ji·had·ica

Sayf al-‘Adl and al-Qa’ida’s Historical Leadership

Vahid Brown May 18, 2011

In light of the widely reported news that Sayf al-‘Adl (also spelled Saif al-Adel) has taken the reins of operational leadership within al-Qa’ida in the wake of the death of Osama bin Laden, I thought it would be useful to Jihadica’s readers to provide a bit of context about this man and about the significance, if any, of these reports (see, e.g., Musharbash and Bergen), all of which rely on the testimony of Noman Benotman, a former leader of the Libyan Islamic Fighting Group.

First of all, it would be more correct to say that Sayf al-‘Adl remains the operational leader of al-Qa’ida rather than that he has lately assumed this rank. (Nor is this the first time that Benotman has called attention in the press to Sayf’s operational re-emergence in al-Qa’ida. He discussed Sayf’s release from Iran and return to headquarters, as it were, with Der Speigel last October)  Several al-Qa’ida insiders have reported since 2009 that Sayf took the top slot in al-Qa’ida’s military committee after the 2001 death of Abu Hafs al-Masri (Muhammad Atef). These sources also evidence long standing tensions within the organization about Zawahiri being AQ’s second-in-command, next in line to lead should Bin Laden exit the scene.

This much can be gleaned from Abu Jandal (Nasser al-Bahri), the Yemeni former bodyguard of Bin Laden, who has much to say on both points in his 2010 memoir.  Abu Jandal broke with al-Qa’ida after 9/11, but according to him up to that point the chain of command in operational terms was clearly Bin Laden, Abu Hafs, Sayf, and then Abu Muhammad al-Masri (Abdullah Ahmad Abdullah). With Abu Hafs dead, Sayf took the operational lead as head of the military committee. As for the doubts about Zawahiri, at the end of his book Abu Jandal asks himself what would happen if Bin Laden died, and answers that while Zawahiri would theoretically replace him, “to me, Zawahiri does not possess the requisite qualities to lead the organization.” He goes on to say (translating from the French here):

“Bin Laden is a born leader. He commanded al-Qa’ida with a certain transparency, rendering him universally acceptable; he is open to dialogue; and he has historical legitimacy. Zawahiri, though, conducts his affairs in secret. There are numerous members of al-Qa’ida that would not accept Zawahiri taking over. His behavior and that of the Egyptians have generated a great deal of reserve, sometimes very harsh criticism. All of this has left its mark. His statements, as we have seen, are sometimes dismissed. I doubt he has sufficient authority for such a position, even with his well-known authoritarianism and his penchant for centralizing power in himself” (p. 281).

Much more revealing is Abdullah Muhammad Fazul’s two-volume autobiography, released online in early 2009. Fazul joined al-Qa’ida as a teenager in 1991, and his trainer at al-Faruq Camp – then located at the Haqqani compound at Zhawara, in southeastern Afghanistan – was none other than Sayf al-‘Adl. Fazul is no fan of Zawahiri, of whom he sometimes writes dismissively, as a Johnny-come-lately hanger-on. He repeatedly emphasizes that he is loyal to what he calls “mother al-Qa’ida,” and says that the “historical leadership” of this old-school al-Qa’ida did not change when Zawahiri decided in 2000 to merge up his all-but-defunct Jihad al-Islami organization with Bin Laden’s. Here are two representative excerpts, one from 2007, the other from late 2008 or early 2009, in both of which Sayf is clearly identified as al-Qa’ida’s operational boss:

“After we learned of the death of Dadullah there was a reorganization of the leadership of the old guard of al-Qa’ida. It was announced today [late May, 2007] that Shaykh Sa’id (Abu Yazid), who was in charge of al-Qa’ida’s financial affairs since its founding and was the first leader of the former Finance Committee, has been made the new Amir of al-Qa’ida’s branch in Afghanistan. This is of a new strategy to confuse the Americans and is the best way to turn the people to the new leaders…This is also to show the Americans and Westerners waging their war on us that they fail to understand our leaders and that the central leadership is fine. So the general Amir Usama bin Ladin is fine and in good health, and the financial leadership is fine and under the command of Shaykh Sa’id. As for the shari’a leadership, all of them are in Iran and living safely under the leadership of the esteemed shaykh Abu Hafs al-Muritani. As for the military and security leadership, it is no secret to anyone that the strikes in Afghanistan have proven the preparedness of these leaders. All of them are fine, and brother Shaykh Abu Muhammad al-Masri and Shaykh Sayf al-‘Adl are both well and in Iran and continue the struggle in consultation with their brothers the field commanders in Afghanistan, such as brother Khalid al-Habib and Abu Islam al-Masri known as Shu’ayb. We were gladdened by the announcement of Shaykh Sa’id’s new amir position, as it came after the capture of our beloved brother Shaykh ‘Abd al-Hadi al-‘Iraqi, may God break his bonds. So long as the heads of the committees that comprise the mother al-Qa’ida remain fine, then insha’allah all things will be fine.” (From vol. 2, p. 310)

The following excerpt is from a lengthy discussion of al-Qa’ida’s quest for nuclear weapons (vol. 2, p. 499):

“I say that the mystery of the word al-Qa’ida is one that few have understood. There is the mother al-Qa’ida, there are the collaborators, and there are the Afghan Arabs who worked together during the Afghan jihad, and now all are characterized as “al-Qa’ida.” In the same way, the Egyptian Islamic Jihad under the leadership of Ayman al-Zawahiri is referred to as “al-Qa’ida” even before the unification and integration. He is called the number two man in the organization, but we don’t have firsts and seconds in Islam, all are equal before God, and in any case I have never once taken orders from Zawahiri. Although he became the deputy of the Shaykh [UBL] after unification, and followed the same management style, the number two man in the mother al-Qa’ida organization is brother Sayf al-‘Adl, after the killing of Shaykh Abu Hafs the Commander (God have mercy on him), and we do not take orders from anyone but our historical leadership.”

(For more on Fazul and the al-Qa’ida succession question, see Nelly Lahoud’s recent article here.)

That Sayf has been hands-on with al-Qa’ida field operations since 2001 is well-known; some of the evidence was rehearsed in a backgrounder put out by longwarjournal today.  (See also my profile of Sayf as of 2007, here at p. 119.) Sayf was responsible for forging al-Qa’ida’s ties with Zarqawi, as we know from Sayf’s own memoir on this published by Fu’ad Hussayn in 2005.  More recently, US military intelligence claimed to have intercepted letters in 2008 between al-Qa’ida leaders – including Sayf, who is referred to as a second-in-command in this context – and AQI, which show al-Qa’ida Central struggling to clean up Zarqawi’s mess in Iraq.  Less well known is Sayf’s role in the killing of Daniel Pearl. Khalid Sheikh Muhammad told FBI interrogators in 2007 that it was Sayf who tipped him off about Daniel Pearl’s kidnapping and directed him to make an al-Qa’ida propaganda coup out of it.

During all this time, then, Sayf and Abu Muhammad al-Masri retained operational leadership of al-Qa’ida from their hideouts in Iran, but more recently Sayf and other members of the “historical leadership” have gone public again. Readers of Jihadica will know this already; I wrote about Sayf’s first batch of new letters here and Will has begun to shed light on the newest batch of letters here. What changed?

The story goes something like this. In late 2008, Iranian diplomat Heshmat Attarzadeh was kidnapped in Peshawar, and then sold down the river to Pakistani Taliban custody in South Waziristan. Iran, in pursuit of his release, sought the good offices of the Haqqani network leadership, who engineered a swap in 2009: Attarzadeh for Sayf and a number of other “house arrested” al-Qa’ida figures, including Abu Hafs al-Muritani, Sulayman Abu al-Ghayth, and several members of Bin Laden’s family. The story first broke in the Afghan press at the beginning of April, 2010, in a story in Pastho on Weesa.net (no longer available online). Abu’l-Walid al-Masri then posted a translation of the story to a forum, and at the end of the month Syed Saleem Shahzad came through with one of his characteristically colorful stories about the whole affair. Some of the details remain slightly fishy – why, for example, would Iran trade such potentially valuable bargaining chips for a minor diplomat? – but whatever the case it was only after this that all of the above-named folks began releasing statements via Abu’l-Walid’s blog. That al-Qa’ida’s operational commander, top religious cleric and former spokesman all released new statements on the website of one of al-Qa’ida’s most virulent critics, and not through official al-Qa’ida channels, does indicate a certain amount of distance between these men and Zawahiri, commander-in-chief of al-Qa’ida TV.

This is already a too-long blog post, so I’ll leave it at that and try to return this weekend with some comments on Sayf’s strategic outlook and what it might mean for al-Qa’ida if he, and not Zawahiri, were to become the face of global jihad.

UPDATE – May 19, 2011

Two further points of interest. Asra Nomani today shared further details about Sayf al-‘Adl’s role in the Daniel Pearl case, pointing out that Sayf had advised KSM not to kill the journalist.

Secondly, Sayf al-‘Adl is not Muhammad Ibrahim Makkawi. Colonel Makkawi is ten years older than Sayf and a number of insiders who knew both men in Afghanistan – including Abu Jandal, Noman Benotman, Abu’l-Walid al-Masri and Yasir al-Sirri – have confirmed numerous times over the years that they are two different people. Both were officers in the Egyptian military; Sayf was a paratrooper and colonel in the Egyptian special forces before his 1987 arrest. Both fought at the infamous battle of Jalalabad in 1989, and around that time Sayf joined Bin Laden’s group and Makkawi remained with Zawahiri’s EIJ, though in the early 1990s he had a falling out with Zawahiri and quit the group. Sayf himself, at the end of the fifth letter in his most recent batch of communications posted on Abu’l-Walid’s blog, also emphatically states that Colonel Makkawi and Sayf are two different people.  The one photo we have and which has become ubiquitous in the press lately is indeed of Sayf, not Makkawi, though since that photo was taken Sayf was injured in his right eye. It is surprising that the Makkawi-Sayf confusion persists, given that Muhammad al-Shafi’i drew attention to this case of mistaken identity seven years ago.

A Note on Usama Bin Ladin’s 1998 Declaration of War: al-Kisa’i vs. al-Kasani

Sayeed Rahman February 24, 2011

[Editor’s note: I am very pleased to introduce a new guest contributor, Sayeed Rahman, a Yale PhD and a fellow with the Truman National Security Project.]

A number of translations analyze and annotate Usama Bin Ladin’s 1998 statement declaring war against the United States and her allies (see here, here, here, here and here). The original Arabic source for this declaration is the February 23, 1998 edition of the London based newspaper al-Quds al-`Arabi.  After citing Qur’anic verses and hadith to support the legitimacy of his call to arms, Bin Ladin and the other signatories cite four well-known post-formative Sunni Muslim jurists to bolster their claim that jihad is an individual duty (fard al-`ayn) when Muslim countries are attacked.  Among the scholars cited is an individual named “al-Kisa’i” and his work al-Bada’i`.  The identification of this al-Kisa’i has eluded American translators.  For reasons I discuss below, I believe this individual to be the Hanafi jurist `Abu Bakr Ibn Mas`ud al-Kasani (d. 1191) and the work referred to is his multi-volume legal compendium Bada’i` al-sana’i` fi tartib al-shara’i`.  This difficulty in identification goes back to the original al-Quds al-`Arabi article in which al-Kasani’s name is misspelled “al-Kisa’i.”  The omission of an alif and mistyping a hamza for a nun plausibly explain this error.    

Among the American translators of this work, Bruce Lawrence, in his reader on Bin Ladin (Messages to the World, p. 60) notes that “al-Kisa’i wrote his book in the 11th century, but very little is known about him outside of his work, which tells numerous stories from the time of the Prophet.”  Although he does not explicitly say so, it appears that Lawrence believes this al-Kisa’i to be the author of the Qisas al-anbiya’ (Tales of the Prophets), a collection of tales about prophets prior to Islam’s messenger, Muhammad.  When this al-Kisa’i lived is not known, but a common opinion holds that he composed the Qisas by 1200.  John Kelsay, in his chapter “Arguments Concerning Resistance in Contemporary Islam,” gives this al-Kisa’i a death date of 805 but offers no further information about him (Ethics of War, p. 69).  Kelsay’s assignment of 805 as his death date implies that he believes this al-Kisa’i is the Qur’an reciter and grammarian Abu al-Hasan `Ali al-Kisa’i (d. 805).  Raymond Ibrahim’s Al Qaeda Reader, which provides a glossary of terms and people mentioned in it, does not attempt to identify al-Kisa’i or his work.  Finally, the translation of this declaration in Al Qaeda in Its Own Words (p. 54) does identify al-Kasani as I have, but it provides no basis for its identification and its variance with those of the aforementioned authors. 

Can a definitive identification of this al-Kasani be made?  Lawrence’s identification of al-Kisa’i as the eleventh-century author of the Qisas and Kelsay’s identification of al-Kisa’i as a grammarian who died in 805 are both untenable for the following reasons:  al-Kasani’s Bada’i` treats individually obligatory jihad; his work was well-known to the signatories of this declaration; and finally, citing al-Kasani fits with the overall purpose of the 1998 declaration.

Al-Kasani’s Bada’i` has a long section explaining why jihad is generally a fard al-kifaya but ends with a short passage explaining when jihad becomes a fard al-`ayn (see 9:382 of the 2003 Dar al-Kutub al-`Ilmiyyah edition).  This indicates that al-Kasani is the author intended by the declaration and not al-Kisa’i.  Moreover, al-Kasani and his Bada’i` would have been familiar to the signatories of this declaration.  Abdullah Azzam (d. 1989), whose writings were certainly well-known to Bin Ladin and al-Zawahiri, cites al-Kasani’s Bada’i` in support of the obligation of individual jihad in a number of his works, and later writings by members of al-Qaida also cite al-Kasani’s Bada’i` for the same purpose.

Finally, it is clear that in this declaration Bin Ladin and other signatories are attempting to garner support for their position among Sunni Muslims worldwide by citing famous post-formative Sunni jurists.  The first is the well-known Hanbali jurist Ibn Qudamah (d. 1223) and his multi-volume legal work al-Mughni.  The second is al-Kasani and his work al-Bada’i`.  The third jurist noted is the Maliki jurist al-Qurtubi (d. 1273); the authors of the declaration claim that his legal exegesis of the Qur’an (tafsirihi), the famous Ahkam al-Qur’an, supports their position.  The fourth and final jurist cited is Ibn Taymiyyah (d. 1328), another Hanbali jurist, who is referred to by the honorific Shaykh al-Islam.  The text of the declaration provides a quote from Ibn Taymiyyah and cites “his selections” (wa-naqala dhalika…fi ikhityaratihi) as the source for this quote.  This is likely a reference to a selection of Ibn Taymiyyah’s legal positions available under variations of the title al-Ikhtiyarat compiled by a later Hanbali scholar named Abu al-Hasan `Ali al-Ba`li (d. 1400).  The function of citing these Sunni jurists is undoubtedly to appeal to all Sunni Muslims and to justify the reasoning of the signatories.  The authors of the declaration would gain no support for their position by citing non-jurists such as al-Kisa’i the compiler of stories or al-Kisa’i the grammarian.

A greater mystery than al-Kasani’s identity remains.  In an appeal to the entire Sunni Muslim world through the citation of esteemed Sunni jurists, why are representatives of only three of the four Sunni schools mentioned?  Two Hanbali scholars, a Maliki, and a Hanafi are referenced.  Why is there no mention of a Shafi`i jurist?  Without a doubt, the signatories of this statement knew the works of Shafi`i jurists that could be presented in support of their position.  That they neglected to cite even one such jurist might indicate that the declaration was rushed, a possibility that would shed light on the misspelling of al-Kasani’s name as well.  

 

Al-Qa’ida Revisions: The Five Letters of Sayf al-‘Adl

Vahid Brown February 10, 2011

The jihadi forums have seen some rather heated and confused debate over the past several months after the publication online of a series of writings from senior leaders of the pre-9/11 al-Qa’ida organization whom we’ve not heard from in years, and which are bringing back into the open serious disagreements over strategy and ideology that had divided al-Qa’ida prior to the 9/11 attacks. The online imbroglio over this growing al-Qa’ida revisions literature – even the existence of the literature itself – has, to my knowledge, escaped the notice of Western audiences. My aim here is to draw attention to this new “crack in the foundation” of the movement, focusing on the most recent salvo: five letters written, under a pseudonym, by Sayf al-‘Adl (also spelled Saif al-Adel), the second-in-command of al-Qa’ida’s historical leadership. These letters are the latest addition to a significant recent body of work by al-Qa’ida figures that directly challenges the claims to the al-Qa’ida legacy made by the more familiar faces of the post-9/11 al-Qa’ida organization – Ayman al-Zawahiri and Abu Yahya al-Libi in particular – a challenge that has not gone unnoticed by al-Qa’ida’s online constituency.

The Five Letters

The letters in question (here and here) were posted by Mustafa Hamid (Abu al-Walid al-Masri) to his website on December 31, 2010, and Hamid introduces them as “five articles, full of frankness and ardor, sent to me by one of the brothers in jihad, an old comrade in arms from Afghanistan.” He describes the author as having adopted the new nickname “’Abir Sabil” (lit., wayfarer or passer-by), and places him among that first generation of jihadis that has “weathered the treachery and betrayals of two decades of activity.” Hamid says the essays are written in a tone “much different from the convulsive tension which has become the predominant characteristic of those who belong to or attach themselves to the jihadi current,” whose vision of jihad “is a mixture of violent hysteria, harm of oneself and others, fighting without guidance or insight, and the killing of as many human beings as possible.” The letters themselves are not dated, but appear to have been written around November 19, 2010, as they refer in one place to the Lisbon Conference as “now underway.” Hamid presents them in the hopes that they will lead to an internal Islamic dialogue that would seek to come to terms with the past mistakes of jihadi activism, and in this sense he frames them as part of the larger trend of jihadi revisions – though, as will be seen below, the five letters do not call for a cessation of violence, a point on which the five letters differ from the broader revisions literature.

Who is ‘Abir Sabil?

In an introductory note appended by Mustafa Hamid to each of the letters, we are told that the author “is a long-time member of the al-Qa’ida Organization. He joined the organization at the end of 1989, when the Soviets had withdrawn from Afghanistan, and the famous battle of Jalalabad had entered the phase of gradual attrition. Though not one of its founders, he assumed some of the most important roles in the organization, including operational leadership in the areas of training, the administration of the camps, and general security and military activity. In 1995 he played a major role in Somalia, supervised the training of the Somali groups, and worked to set in motion their operations in the field. He also played a prominent role in the battle of Kandahar at the end of 2001…. After the martyrdom of Abu ‘Ubayda al-Banshiri in 1996 and then Abu Hafs al-Masri in 2001 – two co-founders, with Usama bin Ladin, of the al-Qa’ida Organization – “Abir Sabil” became the most senior and important member in the uppermost rank of the field leadership of that organization.”

All of these details are consistent with what is known of Sayf al-‘Adl – who also happens to be Mustafa Hamid’s son-in-law.  Jamal Ismail, who reported on the five letters the day after they appeared on Mustafa Hamid’s website, also identifies Sayf as the author. Without naming sources, Ismail further reported that Ayman al-Zawahiri had contacted Sayf, whom Ismail claims is living inside Afghanistan, to urge him against releasing his letters. Ismail’s story does not refer to Mustafa Hamid’s website as the medium of distribution, but there can be little doubt that he is referring to the five letters signed ‘Abir Sabil. (See also this piece for further context.)

The Five Letters as Revisions Texts

Though Ismail’s story is subtitled “Sayf al-‘Adl issues revisions against violence,” Ismail does not repeat or detail anything specific in the article that portray the five letters in this light. In fact, the letters do not appeal to the jihadi community in general nor to al-Qa’ida in particular to renounce violence, though they do contain other characteristics of the jihadi revisions “genre”: they argue that the jihadi movement has made fundamental mistakes, has refused to acknowledge or learn from them, and is in dire need of some re-evaluation. The letters do not get into specifics about what those mistakes are or how to correct them, but they are nonetheless quite damaging to al-Qa’ida’s current leadership.

First of all, not only did Sayf bypass al-Qa’ida’s official channels for distribution, he elected to release these letters via Mustafa Hamid, the most well-known jihadi insider to have come out in no uncertain terms against al-Qa’ida’s current leadership and strategic vision, going so far as to call on its North Waziristan-based bosses to disband the group altogether. In the fifth letter, Sayf admits that his connection to Mustafa Hamid may provoke some controversy, and he claims to have had disagreements with Hamid, old and new. However, Sayf says he also agrees with Hamid on many issues, adding that “we are both sons of the same current, both on one path in which there is no retreat and no surrender. Shaykh Abu al-Walid has a track record that nobody can deny.”

The first three letters are devoted to Afghanistan, and basically present arguments for that country’s unique suitability as a graveyard of empires. There is some dissonance with al-Qa’ida’s ideological messaging within these letters – he speaks highly of the fact that the Afghans are united in their adherence to the Hanafi school of Islamic law, for instance, a notion that al-Qa’ida’s Salafis would find abhorent – but it is really in the last two letters that Sayf takes exception, if often only implicitly, with al-Qa’ida’s current approach.

The fourth letter is addressed to the preachers and scholars of the ummah, and while he has some bones to pick with Muslim religious leaders for distracting the community with irrelevant minutia and for being all-too-willing to legitimize corrupt and oppressive regimes, the main message of this letter is one of conciliation, and Sayf devotes just as much space to criticizing the religious failings of the mujahidin as he does to clerical hypocrisy. He is willing to acknowledge the good in a variety of Muslim leaderships typically condemned in the harshest terms by al-Qa’ida’s current leadership. He ends with an appeal to Islam’s preachers and scholars and to “all who belong to the Islamist trends: we are not enemies of one another. Rather you are our partners in changing the world…. We are not claiming that there is only one way, but rather that there are two paths: preaching (da’wa) and jihad. Our view is that the importance of jihad lies in preparing the ground and clearing the way for the call (da’wa)… The conclusion that must be drawn – no matter whether you were with us but became lost and perplexed, or are of those who think we seek worldly gain – is that our enemy is clear, and our swords must be drawn against him alone for the liberation of the ummah. Islam is coming, so be with us and we will secure the victory together, and will realize the caliphate of God on earth. Da’wa and jihad together – this is our strategy.”

The final letter begins by bemoaning al-Qa’ida’s failure to fess up to and learn from its mistakes, and then turns to outlining a strategic theory for anti-imperialist jihad that Sayf credits Mustafa Hamid with introducing to al-Qa’ida in Afghanistan. This echoes ‘Abdallah Muhammad Fazul’s 2009 autobiography, which makes the provocative claim that Mustafa Hamid “convinced the al-Qa’ida leadership to confront the United States.” (I discuss this briefly here). Basically, Sayf says that Hamid, using the metaphor of pack mules and the mule driver, explained how American imperialism is a project that distributes the burden of subjugation upon various agent regimes, who are thus divided, ruled, and made to serve the interests of empire even in their internal and external conflicts. The implication is that violent opposition to what in most jihadi literature are called the “apostate regimes” is ultimately counter-productive. Sayf concludes by appealing to the “youth of the ummah” to focus their jihad on the mule driver and not the mules – to fight the US, not its client states.

In its broad strokes, none of this is radically different from what we’ve come to expect from al-Qa’ida’s official statements. But in a number of respects – its manner of distribution, its call for review, its relatively ecumenical appeal to Islamists, and its implicit rejection of state-focused revolutionary violence – these messages do present a challenge to Zawahiri and the current leadership of al-Qa’ida, a challenge made all the more serious by the author’s stature in the world of jihadism.

(For background on the revisions literature, Jihadica has followed this genre in a number of posts, and see also this more lengthy study by Omar Ashour. On the cast of characters mentioned here, see my now somewhat dated Harmony profiles of Sayf, Mustafa Hamid, and Fazul).

Jihadis Debate Egypt (2)

Brynjar Lia February 4, 2011

Al-Qaida’s senior leadership (AQSL) is full of Egyptians, but they have yet to produce an official communiqué about events in their home country. Yesterday, a short message was published by a leading Egyptian jihadi figure. It is not from AQSL, however, but from someone we haven’t heard from for many years. The London-based Al Maqreze Center run by Hani al-Sibai has relayed a message from Thirwat Salah Shahata, a veteran of the old Egyptian Islamic Jihad (Jama’at al-Jihad bi Misr). Now nearly fifty one years old, he has been absent from the spotlight for many years. In 2005, he was reported to be under some sort of house arrest in Iran, and Al-Sharq al-Awsat’s sources claim the message was sent from Tehran. Al Maqreze, however, suggests he is now hiding in “Khurasan” (i.e. the Northern Af-Pak region).

In his communiqué, Shahata speaks on behalf of the Jihad Group (EIJ), not al-Qaida. He expresses his solidarity with the courageous Egyptian people “with all segments of its society” in their fight against tyranny, and says “we wish we could have been on the front line, and shared this honour with you”. In an attempt to explain the jihadis’ absence from the scene, he talks about the imprisonment of numerous EIJ cadres in Egypt, their escape from Egypt during various stages of their struggle with the regime, and their participation in other arenas for jihad. He ends his message by urging Egyptians not to be deceived by the regime’s concessions, but continue the current uprising until the regime is gone. Shahata also addresses the army, urging them to heed the nation’s aspirations and side with the people.

In short, Shahata’s communiqué is rather unremarkable and triggered only measured responses on the jihadi web. In fact, apart from the obligatory “bless you” and “God protect Shaykh Tharwat”, it triggered negative comments about Shahata’s appeal to the army: “I don’t know how he can appeal to the army. This is a secular army … and one that produced the tyrants such as Gamal Abdul Nasser, Sadat and now, the damned (“unblessed”) Mubarak …”

Such a response and the mere fact that this anonymous and murky EIJ figure, issues a message, and not a leading Egyptian al-Qaida member, is significant. Again, it demonstrates the jihadis’ irrelevance to the rapidly evolving situation in Egypt.

Jihadis Debate Egypt (1)

Brynjar Lia February 4, 2011

With Tunisia’s President Bin Ali tucked away in Jedda and the world’s attention fixated on the popular uprising in Egypt, al-Qaida may be about to lose one of its main ideological selling points: that only armed struggle can bring down the regimes in the region.

Not surprisingly, the jihadi online community is captivated by the uprising, but many are also bewildered about what this means for their cause, and their leaders have been slow to respond. Jarret Brachman has a point when he taunts Zawahiri: “Your Silence is Deafening.” As of Thursday afternoon, the leading jihadi forum Shamikh only featured a handful of authoritative responses to the events in Egypt, from pro-jihadi pundits, a legal scholar and other participants. However, not a word from the leadership. The closest thing to an official response is AQIM’s statement on the events in Tunisia (available also in translation).

Over the past few days, the most popular sub-forum on Shamikh, the “Umma Affairs Forum”, claiming more than 300,000 visitors, has gradually increased the number of “sticky posters” dealing with the situation in Egypt. The rank-and-file participants are organizing in Q & A sessions and open discussions to bring more clarity to the situation.

Among the few authorative voices we find Abu Mundhir al-Shanqiti, a member of the legal council at Minbar al-Tawhid wa’l-Jihad and a prolific fatwa writer. A few days ago, he issued a fatwa on “the permissibility of participation in the present revolution in Egypt,” which expands on a previous article from January 25th entitled “Revolt against Mubarak”. But don’t let the word “fatwa” mislead you. This is all about politics.

The first thing that strikes me is how much praise Shaykh al-Shanqiti heaps on the anti-Mubarak demonstrators and how frank and outspoken he is about the jihadi movement’s failure to remove the regime: “We need to acknowledge that removing the ruling regime in Egypt is a matter which may be hard even for the largest jihadi organizations, so if these demonstrators succeed in toppling it [the regime], it will be a great victory for Islam and Muslims.” Yes, you read it right: al-Shanqiti openly declares that these demonstrators, who by all accounts have no jihadi links or sympathies whatsoever, are apparently achieving what the jihadis have tried to do for decades. Of course, al-Shanqiti quickly turns his attention to the usual enemy, the Western world and the United States, claiming that they are trembling in fear of losing “one of their most important agents” in the region. Furthermore, Shaykh al-Shanqiti alleges that Western powers are now polishing ElBaradei to become their next “dependent agent”.

But this does not mean that we are back to jihadi ranting as usual. In al-Shanqiti’s view, the repercussions of Mubarak’s downfall will be significant; indeed it might cause “a large earthquake similar to the 9/11 raids”. He points to Israel’s dependence on the Egyptian regime as its Southern “border guard”, but also to implications for the region as a whole. Al-Shanqiti cannot overstate how recent events have overwhelmed him: “we are facing a historic moment and a critical phase in the history of the Islamic nation.” But instead of plunging into the usual jihadi tirades, he is surprisingly nationalist in tone. Check out this quote: “As for the Egyptians today, it means that they have wrestled back their dignity, honour, and freedom and have gotten rid of Western agents. This means the birth of a new era, in which Egypt will possess its own will and realize its own future and belonging, to its religion, to God’s laws and to its Islamic nation.” And this one: “How we long to be among our brothers in Egypt so that we could enjoy the honour of contributing to the downfall of this regime, be it only with half a word”. Al-Shanqiti’s fatwa is so filled with enthusiasm and excitement over events in Egypt, that he almost forgets to provide the obligatory religious justifications for his fatwa. Rarely have I seen a pro-al-Qaida cleric being so excited about secular demonstrators!

True, he hasn’t entirely forgotten the jihadis, and he hopes to see them play a role: “If some of the mujahidin are present today in Egypt, their most preferable jihad would be to participate in this blessed revolution.” Al-Shanqiti also suggests that the mujahidin should be prepared to sacrifice “ten or even hundred of their best fighters” in a suicide operation to put an end to Mubarak and his regime. He also portrays events as though the Egyptian public now finally is about to realize what the jihadi groups have said over the past two decades. Conveniently glossing over the huge differences between the armed strategy of the militant Islamist opposition of the past and today’s non-violent mass protests, al-Shanqiti presents one comparison after the other, attempting to create a sense of historic continuity.

But again, Shaykh al-Shanqiti’s enthusiasm for the (largely secular) protesters is what really stands out. He applauds “the courage of the non-committed youth and their dedication and struggle for the Islamic nation”. He even holds them up as a shining example compared to Egypt’s Salafi current who “call themselves seekers of knowledge”, but “are not even lifting their heads.” Al-Shanqiti accuses them of serving the regime’s cause by their warnings about “fitna”, and he rages against Egyptian Salafis who have claimed that the toppling of Mubarak’s regime will lead to secular rule. Shaykh al-Shanqiti’s order of priorities is clear, politics first, then religion: “the issue we are talking about is the removal of the regime. This is a demand on which we are in agreement with the rest of the [Egyptian] people. We should contribute to realizing this goal. After the regime has gone, it is possible to strive for the creation of a new regime which implements God’s Law”. In other words, the revolutionary agenda takes precedence over the Islamic character of the revolution. 

To be continued.

A Portrait of the Terrorist as a Young Man

Joas Wagemakers July 18, 2010

Of all the jihadis we’ve seen in recent years, Abu Mus’ab al-Zarqawi must rank as one of the most violent. Nicknamed “the slaughtering sheikh” (al-shaykh al-dhabbah) by fellow militants, he is widely held responsible for killing hundreds of Shiites in Iraq and personally beheading the American hostage Nicolas Berg. It would therefore be interesting to know what went on in the mind of this man, who was killed in an American attack in 2006.

While several publications have tried to show us the man behind the myth, it would be even better if we could get a glimpse of what al-Zarqawi thought in his pre-Iraq years. Well, the time has come. About a week ago, a jihadi website posted a notebook allegedly used by al-Zarqawi while imprisoned in Jordan in the 1990s. The link on the website (the eleventh title from the top) is called Safahat min Daftar al-Shaykh Abi Mus’ab al-Zarqawi (Pages from Shaykh Abu Mus’ab al-Zarqawi’s Notebook) and leads to an .exe file that actually allows you to flick through the man’s writings.

Some Jihadica readers may remember that Will McCants discussed this document two years ago (on 22 June 2008 to be exact). At the time, however, only a few pages were available and the links to the rest of the document didn’t work (or at least don’t work anymore). Some readers may also be familiar with the Jordanian journalist Fu’ad Husayn and his book Al-Zarqawi: Al-Jil al-Thani li-l-Qa’ida (Al-Zarqawi: The Second Generation of al-Qa’ida, available in English here), which also only showed a few of the notebook’s pages on pp. 21-23. Now, however, the full 77-page document is available in its original form, including even the blank pages.

Authenticity and timing

The document seems to be authentic. As Will noted at the time, the notebook is dedicated to several people, including Umm Qudama and Abu Qudama, who are respectively al-Zarqawi’s sister and brother-in-law, and al-Zarqawi was indeed in prison in 1998, when the document is said to have been written. This information could, of course, easily have been known by others but there is a third reason to believe this document is indeed the real deal. As mentioned, Will discussed some of these pages before when they appeared on a jihadi forum and so did the book by Fu’ad Husayn, who told me he had received the notes directly from al-Zarqawi’s family. Now that they appear on another jihadi website, it seems unlikely that three different sources keep recycling different pages of a notebook that was never written by al-Zarqawi, although one cannot be entirely sure of course.

As to why this document was posted now, one can only guess. The notebook wasn’t written or discovered recently and, considering al-Zarqawi has been dead for four years, nothing of interest seems to have happened to him that caused the document’s publication. Moreover, if it was posted on the website to commemorate some kind of anniversary (his death, his birth, his release from prison etc.), it would presumably have been announced with quite a bit of fanfare but it wasn’t. The most likely reason it was posted a week ago is that the website it appeared on, tawhed.ws, has posted several collections of jihadi writings as e-books over the past few weeks. These include Ayman al-Zawahiri’s writings, for example, but also those of Mustafa Abu l-Yazid. The posting of al-Zarqawi’s notebook may thus be part of a general effort by the people behind the website to release collections of writings, even of those that have been in their possession for a long time.

Religious texts

In any case, and as Will noted at the time, this is a great source for academics studying the backgrounds and inner workings of terrorists. Although this blog post is not the place for an in-depth analysis of the content, we can surely take a quick glance. The document is filled with religious texts that deal with various topics. There is Qur’anic exegesis, for example on p. 8, where al-Zarqawi cites the explanation of the verse “and be not as those who say, ‘We hear,’ and they hear not” (Q. 8: 21) by the mediaeval exegete al-Qurtubi (d. 1273), and on p. 20, by Ibn Kathir (1300-1373). It also contains several texts apparently copied from books by Ibn Qayyim al-Jawziyya (1292-1350), for example on pp. 9-11 and 15-16. Although Ibn al-Qayyim is generally a favourite among radical Muslims for his uncompromising and strict views on various issues – like his teacher Ibn Taymiyya (1263-1328) – the fact that he was persecuted and imprisoned because of his ideas may also have inspired al-Zarqawi.

Dedication

While the notebook does not have a single topic or message, most of the texts mentioned seem somehow related to what I would call “dedication” to the cause. The passage explained by al-Qurtubi mentioned above seems to serve as a reminder to stay pious and focused, for example. Al-Zarqawi also discusses jihad (p. 12) and cites a hadith (tradition on the life of Muhammad) about not having to fear if one trusts in God (p. 13). He continues by mentioning the various types of consolation to the believers (p. 15). Al-Zarqawi sometimes also writes short pieces that he seems to have made up himself. One of them (p. 25) mentions the close connection one should maintain with God, while one should break with the tawaghit (idols, used here probably to refer to “un-Islamic” rulers). The rest of the notebook is similarly filled with poems, religious texts and exhortations to remain patient and to keep one’s faith.

What all this adds up to is a collection of short pieces that seems to portray a man dedicated to his faith who uses religious texts to get him through the tough times he is facing. Considering the fact that he was in prison when he wrote this and would go on to become one of the world’s best-known jihadis, this makes a lot of sense, of course. I will leave it to others to decipher all of the notebook, which contains a lot of blank pages after p. 34 but also shows some nice drawings (for example on pp. 70-71). It should be clear, however, that any scholar seriously dealing with al-Zarqawi cannot afford to ignore this source.

The Taliban, the UN and al-Qaida

Anne Stenersen October 30, 2009

(Editor’s note: Anne tried to post a comment on Vahid Brown’s landmark post on Al-Qaida-Taliban relations. Given that she is one of the world’s foremost experts on this issue, there was no way I was going to let her remarks “disappear” into the comments section. So here they are. Her text begins with a response to an earlier comment about Taliban’s view of the UN).

“Mullah Omar’s statement should not be interpreted to mean that he or other Taliban leaders are ready to recognize the United Nations. In fact, the Taliban’s leaders have criticized the UN on a number of occasions, in addition to the one you mention. In 2006 Mullah Omar accused the UN of being nothing but a “tool for America” and Mullah Baradir echoed this in 2008, saying that “we regard all the decisions of the United Nations towards Afghanistan, as American orders.” I do not think their 12 Oct 09 statement was issued as a direct response to forum criticism, since it is pretty consistent with the Taliban’s past propaganda statements on the UN.

From the Taliban’s perspective, opposing the UN and wanting to have “good relations” with neighbouring countries are not necessarily contradictory. In the 1990s there was a huge debate within the Taliban regime on whether to join the UN or not – the main argument against it was that joining the UN would mean that the Islamic Emirate would have to subordinate itself to “infidel” laws (the UN Charter, etc). Having strategic alliances with other countries is another matter, which may also be easier to defend from a religious point of view (this seems to be the point of the al-Sumud editors as well). But clearly, there are many within the wider jihadi community who do not agree to this distinction.

By the way, excellent article Vahid – I agree that AQ central are probably not too happy about the Taliban-IEA’s recent propaganda statements, although I do not think it will have any practical implications for the insurgency – there is simply not enough incentive for neither the Quetta Shura or AQ central to “turn on” the other as long as there is a common enemy to fight and the Quetta Shura see themselves in a position of strength (i.e. there is no need for them to enter into negotiations with the Afghan regime, in which they would probably have to renounce their relationship with al-Qaida). Al-Qaida’s close relationship with Haqqani (as you mention in the comment) is also a crucial point – while the Quetta Shura may not be dependent on al-Qaida they are indeed dependent on having Haqqani and his allies on their side. That may partly explain why the Quetta Shura is putting up with al-Qaida propaganda that contradicts their own agenda.”

Al-Qa’ida and the Afghan Taliban: “Diametrically Opposed”?

Vahid Brown October 21, 2009

Mullah Omar’s Afghan Taliban and al-Qa’ida’s senior leaders have been issuing some very mixed messages of late, and the online jihadi community is in an uproar, with some calling these developments “the beginning of the end of relations” between the two movements.  Beginning with a statement from Mullah Omar in September, the Afghan Taliban’s Quetta-based leadership has been emphasizing the “nationalist” character of their movement, and has sent several communications to Afghanistan’s neighbors expressing an intent to establish positive international relations.  In what are increasingly being viewed by the forums as direct rejoinders to these sentiments, recent messages from al-Qa’ida have pointedly rejected the “national” model of revolutionary Islamism and reiterated calls for jihad against Afghanistan’s neighbors, especially Pakistan and China.  However interpreted, these conflicting signals raise serious questions about the notion of an al-Qa’ida-Taliban merger.

The trouble began with Mullah Omar’s message for ‘Eid al-Fitr, issued on September 19, in which he calls the Taliban a “robust Islamic and nationalist movement,” which “wants to maintain good and positive relations with all neighbors based on mutual respect.”  Mullah Omar further stated that he wishes to “assure all countries that the Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan … will not extend its hand to jeopardize others, as it itself does not allow others to jeopardize us.”  A week later, Abu Muhammad al-Maqdisi, one of the most influential living Salafi jihadi ideologues, released an angry rebuke to these “dangerous utterances” of the Taliban amir, pointing out that they were of the same order as Hamas leader Khaled Mashal’s statement that the Chechen struggle is a Russian “internal matter.” For a person of Maqdisi’s stature to equate the Taliban with Hamas, especially in light of the recent jihadi media onslaught  against Hamas for its “crimes” against the Jund Ansar Allah, is an extremely serious charge.  Maqdisi ends his statement with the hope that he has misunderstood Mullah Omar’s message and that some clarification from the Taliban leadership will be forthcoming; more on this below.

A week after the Maqdisi message was posted, al-Sahab issued Ayman al-Zawahiri’s eulogy for Baitullah Mehsud (on which, see my earlier post). Midway through that speech, Zawahiri turns to the Palestinian issue, arguing that the mujahidin in Palestine should destroy the “laws of Satan” being imposed upon them, among which he singles out the notion that there should be “national unity with the traitors and those who sold out the religion and the homeland.” He goes on to lambast Hizbullah as representing a model of “turning jihad into a national cause,” a model which “must be rejected by the umma, because it is a model which makes jihad subject to the market of political compromises and distracts the umma from the liberation of Islamic lands and the establishment of the Caliphate.”

On October 6, Abu Yahya al-Libi’s al-Sahab video, “East Turkestan: The Forgotten Wound,” was released, which calls for support for the defensive jihad in northwestern China, one of those neighbors with whom Mullah Omar expressed a hope for “good and positive relations.” As in Zawahiri’s Baitullah eulogy, al-Libi emphasizes the dangers of dividing the umma into nations and ethnicities. He says that “East Turkestan [Xinjiang, China] is part of the Islamic lands that cannot be divided”; that it is the duty of all Muslims to support the Uighurs in their fight against the Chinese state; and that all who would appease China are “apostates.”  In these messages, then, both al-Libi and Zawahiri are denouncing, in the strongest possible terms, a political strategy being enunciated by the Taliban’s supreme leaders.

A week later, on October 12, Jordanian jihadi writer Ahmad Bawadi posted an exchange of correspondence that he’d recently had with the editors of the Taliban’s al-Sumud magazine. Bawadi, without naming names, points out that Mullah Omar’s ‘Eid message had engendered significant controversy, leading some to say that the Taliban supported making the same sort of compromises as Hamas.  The “clarification” sent in response by al-Sumud and posted by Bawadi pretty much dodged the question. Amid some tortuous sophistry about words being like a double-edged sword, the al-Sumud editors defended Mullah Omar’s position by comparing it to the Prophet Muhammad’s divide-and-conquer strategy of distinguishing between different groups of enemies: What’s wrong, as-Sumud asks, with saying we don’t want to fight the Buddhists (read: China) now, since the aim is to divide them from the Christians (read: ISAF/NATO forces) in order to weaken the latter?  Regardless of how one reads the al-Sumud  “clarification,” any doubts that the controversies were causing the Quetta Shura to rethink its public relations strategy were laid to rest the following day, when the Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan issued an open letter to the Shanghai Cooperation Conference, reiterating verbatim the “neighborly” sentiments from Mullah Omar’s ‘Eid message.  The SCO, it should be pointed out, includes China, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan, all countries that are directly targeted by al-Qa’ida-allied groups based in Pakistan’s tribal areas.

All of this has sparked a great deal of heated argument and anxious hand-wringing on several jihadi forums, but for reasons of space I’ll just single out one thread from the al-Hisbah forum. On October 14, “al-Najjar,” in a post entitled “Mullah Omar and Zawahiri Diametrically Opposed: A plan, a problem, or…?!,” contrasts the neighborly outreach of Mullah Omar’s ‘Eid message with the aforementioned statements about the “laws of Satan” in Zawahiri’s Baitullah eulogy, and ends by asking Zawihiri, “Oh our Shaykh, how is it that these are ‘Satanic laws’ when they are essentially the same as what has been mentioned by Mullah Omar, the Commander of the Faithful, to whom the mujahidin in Afghanistan and Pakistan have pledged their allegiance?”  A later poster, “Abu Azzam 1,” adds that Mullah Omar’s messages imply some level of recognition of the United Nations, an organization which al-Qa’ida has unequivocally labelled as “infidel,” and that these opposing moves seem to him to signal “the beginning of the end of relations between al-Qa’ida and the Taliban.”  Another forum participant, “Abu Salam,” agrees, writing yesterday that “this is a clear indication that al-Qa’ida and the Taliban movement are not of one mind, and that al-Qa’ida may turn on the Taliban in the near future.”  We shall see.  But one thing is clear: the recent shift in the Quetta Shura’s strategic communications is not to al-Qa’ida’s liking, and it is raising serious concerns among the broader Salafi jihadi movement about the religio-political legitimacy of the Afghan Taliban’s leadership.

Al-Qa’ida Publicy Cements Ties to the Tehrik-e Taliban Pakistan

Vahid Brown October 14, 2009

The official al-Qa’ida media outlet al-Sahab has released a flurry of videos in the past two weeks featuring leaders of the Tehrik-e Taliban Pakistan (TTP), both living and dead, in what amounts to a media campaign announcing their open alliance with Pakistan’s deadliest militant network.  On September 28, Zawahiri’s video eulogy for the slain TTP leader Baitullah Mehsud – the “role model of the youth” (ritha’ qudwat al-shabab) – was posted to the forums, followed two days later by a similar video message on the “martyrdom” of Baitullah starring Mustafa Abu’l-Yazid.  On October 2, al-Fajr Media distributed a third al-Sahab video eulogy for Baitullah, but this time featuring Wali ur-Rahman, the new TTP commander for the Mehsud tribal areas (an English transcript of which can be downloaded from here; links to all three videos can be found here).  

This series of al-Sahab celebrations of Baitullah, released two days apart over the course of a week, is itself a rather unusual concentration of al-Qa’ida media attention on a single non-al-Qa’ida member, and is totally unprecedented in terms of the al-Sahab air time devoted to the TTP.  Prior to these developments, the closest that al-Qa’ida came to officially signaling its ties to the TTP was in the release of an al-Sahab interview with Mullah Nazir shortly after he and Gul Bahadur joined Baitullah Mehsud to form the Shura Ittihad ul-Mujahidin this February.  Aside from the brief mention of Baitullah in that video, these recent releases are to my knowledge the first official al-Qa’ida communiqués to give any significant attention to the TTP and its leadership.

But that’s not all, folks. Yesterday, an Urdu newspaper reported that Aqil, alias Dr. Uthman, the sole surviving attacker in this weekend’s dramatic assault on the Pakistani Army’s General Headquarters in Rawalpindi , is the subject of an al-Sahab video released to a private television station in Pakistan, in which Aqil is shown receiving training in Waziristan and casing targets in Rawalpindi (Khabrain, 13 October 2009, pp. 6 and 8; article unavailable online, but there is an OSC translation).  And today, Pakistan’s ARY TV aired an al-Sahab video that they’d received, featuring TTP amir Hakimullah Mehsud, appearing alongside Wali ur-Rahman, in which both of them deliver statements to the people of Pakistan regarding their jihad against the state. (Ironically, both TTP leaders emphasize in the video that the TTP is not a servant of foreign masters, and that the TTP are “sons of Pakistan”).

While the close relationship between al-Qa’ida and the Pakistani Taliban has long been known, this release of multiple joint AQ-TTP messages from the al-Sahab production outlet is nonetheless extremely significant.  First of all, these developments indicate that al-Qa’ida has successfully seized the moment in the wake of the death of Baitullah to dramatically increase its influence over the TTP.  But this series of videos is perhaps also evidence of a decreasing willingness on al-Qa’ida’s part to remain in the shadows of its Pakistani partners as they unleash yet another bloody campaign of violence in Pakistan’s cities.  If so, this would represent a very important strategic shift in the thinking of al-Qa’ida’s senior leaders, who have thus far been content to provide largely anonymous guidance, training and force-multiplication assistance to their Pakistani jihadi allies.

UPDATE, 10/22/09: The video mentioned here as being aired in part by ARY TV on 14 October was distributed on the forums today by al-Sahab.  It is a little over thirty minutes long and, after opening invocations in Arabic, features Hakimullah and Wali ur-Rahman speaking in Urdu. There is no subtitling.

Zawahiri, France and Napoleon

Jean-Pierre Filiu September 10, 2009

Allow me to briefly go back to the last Zawahiri interview, put on-line through Sahab media on 5 August 2009. To my knowledge, this is the first time Bin Laden’s deputy has expressed such articulate hatred for France:

“France claims secularism, while her heart pours grudge towards Islam. Napoleon Bonaparte announced his famous statement to the Jews in 1799 in Akka, in which he promised to support the Jews in stealing Palestine. France is the one whose soldiers went with their horses into al-Azhar University and stood on its Qur’anic Books, and they took it as a stable to their horses. France is the one who fought Islam and Arabs in Algeria, and France is the one who supplied Israel with a nuclear reactor, and France fights Muslims in Afghanistan, and France fights hijab, and France will pay for all her crimes”.

Zawahiri has long be known for his French-bashing. In the late eighties, when he launched a vicious campaign against Ahmad Shah Mas’ud among the jihadi community in Peshawar, he accused the Tajik leader to be a French agent and to be surrounded by French women (in fact humanitarian workers who had walked their way up to Panjshir).

In his pamphlets, he repeatedly branded colonial France for carving up the Middle East through the Sykes-Picot agreement. During the Algerian civil war, he endorsed the attacks against the “French party” (hizb Fransa), as the secular camp came to be known in the jihadi propaganda. And he listed consistently the French among the “enemies of Islam”, along with the Americans, the Jews and the British. He was the first one to threaten France in February 2004, after a law banning the veil at government schools was passed.

What is fascinating in Zawahiri’s recent outburst against France is his ideological focus on Napoleon Bonaparte, who was only a general at the time he invaded Egypt in 1798. He insists on the sacrileges perpetrated by the French revolutionary armies (although they were probably more respectful of the Arab mosques than of the European churches) and he gives utmost credit to a “famous” letter to the Jews of Palestine, a standard of anti-Zionist propaganda, that French historians have proved to be a forgery (originating from European messianic Jewish circles). The key to the argument is that Napoleon embodies the innate hostility of France against Islam, in its two secular and Zionist dimensions. France becomes in Zawahiri’s rhetoric a new brand of Crusader state, more “secular” than Christian.

Apart from Zawahiri’s Egyptian obsessions, two other developments could have contributed to this aggressive emphasis against France. First, Barack Obama’s Cairo speech on 4 June makes it more difficult to portray America as waging an all-out war against Islam, no matter how hard jihadis propagandists try, so France provides a welcome alternative target for his secular commitment (that even Obama indirectly criticized in Cairo).

Second, and probably more important, the merging of the Salafist Group for Preaching and Combat (GSPC) into Al-Qaida as its branch for the “Islamic Maghrib” (AQIM) has introduced more anti-French content to the global jihadi propaganda, with Zawahiri himself taking the lead. (Incidentally, a similar process occurred after the incorporation of Zarqawi’s network in Iraq, when al-Qaida’s media coverage included more anti-Shi’a rhetoric). Drukdal, AQIM’s emir, went as far as labeling France “mother of all evils”, on 30 June this year. And those are not just empty words, since Zawahiri’s “Napoleonic” interview was followed, three days later, by a foiled AQIM suicide attack against the French embassy in Mauritania.

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