-Qa’ida may turn on the Taliban in the near future.”  We shall see.  But one thing is clear: the recent shift in the Quetta Shura’s strategic communications is not to al-Qa’ida’s liking, and it is raising serious concerns among the broader Salafi jihadi movement about the religio-political legitimacy of the Afghan Taliban’s leadership.

“Fatah al-Islam between Asad al-Jihad2 and al-Maqdisi”

Scott Sanford June 8, 2009

A post by an unknown author titled, “Fatah al-Islam between Asad al-Jihad2 and al-Maqdisi / Lessons and Considerations,” has been making its rounds through the various forums. The author offered a scathing critique of Fatah al-Islam (FI) and of recent comments by FI’s Sharia Officer, Abu Abdallah al-Maqdisi (not to be confused with the Jordanian ideologue Abu Muhammad al-Maqdisi). Using statements from Asad al-Jihad2 (AJ2), who is a possible al-Qaida (AQ) leader, the author argued that FI’s leadership lacked clarity in its mission and was too afraid to attack Israel.

In considering al-Maqdisi’s statements, the author concluded that al-Maqdisi:

  1. Is not in Lebanon
  2. Is not aware of the complex relationship between the Lebanese and the Palestinian refugees living in the camps
  3. Is not aware of the “sectarian balances” in Lebanon
  4. Is not aware of the extent of Hezbollah’s state building in Lebanon

He also criticized FI for not having Lebanese Sunni priorities when the organization started in 2006. He claimed, “The Sunni aspired to reach a balance with Hezbollah and were not looking to the Israeli danger.” These accusations echoed statements by AJ2, who the author claimed grasped the full picture of the various battles in Lebanon. AJ2 stated that when FI entered Lebanon, it quickly lost Sunni support because it “began provoking and targeting the weakest party in Lebanon, which was the Sunnis in the army and internal security. It lost the support of all the Sunni at the same time because of the slaughter that took place on elements of the army, who were sleeping or separated from their weapons.”

According to AJ2, at this point, FI had two choices. 1) Eliminate its Sunni enemies and establish an emirate in Tripoli before starting clashes with Hezbollah, which controls access to Israel. 2) Transform the Sunnis into a potent fighting force supported by a wide majority. However, AJ2 reported that FI did not have the opportunity to make any choice because it clashed with security forces too soon, causing the Nahr al-Bared siege. He claimed that the other jihadi groups in Lebanon did not support FI because it had lost popular support.

AJ2 also maintained that Syria is highly active in penetrating and disrupting jihadi cells in the Levant. He claimed that Hashim Minqara, the leader of the Islamic Unification Movement, and Najib Miqati, a former prime minister of Lebanon, gave former FI leader Shakir al-‘Absi to the Syrians. He singled out Minqara alleging that he not only helped capture al-Absi, but also helped Syria penetrate the jihadi groups to further Syrian relations with the Hariri family and to gather information to sell to the US and France. He stated that Syria had unsuccessfully tried similar operations with the Islamic State of Iraq.

According to the author, al-Maqdisi’s story largely confirmed that of AJ2, but al-Maqdisi also tried “to confirm the role of Fatah al-Islam in the leadership of al-Qaida in the Levant.” However, AJ2 stated that there were no organizational links between FI and al-Qaida in the Levant (AQL).

The author then offered lessons learned from al-Maqdisi’s statements and criticisms of these lessons. The first was the limitation for recruitment from secular Palestinian organizations that are close to Syria. Al-Maqdisi claimed that after al-‘Absi was released from prison in Syria, he contacted “the brothers” and “decided to carry out the plan” and “exploit” Fatah al-Intifada, the precursor to FI. He convinced members of Fatah al-Intifada to prepare for operations against Israel from Lebanon. Accepting all nationalities, he wanted to “transform the conflict with the Jews from a Jewish-Palestinian conflict to a conflict between the Ummah and the Jews.”

The author criticized this, stating “How could have al-‘Absi expected to establish all of these complicated operations, and include Arab mujahidin, without the attention of Syrian spies, or without Syrian intelligence attempting to plant its spies within the organization?”

The second lesson was the loss of FI’s priorities. The author stated that FI started training and sending fighters to Iraq, which represented a diversion from FI’s stated aims of attacking Israel. He then mentioned a FI desire to target the entire Levant. Finally, he stated that the last FI goal was establishing an Islamic emirate in northern Lebanon. He quoted al-Maqdisi, “After easily controlling the camp and gaining the loyalty of some of the Islamic groups, there was the idea of establishing an Islamic emirate in Tripoli as the key in the battle with the Jews and to assist their brothers in Iraq. It would also attract the downtrodden Sunni in Lebanon, who raced behind Hariri the apostate. Additionally, it would be for the sake of attracting Sunnis to Syria because the tyranny of the Baath Party forced them to fear themselves.”

The author countered, “What are the priorities of the organization? Fighting the Jews, combating the Syrian regime and besieging it, or supporting the mujahidin in Iraq with trained men?” He also asked how FI thought it could fight Israel, when it was trying to open a front with Syria. He added that if the goal was to train fighters and send them to Iraq, then why cause trouble with Syria. According to the author, regardless of what FI’s goal was, it was not taking a course of action that could have achieved any goal.

The third lesson was the danger of miscalculations. According to the author al-Maqdisi said, “The Fatah al-Islam leadership did not expect the Army to enter the [Nahr] al-Bared camp. It calculated politically that the clashes would last for two days or more and then there would be calm like what happened in Ain al-Hilweh.” He claimed that that the decision to enter the camps was taken internationally because they are linked to the UN. He also thought that Lebanon’s complicated politics would forestall the Army from entering the camp and that the US hastened the decision to enter because it learned about FI’s presence in the camp, and its strategy and future goals.

The author responded with a question about why FI did not fear the repercussions of a Lebanese Army attack, but feared what would happen if they carried out an alleged plan to abduct Israelis, which essentially states that FI was too scared to attack Israel.

Finally, al-Maqdisi supposedly claimed that it is best if a group does not announce its responsibility for terrorist attacks because the enemy does not know where to respond. The author thought that the idea was bad because anyone could use the group’s name for bloody acts.

Two developments from this story will be interesting to watch in the coming months. The first is the criticism of FI, which may evolve into another incidence of jihadis bickering amongst themselves. The second is the supposed announcement of AQL. AQ has long attempted to establish a presence in the Levant and many groups have claimed to be AQ syndicates. Over a year ago, AJ2 warned that AQ would announce its presence in the Levant after the US presidential elections and it would begin attacking Israel by 2010. It appears that he is keeping his word. However, I will believe AQ is an actual presence in the Levant when I see it due to the multitude of groups in the past claiming to be AQ and the difficult operating environment in the Levant, which is largely due to the lack of ungoverned spaces on the border with Israel. Nevertheless, al-Zarqawi managed attacks in Jordan and launched rockets into Israel, so an attack is not completely out of the question.

No Jihadi Claim Of Rocket Attacks

Will McCants January 8, 2009

There’s been no claim on the forums today for the rockets fired from southern Lebanon into Israel but everyone believes it’s a Salafi-Jihadi group.  Some have opined that it’s Fatah al-Islam, but they’re as clueless as the rest of us.  Look here and here for some clues as to what’s going on.

Update: From MEMRI.

The Denudation Of The Exoneration: Part 13 (Final)

Will McCants December 2, 2008

Sayyid Imam wraps up his new book today.  Much of his final criticism is aimed at Bin Laden, whom he describes as incurious and incapable of holding himself accountable for his errors.  Regarding the latter, Imam compares Bin Laden negatively to Hassan Nasrallah, who apologized and offered compensation to the Lebanese civilians whose homes had been destroyed by Israeli bombing in the 2006 war (paging Andrew Exum).  

Sayyid Imam ends by explaining why his attacks on Zawahiri and Bin Laden have become more personal: he felt obliged to do it after Zawahiri accused him of being an Egyptian tool before Imam’s first book had even been released.  Zawahiri’s more pointed personal attacks in the Exoneration prompted an even more personal response.

Concluding…

The Denudation is divided into four sections:

 

  • Exposing the lies of Zawahiri
  • Exposing his jurisprudential errors
  • Exposing the ways he misleads the reader
  • Exposing his search for fame

In this, the conclusion, I wish to say: If there are Muslims who have been led astray by bin Laden, Zawahiri, and their like, how are they going to remain firm during the fitna of the Anti-Christ, which the prophet says will be the greatest fitna?

In like manner, people have been led astray by Ataturk for 90 years.  They praised him for expelling the allies from Turkey in World War I and called him “al-Ghazi” (pious frontier warrior), but that didn’t stop him from abolishing the caliphate and attacking Islam.

People should not fall under the spell of those who talk about religion and jihad before they know what these people stand for and what they know of the Sharia.

The Prophet has said that, “God helps this religion with a debauched man.”  The man he is talking about fought alongside the prophet at Khaybar, mightily vexed the infidels, and did not harm a single Muslim.  He only harmed himself by committing suicide on account of his wounds.  Compare him with those who bring great harm to Muslims.  What has been the benefit of destroying two buildings in America, destruction which led to the downfall the Taliban state, the only Islamic state in the world?  Bin Laden left Afghanistan to pay the price for his stupidity.  He cries for the children of Palestine but forgets the children of Afghanistan.  And behind him stands Zawahiri, justifying all of it.

Now Bin Laden is using his organization for his own personal security, leaving many of its members to be killed or captured.  Bin Laden even abandoned his most sincere supporter, Abu Hafs al-Masri, who had built al-Qaeda for him.  He, along with others, were killed in the American bombings in 2001 because they didn’t have the protection that Bin Laden had.  The captain is usually the last one to abandon the ship, but not Bin Laden or Zawahiri; they are the first.

Bin Laden talks of jihad, yet he withdrew from every battle he and his companions fought without the support of the Afghans against the communists.  Bin Laden was even captured during one of the battles.  The Arabs had no effective military role in the Afghan jihad against Russia.  To say otherwise is a lie. [On this, see Wright’s Looming Tower.]

What of Bin Laden’s religious knowledge?  In 1994 in Sudan, there was a subject that he was interested in.  I suggested he read a certain book about it.  He said to me, “I am unable to read a whole book.”  As for his speeches, his followers write them for him.

Is one who destroyed two buildings, and thus destroyed the Taliban state, knowledgeable in Sharia or military matters? Does someone who sends hundreds of his brothers to their graves or to jail for the sake of “the idea” and “the flame” of jihad (Exoneration p. 193) have Sharia or military skills?

These people are mischief makers.  And why not, as long as there is someone to pay for their mischief.  They can flee and accumulate popularity and money (Exoneration, p. 79, 199).

What are the consequences of their knowledge?  The operation succeeded (9/11), the patient died (Taliban state), and the doctor fled (Bin Laden and Zawahiri).

When Gamal Abdel Nasser lost the 1967 war, he presented his resignation from the presidency three days later.  Hassan Nasrallah apologized to the Lebanese people only one month after the July 2006 war with Israel and promised to pay compensation to those who had been harmed.  This was despite the fact that Lebanon was not occupied. It was partially destroyed, which Nasrallah could have prevented if he’d had good anti-aircraft weapons.  Compare this to Bin Laden, Zawahiri, and their followers.  They make no apologies to anyone.

Every follower of Bin Laden and those that approve their actions will be gathered together under the same banner on the Day of Judgment if they do not repent [ie they’re hell bound].

I had not intended to write a single word about Bin Laden, Zawahiri, or anyone else.  It did not occur to me to do so when I wrote the Document in December 2006 and when I revised it in March 2007.  I have witnesses who can attest to this.  But then I showed the Document to the brothers in prison in April 2007.  Afterwards, there was a lot of talk in the press about the Document, so I released a statement to stop speculation, which was published in May 6, 2007 in al-Hayat and al-Sharq al-Awsat.  I said it was a call to the Islamic groups to put Jihadi operations on the right path.  I said it deals with jurisprudential matters and not with a specific group.  Nevertheless, Zawahiri issued a statement in June 2007 criticizing the Document before it had been published and before he had a chance to read it.

Why did Zawahiri launch this preemptive strike?  He knew my opinion about the mistakes of the Islamic groups, such as prohibiting visa holders from operations in the Abode of War and other things that he cut from my book, The Compendium, in 1994.  Zawahiri and his colleagues in Europe continued to badmouth me, so I added material which was not in the Document I had initially shared with the brothers in April 2007 so I could respond to Zawahiri’s and his colleagues’ stupidity and reveal to the people what they stand for, but I wasn’t too specific.  I spoke more specifically about them in my interview with al-Hayat.

An important lesson: the matter of the masses relying on religious scholars

The religious scholars are the sources of religious guidance.  Al-Juwayni has said that when there is no caliphate, the religious scholars are the heads of the Muslims.

I’ve seen a lot of ignorant people like Bin Laden and Zawahiri presenting themselves as religious scholars for Muslims.  They are not, as I have shown in part two of this note.  I want to caution you against them here.  Warning against such people was the main reason I wrote The Compendium in 1993.

Document (Arabic): 12-2-08-al-masri-al-youm-denudation-part-13

Anti-Shia Graffiti In Gaza

Will McCants October 26, 2008

A member of the Faloja Forum, Abu Muhammad al-Rafhawi, has posted pictures of anti-Shia graffiti from Gaza that he claims was written by youth in the Qassam Brigades and the internal security forces.  I don’t know if this sort of graffiti is typical or if it reflects rising hostility toward Hezbollah and Iran among younger Hamas members, but it’s interesting nonetheless.

Document (Arabic): 10-24-08-faloja-anti-shia-graffiti-in-gaza

Jihadi Explains Iranian Realpolitik

Will McCants August 6, 2008

Abu `Abd al-Rahman `Atiyyat Allah (possibly this person) has written a new booklet titled Ru’ya kashifa in which he tries to convince his Jihadi brethren that Iran and Hezbollah are not working with the U.S. and Israel as part of a grand conspiracy to subjugate Sunnis. Rather, he argues, Iran and its cat’s paw Hezbollah are seeking hegemony in the region. Achieving it means supporting popular Muslim causes and making temporary alliances with ideological enemies or competitors. Below is a summary:

  • It is hard to analyze Shia states and groups because of their doctrine of dissimulation (taqiyya), or concealing one’s true beliefs. p.4
  • Dissimulation is permitted in Sunni Islam if you are in danger. But the Shia make a habit of it. p.5
  • Outwardly Iran and Shia groups stress Sunni-Shia unity; embrace causes that are important to Muslims, particularly the Palestinian issue; and put Iran forward as the only authentic Islamic state, which fills a void left by the absent caliphate. p.12-14
  • Inwardly, Shia sincerely believe in Islam, but it is an Islam of their own making, not true Islam; they believe they are the only true Muslims; and they are seeking to dominate the Islamic world. p.15-16
  • “The hostility between the Rejectionists [the Shia], America, and Israel is real hostility.” p.19
  • Those who believe there is no real hostility between Iran on one side and the U.S. and Israel on the other have bought into conspiracy theories, which are a regrettable flaw in our culture. p.19
  • The hostility of Iran toward the U.S. and Israel is partly religious, in that Shi`ism retains the religious hostility toward Christians and Jews found in the true religion, Sunnism. It is also due to Iran’s desire for power. p.19
  • Iran helped the U.S. in Afghanistan and Iraq because of its self-interest–the U.S. eliminated two of its enemies, the Taliban and Saddam. This is a good example of the opportunistic and circumstantial nature of Shia politics. p.21
  • The Shia make these kind of decisions because their greatest enemy is the Sunnis. They can live with Jews and Christians, but not Sunnis. Look how Iran treats its Sunni minorities, how Hezbollah behaves toward Sunnis, and how the Shia government in Iraq has dealt with Sunni Iraqis. p.21, 24
  • Contrary to what many Jihadis say, Hezbollah is not Israel’s collaborator. But Hezbollah will talk to Israel and work with it on a limited basis if it suits Hezbollah’s interests. p.22-3
  • The Shia are pragmatic. They are willing to work with anyone regardless of their stated beliefs. This includes working with Wahhabis. p.23
  • Hezbollah supports Palestinian militants to achieve the wider aims of Iran. It has adopted a popular cause to increase its popularity. It is also filling a leadership vacuum left by other Arab states who have failed to step up. p.32-3
  • Hezbollah is a tool of both Iran and Syria. It serves their interests and policies. p.36
  • Hezbollah prevents any Sunni resistance from setting up on the Lebanese border with Israel. It has cut deals with Syria, the U.S., and even Israel to retain its control of the area. p.36

Despite the excessive focus on dissimulation (which also plagues Western analyses of Shia politics) and the Iran-wants-to-rule-Sunnis argument (does it really want to rule Indonesia?), this is a good primer on Iran’s realpolitik in the Middle East and dovetails well with the findings of an excellent new book, The Limits of Culture. That `Atiyyat Allah has to chastise his fellow Jihadis for their conspiracy thinking and their overemphasis on cultural motives when analyzing state behavior shows that they are problems for the Jihadi analytical community. Same could be said for us.

abu-abd-al-rahman-atiyyat-allah-ruya-kashifa رؤية كاشفة

Islamic State of Iraq Online Media Distribution

Will McCants June 24, 2008

Just in time for Craig Whitlock’s helpful survey of Jihadi internet propaganda, Ekhlaas member Usud al-Tawhid (Lions of Monotheism) has posted a message about the Islamic State of Iraq’s method of media distribution. The message is by an Abu al-Zarqa’ al-`Iraqi, who claims to be a member of the ISI.

AZ warns forum members not to post media material from Iraq outside of official channels online. He relates that he once made this mistake when he published clips of an attack carried out by a certain “Dr. Fathi” (probably alluding to this). AZ’s action angered people in the ISI’s Media Ministry and resulted in AZ and another brother being hauled before a Sharia tribunal.

A brother informed AZ that Furqan is the only entity that can publish media material for the ISI. By this, AZ says, the brother meant that members of the ISI’s Media Ministry in al-Furqan were the only people allowed to upload material to the internet and send it to al-Fajr Media Center for distribution.

AZ explains to the brothers that there are several good reasons why the members of Furqan only want to publish media material through official channels:

  1. They do not want to cause hardship for their videographers and those who expose themselves to danger. (Presumably, he means that publishing material through unofficial channels increases the security risks.)
  2. They do not want to make things hard for people in the Media Ministry or Furqan.
  3. When material is published unofficially, the infidels think that their efforts are succeeding and that the information specialists are not able to publish material on the Internet because of security constraints. This, AZ says, is a very important point. Publishing through official channels demoralizes the infidels because it demonstrates that their plan isn’t working and that mujahids are still able to communicate.
  4. (Basically the same as point #3).
  5. The videographers capture an operation and give it to the brothers who clip the important material. Then the material goes to brothers who produce a product. Then the product goes to the Media Ministry and through it to the Fajr Center to determine the right time for publication.

After going through the benefits of posting ISI material through official channels, AZ attaches a letter that explains how to post ISI material when you don’t know how to contact the ISI: Compress the material, password protect it with with a number, and save it to one of the online file sharing sites. Then contact the administrators of Ekhlaas, Boraq, Hesbah, or Firdaws and give them the link. The administrators will send the material to Fajr, and Fajr will determine the right time to publish it.

Download (Arabic): 6-24-08-ekhlaas-isi-media-distribution

Fatah al-Islam Leader Threatens Hezbollah, U.S.-Friendly Sunnis

Will McCants June 9, 2008

Shakir al-`Absi, the fugitive leader of Fatah al-Islam, has issued his second audio statement since the defeat of his organization at the hands of the Lebanese Army last year. In it, he claims that the U.S. knows that it cannot directly break the “power” (shawka–a favorite Jihadi term) of the Sunnis in the Middle East, so it is using proxies to achieve the same result. This is particularly the case in Lebanon. Firstly, the U.S. is working through Sunni proxies to take control of the state’s material and media resources. Secondly, it is deliberately empowering Iran and its rejectionist allies in the region. (“Rejectionists” is a pejorative term used for Twelver Shia, who reject the first three caliphs).

`Absi goes on to say that the Sunnis of Lebanon have no one to fight for them. Hezbollah is not serious about fighting Jews; they just want control of Lebanon. And the Lebanese Army abandoned the Sunnis when Hezbollah militiamen swept into their neighborhoods in May. This, despite the fact that these same Sunnis had supported the army’s crackdown on Fatah al-Islam last year.

Toward the end of his audio statement, `Absi addresses the “heroes of Islam” in northern and southern Lebanon and the “lions of Islam” in the Palestinian camps in Lebanon:

The time of separation has come. Now you will find the lions of monotheism suddenly attacking the enemies of God, no matter who they are–Jew, Christian, hateful rejectionist [Shia], or apostate.

He also menacingly warns: “The car bombs of Iraq and the brigades of martyrdom seekers are not far from the enemies of God, wherever they are.”

Bin Laden Message Prompts Speculation on AQ Strategy in Palestine (Part 1)

Will McCants May 20, 2008

Bin Laden’s statement on May 18th has prompted several Jihadi pundits to speculate on AQ’s future strategy in the Palestinian territories. Over the next few days, I’ll post the most interesting speculation. For part one, we’ll look at a short post by Ekhlaas member Khalid al-`Asqalani.

According to `Asqalani, Bin Laden has presented a complete program of action for the coming stage of the Jihadi movement, which is the liberation of Palestine.

1) Bin Laden explained that oppressive international order is in an alliance with Israel and its resources are at its disposal.

2) The apostate Arab regimes are the guardians of Israel’s security, so overthrowing these regimes will make liberating Palestine much easier.

3) The pressure of the repressive regimes causes the Islamic groups to abandon jihad on the justification that it harms the da`wa (spread of Islam).

4) Hezbollah is misleading the youth because it has duped them into thinking it is the only resistance to Israel and that any other resistance in southern Lebanon must give obeisance; it plays political games at the expense of the Muslim community; and it gives its allegiance to the Guardianship of the Jurist (i.e. the Iranian government).

5) Fighting and jihad are a “strategic choice” for the Muslim community to replace the strategic choice of the defeatist Arabs who submit to peace and recognize Israel.

6) A group of people must penetrate the borders of Palestine in order to resist the Israeli blockade.

This is not quite the program of action that we were promised, but `Asqalani does pick up on Bin Laden’s call for jihad against the countries surronding Israel as a prelude to action in the Palestinian territories.

More interesting than `Asqalani’s summary of Bin Laden’s message is his take on why the time is ripe for the Jihadis to liberate Palestine:

1) They have a mature mujahid leadership that is well aware of the situation on the ground and can make military plans accordingly.

2) A global community of Jihadis can be mobilized to fight in Palestine regardless of their nationality.

3) The Jihadis have established a central base with the Islamic State of Iraq that can supply every mujahid with weapons, money, and training and function as a gathering point.

4) The Jihadis know what they want, they understand their enemy, and they have pushed the religious scholars to mobilize the Muslim community to fight.

5) Palestinians now know that their conflict is not a national conflict but a religious conflict.

`Asqalani is not alone in feeling that al-Qaeda is getting ready for operations against Israel in the Paletinian territories, even though Zawahiri tried to downplay expectations in his recent Q&A. In the following days, we will be looking at other Jihadi pundits who are responding in a similar manner. Bin Laden may only be throwing a bone to the Jihadis online and to those living in countries surrounding around Israel, but this sort of talk (increasingly frequent) also creates expectations, which in turn creates pressure for the al-Qaeda High Command to do more than talk.

Document (Arabic): 5-19-08-ekhlaas-khalid-asqalani-response-to-bin-laden-statement-on-palestine

Lebanon in the Mouth of the Dragon: Why Aren’t the Salafis Fighting?

Will McCants May 17, 2008

Ekhlaas member al-Sarim al-Shami (“the Stern Shami”) asks: Why aren’t the armed Salafi groups entering the fight in Lebanon? He is particularly critical of their religious leaders, who are sitting on their hands. Sarim acknowledges, as I wrote a few days ago, that some Ekhlaas members endorse this tactical neutrality in order to prepare for a larger battle against the state. But he retorts that there is no better time than now to begin “the holy war” (al-harb al-muqadassa) against the infidel foreign powers that are trying to shape the destiny of Lebanon. These powers know that conflict in Lebanon will only benefit “the sons of al-Qaeda,” so they are pushing their proxies to negotiate. They realize that if there is not a peaceful settlement, Lebanon “will become a second Iraq and (turn into) the Islamic State of Lebanon.”

Another Ekhlaas member, abu_3ubayda, disagrees. Armed Salafi groups should not enter the fray because it is merely a political dispute between al-Mustaqbal, Hezbollah, and Amal. It is not a battle to raise the banner of Islam. Moreover, the war is not caused by Sunnism or Shi’ism; if that were the case, then the situation would be different and there would be no way for the warring factions to reconcile because pious people on both sides would not agree to it.

Another member, Abu Suhayb al-Shami, agrees with Sarim for the most part, but does not think it is appropriate to criticize the Salafi religious scholars for not acting. No matter the near-term resolution to the crisis, he argues, Sunnis are now more receptive to al-Qaeda in Lebanon because of what happened (i.e. they will want AQ to defend them against Hezbollah).

Document (Arabic): 5-15-08-jihadis-debate-should-sunnis-fight-in-lebanon

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