ji·had·ica

Al-Maqdisi and the Jordanian Jihadi-Salafi Movement

Joas Wagemakers December 1, 2012

As most readers of Jihadica will know, the famous Jordanian radical scholar Abu Muhammad al-Maqdisi was arrested in September 2010 on suspicion of aiding terrorists and was sentenced to five years’ imprisonment in July 2011. Since then, however, we have rarely heard anything from the man often described as the most important radical Islamic scholar alive. As my current research focuses on quietist Salafis and the Muslim Brotherhood in Jordan, I regularly read Jordanian newspapers, which not only give us some idea of what is happening with al-Maqdisi, but also report on the Jihadi-Salafi community that he has left behind.

Hunger strike

For those who know something about al-Maqdisi’s earlier stays in prison, it is clear that these periods have often been some of the most productive ones in his entire life. He once even referred to the period 1994-1999 as the “blessed days”, as they allowed him to write many books, articles and fatwas. Since his earlier re-arrest in 2005 (released in 2008), however, very few of his writings have reached a wider audience while he was in prison. This is not to say that he was not engaged in putting his thoughts on paper, but just that he was apparently less successful in getting them out to the rest of the world.

His most recent stay in prison is also characterised by an almost complete black-out to the media and others. Almost, that is, since the Jordanian Islamist Al-Sabil newspaper reported on 9 November that al-Maqdisi sent them a letter from behind bars in which he told them of his threat to go on a hunger strike. Al-Sabil had reported this before and al-Maqdisi also sometimes took the same action during his previous stays in prison. The reason this time, according to al-Maqdisi’s letter, is that he wants to be transferred from the current prison in which he is staying in al-Mafraq (in the north of Jordan) to one closer to al-Rusayfa, where his family live, but the prison authorities are apparently not forthcoming in granting his request.

In his letter to Al-Sabil, al-Maqdisi also writes that life in prison has not been easy for him. On top of his assertion that he is innocent and therefore wrongly imprisoned and is withheld the support of a lawyer, he claims to suffer from back pains and also has a knee that hurts. The latter, al-Maqdisi states, was caused by an intelligence officer (described by him as the son of the current Jordanian Minister of Justice) who beat him there with the butt of his rifle. Meanwhile, the prison authorities refuse to give him the treatment he needs, al-Maqdisi claims, and – to his frustration – also offer him fruit on which the words “Produced in Israel” are written.

Al-Maqdisi’s Jordanian heirs

With al-Maqdisi apparently languishing in prison, it is interesting to see what the Jihadi-Salafi community he left behind is now doing. First of all, there is the question of leadership. While al-Maqdisi was clearly a scholar with a wide and international following, none of the remaining Jihadi-Salafi leaders seem able to fill his shoes in this respect. The movement’s current leaders include men such as Abu ‘Abdallah Luqman al-Riyalat, Nur al-Din Bayram and Abu Muhammad al-Tahawi. Although all three enjoy the respect of their local base in the cities of al-Salt, al-Zarqa’ and Irbid, respectively, none of them have the same scholarly credentials as al-Maqdisi and they are virtually unknown outside Jordan.

If the amount of media exposure is any guide to indicating who al-Maqdisi’s Jordanian temporary heirs are – until he is released from prison again, that is – the movement’s undisputed leaders are Muhammad al-Shalabi (better known as Abu Sayyaf) from Ma’an, in the south of Jordan, and especially the aforementioned Abu Muhammad al-Tahawi from the northern city of Irbid. The latter is obvious, since he was a prominent figure even when al-Maqdisi was still a free man and was on good terms with him. Abu Sayyaf is a different matter, however, since he was considered little more than a firebrand several years ago, but is now often called upon to comment on issues related to radical Islam.

Al-Maqdisi’s jihad

The Jihadi-Salafi movement led by the men mentioned above may have few scholars and even fewer high-profile activists, but al-Maqdisi left them some very clear ideas on why, when and how to wage jihad. As I point out in detail in my recently published book on al-Maqdisi, the most important reason to wage jihad according to the latter is to overthrow “apostate” rulers in the Muslim world, rather than defending Muslim land against non-Muslim invaders, although he certainly considers this legitimate too.

Even a legitimate jihad, however, should not be engaged in hastily and recklessly, but only if there is a real chance of succeeding. There is little use in jihadis simply acting as cannon fodder for their enemies, as al-Maqdisi once explained in the context of his opposition to youngsters going off to Iraq to fight the Americans there. Moreover, even if someone decides to join a jihad, this needs to be waged in a way that is legitimate from the point of view of the shari’a, meaning that the ends (victory over the enemy) do not always justify the means (beheadings, killing innocent civilians, etc.).

In short, it is necessary for all jihadis, al-Maqdisi believes, to think twice before they to run off to some war front; even in legitimate jihads, he wants them to join a proper organisation that fights under the banner of Islam so that their fighting efforts will be organised, effective and legitimate. Now that al-Maqdisi is not available to guide and correct his followers, however, how are they faring?

Fighting on two fronts?

The Jordanian Jihadi-Salafi movement seems to have been engaged in at least one jihad this year, namely the fight to overthrow the regime of President Bashar al-Asad in Syria. According to al-Tahawi, some 250 Jordanians are fighting the regime in Syria at the moment. Several of these were reported to have been killed, including – incidentally – al-Tahawi’s own son-in-law, and some of them have also been arrested after returning from Syria in increasing efforts by the Jordanian regime to crack down on border-crossing jihadis.

The second front – if there is one – is less clear. Although al-Tahawi proclaimed in late October that his movement “is determined to do a martyrdom operation in Israel”, little has come of such efforts in the past and the fact that such threats are published in the media seems to suggest that they are little more than empty rhetoric. More interesting is the arrest of eleven Jihadi-Salafis suspected of wanting to attack shopping centres and Western diplomatic targets in Amman in October. While much of the Jordanian press praised the security services for nabbing these men before they could do any damage, some took the trouble of asking Abu Muhammad al-Tahawi about his thoughts on the case. The latter rejected the regime’s accusations and stated that he believed they were innocent since his movement condemned killing other Muslims.

What would al-Maqdisi do?

It is unclear whether al-Tahawi’s claims should be taken at face value. Do the actions that we can be sure about (i.e., the Jordanians fighting in Syria) conform to al-Maqdisi’s jihadi preferences? Although it remains difficult to assess, al-Maqdisi’s focus on fighting “apostate rulers” most probably means that he agrees with a jihad against al-Asad, especially since the jihadis actually have a (long) shot at succeeding, particularly as no Western armies have entered the fray yet.

Al-Maqdisi would also look favourably on the Jihadi-Salafi groups set up in Syria itself, such as Jabhat al-Nusra li-Ahl al-Sham, which at least some Jordanians are said to have joined and which ensure that the jihad being waged is better organised and fought under a legitimate banner. Although he would definitely lament the fact that no true scholar has temporarily succeeded him to provide religious guidance to Jordanian jihadis, al-Maqdisi may well be quite satisfied with what his followers are doing.

 

Abu al-Yazid Mending Fences with Hamas

Thomas Hegghammer July 10, 2009

It’s late, I know, but I couldn’t let Mustafa Abu al-Yazid’s interview with al-Jazeera go uncommented. I found it absolutely fascinating. My hat is off to Ahmad Zaydan for finding Mustafa and asking him excellent questions.

International media focused on the A-bomb remark, but this was neither a very significant or surprising part of the interview (here I agree with Dan Drezner). It was just a quick unrehearsed side comment in an answer to a question about the security of Pakistan’s nuclear weapons.

The most significant part of the interview was Abu al-Yazid’s endorsement of Hamas. “We support the sincere mujahidin in Palestine, even the mujahidin of Hamas. We support them and help them; they are our brothers; we and they have the same ideology and the same method,” Abu al-Yazid said. This is quite a different message from that of Ayman al-Zawahiri and Abu Muhammad al-Maqdisi, who have been relentless in their criticism of Hamas in the past few years.

Not surprisingly, this caused quite a debate on the forums (see also here and here), where Hamas has long been subject of criticism (see e.g. here, here and here).

Abu al-Yazid’s statement was clearly an attempt by al-Qaida to mend fences with the broader Islamist movement and reach out to a wider audience. His choice of podium was surely no coincidence, for he is well aware that most al-Jazeera viewers are sympathetic to Hamas.

It has been a while since I heard a top al-Qaida member speak as clearly and straightforwardly as Abu al-Yazid did here.  He gave simple and seemingly honest answers to questions about al-Qaida’s organizational structure in Afghanistan, attacks called off against the US, the issue of two Islamic emirates (Iraq and Afghanistan), and many other things. Rob at the Shack is also right that overall, Abu al-Yazid’s remarks were not outlandishly radical when seen from the Arab street (the nuclear remark apart, obviously).

With the Abu al-Yazid interview, al-Qaida undoubtedly regained some of the popular support lost over the past few years. It is a reminder of how good al-Qaida can be at PR when they want to.

Watch the whole thing, look at the extracts or read it – I guarantee you will not be disappointed.

Jihadi reactions to Obama

Thomas Hegghammer June 4, 2009

We have heard Bin Ladin and Zawahiri’s comments, and Marc Lynch and others will tell us how the Arab mainstream reacted. But what are the grassroot jihadis saying about Obama’s Mideast tour in general and his Cairo speech in particular?

Let me begin by lowering your expectations. For a start, we should not expect to see any positive reactions to Obama’s initiative, for anybody thus inclined would not be on the forums in the first place. Second, there is no tradition among jihadi strategists or pundits for parsing presidential speeches. They might pick up on a phrase (like Bush’s reference to a “crusade”) and use it for their own purposes. But generally these guys don’t listen to what America says – they watch what she does.

I should also add that Faloja, the main jihadi forum, has been down since this morning (as has Shuraa), so our ability to gage the reactions to the Obama’s speech is limited. Fortunately I surveyed Faloja for Obama-related material yesterday, and Shumukh, the no.2 forum, is up today, so we have something to work with.

Overall, there is quite a bit of chatter about the Obama tour, and four types of postings recur. First are the political messages which denounce the visit and present it as further evidence that Egyptian and Saudi governments and ulama have submitted to American dominance. “In honour of Obama’s visit to Saudi Arabia”, one member reposted the classic bookThe evident proofs of the infidelity of the Saudi state (1990) by Abu Muhammad al-Maqdisi. Other posts circulate the pictures of Saudi and American flags side by side. Yet others claimed Egyptians are suffering as a result of Obama visit, because the security barriers in Cairo “confined 18 million Egyptians to their homes” and because the Sultan Hasan mosque had to be closed for security reasons.

In a widely diffused and entertaining post, a contributor named “Abu al-Bashar” describes a daydream about Egyptian Salafi Ulama confronting Obama. The text is written like a short skit which goes something like this (loosely translated):
“Here are our ulama from Egypt: Sheikhs Yasir al-Barhami, Muhammad Hussain Ya’qub, Ahmad al-Sisi, Abu Ishaq al-Huwayni, Tal’at Zahran, Muhammad Hasan, Muhammad Ismail al-Muqaddam and Mahmud al-Misri. They hear about Obama’s visit to Egypt and decide to convene a meeting in which the following conversation takes place.
Ismail gets angry and says we have been silent for long enough.
Hasan asks: what about Obama? He is coming here to salvage relations with the Muslim world.
Al-Huwayni intervenes: But he’s coming here while is armies are killing Muslims in Iraq and Afghanistan and supports the Jews in their killing of Palestinians.
Burhami says: The bottom line is that Obama the pig is coming here to slaughter us and he smiles at us in the process.
Al-Sisi sayd: Sure, but Obama the pig is coming here, so what should we do?
After long discussions, the scholars announce their decision, which consists of two steps.
First, a statement, denouncing Obama’s visit. It would be distributed on the satellite tv stations and on the internet forums and on facebook, and in all newspapers and journals, in Arabic and English and French. Second, a demonstration on the day of the speech. All preachers and scholars and their students would go to the location where Obama will deliver his speech and show their opposition.

– The end –
Here Sheikh Muhammad Husain Ya’qub intervenes, saying ‘I retract my positions’.”

The final part is quite funny – even in a dream official ulama lack moral courage.

The second type of posts are strategic assessments in which writers try to second-guess the real purpose and implications of the visit. These posts are neither numerous nor sophisticated, and so far none of the serious jihadi strategists have weighed in. “Al-Munasir1” warns that part of the purpose of Obama’s visit to Egypt is to make final preparations for an international campaign against Sudan.

The third and most widespread type of post focuses on tactical issues such as the detailed program of Obama’s visit, the size and nature of his security attachment and the prospects of carrying out an assassination. One writer quoted the Saudi opposition abroad as saying observers and Saudi security officials fear for Obama’s life in Saudi Arabia. He argued that the recent shooting in Jubayl is indicative of a surge in pro-al-Qaida sentiment in the Kingdom. The fact that the perpetrators of the Jubayl shooting have not been caught further worried the authorities. Most responses to the post expressed hope that Obama be assassinated, but one commentator drily noted that Obama comes and goes as he wishes so long as the royal family is in power.

Another post by “Baghdad al-Khilafa” presented a more detailed “Plan for killing Barak Obama” in Egypt. It included a picture of Cairo university followed by the note: “the best way of killing Obama: Suicide belt, suicide belt, suicide belt.” Then followed detailed instructions on how to manufacture a suicide belt, including links to downloadable instruction videos.

The fourth type of posting consists of reproductions of articles from other, more mainstream Arab and Islamic media. These posts are interesting not so much for the debates they generate (usually very little), but because they tell us something about which voices the forum participants would at least consider listening to. So we find
– Abd al-Bari Atwan ‘s article “Our advice to Obama”
– An article by Mahmud Abduh Ali at Islamonline entitled “An examination of Obama’s position on the big issues that concern the Muslim world”
– An article from al-Jazeera.net on the Muslim Brotherhood’s reaction to the Obama visit.
– An article from Middle East Online entitled “Egyptians: No Ahlan wa Sahlan for Obama”, which cites a poll showing three quarters of Egyptians were skeptical of Obama’s visit.

Of particular interest is the posting of an article from Sabq News reporting that the Saudi Islamist Ayidh al-Qarni loved Obama’s speech. The article is posted by the same Baghad al-Khilafa who wanted Obama blown up, and he is naturally expressing dismay at al-Qarni’s reaction, to the point of declaring him an infidel. This triggers a debate, with several contributors objecting to the excommunication (takfir) of al-Qarni. “Brothers, don’t declare him an infidel, he is just a regime cleric”, writes “Asad al-Jazira”.

In my two days of surfing the forums I was able to find one single statement mildly favourable to the Obama administration. A contributor named “Khaldun Halwani” wrote in a comment to a post: “Let us hope that this is the beginning of a new direction that will serve Muslim interests. I would add that Foreign Secretary has started changing US policy toward the enemy of Islam, Israel.” But this is of course an isolated statement by an anonymous contributor and thus not indicative of anything.

There are in other words no big surprises in the forum reactions to Obama’s Middle East tour, although it is still too early to tell how the jihadi movement will adapt to these initiatives. Hopefully we will see more serious jihadi strategic studies of Obama’s PR offensive in the weeks to come. I will keep my eye out for them and keep you posted. If anybody sees anything interesting, please let me know.

Update: Parts of this post was reproduced on the Foreign Policy Blog on 5 June and on NPR.com on 8 June.

Transformations of ‘Usbat al-Ansar

Scott Sanford May 14, 2009

Falluja Forum contributor Abu al-Ghadiyah recently posted an article titled “Transformations of ‘Usbat al-Ansar” that the Lebanese paper al-Akhbar published in March. The article was part of a larger series of reports that journalist Hasan ‘Aliq wrote regarding the political and security climate in Lebanon’s largest Palestinian refugee camp Ain al-Hilweh. He argues that the Islamist position is growing stronger in the camp due to changes in their attitudes towards the Lebanese state. However, Fatah attempts to check the Islamists’ growing influence have resulted in bloodshed and instability.

In “Transformations of ‘Usbat al-Ansar,” ‘Aliq claims that since 2003 ‘Usbat al-Ansar, a Palestinian militant organization that espouses takfiri ideology and allegedly sends fighters to Iraq, has recently undergone three major transformations. The first is the surrendering of Badi’ Hamadah, aka Abu ‘Ubaydah, to the Lebanese Army. According to the article, this move negatively impacted the organization’s relations with and support from al-Qaeda and “a number of religious men, especially in Saudi.”

The second “transformation” is the movement of ‘Usbat al-Ansar militants from Lebanon to Iraq. The organization claims that 20 of its members were killed in Iraq while engaging “occupation forces.” Additionally, it alleges that its members never participated in the sectarian violence that plagued Iraq. The article also maintains that Syria arrested ‘Usbat al-Ansar’s leader Abu Muhjin while he was in transit to Iraq. The article reports that ‘Usbat al-Ansar denies rumors that it is negotiating with Syria to release Muhjin for two fugitives hiding in Ain al-Hilweh. However, a second article by ‘Aliq states that Abu Muhjin left for Iraq in 2003 and has since returned to Ain al-Hilweh, according to an unnamed “Palestinian official.” Thus, it appears that Abu Muhjin’s whereabouts and status remain hazy.

The third “transformation” is a change in ‘Usbat al-Ansar’s behavior towards the Lebanese government. The article claims that the group once saw the Lebanese state as an enemy, but it now has an open communication line with Lebanese intelligence officials and helps maintain some stability in the camp. According to the report, the organization states that it will not partake in any Lebanese sectarian violence, but it did offer help to Hezbollah during the 2006 war with Israel.

‘Usbat al-Ansar’s actions are a positive step in building security in Lebanon. During the 2007 siege against Fatah al-Islam, ‘Usbat al-Ansar refrained from opening the so-called “second front” against the Lebanese Army and prevented its sister organization, Jund al-Sham, from doing so as well, a move that the Lebanese army was undoubtedly thankful for. However, not everything is on the up and up in Ain al-Hilweh.

According to a third report by ‘Aliq titled “Abu al-‘Abd the Palestinian: I Will not Forgive,” elements within Fatah are attempting to prevent the Islamists growing influence in Ain al-Hilweh. This article claims that Muhammad ‘Isa, aka al-Linu or Abu al-‘Abd, is a prominent Fatah military leader, who dislikes Islamists because he is allegedly is a member of the al-Habashiyah Sufi sect, which Salafi Islamists are hostile towards. He also reportedly has a desire to “return lost pride” to Fatah after its setbacks to Hamas in Gaza.

The article maintains that al-‘Abd “started a series of purifications” that have pitted Fatah against Jund al-Sham and have killed several people including Shehada Jawhar, a self proclaimed al-Qaeda trainer in Iraq and weapons smuggler in Lebanon. The article also states that al-‘Abd has been implicated in several explosions that have recently rocked Ain al-Hilweh and that he has rankled Fatah’s Lebanese leadership because he has supposedly found outside funding.

Lebanon’s Palestinian refugees remain a contentious issue. They appear to be heavily armed and well trained since many of them have fought in Iraq. Currently, the Palestinians are fragmented and suffer internal strife due to the strengthening of the Islamist position. The Islamists enjoy this position and are not keen to squander it by provoking another Nahr al-Bared. However, the internecine fighting will likely keep Ain al-Hilweh a dangerous place and the Lebanese Army on its toes.

More On Sayyid Imam’s Effectiveness

Will McCants December 11, 2008

Monika Maslikowski has a smart take on Sayyid Imam’s communication strategy vs. that of Zawahiri (it’s part of a larger assessment of the latter’s stumbles as a communicator this year).  She seconds my argument that Imam’s personal attacks on Zawahiri are effective because “Zawahiri’s success as a leader is dependent on whether or not he can gain trust and support.”

On the same subject, the Shack has an essay by an Egyptian lamenting Imam’s personal attacks.  For a different perspective by another Egyptian, I’d point you to Caliph’s remarks in the comments section of a previous post.  Without revealing too much, Caliph has closely followed Egyptian media and Islamism for years.  I’d rate his comments pretty high on their own merit, but one’s background seems to matter in these sorts of debates.

Response To Rob At The Shack

Will McCants December 5, 2008

We’re probably now at the point of diminishing returns, but the issue of Jihadi revisions is important enough to work through the particulars until it’s clear what’s fact, what’s unproven, and what’s merely a matter of taste.  It’s important not just for assessing the impact of Sayyid Imam’s work but for understanding how ideological challenges to Jihadism fail or succeed.  My response to Rob is below the fold: (more…)

Assessing The Impact Of Jihadi Revisionists

Will McCants December 3, 2008

Rob at Media Shack has posted a summary of a discussion on al-`Arabiyya’s “Death Industry.”  Of interest to him (and me) is Montasir Zayat’s assessment of Sayyid Imam’s latest book (Zayat only read the first one and a half chapters).  Here’s Rob’s take:

In Zayat’s view, what’s being printed now in Al-Masri Al-Youm is a disgrace and jeopardizes the reputation of the entire Revisions process.   No Jihadists or even Muslims anywhere will treat them seriously.

Rob agrees with this sentiment (as does Nathan Field).  But that’s not exactly what Zayat says.  Zayat does say the book is a disgrace, but he’s also pessimistic that anything can move Jihadis, no matter how refined.  Here he is in the same interview responding to the host’s question of which man, Imam or Zawahiri, has more popularity:

Dr. Sayyid Imam has an abundance of Sharia knowledge and he certainly had these beliefs before he was imprisoned.  He used to say the same things before he was imprisoned and I believe him.  However, Dr. Ayman al-Zawahiri has charisma and popularity, and he is readily accepted among the youth also.  Many of the youths’ hearts and heads are attached to him.  It is difficult for the words of Sayyid Imam to affect them.

Exactly.  There is nothing Sayyid Imam can say to sway hardcore fans of Zawahiri.  It doesn’t matter how mean or nice he is.  Thus, as I argued yesterday, we shouldn’t be assessing the impact of Imam’s book on Jihadis but rather on neutral pious, educated Arabs, particularly high school and college-age youth, whom Imam considers his primary audience.

But how do we measure this impact?  Rob says that it is by looking at the discussion of Sayyid Imam’s new book in the mainstream press.  By this measure, he says, it’s a failure because “there has been almost no coverage in the Arabic media.”  I don’t concede the latter assertion–the book was printed in full in Islam Online, al-Masry al-Youm, and al-Sharq al-Awsat and commented on in at least thirteen print news venues.  It is also all over the forums and the Arabic blogosphere.  Still, I agree that it is getting less coverage than Imam’s last book.  Rob says that’s because the tone of the book is bitter and personal.  A simpler explanation is that the subject–Imam turning on Zawahiri–is old news.

However, for the sake of argument, let’s say the story wasn’t covered by anyone in the mainstream media.  So what?  As I observed regarding a different matter (Jihadi forums), the fact that the Arab press ignores a phenomenon does not mean the phenomenon has little impact on Arabs.  The Arab press wrote nothing about Abu Bakr Naji until the Saudi arrests.  The Arab press has also missed the recent Maqdisi story.  Aside from this blog and an excellent article in Jamestown, only al-Hayat has caught it.

So how are we to assess the impact of Sayyid Imam’s new book on its target audience?  Here are a few places to look:

  • Mainstream Muslim discussion forums
  • News discussion forums (al-Jazeera, etc)
  • Personal blogs

Much of the circulation, of course, will be person-to-person, which we can’t possibly track.  Still, I’m willing to partially concede that it’s a dud if the mainstream forums and blogs are largely negative.  But let’s wait a little bit before rendering judgment.  As Sayyid Imam said in his last installment, it’s simply unfair to judge a book before it’s even been released.

New Booklets on Media, Jihad

Will McCants July 29, 2008

Abu al-Harith al-Ansari, a popular Jihadi author, has written an introductory booklet to Jihadism that explains the ideology and motivations of its adherents. Topics covered include: “Why we fight,” “Who we fight,” “How we fight,” and “Who we fight first.”

Another interesting booklet that was posted recently is by Abu Ta Ha al-Miqdad, an Ekhlaas member. The booklet is a study of how the media distorts Islam and the Jihadi Movement. There’s an introductory essay on how to spot spin, followed by close readings of articles from the mainstream Arab press.

(Follow the links in the .pdfs to get the documents.)

Document (Arabic): 7-28-08-ekhlaas-new-book-by-abu-harith-al-ansari-on-principles-of-jihad

Document (Arabic): 7-27-08-ekhlaas-how-to-uncover-media-spin


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