ji·had·ica

Are the Jihadi Forums Flagging? An Ideologue’s Lament

Last month prominent jihadi ideologue Abu Sa‘d al-‘Amili published a critical essay on the state of online global jihad. Released by Fursan al-Balagh Media (@fursanalbalaagh) on February 17, the eight-page essay stirringly lamented a general decline in participation in jihadi online forums (websites such as Shumukh al-Islam and Shabakat al-Fida’ al-Islamiyya) and pleaded with users to reinvigorate the forums as the proper centers of jihadi discussion and intellectual production online. (For the history of these forums and their important role in jihadi activity, including their ties to al-Qaeda and its affiliates, see here.)

While it is certainly a stretch to say that the forums are falling into desuetude, al-‘Amili’s lament ought to be taken seriously, if only on account of the author’s status in jihadi circles. The pseudonymous shaykh is a prolific jihadi presence online, with numerous essays and fatwas and even a collection of poetry to his name. Who al-‘Amili actually is remains a mystery. He has previously justified guarding his true identity—and any and all details of his background—out of security concerns, citing Qur‘an 74:31: “And none knows the soldiers of your Lord except He.”

His essay in question, “On the Languishing of the Jihadi Forums: Causes and Solutions,” is a passionate appeal to his fellow jihadi netizens. Al-‘Amili describes the forums as a “factory” whose workers ought to be participating in production but who apparently are not working very hard. He admonishes forum members for not honoring the “responsibilities” that forum membership entails, including guarding the forums’ “reputation,” “credibility,” and “preeminence” in the field of jihadi media.

The rest of the essay consists of two parts, the first enumerating the reasons behind the decline of the forums and the second providing suggestions for turning this situation around.

Why the forums are flagging

The first reason for the forums’ “languishing,” according to al-‘Amili, is the periodic disruptions to which they are subjected by “our enemies,” meaning Western governments. In spring of last year, for example, most of the major jihadi forums were shut down for a number of days or weeks. The result of such shutdowns, says the author, is that some forum members seek out temporary online alternatives, though most simply abandon their previous activity out of either fear or negligence.

The second reason is increasing fear of monitoring and tracking by state governments, which has resulted from these routine forum outages.

The third is the “departure into battle” (al-nafir) of forum members heading to theaters of jihad such as Syria. Al-‘Amili proudly notes that “the jihadi forums are universities graduating bands of ansar al-jihad” (supporters of jihad). These “departers” are not to be considered a loss to the forums, though their departure does result in decreased activity. (For a study that confirms the phenomenon of forum members moving to jihad fronts, see here.)

The fourth reason for the forums’ decline, and the one which al-‘Amili focuses on the most, is jihadis’ migration to social networking sites such as Twitter and Facebook. Such movement was born out of necessity during the periods when the forums were shut down, he says. This bore fruit temporarily, but in the long run relying on social media is an error that will derogate from the centrality of the forums—“our protected strongholds.” The movement of “major [jihadi] writers and analysts” (kibar al-kuttab wa-l-muhallilin) to social networking sites is also part of this problem, as ordinary forum members have migrated with them in order to follow their writings.

The fifth and final reason for decline is a vicious circle problem following from the withdrawal of both major writers and ordinary members. When the former’s writings have received little attention on the forums from the latter, the major writers have been further discouraged from contributing directly to the forums. Thus the withdrawal of the one reinforces the withdrawal of the other.

How to reinvigorate the forums

The first of al-‘Amili’s “suggested solutions” to reversing the forums’ purported state of disrepair is reaffirming the importance of the forums “as a defensive, lethal weapon for confronting the enemies of the Islamic community.” As much as soldiering on the battlefield, actively participating on the forums ought to be considered jihad in the fullest sense of the word.

Second is for members to have more confidence in the forums’ security and in their own security as users. The forum administrators, he says, are more concerned with the general membership’s safety than with their own; they are utterly devoted to forum security and would never forsake “their soldiers.” It is simply unjustified, he says, to turn away from the forums out of fear that they have been compromised. Nor is it justified to turn away out of fear that participating will lead to being monitored. Members need only use the “identity-disguising programs” (baramij al-takhaffi) designed by “your technician brothers” on the forums to protect their online anonymity.

Third is for major jihadi writers to use the forums as the main outlet for their writings, thus drawing ordinary members back to the forums in tow. Here he directs a plea to “the major [jihadi] writers and shaykhs and analysts” to return to the forums. These latter ought to be “the main theater of your jihad and the principal point of departure for your guidance and your analysis.”

Fourth is to recognize the inadequacy of social media as an alternative to the forums, a point on which al-‘Amili is adamant. On social media, he says, we are only “guests,” for these sites are run by “our enemies.” Inevitably there will come a day when “they shut their doors in our faces.” What is more, relying on social media poses an inherent danger to jihadis as “the enemies” can use these sites against us at any time. If we preference social media we will be “duped” into diminishing and spoiling our efforts. The forums ought to be jihadis’ “base and foundation” online.

Fifth is to attract new technical experts, graphics designers, and translators to “jihadi media organizations”—which publicize on the forums—to improve the effectiveness of the media and messages posted there.

An effective prescription?

If al-‘Amili’s five stated reasons for decline are accurate, is it possible, following the author’s prescription, to reinvigorate the forums? The short answer seems to be no: periodic forum outages have been damaging and the attraction of social media is on the rise. But one must also consider that al-‘Amili is exaggerating the extent of whatever “languishing” is actually taking place. For one thing, jihadi participation in social media has not necessarily undermined the position of the forums.

Recently, Shumukh members posted long lists of jihadi Facebook and Twitter accounts suggested for following. Among the Twitter accounts listed was one belonging to a certain Abu Sa‘d al-‘Amili (@al3aamili)—yes, the very author of this essay warning readers of the dangers of social media. Al-‘Amili, in fact, has tweeted quite often since December 2012.

Indeed, social media has probably benefited the state of online global jihad by exposing the jihadi message to more potential sympathizers and recruits. This has had the effect of decentralizing the online jihadi environment, leading to relatively less participation on the forums in the form of discussion and analysis. But the forums are hardly in a state of disrepair; comments and analyses are constantly being posted, often in a parallel effort with Facebook and Twitter jihadi accounts. This is very much the case with the “major writers” whom al-‘Amili mentions—and among whom al-‘Amili may be counted. Their writings tend to originate with independent jihadi media outlets that post to Twitter and Facebook, as well as to the forums.

Rather than languishing, the forums have succeeded in retaining their special position as an unusually private setting for exclusive discussion, which sometimes leads to collaborative efforts. Furthermore, as the main conduits for conveying official al-Qaeda media to the online jihadi community, they continue to enjoy a vaunted status as semi-official websites for al-Qaeda and its affiliates. They may be suffering somewhat, but the jihadi forums are hardly on the down and out.

From the Pen to the Sword

One of the things that struck me about the Stockholm bomber, Taimour Abdalwahhab, was that he was apparently active on the internet as a radical before he decided to engage in actual terrorism (see Thomas’ posts below for more details). This transition reminded me of a similar but much more serious process by someone who also moved from “jihad by the pen” to “jihad by the sword”: Abu Dujana al-Khurasani, the Jordanian former internet-jihadi turned suicide bomber who killed several CIA-agents in his attack on an American base in Khost, Afghanistan, on 30 December 2009.

The attack in Khost, which took place exactly a year ago, led many to praise al-Khurasani for his supposed heroism, his willingness to move from cyber-jihadism to an actual suicide bombing and his loyalty to the cause. A few months ago, an e-book was released by the Jihadi Media Elite (Nukhbat al-I’lam al-Jihadi) that not only continues this praise but also contains dozens of articles about al-Khurasani and provides all the writings and recordings by the man himself as well: Abu Dujana al-Khurasani: The Hero of the Jihadi Media and the Destroyer of the Intelligence Services (only the link to the e-book works).

Jihadi historiography

The book is obviously hagiographic, but that doesn’t make it less interesting since it gives the jihadi version of things and, as such, can be seen as jihadi historiography. Al-Khurasani is described as a hero who, after having become a physician in Jordan and marrying a Turkish wife, becomes a prominent member on the Hisba jihadi forum, which eventually leads to his arrest by the Jordanian security service. While the latter start using him as a spy to work for them in Afghanistan, al-Khurasani is described as cleverly turning on his masters by secretly working for the Mujahidun who he is supposed to help combat. His suicide bombing is portrayed as extremely important because it supposedly struck very senior officials within the CIA. The subsequent American statement that “the seven American officers that were killed in Khost were among the finest officers in the entire world” is held up as proof of this.

Another part of the book lists numerous statements by various people, ranging from American CIA-officials to jihadi ideologues, who indicate the impact al-Khurasani has had or praise him. A recurring theme that is left implicit but is nevertheless striking is the oft-mentioned transition al-Khurasani made from the Hisba forum to actual military action. Although he quite possibly saw no other way out than to cooperate with the Jordanian authorities, only to turn on them when he got in touch with al-Qa’ida, he is implicitly described in the book as someone who gradually worked his way from his keyboard to his bombing-belt.

An exemplary life

One cannot escape the thought that the Jihadi Media Elite released this book for more reasons than just to praise al-Khurasani. For one thing, the editors present him as a sign that al-Qa’ida is still alive and kicking. More important, however, is that they seem to believe that al-Khurasani lived not only a pious but also an exemplary life. Although I have not found any explicit reference to this in the book, the editors may well be presenting al-Khurasani as a hero precisely because they know there are many people who, like him before his transition to actual military action, are simply armchair jihadis only engaged in commenting on forums without joining the Mujahidun in Afghanistan or elsewhere.

The alleged stimulus that the editors want to provide for other would-be jihadis sitting at home to take up arms and wage jihad is not uncontroversial. For example, a fatwa from 2009 (responding to a questioner who happens to be from Afghanistan) states that a person capable of waging military jihad may still dedicate himself to cyber-jihad if that is where he is needed. While the editors may not necessarily disagree with this, it does seem that they – under the guise of praising one of al-Qa’ida’s heroes – may have released this book to stimulate other participants on jihadi forums to follow al-Khurasani’s example. Whether the latter will do so remains to be seen.

Quilliam Report

The Quilliam Foundation, a London based think tank, has released a very interesting new report by Muhammad Ali Musawi titled Cheering for Osama: How Jihadis Use Discussion Forums. It is one of the best introductions to the world of online jihadism that I have seen. It also points out some recent forum trends that should interest more seasoned observers.

Spy Forums

In a remarkable story, the Washington Post reported today that Saudi intelligence and the CIA operated a honeypot jihadi forum for years until it was shut down by the US military in 2008. The news here is obviously not that intelligence services run jihadi forums, but that US agencies wage cyberwarfare on each other. Since I don’t know what is technologically possible and what is not, I don’t have an opinion on the issue of forum takedowns, but I find the lack of interagency coordination appalling.

Bureaucratic politics aside, which forum was it? The Post article does not say. There are several candidates, since many forums went down in 2008, foremost of which Ekhlaas (September) and Hesbah (November). I initially suspected the latter, but I was a little confused by the article mentioning events in “early 2008”. So I asked my forum-watching colleagues Evan Kohlmann and Reuven Paz, and they also seem to think it was Hesbah. As Reuven pointed out, this makes sense since Hesbah was the most valuable target in the jihadosphere, since it was the one favoured by Saudi activists, and since a senior Saudi Hesbah administrator was reported arrested a couple of years ago. If the Saudis and the CIA really ran Hesbah for years, then they deserve credit for a well-executed operation, regardless of one’s general view on forum takedowns.

Does online espionage compromise the value or credibility of online jihadi propaganda? In other words, does it render forum watching irrelevant? I don’t think so. As Aaron points out, it does not matter who runs the forum so long as the participants think it is real. Unless you think the CIA fabricates all the jihadi texts and videos out there, then online jihadi propaganda is still worth studying. But a little bit of skepticism does not hurt.

Midad al-Suyuf and al-Maqdisi: Sworn Enemies?

[Editor’s note: I am proud to introduce Joas Wagemakers as our new guest contributor. Regular Jihadica readers will know Joas as the world’s leading expert on Abu Muhammad al-Maqdisi; but as you will discover over the next few weeks and hopefully months, Joas’s expertise extends way beyond the Jordanian ideologue. A lecturer and PhD candidate at Radboud University in Nijmegen, Joas has published widely on jihadi ideology and is a rising star in the Middle East and Islamic studies field.]

In the past, Will (here and here), Brynjar (here) and Thomas (here) have written excellent posts on Jihadica about the Jordanian ideologue Abu Muhammad al-Maqdisi’s credibility problems. Just to refresh everyone’s memory: as a result of al-Maqdisi’s criticism of his former pupil Abu Mus‘ab al-Zarqawi’s extreme use of violence in Iraq in 2004 and 2005, some fellow jihadis accused him of reneging on his earlier, supposedly more radical beliefs and of betraying the mujahidin. This criticism was expressed particularly fiercely on the Midad al-Suyuf forum by contributors such as al-Mihdar, Layth Makka and especially al-Zarqawi’s brother-in-law, Abu Qudama Salih al-Hami.

Abu Qudama, a journalist who worked in the AfPak region during the fighting there in the 1980s, is said to be close to many of the mujahidin who fought there and particularly al-Zarqawi. It therefore seemed safe to assume that the reason for his hostility was al-Maqdisi’s criticism of al-Zarqawi. Abu Qudama’s hostility was expressed in several books, including The Truth of the Conflict between Shaykh al-Maqdisi and the Heirs of al-Zarqawi is Jihad in the Way of God, which were also posted on the Midad al-Suyuf forum, as well as some others. Indeed, if one were to visit the Midad al-Suyuf forum today and go to the “al-Siyasa al-Shar‘iyya” section, it would be easy to find recent threads dedicated to anti-Maqdisi themes. These include threads with titles such as “Why does Abu Qatada remain in prison while al-Maqdisi is released?”, “Shaykh al-Maqdisi is a scholar with the people of ignorance”, “When is al-Maqdisi going to wake up?” and “Al-Maqdisi and the internet… The means to realise the agreed upon goal… or only for fame?” These and other threads are highly critical of al-Maqdisi and make Midad al-Suyuf look like it is obsessed with al-Maqdisi since he criticised al-Zarqawi and doesn’t seem to take him very seriously anymore no matter what he does. Indeed, al-Maqdisi himself has dedicated an article to addressing the hostility he encounters on this particular forum. They give the impression, in other words, of being sworn enemies over their dispute about al-Zarqawi.

This impression may be wrong, however. Strangely enough, as late as 2008 al-Maqdisi’s writings were sometimes posted on the Midad al-Suyuf forum without any commentary or accompanied by praise, occasionally even by people like al-Mihdar, who would later criticise him severely. This change of tone from neutrality or even support for al-Maqdisi to downright hostility cannot be explained by simply pointing to al-Maqdisi’s criticism of al-Zarqawi; after all, this was expressed in 2004 and 2005, implying that if this was the reason, the change in attitude towards al-Maqdisi would have taken place earlier. This raises the question: what caused this change?

Umm Mus‘ab

The reason why Midad al-Suyuf turned sour on al-Maqdisi has a lot to do with the writings by Abu Qudama, which seem to have given the contributors to the forum the information on which they base most of their hostility. In 2007, he wrote a book called Knights of the Absent Duty, in which he describes his experiences with the mujahidin and especially displays his knowledge of al-Zarqawi. In the book, however, he is not very negative about al-Maqdisi at all and even describes his endurance under torture in a Jordanian prison, although he does indicate the differences between al-Maqdisi and his hero al-Zarqawi. Significantly, however, Abu Qudama points out that al-Zarqawi was killed in 2006 by an American attack because the latter’s wife, Umm Mus‘ab, wrote letters to family and friends in either Iraq or Jordan without her husband’s knowledge. He suggests that through these letters, Umm Mus‘ab must have (inadvertently) betrayed al-Zarqawi’s whereabouts, leading the Americans to the place where he was hiding. He states that this is the only way they could have known about this.

This implicit accusation of Umm Mus‘ab was apparently so offensive to al-Maqdisi that he claims to have written a letter to Abu Qudama in which he tells him that he shouldn’t defame Umm Mus‘ab and that this whole story is a lie since al-Zarqawi’s wife was not even in Iraq at the time so she couldn’t have known about her husband’s hiding place. Although al-Maqdisi has several writings on his website that briefly refer to Abu Qudama’s accusation, in none of them does he mention what Abu Qudama actually accuses Umm Mus‘ab of. He states that he didn’t mention this because he didn’t want to defame her any more than Abu Qudama had already done. Perhaps for the same reason, al-Maqdisi’s letter to Abu Qudama is also absent from his website.

According to al-Maqdisi, Abu Qudama got so angry with him over this letter that he started writing books condemning al-Maqdisi. Although he doesn’t say so explicitly, al-Maqdisi may suggest that all of Abu Qudama’s anger towards him isn’t about his criticism of al-Zarqawi at all but simply about his own anger over being reprimanded for supposedly falsely accusing Umm Mus‘ab. Although this information should be treated carefully since I do not know how Abu Qudama feels about this issue, it would explain why the Midad al-Suyuf forum turned increasingly hostile to al-Maqdisi.

This story may come across as nothing more than jihadi gossip. There is, however, some significance to it. Firstly, it shows how much influence one author knowledgeable about jihadis can have on a forum that was initially not unfavourably disposed towards al-Maqdisi. Secondly, it also shows how a man widely viewed as one of the most important radical scholars alive can quickly fall from grace among a small but dedicated group of people if targeted in the right way. Perhaps surprisingly, it appears that for some zealous jihadis al-Maqdisi’s large number of books and his prison credibility seem to count for little.

How al-Sahab Works

If you are even remotely interested in this question, you simply have to read this post by Aaron at Haganah.

Media Incursion of Abu al-Nur al-Maqdisi

The Global Islamic Media Front, in cooperation with the Faloja Forums, has announced, “The Media Incursion of the Imam and Martyr Abu al-Nur al-Maqdisi.” It has five goals:

  1. Expose the truth about Hamas’s “crime” and “lies,” i.e. the recent attack on Jund Ansar Allah (JAA).
  2. Expose the truth about Hamas today and how it has “strayed” from its foundational roots.
  3. Let Muslims know that the money they give Hamas equates to “bullets in Muslims’ chests.”
  4. “Support the monotheistic mujahidin, who fight for the word of God and for the rule of God’s absent law.”
  5. “Distribute the legacy of the Imam Shaykh Abu al-Nur al-Maqdisi.”

Thus far, the effort consists of a new forum dedicated to Abu al-Nur al-Maqdisi on Faloja. There are not many posts yet, but several appear to be interesting, such as a photo list of JAA members killed in the battle with Hamas. Other posts include: “Two Imams of Truth: The Red Mosque and the Ibn Taymiyyah Mosque. What is the difference?”; “Was Abu al-Nur al-Maqdisi one of the Khawarij or a Tyrant?”; “Dangerous Speech: Hasan al-Banna – Hamas is not Islamic and it Claimed That”; “A Resounding Scandal: A Voice Recording Confirming the Execution of Wounded Mujahedin by Hamas During their Ride to the Hospital”; and “Hamas’s Crime in Rafah.”

This makes the split between Hamas and the salafi-jihadi movement plainly obvious. As the attack against JAA and last year’s attack on the Army of Islam indicate, Hamas is currently powerful enough to deal with these fringe elements. However, if conditions in Gaza continue to worsen or Hamas’s position becomes more perilous, these groups may gain more momentum and power, complicating any reconciliation with Fatah or Palestinian agreements with Israel.

The Mou10ra11bitt18oun25 Code

On 3 October 2009, Mou10ra11bitt18oun25″ (sic), a “new member” on the Faloja Forums, posted a statement reiterating the threat of an al-Qaida attack on Germany. He claimed that the attack will occur on a Sunday in October stating, “After we [al-Qaida] chose Thursday for London, Tuesday for New York and Washington, and Tuesday for Madrid, we choose Sunday for you….”

Additionally, the name Mou10ra11bitt18oun25 appears to indicate the same with the 10 equating to October and the 11, 18, and 25 equating to the remaining Sundays in October. In Arabic, Mourabittoun is difficult to translate, but generally means people laying in wait.

Another forum member, “Abu Hamza 2005”, cited similarities between the names of Mou10ra11bitt18oun25 and the Ikhlaas member p2l0a0g8u9e, who supposedly caused a media stir when he threatened nuclear attacks. Abu Hamza asks, “What does he [Mou10ra11bitt18oun25] carry in his quiver, or is he a general member [of the forums]? There is great similarity in the letters, numbers, and type of name.”

The Mou10ra11bitt18oun25 statement adds to the media hype regarding possible attacks on Germany. As Thomas has pointed out, these threats may be propaganda rather than preludes to an attack. If so, I am curious what the affect these threats will have beyond sending security organizations and on-line jihadis into a frenzy. If there is not an attack in Germany, will al-Qaida’s credibility suffer among its supporters?  Or, will the terror organization be able to pass it off as part of a larger strategy?

Tajdeed is Back

While conducting some research today, I found that as of August 2009, the jihadi forum Tajdeed.org.uk is back. The website was one of the most prominent – if not the most prominent – jihadi discussion forum until it went down about a year and a half ago. The website’s administrator was and remains Muhammad al-Massari. After Ekhlaas and Faloja, it seems it is all the rage to bring back shut down jihadi forums.

Faloja and Jihadi Libraries

On 14 September 2009, the Faloja Forums announced their return after they were knocked off the Internet three days previously. It seems the administrators have been researching methods to avoid permanent banishment from the Internet so the cat and mouse game will continue.

Additionally, Boraq has opened a new library dedicated to preserving statements of jihadi leaders. It currently houses over 150 documents organized by the entity that published the statements. The new site also has links to nine different Faloja addresses, six of which work. This site could become a valuable resource for researchers.

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