ji·had·ica

Q&A On Gaza

Will McCants January 12, 2009

Asad al-Jihad2, who some claim is senior AQ member Hukayma, is taking questions on Gaza.  The Q&A session, modeled on that of Zawahiri, is open for four days of questions; AJ2 will give his answers soon after.  Individuals are allowed to ask five question and news orgs can ask ten.

One has to be careful not to read too much into these questions since some were probably posted by intel orgs.  But the concerns raised jive with everything else I’ve seen on the forums: what’s our stance on Hamas, who are the authentic Jihadi groups and why aren’t they doing more, and what do we do about Egypt and the Gulf countries?

I don’t have time to summarize them all, but one question directed to Asad al-Jihad2 struck me: “What is your view regarding the recent disclosure that Gaza is being annexed to Egypt and the West Bank is being annexed to Jordan?”

New Zawahiri Statement: Obama Is Killing Muslims In Gaza

Will McCants January 6, 2009

An audio statement by Zawahiri was just posted to the forums.  Here’s a summary:

  • Bin Laden swore he would keep fighting until Palestine and Muslim lands are free of foreign occupiers.
  • The Israeli attacks are Obama’s “gift” to the Palestinians before he takes office.  President Mubarak of Egypt is an accomplice in this slaughter since he has closed Egypt’s border with Gaza.
  • To the Muslims and mujahids in Gaza and Palestine: Al-Qaeda is with you.  We are attacking the American-Zionist Crusade wherever we can and we are quickly moving toward you.  The American withdrawal from Iraq heralds our approach toward you.
  • To the Muslims in Egypt: Strike and protest to force Mubarak to end the blockade.
  • To the Bedouins in Sinai: Help break the blockade.
  • To the Muslims of the world: American propaganda portrayed Obama as your savior but here he is “killing” Muslims in Gaza.  Demonstrating against these atrocities is not enough; you must engage in jihad.  Strike the American-Zionist Crusade everywhere.

Document (Arabic): 1-6-09-shamikh-zawahiri-on-gaza

Hussam Tammam On Sayyid Imam

Will McCants December 22, 2008

Several days ago, Marc Lynch linked to a very a thoughtful article by Hussam Tammam on the significance of the revisions by the Islamic Group and by Sayyid Imam.  Today, Rob at the Shack has cited the article as one more piece of incontrovertible evidence for his Imam-doesn’t-matter argument.  I won’t rehash all of that (if you’re interested, you can start here), but as you’ll see, Tammam’s article is a lot more complicated than Rob’s assessment suggests.

Tammam’s basic argument is that organizations like the Islamic Group and al-Jihad will not be able to stop violence today because the nature of Islamist authority in Egypt has changed.  In the past people had to join groups and institutions to engage in Islamist activism.  But in the last ten years, the role of organizations and institutions has faded because of the rapprochement between the Egyptian regime and Islamist groups and because the state controls so many Islamic institutions.  So today, Islamist activism, both violent and nonviolent, is more individualistic.  It is loose associations of people engaging in the “market of religious performance.”  In this new environment, missionaries and teachers are more influential than organizations and movements.  For these reasons, Tammam argues, the revisions of groups like the Islamic Group and al-Jihad have no impact on Jihadis because these groups no longer have power over people committed to an ideology, not an organization.

I’m intrigued by Tammam’s general thesis that individualism is on the rise in Egyptian Islamism.  I also agree with his general assertion that Imam won’t impact other Egyptian Jihadis.  But I disagree with the way he reached this conclusion.  For one, Imam is not the head of al-Jihad, trying to exert organizational control over Egyptian Jihadis.  He’s trying to change the minds of his former al-Jihad associates in prison with him and secure their release.  More importantly, Imam’s not trying to persuade other Jihadis at all.  As he says repeatedly, he is reaching out to youth that might be swayed by Jihadis.  Since Tammam himself argues that Egyptian Islamists today care more about a learned man’s opinion’s than his organizational affiliation, perhaps Imam will have greater traction with the fence-sitting sort.  But that’s not where Tammam or Rob are looking, which is a mistake.

More On Sayyid Imam’s Effectiveness

Will McCants December 11, 2008

Monika Maslikowski has a smart take on Sayyid Imam’s communication strategy vs. that of Zawahiri (it’s part of a larger assessment of the latter’s stumbles as a communicator this year).  She seconds my argument that Imam’s personal attacks on Zawahiri are effective because “Zawahiri’s success as a leader is dependent on whether or not he can gain trust and support.”

On the same subject, the Shack has an essay by an Egyptian lamenting Imam’s personal attacks.  For a different perspective by another Egyptian, I’d point you to Caliph’s remarks in the comments section of a previous post.  Without revealing too much, Caliph has closely followed Egyptian media and Islamism for years.  I’d rate his comments pretty high on their own merit, but one’s background seems to matter in these sorts of debates.

Response To Rob At The Shack

Will McCants December 5, 2008

We’re probably now at the point of diminishing returns, but the issue of Jihadi revisions is important enough to work through the particulars until it’s clear what’s fact, what’s unproven, and what’s merely a matter of taste.  It’s important not just for assessing the impact of Sayyid Imam’s work but for understanding how ideological challenges to Jihadism fail or succeed.  My response to Rob is below the fold: (more…)

Assessing The Impact Of Jihadi Revisionists

Will McCants December 3, 2008

Rob at Media Shack has posted a summary of a discussion on al-`Arabiyya’s “Death Industry.”  Of interest to him (and me) is Montasir Zayat’s assessment of Sayyid Imam’s latest book (Zayat only read the first one and a half chapters).  Here’s Rob’s take:

In Zayat’s view, what’s being printed now in Al-Masri Al-Youm is a disgrace and jeopardizes the reputation of the entire Revisions process.   No Jihadists or even Muslims anywhere will treat them seriously.

Rob agrees with this sentiment (as does Nathan Field).  But that’s not exactly what Zayat says.  Zayat does say the book is a disgrace, but he’s also pessimistic that anything can move Jihadis, no matter how refined.  Here he is in the same interview responding to the host’s question of which man, Imam or Zawahiri, has more popularity:

Dr. Sayyid Imam has an abundance of Sharia knowledge and he certainly had these beliefs before he was imprisoned.  He used to say the same things before he was imprisoned and I believe him.  However, Dr. Ayman al-Zawahiri has charisma and popularity, and he is readily accepted among the youth also.  Many of the youths’ hearts and heads are attached to him.  It is difficult for the words of Sayyid Imam to affect them.

Exactly.  There is nothing Sayyid Imam can say to sway hardcore fans of Zawahiri.  It doesn’t matter how mean or nice he is.  Thus, as I argued yesterday, we shouldn’t be assessing the impact of Imam’s book on Jihadis but rather on neutral pious, educated Arabs, particularly high school and college-age youth, whom Imam considers his primary audience.

But how do we measure this impact?  Rob says that it is by looking at the discussion of Sayyid Imam’s new book in the mainstream press.  By this measure, he says, it’s a failure because “there has been almost no coverage in the Arabic media.”  I don’t concede the latter assertion–the book was printed in full in Islam Online, al-Masry al-Youm, and al-Sharq al-Awsat and commented on in at least thirteen print news venues.  It is also all over the forums and the Arabic blogosphere.  Still, I agree that it is getting less coverage than Imam’s last book.  Rob says that’s because the tone of the book is bitter and personal.  A simpler explanation is that the subject–Imam turning on Zawahiri–is old news.

However, for the sake of argument, let’s say the story wasn’t covered by anyone in the mainstream media.  So what?  As I observed regarding a different matter (Jihadi forums), the fact that the Arab press ignores a phenomenon does not mean the phenomenon has little impact on Arabs.  The Arab press wrote nothing about Abu Bakr Naji until the Saudi arrests.  The Arab press has also missed the recent Maqdisi story.  Aside from this blog and an excellent article in Jamestown, only al-Hayat has caught it.

So how are we to assess the impact of Sayyid Imam’s new book on its target audience?  Here are a few places to look:

  • Mainstream Muslim discussion forums
  • News discussion forums (al-Jazeera, etc)
  • Personal blogs

Much of the circulation, of course, will be person-to-person, which we can’t possibly track.  Still, I’m willing to partially concede that it’s a dud if the mainstream forums and blogs are largely negative.  But let’s wait a little bit before rendering judgment.  As Sayyid Imam said in his last installment, it’s simply unfair to judge a book before it’s even been released.

The Denudation Of The Exoneration: Part 13 (Final)

Will McCants December 2, 2008

Sayyid Imam wraps up his new book today.  Much of his final criticism is aimed at Bin Laden, whom he describes as incurious and incapable of holding himself accountable for his errors.  Regarding the latter, Imam compares Bin Laden negatively to Hassan Nasrallah, who apologized and offered compensation to the Lebanese civilians whose homes had been destroyed by Israeli bombing in the 2006 war (paging Andrew Exum).  

Sayyid Imam ends by explaining why his attacks on Zawahiri and Bin Laden have become more personal: he felt obliged to do it after Zawahiri accused him of being an Egyptian tool before Imam’s first book had even been released.  Zawahiri’s more pointed personal attacks in the Exoneration prompted an even more personal response.

Concluding…

The Denudation is divided into four sections:

 

  • Exposing the lies of Zawahiri
  • Exposing his jurisprudential errors
  • Exposing the ways he misleads the reader
  • Exposing his search for fame

In this, the conclusion, I wish to say: If there are Muslims who have been led astray by bin Laden, Zawahiri, and their like, how are they going to remain firm during the fitna of the Anti-Christ, which the prophet says will be the greatest fitna?

In like manner, people have been led astray by Ataturk for 90 years.  They praised him for expelling the allies from Turkey in World War I and called him “al-Ghazi” (pious frontier warrior), but that didn’t stop him from abolishing the caliphate and attacking Islam.

People should not fall under the spell of those who talk about religion and jihad before they know what these people stand for and what they know of the Sharia.

The Prophet has said that, “God helps this religion with a debauched man.”  The man he is talking about fought alongside the prophet at Khaybar, mightily vexed the infidels, and did not harm a single Muslim.  He only harmed himself by committing suicide on account of his wounds.  Compare him with those who bring great harm to Muslims.  What has been the benefit of destroying two buildings in America, destruction which led to the downfall the Taliban state, the only Islamic state in the world?  Bin Laden left Afghanistan to pay the price for his stupidity.  He cries for the children of Palestine but forgets the children of Afghanistan.  And behind him stands Zawahiri, justifying all of it.

Now Bin Laden is using his organization for his own personal security, leaving many of its members to be killed or captured.  Bin Laden even abandoned his most sincere supporter, Abu Hafs al-Masri, who had built al-Qaeda for him.  He, along with others, were killed in the American bombings in 2001 because they didn’t have the protection that Bin Laden had.  The captain is usually the last one to abandon the ship, but not Bin Laden or Zawahiri; they are the first.

Bin Laden talks of jihad, yet he withdrew from every battle he and his companions fought without the support of the Afghans against the communists.  Bin Laden was even captured during one of the battles.  The Arabs had no effective military role in the Afghan jihad against Russia.  To say otherwise is a lie. [On this, see Wright’s Looming Tower.]

What of Bin Laden’s religious knowledge?  In 1994 in Sudan, there was a subject that he was interested in.  I suggested he read a certain book about it.  He said to me, “I am unable to read a whole book.”  As for his speeches, his followers write them for him.

Is one who destroyed two buildings, and thus destroyed the Taliban state, knowledgeable in Sharia or military matters? Does someone who sends hundreds of his brothers to their graves or to jail for the sake of “the idea” and “the flame” of jihad (Exoneration p. 193) have Sharia or military skills?

These people are mischief makers.  And why not, as long as there is someone to pay for their mischief.  They can flee and accumulate popularity and money (Exoneration, p. 79, 199).

What are the consequences of their knowledge?  The operation succeeded (9/11), the patient died (Taliban state), and the doctor fled (Bin Laden and Zawahiri).

When Gamal Abdel Nasser lost the 1967 war, he presented his resignation from the presidency three days later.  Hassan Nasrallah apologized to the Lebanese people only one month after the July 2006 war with Israel and promised to pay compensation to those who had been harmed.  This was despite the fact that Lebanon was not occupied. It was partially destroyed, which Nasrallah could have prevented if he’d had good anti-aircraft weapons.  Compare this to Bin Laden, Zawahiri, and their followers.  They make no apologies to anyone.

Every follower of Bin Laden and those that approve their actions will be gathered together under the same banner on the Day of Judgment if they do not repent [ie they’re hell bound].

I had not intended to write a single word about Bin Laden, Zawahiri, or anyone else.  It did not occur to me to do so when I wrote the Document in December 2006 and when I revised it in March 2007.  I have witnesses who can attest to this.  But then I showed the Document to the brothers in prison in April 2007.  Afterwards, there was a lot of talk in the press about the Document, so I released a statement to stop speculation, which was published in May 6, 2007 in al-Hayat and al-Sharq al-Awsat.  I said it was a call to the Islamic groups to put Jihadi operations on the right path.  I said it deals with jurisprudential matters and not with a specific group.  Nevertheless, Zawahiri issued a statement in June 2007 criticizing the Document before it had been published and before he had a chance to read it.

Why did Zawahiri launch this preemptive strike?  He knew my opinion about the mistakes of the Islamic groups, such as prohibiting visa holders from operations in the Abode of War and other things that he cut from my book, The Compendium, in 1994.  Zawahiri and his colleagues in Europe continued to badmouth me, so I added material which was not in the Document I had initially shared with the brothers in April 2007 so I could respond to Zawahiri’s and his colleagues’ stupidity and reveal to the people what they stand for, but I wasn’t too specific.  I spoke more specifically about them in my interview with al-Hayat.

An important lesson: the matter of the masses relying on religious scholars

The religious scholars are the sources of religious guidance.  Al-Juwayni has said that when there is no caliphate, the religious scholars are the heads of the Muslims.

I’ve seen a lot of ignorant people like Bin Laden and Zawahiri presenting themselves as religious scholars for Muslims.  They are not, as I have shown in part two of this note.  I want to caution you against them here.  Warning against such people was the main reason I wrote The Compendium in 1993.

Document (Arabic): 12-2-08-al-masri-al-youm-denudation-part-13

The Impact Of The Denudation

Will McCants December 1, 2008

When Sayyid Imam’s first book was released serially last year, CT pundits were split.  Some, like Lawrence Wright and Peter Bergen, said it was evidence of a serious fissure in the Jihadi Movement and would further divide it.  Others, like Michael Scheuer, said it was neither evidence of a fissure nor would it divide the movement because Sayyid Imam was being coerced, which instantly discredits his book.  

From the beginning, I took issue with both sides.  I didn’t like the war-within position because I don’t believe that most Jihadis will change their minds upon reading Sayyid Imam; they’d require a lot more than that (family intervention, etc).  But I also didn’t like the nothing-to-see-here position because it too easily adopted a Jihadi talking point and because it, like the war-within position, did not see that the most important audience for Sayyid Imam’s book was the pious, educated Arab public, particularly high-school and college-age youth.  To the extent that the book persuaded fence sitters that Zawahiri and al-Qaeda were making religious errors, it succeeded.  If they also came to believe there was a war within, even better.

With Imam’s second book, we have a similar dynamic.  But this time, the nothing-to-see-here position is based not on the fact that Sayyid Imam is in prison but on the meanness of his words and his personal attacks on Zawahiri.  Jihadis are saying it and so are astute bloggers and journalists (Rob, Nathan, and Marisa).  The argument is that Sayyid Imam is so mean that Jihadis will be turned off because his rhetoric indicates that he is unfair.  I don’t agree with this position for several reasons:

 

  1. Jihadis are going to dislike Sayyid Imam’s book no matter what.
  2. The most important audience is pious, educated Arabs, especially the youth in high school and college.  It is not Jihadis.
  3. Sayyid Imam was pretty vicious in his first book and it didn’t seem to dampen its effect.  For example, he repeatedly accused Zawahiri of abandoning his family and getting them killed.
  4. Sayyid Imam has a different goal in this book.  He’s already tried to discredit the religious underpinnings of Zawahiri’s ideology.  Now he’s trying to impugn his character.  Zawahiri has said that for the Jihadi Movement to succeed it needs leaders that people can trust.  Sayyid Imam is trying to destroy that trust.  Think of political attack ads; Imam’s gone from attacking Zawahiri on the issues, now he’s attacking his character.

I’ll leave off on my assessment of the new things to be learned from the Denudation.  I just wanted to share my thoughts on its impact and audience before the emerging narrative hardens.

 

The Denudation Of The Exoneration: Part 12

Will McCants December 1, 2008

 

Sayyid Imam has some surprising things to say about Sayyid Qutb and some interesting speculation on Zawahiri’s tenuous position in al-Qaeda.  He also observes that Libyan and Mauritanian students serve as Zawahiri’s primary research assistants.  I don’t know about their nationalities, but there’s no doubt Zawahiri has research assistants (as do many productive academics).  Moreover, Zawahiri talks about Mauritanian seminarians coming to visit him and Bin Laden in his Exoneration, so it makes sense that some stayed on to help him write.

Continuing…

Zawahiri says in Knights that he joined al-Qaeda to unite the efforts of the Muslims.  That’s not true.  Zawahiri knew Bin Laden for 14 years, from 1987 to 2001, and never joined with him.  Rather, he criticized Bin Ladin harshly as a Saudi intelligence agent for merely reducing donations to his (Zawahiri’s) group in 1995.  To this end, Zawahiri wrote an article critical of Bin Laden called “The Youth Are Generous with Their Lives and The Rich Are Stingy with Their Money” (جاد الشباب بأرواحهم وضنّ الأغنياء بأموالهم), in the Kalimat Haqq journal.

Egyptian Islamic Jihad did not join Al Qaeda; only Zawahiri and eight others joined.  It wasn’t to unite jihad; it was because Zawahiri saw his fame and fortune linked to Bin Laden.  Bin Laden knew Zawahiri had nothing to offer him except his name.  He kept Zawahiri out of the dark regarding 9/11 and didn’t allow him or anyone else to make media appearances.

Zawahiri used to visit the al-Qaeda media committee under Khalid Shaykh Muhammad in Kandahar to learn about its activities [ie he was out of the loop].  

9/11 was a big break for Zawahiri because it gave him the opportunity to play a role in the media because the leaders of al-Qaeda were either hiding, killed, or captured.

Here are some of the things Zawahiri did to capitalize on 9/11:

 

  • He glorified the 9/11 attacks and berated those who criticized them as American agents.
  • He justified the 9/11 attacks.
  • He didn’t take responsibility for the negative effects of 9/11, the immediate aftermath of which ruined al-Qaeda, the Taliban, Afghanistan.

 

Even though they tried to obscure their crimes, current and future generations will never forget that Bin Laden, Zawahiri, and their followers bear sole responsibility for losing an Islamic state, which had been established by the Taliban.

Zawahiri has canonized Bin Laden to such an extent that he denies his errors, as if Bin Laden is infallible.  It’s odd that Zawahiri has criticized the Muslim Brotherhood his entire life yet became a follower of one of them (Bin Laden).  Zawahiri justifies all of Bin Laden’s crimes like Goebbels did for Hitler.

Here are the reasons why Zawahiri has canonized bin Laden after criticizing him and accusing him of collaboration:

 

  • Reason one: Bin Laden provided the greatest opportunity for Zawahiri to get the fame he’s craved for 30 years, an opportunity realized after 9/11.
  • Reason two: Zawahiri knows that al-Qaeda is Bin Laden and no one else.  99% of its membership is Saudi and Yemeni and is tied to Bin Laden personally.  Zawahiri has canonized him in order to get the allegiance of his followers if Bin Laden dies.  It’s doubtful that Bin Laden’s followers will follow Zawahiri, but he tries nonetheless.
  • Reason three: 99% of al-Qaeda’s financing comes from Saudi Arabia to Bin Laden personally.  Zawahiri has to canonize him to continue to get their support if bin Laden dies.  “Zawahiri is preparing for the moment of the announcement of Bin Laden’s death so that he can inherit his organizational legacy.”
  • Finally: Zawahiri has to talk about all the issues of the umma to be perceived as its leader, especially the Palestinian issue.

 

Zawahiri does not care about the destruction he has justified.  In his life, only three things matter to him: preserving his personal well-being, media attention in any form, and gathering money.  “In short: fleeing, microphones, and donation boxes.”

Bin Laden and Zawahiri care nothing for the people of Afghanistan.  During the four years Bin Laden was in Sudan, he spent millions of dollars on the Sudanese and paved hundreds of kilometers of road.  He was in Afghanistan for five years before 9/11 and gave an oath of allegiance to Mullah Omar, yet he did not pave a single road, build a single school, or construct a single hospital.  Hundreds of Afghan kids were dying at that time yet he did nothing and things only got worse after 9/11.

Al-Qaeda entered Iraq after its occupation in 2003 by standing on the shoulders of Ansar al-Islam, a Kurdish group.  Then al-Qaeda renounced Ansar al-Islam and operated in Iraq independently.  (The amir of this group, Mullah Krekar, told me in 1990 that he had translated my book, al-`Umda, into Kurdish.)

Al-Qaeda in Iraq was accused of being made up of foreigners.  To establish that it was an Iraqi resistance, al-Qaeda sent one of their senior leaders, `Abd al-Hadi al-`Iraqi, from Waziristan to Iraq, but the U.S. captured him along the way.

I want to remind readers that Zawahiri was influenced by the words of Sayyid Qutb.  Although both men have severe jurisprudential shortcomings, there’s a big difference in their level of sincerity.  If Qutb had lived, I think he would have realized his jurisprudential mistakes.  But whereas Qutb had studied his whole life, Zawahiri stopped his intellectual development after reading Qutb.  I tried for years to push him to study the Sharia but to no avail.  He doesn’t have the patience for it.

When I was part of Egyptian Islamic Jihad, Zawahiri put his name on some of my works to cover up his Sharia shortcomings.  When I broke my ties with them, they continued to steal from my book.  Later, Zawahiri came to rely on the seminary students around him from Libya and Mauritania, especially for writing the Exoneration.  They merely hunted for statements that justified their actions without distinction between sound and weak statements.

I’ve written these words, as I did in the Document, to warn Muslims, especially the younger youth, about these reckless, opportunistic people and their like.  Do not be fooled by slogans or by the justice of a specific cause until you know the reality of the person’s life who raises these slogans.  Is he honest or is he hunting for ignorant quarry and trading upon them?

Document (Arabic): 12-1-08-al-masry-al-youm-denudation-part-12

 

The Denudation Of The Exoneration: Part 11

Will McCants November 30, 2008

In today’s installment, Sayyid Imam issues another mubahala, this time concerning the publication of his Compendium.  You’ll have to look at Zawahiri’s Exoneration to really understand what Sayyid Imam is reacting to, but in short he believes that Zawahiri plagarized his book.  There’s also some pointed barbs about Zawahiri’s hunger for media attention.  Imam connects the two lines of attack by saying that Zawahiri is largely talentless and instead relies on the hard work of others to attract the limelight.  Doubtless some of Jihadica’s readers know the type.

Continuing…

I am writing this book to warn people, especially the youth, who are being led by deviant ideas and fiery sermons to their doom.  These ideas and sermons have no avail and achieve nothing on the groud.  They are just media noise.

Bin Laden has used Zawahiri to do his dirty work, which is distorting religion to justify Bin Laden’s ideas.

Part 4

Zawahiri’s goal is leadership of the umma and his method is propaganda.

Zawahiri has explained how he will achieve his goal: The  Islamic mujahid movement must claim to be fighting to free the three Islamic holy places–the Kaaba, the Mosque of the Prophet, and the Aqsa Mosque.

Zawahiri has also said in Knights that in order to mobilize the masses, they must have leaders they can trust and a clear enemy.

 Zawahiri presents himself and his companions as the mujahid vanguard of the umma and as symbols of popular resistance to the Zionist Crusader campaign (Exoneration, page 74 and 199).  These people don’t protect Islam and Muslims; they are willing to sacrifice everything to achieve their goals.

Early on, in the court trials of 1981 [following the Sadat assassination], Zawahiri recognized the power of the media to produce fame and stardom.  Despite his marginal role in the events that led to those trials, he repeatedly spoke to the media in court, which led to an increase of his fame and shifted attention away from his testimony against his brothers.

Zawahiri has always stood on the shoulders of others to increase his own fame.  For example, he stole my book and his group presented it as their own.  I had left them the manuscript of my book, The Compendium, so they could study it.  Even though I said in the introduction that none of it should be cut, they cut a lot of it anyway.  He destroyed the book but blamed others for doing it as usual.  He even told a brother in London that it was my original book.

Here is my third mubahala:  I swear I alone wrote the book in 1993 after I had broken my connection with the Egyptian Islamic Jihad.  Zawahiri says the name `Abd al-Qadir b. `Abd al-`Aziz [Sayyid Imam’s pen name] stands for the name of the group.  That is a lie; I wrote this name.  Finally, I was not requested to write the work nor did I receive payment for it.  May God curse me if I am lying and curse Zawahiri if he is lying.

Zawahiri criticizes me for criticizing mujahids while they are fighting.  Such considerations never hindered the Prophet from criticizing the mujahids for erroneous actions or beliefs.

Further examples of Zawahiri’s hunger for fame:

When the media didn’t mention his name after the Sidqi assassination attempt, Zawahiri let them know by fax.  But he put the responsibility for the decision on the EIJ’s Shura Council.

Zawahiri is not manly because he continues to run and never fights; rather, he encourages others to fight in his stead.

Even though Zawahiri had the Egyptian Islamic Jihad stop their fighting in Egypt in 1995, he severely criticized the Islamic Group when it renounced violence in 1997 because it stopped the violence that he trades upon.

After he left Sudan, Zawahiri wrote articles for the Mujahidun and al-Ansar journals encouraging the Armed Islamic Group of Algeria to fight.  He did this to get a piece of the media attention so he would have a role to play if the group came to power.  When they fell into disrepute, he backed away from them to save his own reputation.

To get more fame, Zawahiri joined al-Qaeda in June of 2001.  Only eight people from Egyptian Islamic Jihad went with him.  The Egyptian Islamic Jihad did not approve of working with Bin Laden, as is evident in their statements (see al-Hayat 1-24-2000, p.5).

Document (Arabic): 11-30-08-al-masry-al-youm-denudation-part-11

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