ji·had·ica

Jihadi Salafi but not al-Qaida

Scott Sanford August 25, 2009

On 24 August 2009, Falluja Forum member Abu Yahya al-Mu’tasim issued a statement titled “A Jund Ansar Allah Clarification Regarding the Events of Rafah.” He claimed the statement is Jund Ansar Allah’s (JAA) newest, but forum comments to the post expressed doubts over its authenticity, referring to the fact that Hamas arrested JAA’s normal Internet spokesman after the “slaughter.” In the statement, JAA denounced several media allegations against the group and provided some clues to the make-up and outlook of the group.

According to the statement, fifteen of the JAA casualities in the Hamas attack were former members of Hamas’s military wing, the Qassam Brigades. These included Ibn Shaqiq Musa Abu Marzuq, a supposed former deputy to Khaled Mash’al, and a former leader in a “manufacturing unit” for the Qassam Brigades. It also alleged that JAA leader Abu Abdullah al-Muhajir “was very close to the Qassam leaders and participated in Qassam combat training.”

The statement claimed that Abu al-Nur al-Maqdisi’s announcement of an Islamic emirate in the Palestinian Territories was “symbolic.” It maintained that al-Maqdisi was aware of a possible Hamas strike and “wanted to illustrate to Muslims that Hamas actually rejects the idea of the Islamic emirate and fights the idea militarily.” The statement alleged that in al-Maqdisi’s final sermon, he dismissed many of the accusations levelled against the JAA, such as bombing merchants, declaring takfir on Hamas, and having connections to secular powers. The statement clarified that JAA did not join al-Qaida, and that it is not seeking revenge on Hamas. The declaration also denied that Abu al-Nur al-Maqdisi preached Khawarij teachings or that he blew himself up during the Hamas raid.

The statement maintained that Hamas is waging a campaign against the Salafi-jihadis. As evidence it cited the Hamas attack on the Army of Islam last year, recent arrests of Jaysh al-Ummah members, and the attack on JAA. It concluded, “We believe that Hamas does not want anyone to fight Jews unless it is under Hamas’s banner. Hamas sees that the Salafis who leave Hamas are the best fighters and most pious.”

This statement, regardless of its veracity, is an excellent example of the rhetorical war between Hamas and the Salafi-jihadis. The Salafi-jihadis depict Hamas as a power hungry entity that is not actually interested in Islam nor fighting Israel, while the Salafi-jihadis are pious and actively engaging Israel militarily. At the same time, they are careful not to insult rank-and-file members of Hamas. Given JAA’s allegation that fifteen of its recently deceased members were former Qassam members, and given Hamas’s need to confront the group militarily, it appears that this tactic is having some effect on Hamas’s members and that the leadership is taking notice.

In several instances, the statement denied that JAA were Khawarij, showing the Salafi-jihadi sensitivity to such names. The remarks denying al-Maqdisi’s suicide death may be an indication that suicide bombings, at least within Gaza, are taboo and another source of sensitivity for Salafi-jihadis. Finally, the statement made clear that JAA was not using takfir, making a distinction between itself and al-Qaida. Forum comments to the JAA statement took issue with this aspect of the statement and demanded further clarification. This would suggest that the Salafi-jihadism that is gaining ground in Gaza is not necessarily identical to that of al-Qaida. Moreover, On another level, it is yet an indication that the brand name al-Qaida is losing some of its appeal in the Muslim world.

Jihadis Respond to Hamas Attack on Jund Ansar Allah

Scott Sanford August 20, 2009

The forums are ablaze with postings regarding the 14 August 2009 Hamas attack on the Ibn Taymiya Mosque that Jund Ansar Allah (JAA), a group espousing Salafi-jihadi ideology, controlled.  Hamas assaulted the mosque in response to JAA leader Abd al-Latif Musa, AKA Abu al-Nur al-Maqdisi, declaring an Islamic emirate in Gaza and general JAA criminal activity. Not surprisingly, commentators are condemning Hamas’s actions and linking these actions to a larger Muslim Brotherhood and Iranian conspiracy to combat Salafi-jihadis.

Akram Hijazi claimed that Hamas has distorted the facts surrounding Salafi-jihadi groups. He maintained that through its violent targeting of Salafi-jihadis like the Army of Islam, whom Hamas also largely destroyed in September 2008, and now the JAA, Hamas is effectively practicing takfir against its fellow Muslims. In regards to the declared Islamic emirate, Hijazi stated that anyone who “read the emirate announcement well” knows that it was very general, for all of Palestine, and did not threaten Hamas’s authority. Hijazi exonerated JAA from any accusations Hamas has made against the group and he declared Hamas as the real criminal group in Gaza.

Hijazi also railed against Hamas in a second article stating that the Salafi-jihadis are not against pious Hamas members, but rather they are against Hamas hypocrites and liars. He used Ahmad Yassin and Abd al-Aziz al-Rantisi, both former Hamas leaders who Israel assassinated in 2004, as examples of good Hamas members. He went on to claim that the Salafi-jihadis were the first to attack former Fatah chief in Gaza Muhammad Dahlan, the Oslo Accords, and Mahmud Abbas.

These assertions are important because Hamas members consider Yassin and al-Rantisi good leaders, but now Hijazi is linking these leaders with the Salafi-jihadi movement, of which Yassin and al-Rantisi were not a part. In short, Hijazi is attempting to hijack the legacy of these leaders from Hamas to the Salafi-jihadi cause, giving latter more credibility. His comments about Dahlan, Oslo, and Abbas reiterate this point because Hamas is famous for its opposition to these Fatah symbols, not the Salafi-jihadis who played a minor, if any, role in opposing Fatah and its goals.

Hijazi was not the only commentator who attempted to lure rank-and-file Hamas members towards Salafi-jihadism. Hani Siba’i, a radical preacher in the UK, claimed the Muslim Brotherhood and Hamas have strayed from the right path and true Islam. He encouraged ordinary Hamas members to turn against the group by adjusting its slogan of “death in the path of God” to “death in the path of the man-made parliament.”

It is not surprising that jihadi commentators are condemning Hamas for its attack against the JAA. However, their attempts to exploit this event to their advantage by luring Hamas members away from the movement are interesting. To do this, propagandists are linking Hamas symbolism and achievements to Salafi-jihadism and reaching out to rank-and-file members. As long as Hamas remains in control of Gaza, this attempt will not likely achieve many results. However, if Hamas starts to lose control, either physically or ideologically, Salafi-jihadis may see a boon in recruitment, which will mean more violence in Gaza and against Israel.  

Abu al-Yazid Mending Fences with Hamas

Thomas Hegghammer July 10, 2009

It’s late, I know, but I couldn’t let Mustafa Abu al-Yazid’s interview with al-Jazeera go uncommented. I found it absolutely fascinating. My hat is off to Ahmad Zaydan for finding Mustafa and asking him excellent questions.

International media focused on the A-bomb remark, but this was neither a very significant or surprising part of the interview (here I agree with Dan Drezner). It was just a quick unrehearsed side comment in an answer to a question about the security of Pakistan’s nuclear weapons.

The most significant part of the interview was Abu al-Yazid’s endorsement of Hamas. “We support the sincere mujahidin in Palestine, even the mujahidin of Hamas. We support them and help them; they are our brothers; we and they have the same ideology and the same method,” Abu al-Yazid said. This is quite a different message from that of Ayman al-Zawahiri and Abu Muhammad al-Maqdisi, who have been relentless in their criticism of Hamas in the past few years.

Not surprisingly, this caused quite a debate on the forums (see also here and here), where Hamas has long been subject of criticism (see e.g. here, here and here).

Abu al-Yazid’s statement was clearly an attempt by al-Qaida to mend fences with the broader Islamist movement and reach out to a wider audience. His choice of podium was surely no coincidence, for he is well aware that most al-Jazeera viewers are sympathetic to Hamas.

It has been a while since I heard a top al-Qaida member speak as clearly and straightforwardly as Abu al-Yazid did here.  He gave simple and seemingly honest answers to questions about al-Qaida’s organizational structure in Afghanistan, attacks called off against the US, the issue of two Islamic emirates (Iraq and Afghanistan), and many other things. Rob at the Shack is also right that overall, Abu al-Yazid’s remarks were not outlandishly radical when seen from the Arab street (the nuclear remark apart, obviously).

With the Abu al-Yazid interview, al-Qaida undoubtedly regained some of the popular support lost over the past few years. It is a reminder of how good al-Qaida can be at PR when they want to.

Watch the whole thing, look at the extracts or read it – I guarantee you will not be disappointed.

When Hamas is not Islamic Enough (Part 1)

Scott Sanford May 27, 2009

On 4 May 2009, Abu Yunis al-Abbasi wrote an article critiquing Hamas’s supposed “neglect” in implementing strict sharia law in Gaza. He claimed that his article was a response to a lecture that two alleged Hamas jurisprudents, Mazen Haniyah and Wael al-Zard, gave to the student council at the Islamic University in Gaza. His critique provides excellent insight into many of the issues takfiris have with Hamas since it took power in Gaza.

Al-Abbasi started his article emphatically stating, “Our demand is sharia rule, it is not a demand for implementing boundaries only,” implying Hamas is only employing partial sharia law and that will not do. He stated that sharia law is important for five reasons:

  1. Protecting Islam by punishing those who leave it with death
  2. Protecting oneself by punishing aggression with “reprisal”
  3. Protecting the mind by punishing aggression upon it with 80 lashes, an example of violating the mind is drinking alcohol
  4. Protecting honor from slander with the punishment of 80 lashes
  5. Protecting money from stealing with the punishment of amputation

Al-Abbasi claimed that a common question regarding Hamas’s use of law is, “Isn’t this implementing the provisions of sharia?” He replied that the need to ask such a question proves that Hamas is not employing full sharia law, which is “a great defect.” However, he did provide several of the examples al-Zard gave allegedly demonstrating how Hamas has employed many aspects of sharia such as “jihad and martyrdom …  steadfastness in the face of a series of struggles, and banishing drugs and debauchery.” He cited four reasons why these claims are incorrect. First, he maintained that Hamas achieved most of its accomplishments before it seized power in Gaza.  Therefore, the accomplishments could not be a result of sharia. Second, he stated that Hamas’s assertion that it was steadfast “in the face of a series of struggles” is incorrect because it is based on nationalism, not sharia. Third, in regards to Hamas and drugs, he mentioned that every government fights drugs and that Hamas is using temporal laws to fight drugs instead of God’s law. He complained that Hamas does not attempt to right the supposed other wrongs in society like makeup, unveiling, and “shameless parties.” Finally, he faulted Hamas for supposedly using many sources of law, like the Bible and Torah, as well as the Quran. He claimed that this is grounds for being an infidel and furthered his point by stating that the Mongols and the Jahiliyah period Arabs, presumably all infidels, used varied sources as well.

Allegedly, al-Zard stated that if Hamas ruled by sharia, the results would be negative. Al-Abbasi responded by citing evidence that when Muhammad was surrounded in Medina during the Battle of the Ditch, he did not give up Islam. Al-Abbasi continued, “Who ordered us to rule by sharia? Was it not God? Therefore, it is not permissible for us to fear anyone when we implement it because he who orders us to implement sharia will defend us and will not surrender us to our enemy when they fight and make war upon us.” It is possible that when al-Zard spoke of the negative results from implementing sharia, he was speaking about the probable negative repercussions to Hamas’s popularity. Gazans may be conservative, but there is little evidence that they aspire to a Taliban-like state as al-Abbasi proposes.

Al-Abbasi continued his attack with four responses to al-Zard’s supposed commentary that implementing sharia is not possible because Hamas is not powerful enough. First, he claimed that executing temporal law also requires power and since Hamas has enough power to implement temporal law, there is no reason for the organization to not employ sharia. Second, he maintained that since the Hamas government is independent it should be able to institute sharia, even if it is under siege. He cited the Taliban’s destruction of the Buddha statues in 2001 as evidence of a government under siege that was still able to assert its authority using sharia. Third, he maintained that if Hamas can defeat Israel, it could implement sharia. Finally, he claimed that the Taliban, the Islamic State of Iraq (ISI), and the Shabab al-Mujahideen all successfully implemented sharia. Thus, Hamas can too. Again, al-Abbasi ignored the popular backlash that resulted due to the Taliban and the ISI supposedly ruling by sharia law.

Finally, al-Abbasi countered al-Zard’s supposed claims that Hamas has found a middle way in Islam by “feeding the hungry, not amputating the hand of the thief.” He stated, “Islam is the religion of moderation, without a doubt. However, moderation is not limited to whims and temperaments. Rather, it is bounded by legal guidance from the Quran and the Sunnah.” Unlike Hamas, takfiri organizations are not known for their charitable work, another reason why they generally are not very popular in the communities they wish to rule.

This summary of the first half of al-Abbasi’s argument illustrates some of the ideological differences between Hamas and takfiris. (Look here for Abu Muhammad al-Maqdisi’s take on Hamas.) Al-Abbasi was emphatic in stating that Hamas has not implemented what he considered sharia law and that the organization does not intend to do so anytime soon, which he believed is a mistake. Thus far, al-Abbasi has refused to consider that the extreme nature of the ISI and al Qaeda makes them unpopular in the Arab world. This lack of retrospection will lead like-minded individuals and groups to new failures and will make it difficult for them to achieve a large following in the Palestinian Territories.

The Islamic State of Iraq in Gaza?

Scott Sanford May 18, 2009

On 15 May 2009, Falluja Forum contributor Wahj al-Rasas (Blazing Bullets) posted photos of leaflets the Islamic State of Iraq (ISI) supposedly distributed recently in Gaza. The leaflets claim that the recent announcement of Abu-Omar al-Baghdadi’s capture is a fabrication, the ISI does not know the identity of the person in the alleged photos of al-Baghdadi, and al-Baghdadi is doing just fine. The leaflets were signed by the “Ministry of Information / The Islamic State of Iraq” and the “the al-Shahid Abi-Mus’ab al-Zarqawi Brigade for Jihadi Media Jerusalem.”

The content of the announcement is not surprising, given al-Baghdadi has already released a statement refuting claims of his capture, and it is possible that the announcement is a forgery. However, if it is legitimate, it is interesting that the ISI would be so concerned about how Palestinians perceived the alleged al-Baghdadi capture – I have not seen a special ISI statement issued by a Somalia, North African, or Yemeni ISI branch. Additionally, it could indicate that the ISI is looking beyond Iraq and has already started activities in Gaza. It remains unclear whether or not these activities are merely for propaganda value, i.e. another attempt to connect the Palestinian issue to the wider global jihad, or an actual effort to build an ISI presence in Gaza. However, if it is the latter, the ISI faces a step uphill battle because, as I have argued previously, it is unlikely that Hamas will allow a competing organization to operate in Gaza freely.

Magazine Update

Thomas Hegghammer February 12, 2009

It has been a good week for jihadi magazine buffs. There are new issues of Qadaya Jihadiyya and Tala‘i Khurasan, as well as two brand new magazines, Sawt al-Qawqaliz (sic) and Markaz Ansar al-I‘lam.

The newcomers are not particularly impressive and I do not expect them to last long in the fiercely competitive world of jihadi media. Sawt al-Qawqaliz seems intended as a mouthpiece for the Caucasus Emirate, and it is clearly the work of non-native Arabic speakers, for the language is full or errors and low on idiom. Incidentally, I cannot figure out what “Qawqaliz” is supposed to mean (suggestions anyone?). It could simply be a misspelling of Qawqaz, but how could they get the very name of the magazine wrong? In terms of content, the 24-page publication is almost entirely focused on Caucasian issues and does not even mention Gaza. The Shabab of Somalia are the only outsiders to receive a mention, though only at the very end. The PDF file is clumsily assembled and reads from the bottom upwards.

The 21-page Markaz Ansar al-I‘lam is more difficult to place geographically and the editors claim independence “from any organization, foundation or media front”. But there is very little original material here. It is basically a cut-and-paste job with old articles from the jihadi Internet and the mainstream press. Articles by a “young man from Gaza” and by Abd al-Bari Atwan give the magazine a certain Palestinian focus, but that is not surprising given the current political climate.

The fifth issue of Qadaya Jihadiyya is considerably more impressive than the newcomers. With its high-quality photos and witty editorial style, this is the Vogue Magazine of jihadi media. QJ is affiliated with the al-Yaqin media center, but it is not easy to place geographically. My guess is that the editors are based somewhere in the Levant, but it’s just a guess. The latest 21-page issue is devoted to Gaza and has an interesting strategic study which concludes that there was no clear winner in the latest war, but the final outcome will be decided by the next Palestinian elections. If Hamas gains political ground vis a vis Abu Mazen, Israel’s strategy will have failed.

The thirteenth issue of Tala‘i Khurasan is also well produced, and with its 90 pages it is one of the chunkier publications on the market. As its name suggests, it is produced by Arabs in Afghanistan, and it has several high-profile contributors, such as Sheikh Atiyat Allah, Mustafa Abu Yazid and Abu Yahya al-Libi. As such, it is perhaps the jihadi magazine with the closest links to al-Qaida Central, although not to Bin Ladin and al-Zawahiri. Interestingly, this issue does not have much material on Gaza. The cover story is a very interesting strategic study of the impact of 9/11 on Pakistan, and the rest of the magazine is devoted to either general jihadi culture or to Afghanistan-related developments. It is possible that most of the magazine was assembled before the Gaza debacle. The last issue came in October 2008, and many of the field reports in the current issue date from August and September 2008.

Here are the tables of contents:

Sawt al-Qawqaliz
•    Commander Dawud: “This year was a successful one for us”
•    A word from the Chechen leader Dokka Umarov on the establishment of the Caucasus Emirate
•    Shaykh Sa‘id Buryatski: “How I went out for jihad and what I saw in the Caucasus”
•    Yudugov: “The key to security in south Caucasus is hidden in the north Caucasus”
•    The infidels crushed … because of the union of the Muslims in the Caucasus
•    Commander Hussain:  All the Mujahidin received the decision by Commander Dokka on the Qawqaz Emirate with great joy
•    Experiences of brother Abu Umran
•    Letter from the Chechen leader martyr Abd al-Halim Saidulayev on the preparation to announce an Islamic state
•    Kazbak, the “Lion of Cherkessia”
•    The freedom of Chechnya is a matter of time
•    Everything starts with the small things
•    Students of Daghestan want a life governed by Sharia
•    When Muslims leave jihad, God punishes us.
•    The theory of the unity of religions is a notion of infidelity, atheism and heresy
•    The Emirate’s agency obtains recording of the collaboration of Zakayev with the infidel Russians
•    Martyrdom of Commander Walid in Ingushetia
•    Greetings to the Shabab in Somalia

Markaz Ansar al-I‘lam
•    The bedouin and politics
•    When victory is slow (Sayyid Qutb)
•    And the martyrs are taken from you (Hussain bin Mahmud)
•    Memoirs of a young man from Gaza
•    The smuggling will continue until its targets are reached (Abd al-Bari Atwan)
•    The Pakistani Taliban
•    The raid of love for the Prophet
•    The power is in firing (Abu Umar al-Kurdi)
•    Memories of the assassination of the martyr leader Khattab

Qadaya Jihadiyya
•    Gaza under Zionist siege and anti-Islamic silence (Suhayb al-Ghazzawi)
•    To the honourable scholars of the Muslim nation (Abu Abdallah al-Shafi‘i)
•    The Battle of Gaza: Who wins and who loses (Khalid Abd al-Rahman al-Nubi)
•    Palestine between the diplomacy of Hamas and the viciousness of the Arab regimes (Muadh al-Khuwsti)
•    Gaza facing a war more dangerous than the military one (Abu Taha al-Miqdad)

Tala‘i Khurasan
•    The impact of 9/11 on the crusader assault and the internal Pakistani front (Husam Abd al-Ra’uf)
•    Spend at your leisure (Sheikh Atiyat Allah)
•    Divine directions (Mustafa Abu Yazid)
•    Al-Zarqawi and the speech of memories (Abu Ubayda al-Maqdisi)
•    In the shadow of the quranic verse (Sheikh Mansur al-Shami)
•    Signs of victory emerging in Afghanistan (Sheikh Abdallah Sa‘id)
•    Field reports
•    The Ansar (Shakir Allah al-Kuwaiti)
•    Frostbite (Dr. Abu Abd al-Rahman al-Makki )
•    Witticisms from literary books (Ja‘far al-Tayyar)
•    Messengers of Destinies (Abu Ubayda al-Maqdisi)
•    Mother of believers Khadija bint Khuwaylid (Atiyat Allah Abu Abd al-Rahman)
•    If I were Bin Ladin I would declare it: The success of the strategy – part 1 of 2 (Abu al-Futuh al-Maghribi)
•    Abu Abdallah al-Shami: Journey of martyrdom (Abu Yahya al-Libi)
•    Reviving the hope – and how sweet the feeling of hope (Mujahid)

Document (Arabic): 02-02-09-faloja-sawt-al-qawqaliz-1
Document (Arabic): 02-08-09-faloja-ansar-al-ilam-1
Document (Arabic): 02-07-09-faloja-qadaya-jihadiya-5
Document (Arabic): 02-11-09-faloja-talai-khurasan-13

Gaza Galore in New Issue of Sada al-Jihad

Thomas Hegghammer January 28, 2009

The thirty-second issue of the ever so slick magazine Sada al-Jihad is out. Like the rest of jihadi media these days, it focuses on Gaza. Practically the entire 41-page journal is devoted to Palestine, and the front page features a close-up picture of the blood-stained face of a Palestinian child. However, the articles do not seem to contain many original viewpoints and analyses. They highlight the civilian suffering, the treason of the Arab leaders, and the futility of the moderate  Muslim Brotherhood approach. Much of this has been heard before.

But this does not mean the Gaza rhetoric is inconsequential. For many I am stating the obvious, but the Israeli assault on Gaza has greatly benefited al-Qaida propagandists and recruiters. In 2007 and 2008, the global jihadist message was losing some of its resonance, partly as a result of Iraq’s sectarian turn, bickering within the jihadi movement, and the absence of new symbols of Muslim suffering. Gaza reinvigorated the global jihadist movement and provided a much-needed new rallying cause. I do not doubt that we will soon feel its repercussions in the form of new recruitment and perhaps more violent activity. By the way, it is a relief to finally see Western officials such as Alan West publicly recognizing the connection between Palestine and global jihadism.

The last time Palestine caused a similar stir was during the early days of the al-Aqsa intifada, which was then accompanied by a massive increase in the flow of recruits to al-Qaida camps in Afghanistan. Today the impact will be somewhat more difficult to measure, since new recruits have fewer places to go, but I would not be surprised if we see an increase in the number of people trying to go to Iraq, Afghanistan and other jihad fronts.

We are also starting to see foreign volunteers making it to the battlefront in Palestine. Princeton Professor Bernard Haykel kindly brought to my attention the martyrdom biography of a Saudi fighter named Abu Muhammad al-Marri who was recently killed in Gaza. Although he is not the first Saudi to try to join the jihad in Palestine,  he is, to my knowledge, the first to die in combat there. The novelty is not that foreign jihadists want to fight in Palestine – they always wanted to – but rather that al-Marri made it through and was allowed to fight by the Palestinians. There are three ways to interpret this report: 1) as a fluke – al-Marri had a Palestinian wife so he may not have been seen as an outsider; 2) as reflecting a decision by Hamas to allow in a Saudi or two to embarrass the Saudis, or 3) as reflecting a strategic decision by Hamas to accommodate more foreign volunteers. Only time will show which one it is.

Meanwhile, here is the table of contents of Sada al-Jihad 32:

•    The Gaza war: if we lose, our enemies will benefit (leader)
•    Hamas: correct the basis and fear God, not people (by Abu Muhammad al-Maqdisi)
•    Gaza, attacked by the Jews and besieged by the apostates and the infidels (Abd al-Aziz al-Julayyil)
•    The Gaza massacre and the siege of the traitors (Ayman al-Zawahiri)
•    Gaza, a war that distinguished the ranks and uncovered positions (Sada al-Jihad special)
•    Reflections on the jurisprudence of jihad (part 2) (Muhammad al-Shaybani)
•    Believers are brothers (Abu Umar al-Baghdadi)
•    A call for jihad and to end the aggression on Gaza (Usama bin Ladin)
•    The lies of the blood profiteers are uncovered in the cities of Gaza and al-Ahya (Abu Taha al-Miqdad)
•    The great scandal (Ahmad al-Masri)
•    Will Palestinians understand those waging war on them? (Akram Hijazi)
•    Amir al-Shihri (Abu Hilal)
•    How do you confront an interrogator?
•    A call to the monotheists

Document (Arabic): 01-28-09-faloja-sada-al-jihad-32

Document (Arabic): 01-28-09-almoltaqa-saudi-martyr-in-gaza

Bin Laden And Zawahiri Not Sharing Talking Points

Will McCants January 14, 2009

It’s interesting to compare Bin Laden’s new statement on Gaza with Zawahiri’s of last week.  Of course the overarching message–jihad now!–is the same.  But unlike Zawahiri, Bin Laden doesn’t mock Obama, he doesn’t echo Zawahiri’s call for demonstrations in Egypt (Bin Laden says demonstrations are useless), and he takes a slightly more conciliatory view of democracy (electing a president, yes; man-made legislation, no).  Bin Laden is also more explicit about how to raise money to finance the jihad (hit up rich businessmen).

Bin Laden does echo Zawahiri in one important respect.  Zawahiri said that the U.S. withdrawal from Iraq is one of the “good omens” (basha’ir) of AQ coming to fight in the Palestinian Territories.  Bin Laden ends his message by saying that in this year there will be “omens” (tabashir, from the same Arabic root as basha’ir) of the receding of the Zionist-Crusader campaign.  Make of it what you will.

Here’s a summary:

  • Jihad is the only way to solve the problem in Palestine.  Appealing to the Security Council or local rulers won’t solve it.  The former want to hurt Muslims and the latter are agents of the West.
  • The leaders of Islamic movements who won’t call for a jihad in Palestine unless their rulers approve it are ducking their responsibility.  Jihad today is an individual duty, not dependent on the permission of rulers.
  • Engaging in demonstrations without weapons is useless.
  • You can win against the Zionist-Crusader alliance if you will just fight.  Look at what the mujahids did in Afghanistan against the Soviets.  Look at what the mujahids have done to the U.S., which is now bleeding human and financial resources.  It is in the midst of a financial crisis; its enemies don’t fear it and its friends don’t respect it.
  • Israel had to launch an attack on Gaza to protect itself by replacing Hamas with the Palestinian Authority.  It has done so now because the power of its chief sponsor, the U.S., is rapidly waning and because its major backers, Bush and the neoconservatives, are about to leave office.
  • Biden, Greenspan, and various world leaders have said the global economic system is on the verge of collapse.  The American intelligence community reports that U.S. influence will wane even more in the coming years.
  • Americans can’t continue to fight Muslims for several more decades.  Most Americans are displeased with what Bush has done.  He has bequeathed two wars to his successor, who can’t win them no matter what he does.  If he withdraws, it’s a military defeat.  If he continues, it deepens the economic crisis.
  • The open fronts of jihad “in the region” are Palestine, Iraq, Afghanistan, Waziristan, North Africa, and Somalia.
  • Muslims should support the jihad financially.  One wealthy businessman can pay for all the expenses of jihad on the open fronts.  I know many Muslim businessmen want to support the jihad financially, but they are worried about being discovered by America and its agents in the region.  This is not an excuse.
  • You cannot secure your rights by voting; they can only be secured through force.  Western countries themselves took their rights by force.  Look at the French Revolution.  Look at the American Revolution.
  • There can be no ballot boxes in our countries while tyrants rule them.
  • Muslims believe in electing presidents and offering him council.  But we do not believe in electing legilatures that create man-made laws.
  • We are in solidarity with you since we are fighting the same enemy.
  • “God wills that this year will reveal the signs of dawn and the omens of deliverance through the receding of the Zionist-Crusader reach.”

The Denudation Of The Exoneration: Part 8

Will McCants November 28, 2008

In part 8, Sayyid Imam continues to hammer al-Qaeda for bringing disaster to the Middle East and for the hypocrisy of its leaders.  He

  • puts forward the odd claim that AQ lied to the U.S. about WMD in Iraq and about AQ ties with Iraq to push the U.S. to invade
  • observes that Iran and Syria have been the primary beneficiaries of AQ’s antics in Iraq
  • notes what any observer of the region already knows but rarely says: bashing the U.S. and Israel and talking about the Palestinian issue is great PR
  • offers an excellent explanation as to why AQ will not get a foothold in the Palestinian territories
  • claims that Bin Laden gave Saudi donations for jihad to Nawaz Sharif in support of his candidacy against Benazir Bhutto

Continuing…

Z claims that only the mujahids have thrawted the plans of the U.S.  That’s like Gamal Abdel Nasser’s slogan after the ’67 defeat that “no voice rises above the voice of battle” in order to silence his critics.

AQ brought the U.S. into the region and caused it to occupy Iraq and Afghanistan.  It gave the U.S. false information about WMD in Iraq and tying Iraq to al-Qaeda to give the U.S. the excuse to invade Iraq.  They did this to lure the U.S. into a battlefield where it could be destroyed.  But AQ killed far more Iraqis than it killed Americans.  It brought the U.S. in and excommunicated the people of Iraq solely to fulfill its desire to fight America.

Z claims that AQ thwarted the plans of the U.S. but the truth is the opposite.  Wherever AQ goes, it brings destruction to Muslims.

Those who have benefitted from the killing in Iraq are first Iran, then Syria.  Is Syria facilitating those who seek to fight in Iraq out its love for jihad, for the Iraqis, or for its own self interest?  Aren’t some of the leaders of AQ who are encouraging others to fight in Iraq located in Iran, particularly the son of UBL?  Is fighting for the interests of Syria and Iran a jihad?  Hasn’t Z previously paid his brothers to fight in Egypt in service of Sudanese intel?  Isn’t killing the Iraqis and demolishing their homes exactly what Jews are doing to Palestinians?  Is this jihad or even thwarting the plans of America?  Wasn’t Iraq part of the Abode of Islam under Saddam before the American occupation?  Didn’t al-Qaeda, at the hands of Zarqawi, trigger a sectarian civil war in Iraq by killing the Shia en masse?  Haven’t the Sunnis paid the ultimate price for this?  Killing the Iraqi Shia only strengthened their ties to Iran and facilitated Iranian involvement in Iraq, whereas it did nothing but weaken the Sunni position in Iraq.

Does the mentality that lost an actual Islamic state in Afghanistan really believe that an Islamic state will be established in Iraq and not just on the Internet?  Are the Islamic peoples to be test animals for Bin Laden’s and Zawahiri’s experiment?

No one is more pleased with al-Qaeda today than Iran and Syria.  All they have to do is turn a blind eye to the fighters who travel through their countries to blow themselves up, which serves Iranian and Syrian interests.

8) One of Z’s ignorant beliefs is that he proves the truth of what he says by pointing to the number of his followers.

Z says I heaped abuse on Bin Laden, but then he asks which of us has better understood reality and affected more of Muslim youth and masses? (Exoneration, p. 10)

The truth is known by its agreement with the Sharia, not by the number of its followers.

I have not called on anyone to follow me.  I am only relaying what I think is right according to the Sharia. 

Aren’t those who extol Bin Laden the same people that previously extolled Saddam Hussein?

Z’s words [ie the truth of what you say is proven by the number of your followers] indicate a fundamental aspect of his character: he has always been looking for fame and he is willing to get it by killing the innocent.

* One of the deceptions of Z is his trading on the Palestinian question

It is well-known that the fastest way to gain popularity among the Arab and Muslim masses is to bash the United States and Israel and talk a great deal about the Palestinian issue.  Nasser did it, Saddam did it, Ahmadinejad does it, as do others.  However, these people have actually done something for Palestinians, particularly Nasser, whereas Bin Laden and Z just talk.  Z even says in his Exoneration that “the slogan which the masses of the Muslim umma have understood and responded to well for 50 years is the slogan of calling for jihad against Israel.  Moreover, in this decade the umma is mobilized by the American presence in the heart of the Islamic world.” [I think this quote is from Knights but haven’t checked it yet]

Z and Bin Laden talk about Palestinian children being hurt but not about the death they bring to the children of Afghanistan.

* Why doesn’t al-Qaeda undertake operations in Palestine?

If Al-Qaeda is so interested in the Palestinian question, why hasn’t it undertaken operations against the Jews there?  There are two reasons.  First, killing Jews is not one of Bin Laden’s priorities.  Second, al-Qaeda is an organization without a state; wherever it is, it is a stranger.  One can’t carry out operations in a country without the help of some of the people in that country. 

Al-Qaeda has failed to ally with any of the Palestinian organizations for four reasons:

1) Palestinian organizations don’t trust Bin Laden.  There’s no room to explain here, but it is an old matter from the days of the Afghan jihad.

2) Al-Qaeda has nothing to offer Palestinian groups militarily since the latter are far more advanced.  Indeed, Al-Qaeda relied on the cadres of the Egyptian Islamic Jihad trained by the Palestinian groups in Lebanon from 1990 to 1992.

3) Different tactics with respect to the use of force.  Bin Laden uses blind force to kill as many people as possible, even if it leads to the destruction of his organization–“organizational suicide.”  Palestinian organizations, on the other hand, use limited force to make gains against the enemy while ensuring the survival of their organization.  They follow the traditional principles of guerrilla war, the “war of the flea and the dog.”  Bin Laden’s new way is the war of the elephant, which makes mass killing the goal.

4) Palestinian organizations don’t need Bin Laden’s money since they have their own resources, just as they are more politically sophisticated than Bin Laden.

This is why Al-Qaeda has failed to ally with Palestinian groups and failed to gain a foothold in Palestine.  That’s why Z in his recent statement called for the Bedouin of Sinai to engage in jihad in Palestine.  It’s just propaganda.

When the Palestinian organizations rebuffed al-Qaeda, Z started criticizing them. Z accused Hamas of killing Jewish children with their missiles.  Is this a rational person?  What about the innocents al-Qaeda has killed in Afghanistan, Iraq, Algeria, and elsewhere?  Is what is permitted for Al-Qaeda forbidden for Hamas?  Z is sad for Jewish children but kills Muslim children.

Z accuses Hamas of participating in elections on the basis of a secular constitution.  Why does Z criticize Hamas only?  Why not also criticize his shaykh Bin Laden?  Bin Laden paid a lot of money in support of Nawaz Sharif in parliamentary elections in Pakistan against Benazir Bhutto.  This was money for jihad that Saudis had give Bin Laden.  When I found out about this in 1992, I said to Abu Hafs al-Masri, who was the one who gave the money to Nawaz Sharif, “Abu Hafs! By God, Bin Laden is leading you to Hell!”

Document (Arabic): 11-27-08-al-masry-al-youm-denudation-part-8

Divide And Conquer

Will McCants November 12, 2008

The Hesbah forum’s reaction to two recent rumors is instructive. First, the claim by a Hamas official that Obama’s advisers met with members of the organization during the U.S. election is being met with derision.  The derision is directed not at Obama but at Hamas for selling out and walking down the trail blazed by Fatah.  Interestingly, the credibility of the story is not doubted. 

In contrast, many Hesbah members are skeptical of a recent report that the U.S. is trying to cut a deal with Taliban ally Hekmatyar (a seriously bad dude).  Respondents doubt that someone of his stature, ideology, and ties to Bin Laden would cut a deal.

Three thoughts:  First, Hesbah members believe the news about Obama’s advisers because it makes Hamas look bad; they don’t believe the news about Hekmatyar because it makes the Taliban look bad.  The Taliban is one of the Jihadis’ last, best hopes for establishing an Islamic state, whereas Hamas has long been viewed as a sell out by most Jihadis.  

Second, Jihadis are splitting or becoming demoralized on the mere rumor of talks, either with Hamas or with the Taliban.  What will happen when serious deals are made?  In the case of Hamas, deals will only disturb the minority of Jihadis who have been sticking up for the organization; everyone else views it as a lost cause.  But in the case of the Taliban, it will be an earthquake and cause serious cognitive dissonance among the Jihadis outside of Af-Pak (those inside already know how fractious the Taliban is).

Finally, to state the obvious, the Jihadosphere is having trouble coping with the shades of grey that color the current U.S. approach to counterterrorism and COIN.  

Document (Arabic): 11-11-08-hesbah-reaction-to-news-of-obama-advisers-meeting-with-hamas

Document (Arabic): 11-12-08-hesbah-reaction-to-news-of-us-seeking-to-split-hekmatyar-from-taliban

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