ji·had·ica

Emirate of Confusion

Truls Tønnessen May 8, 2009

Editor’s note: I am delighted to introduce a new contributor, Truls Tønnessen, who is a FFI research fellow as well as a PhD candidate in History at the University of Oslo. He works on jihadism in Iraq and will be covering Iraq for Jihadica.

 

The alleged arrest of the emir of al-Qaida led Islamic State of Iraq (ISI), Abu Umar al-Baghdadi, has not incited a torrent of reactions on the jihadi web forums so far. Interestingly, the major Iraqi insurgent groups, including the ISI itself, have not commented upon the alleged arrest. 

There may be several reasons for this lack of reactions. One reason may be concern over security. A participant on the Falluja forum recently recommended his fellows not to comment on news concerning arrests of any leaders unless the information stems from reliable jihadi sources. One of his arguments was that their enemies may be putting forward a rumour in order to monitor the reactions on the jihadi websites, so as to determine whether they have arrested al-Baghdadi or not. 

However, the most important reason may be related to the confusion over the identity (and existence) of al-Baghdadi and his leadership role in the Islamic State of Iraq. I will not venture into the confusing debate over the identity of al-Baghdadi, but those interested in more details should check out these postings by the Long War Journal and Talisman Gate. 

Most of the reactions on the jihadi forums so far relate to the identity question. Several contributors have argued that the contradictory information from different Iraqi and US sources indicates that they don’t know who they have arrested. This is notably the view of Akram Hijazi who concludes that is it not possible to confirm Baghdadi’s arrest at this point. He writes that only a statement from the Islamic State of Iraq (ISI) may clarify the issue. However, Hijazi argues that it may take a while before ISI does so, especially if al-Baghdadi is in fact arrested, in order to protect his family and relatives.  

The question of al-Baghdadi’s identity is further complicated by his alleged position as Amir al-mu’minin or Commander of the faithful of the al-Qaida led Islamic State in Iraq. Al-Baghdadi has been presented as a member of the Quraysh (the Prophet’s tribe), presumably in an attempt to buttress his credentials. His alleged full name is Abu Umar al-Qurashi al-Husayni al-Hashimi al-Baghdadi. If al-Baghdadi has indeed been arrested, we will soon know his lineage. If he is not a Qurashi, the credibility of the Islamic State of Iraq will suffer. 

There is in other words much at stake here, which makes ISI’s silence all the more deafening.

 

Document (Arabic): 04-28-09-al-fallujah-baghdadi
Document (Arabic): 04-30-09-akram-hijazi

Back

Thomas Hegghammer March 26, 2009

I have been busy the past two weeks, but the jihadis have been busier. Bin Ladin has issued two audio statements, one proposing practical steps to liberate Palestine and the other about the treacherous government in Somalia. Al-Zawahiri warned against the forthcoming Crusader attack on Sudan, while Mustafa Abu al-Yazid has addressed the people of Pakistan. Abu Umar al-Baghdadi has spoken about the US plan to withdraw from Iraq, but he does not seem to get the same attention from the online community as his colleagues in Afghanistan. Abu Qatada has issued a statement from prison about the decision to extradite him to Jordan. Fatah al-Islam sharia officer Abu Abdallah al-Maqdisi has been taking questions since Monday, but nobody is allowed to ask about Shakir al-Absi or Asad al-Jihad2 (hmm).

On the magazine front, Sumud 33  has been out for a little while. Fortunately Sada al-Malahim 8 came out on Sunday so now Greg can sleep again. Turkestan al-Islamiyya 3 came out earlier this week, adding to the past month’s increasing flow of Uighur jihadi propaganda.

We have also seen the publication of a couple of unusual videos featuring Abu Muhammad al-Maqdisi, one with him delivering a funeral sermon in front of a crowd of several hundred people, and another showing him at a large wedding alongside half the jihadi community in Zarqa.  I suspect these videos are part of an attempt to bolster al-Maqdisi’s legitimacy by showing that he is enjoying freedom of movement and expression. By the way I highly recommend the 2-hour wedding video. It offers a fascinating inside look into the sociology of Islamism. It serves as a great illustration of a point I made in a recent article about Zarqa, namely that you cannot deradicalise entire communities. The film may depress you, but you might enjoy the songs.

I will be back soon with a report from the jihadi roundtable in Oslo.

Update (27 March): The Christian Science Monitor became the first Western newspaper to report on the Maqdisi controversy today – and Jihadica is mentioned.

Document (Arabic): 03-26-09-shouraa-mustafa-abu-al-yazid
Document (Arabic): 03-19-09-shouraa-abu-qatada-statement
Document (Arabic): 03-23-09-shamikh-abu-abdallah-al-maqdisi-qa
Document (Arabic): 03-22-09-shouraa-sada-al-malahim-8
Document (Arabic): 03-25-09-shouraa-turkestan-al-islamiyya-3
Document (Arabic): 03-12-09-faloja-maqdisi-fima-kuntum
Document (Arabic): 03-12-09-ansar-maqdisi-wedding-video

More Fitna in Cyberspace: Mihdar vs al-Maqdisi

Brynjar Lia February 7, 2009

Is another chapter in the history of cyber-jihadi infighting about to be written these days? The latest controversy is a series of attacks by the webforum Madad al-Suyuf on Abu Muhammad al-Maqdisi, perhaps the most influential salafi-jihadi clerics alive.

That the cyber-Jihadis quarrel with one another should come as no surprise. Despite calls for unity and brotherly counseling, jihadi writers frequently fight it out in the open.  In fact, inter-jihadi quarrels seem to have become more common and less ‘brotherly’ in tone in recent years. As for al-Maqdisi himself, most of you will recall his open letter of advice to al-Zarqawi in mid-2005, which earned him a stern reply from his former disciple and many enemies among al-Zarqawi’s numerous buddies. More recently, people have suspected that al-Maqdisi is being pressured to follow in the footsteps Sayyid Imam Sharif and other revisionists. Will, Joas and others have already covered these accusations brilliantly on Jihadica (See also Murad al-Shishani’s piece).

A key player in the latest round is ’Mihdar’, the Madad al-Suyuf administrator. His full name is apparently Abu Harith Mihdar al-Shadhili and he is a very controversial figure. He has been kicked out of many jihadi forums and is notorious for his attacks on well-known clerics. Mihdar is now accusing al-Maqdisi for posting studies on his website the Minbar al-Tawhid wa’l-Jihad without referencing their source. (This is an odd accusation coming from a cyber-jihadi since copyright is usually seen as a ’kafir’ invention. In jihadi propaganda one is more likely to find statements like ’this is the property of the entire Islamic Umma’ than ’all rights reserved’.) However, the harsh tone in Mihdar’s criticism suggested that the issue was not merely about copyright.

Al-Maqdisi took this accusation seriously and posted a response on his website, as he has done in the past. What followed was an avalanche of hostile postings on Madad al-Suyuf on a range of serious matters. One sticky posting entitled “For discussion: ambiguity problems in al-Maqdisi’s thinking” accused him of confusing and misguiding the mujahidin with his ambivalence on the takfir issue. Another details al-Maqdisi’s ‘disgraceful acts’ in prison.

Others have jumped in to try to reconcile the parties and mend differences. Hani al-Sibai at the al-Maqrizi Centre in London was called upon to support al-Maqdisi, and he came out firmly on al-Maqdisi’s side,  as he has done in the past. This in turn triggered yet another angry reply from Mihdar. On many other webforums, people have responded harshly to Mihdar’s attack, most of them denouncing Mihdar and accusing Madad al-Suyuf of being “nothing more than an intelligence operation”.

Some of this wrangling smacks of a type of blue-collar vs white collar jihadists: we fight and they only criticize. Mihdar may well be an armchair jihadi himself, but his criticism could reflect growing discontent among jihadis in the field toward jihadi clerics. Are we witnessing a renegotiation of the very nature of the commander vs clerical mentor relationship? The neo-Zarqawists and their like clearly seek and welcome clerical counseling, but not in public. And they respond by showing their strongest card: battlefield glory. In the current debate, for example, the Madad al-Suyuf crowd hold against al-Maqdisi that the latter does not have “any jihadi credentials”. This is precisely what Abu Musab al-Suri, also more of a jihadi practitioner than a cleric, used to say about Abu Qutada: the latter never fought in Afghanistan. He “was not a jihadi and had no history in that field.” The clerics’ resort to public admonishments instead of discrete counseling is a common theme elsewhere too. Critics of Shaykh Hamid al-Ali’s controversial repudiation of the Islamic state in Iraq have also complained: Why don’t you keep this out of the public eye? At the very least, there is an inherent contradiction between two oft-heard slogans in jihadi discourse: “the mujahidin in the fields know best” and “pay respect to the clerics”.

Document (Arabic): 1-al-maqdisis-response-to-madad-al-suyuf

Document (Arabic): 2-boraq-forum-on-mihdar

Document (Arabic): 3-for-discussion-ambiguity-problems-in-al-maqdisis-thinking

Document (Arabic): 4-call-to-the-two-shaykhs-al-maqdisi-and-al-mihdar

Document (Arabic): 5-madad-al-suyufs-respons-to-hani-al-sibai

Document (Arabic): 6-the-truth-about-the-differences-between-shaykh-al-maqdisi-and-the-heirs-of-al-zarqawi

Pathetic Psy-ops

Thomas Hegghammer February 5, 2009

The British tabloid The Sun reported yesterday that al-Qaeda leaders rape male recruits to shame them into becoming suicide bombers. Let me start by congratulating the journalist on being able to fit the four words “al-Qaida”, “gay”, “rape” and “horror” in one and the same headline in the world’s largest English-language newspaper.

I would not normally bother with this kind of nonsense were it not for the fact that it sheds light on the recent reports about AQIM’s alleged plague experiments, covered previously on Jihadica. Both stories were broken in the West by The Sun, and both stories relied on Algerian security sources. We are most likely dealing here with an anti-al-Qaida psy-op, and a very poor one at that.

These latest stories echo an only marginally better operation targeting al-Qaida in Iraq last winter. It involved a steady stream of articles about al-Qaida exploiting all kinds of defenceless people for suicide missions: children, women with Down’s syndrome, orphaned homeless children with mental disabilities, and what not. This rapid succession of articles over the same theme reeked of information warfare. Of course al-Qaida in Iraq has used suicide bombers under 18 as well as female attackers. But given that reports from the same period highlighted a steady influx of able-bodied foreign fighters, why on earth would al-Qaida spend precious resources on disabled operatives? I am surprised that so many serious media outlets have uncritically conveyed these articles.

While the gay rape story wins the prize for worst psy-op ever, the silver medal goes to the Saudis, who claimed in 2003 that al-Qaida had planned terror attacks on pilgrims in Mecca and had booby-trapped copies of the Quran. In fact, since then the Saudi Interior Ministry has made a tradition of “warning against” or “foiling” attacks in Mecca almost every year around the Hajj; most recently in 2007 and 2008. To my knowledge, there is not a single indication in the jihadi literature that al-Qaida or its affiliates have ever contemplated an attack on pilgrims in Mecca. (The Juhayman group which attacked the Mecca mosque in 1979 represented a highly unusual apocalyptic sect).

For the record, several of these reports were subsequently denied. This was the case with the stories about the plague, the use of women with Down’s syndrome and the 2008 Hajj attacks. But of course the denials do not get nearly the same attention as the initial impact story.

Does it matter if we circulate stories that are not completely true, if it helps defeat al-Qaida? Well, maybe not, if counterterrorism is our only concern. But then we shouldn’t complain about the spread of conspiracy theories in the Muslim world.

“The Painful Truth: Al-Qaeda is Losing the War in Iraq”

Will McCants October 1, 2008

That’s the title of a post by hamzacom on the Faloja forum.  In it, he draws an analogy with Afghanistan just after the U.S. invasion.  It was a time of defeat for the mujahids but now they are resurging.  The same will happen in Iraq.

Other forum members are predictably annoyed by hamzacom’s pessimistic title.  Abu `Umar al-Masri retorts that it is merely “a knight’s stumble,” not a loss.  Qannas al-Dawla al-Islamiyya (“The Islamic State’s Hunter”) is even more optimistic: “We will never lose the war as long as God is with us.”

Others share hamzacom’s pessimism but are nonchalant.  “If al-Qaeda has lost the war, what’s the problem?” Shabab Lubnan (“Youth of Lebanon”) states blithely.  “There really isn’t a problem.  There are a number of Jihadi groups that possess the idea of al-Qaeda even if they do not aid (the organization) publicly.  It is possible for these groups to launch a new war and to undertake the duty of jihad if al-Qaeda loses the war.”

The most sober commentator is Abu al-Fadl Madi, whose work we’ve been reading.  Abu Fadl believes the insurgency was largely comprised of members of the Iraqi army that the U.S. disbanded and left without a livelihood.  Now that the U.S. has started paying them off, they have stopped fighting and the insurgency has ended.  The only true resistance to the occupation was Zarqawi and his men; everything else was limited and spontaneous.  “The resistance will not return to Iraq,” Abu al-Fadl remarks, “until al-Qaeda returns to the theater of jihad.  But that won’t happen until after careful study of the lessons (learned).”

Document (Arabic): 9-4-08-faloja-member-believes-aq-is-losing-war-in-iraq

Maqdisi Composes Elegy for Zarqawi

Will McCants September 25, 2008

Zarqawi’s spiritual mentor, Abu Muhammad al-Maqdisi, composed an elegy for his deceased disciple soon after his death.  Although the two fell out over Zarqawi’s brutal tactics in Iraq, Maqdisi still has a soft spot for him.  The elegy, “The Dove Cried and the Swords Wept,” is recited by Maqdisi and has been released online for the first time via the Shumukh forum.

For those of you that don’t know Maqdisi, he rated as the most-cited Jihadi alive in the study I conducted for West Point.

Document (Arabic): 9-20-08-shamikh-abu-muhammad-maqdisi-elegy-for-zarqawi

Zawahiri the XO

Will McCants September 11, 2008

The US military has given CNN letters that Zawahiri wrote in March 2008 to senior al-Qaeda commanders in Iraq (hat tip SK). Much of the content has been filtered through an MNFI spokesman so it’s hard to use CNN’s summary to assess al-Qaeda’s fortunes in Iraq. Nevertheless, since the summary fits with the bleak picture that has been emerging these past few months, it’s worth noting. I’ve rearranged the information for ease of reference:

Zawahiri letter to al-Qaeda in Iraq leader Abu Ayyub al-Masri, March 2008. Letter was captured in April during U.S. op that killed AQI Information Minister Abu Nizar. Abu Nizar was an intermediary between Masri and AQ Central. The letter was found on Abu Nizar’s person.

  • Leadership: Masri too isolated to keep watch of his operatives. Zawahiri questions Masri’s ability to lead AQI.
  • Poor Communication with AQ Central: Zawahiri concerned that he is not getting regular updates on Iraq. He is also not receiving regular communication from Masri.
  • Poor Recruits: Dissatisfied with poor quality of recruits for ops in Iraq
  • ISI’s Legitimacy: Questions manner in which the Islamic State of Iraq was established
  • ISI’s Blatant Propaganda: Unhappy that ISI is repackaging old footage of operations and claiming the ops are new. Also unhappy that ISI takes credit for ops carried out by other terror groups, like Islamic Jihad. Zawahiri writes: “The media policy for the Islamic State is using exaggeration, to the extent of lying.”

Zawahiri letter to Abu `Umar al-Baghdadi, March 2008

  • Relations b/n Zawahiri & Bin Laden: Zawahiri passing along advice from Bin Laden.
  • Offer of Assistance: Zawahiri asks what ISI needs to be victorious.

We know from an earlier set of captured documents reviewed by a Washington Post reporter that Masri went to Afghanistan this summer to speak with AQ leadership. From the tone of Zawahiri’s letter, it might have been a trip to the woodshed.

This is at least the second time that captured AQI documents have been given to CNN. But in both cases, the original documents have not been released for general scrutiny. If the people releasing them hope their contents will demoralize al-Qaeda supporters around the world, it would help to release the documents to the general public soon after the news stories based on them are published. Despite all the attention paid to Jihadi visual media, Jihadis themselves love texts.

Update: Bill Roggio at Long Wars Journal was given the documents by MNFI and has a more extensive summary of their content. He also says that the documents will be made available shortly on the Foundation for the Defense of Democracy’s website. The documents are now up and I’ll post a more detailed summary once I’ve read them.

Lamenting Loss of Anbar, Apprehensive of Jihad’s Future in Iraq

Will McCants September 5, 2008

In response to Bush’s recent statement that al-Qaeda lost Anbar Province in Iraq, Ekhlaas member Abu Mu`adh al-Maqdisi defiantly writes that it is the U.S. and its allies that lost the province. Nevertheless, he tacitly admits the truth of Bush’s words, writing: “War has ups and downs. Soon, by the permission of God, Anbar will return and the law of God will be applied in it. However, ye are an impatient people.”

Mukashshir Anyabahu (“Bares His Teeth”) replies that the people of Anbar, not just the Awakening members, deeply betrayed the mujahids.

Mu`adh optimistically responds, “As long as the Commander of the Faithful Abu `Umar al-Baghdadi is present, there is no need to worry.”

To which Mukashshir retorts:

You have no idea of the extent of the betrayal and apostasy which transpired in Iraq, especially in Anbar….The people of Iraq completely betrayed the mujahids and allied with everyone who had turned away from religion, except those whom my Lord had mercy on….The situation of the mujahids has become extremely difficult.

I am not saying that the jihad in Iraq has ended; it still continues by the grace of God.

Asad Misr (“Lion of Egypt”) concurs, arguing that the failure of the Jihadis in Anbar stems from their loss of support among its people:

Anbar was lost because of the betrayal of its people.  I will not say that it was due to the power of the Awakening and the apostates.  By God, I believe that this entity called “The Awakening” is very weak.  The problem is not the Awakening; rather, it is the betrayal in Anbar–those people who betrayed God and our master Muhammad by allying with the crusaders and the Jews.

Document (Arabic): 9-2-08-ekhlaas-member-admits-that-anbar-has-been-lost-to-isi

Major Contributor to Ekhlaas Killed in Iraq

Will McCants August 24, 2008

[Scott Sanford]  Abu Kandahar (أبو قندهار) reported on Ekhlaas that coalition forces, “crusaders,” killed Ekhlaas member Abu Hurayra 2 (أبو هريرة 2), a major contributor to Ekhlaas, in northern Iraq’s Ninawa province on 21 August 2008.  Abu Kandahar is a main contributor to Ekhlaas and Ekhlaas has given him the title of “distinguished pen (قلم متميز),” one of the highest distinctions to achieve, which adds credibility to his report.

Abu Hurayra 2’s last post was on 14 August 2008 where he provided photos of militants supposedly engaging in combat and he reassured readers that operations were increasing by the day.  He also gave a cryptic message saying, “I give you these new photos.  They are the last for me before my departure from you because I will be absent for a long time.”  It is unclear exactly what this means, but it appears that he may have been preparing for his death or arrest.

Abu Kandahar claimed that he received a letter informing him of Abu Hurayra 2’s death and that Abu Hurayra 2 fought some soldiers trying to arrest him.  Abu Hurayra 2 allegedly engaged the soldiers with a pistol killing two and wounding one.  He also reported that Abu Hurayra 2 restored the Islamic State of Iraq’s (ISI) media operations in Ninawa province.  If true, coalition forces may have dealt the ISI a major blow as far as its media arm is concerned.  However, if Abu Hurayra 2 was expecting his demise, it is possible that he trained someone else to fulfill his role making his death less of a blow to the ISI.

Document (Arabic): 8-23-2008-Ekhlaas-ah2-killed

Document (Arabic): 8-14-2008-Ekhlaas-ah2-last-post

The Chameleon Strategy

Will McCants August 21, 2008

Muhami al-Dawla (“Defender of the State”) has written an essay on Ekhlaas titled, “The Connection between the State of Islam and the Taliban is the Strategy of the ‘Chameleon.'”  His argument is that the Taliban’s recent successful surge in Afghanistan is the result of using “chameleon cells,” which are small, well-organized, armed bands that 1) blend into the population, 2) do not take orders from a commander, and 3) have penetrated the state security apparatus.

Muhami claims that the Taliban borrowed the strategy from the Islamic State of Iraq, which used it after the tribal Awakenings.  The chameleon groups in Iraq are able to carry out attacks on Awakening leaders because of their infiltration of the Awakening security forces.  Moreover, their presence in these forces means that they can undertake attacks for which the Awakening leaders get blamed.

Muhami argues that the Taliban has adopted this strategy because it is working so well in Iraq (is it?).  The group’s successful use of the strategy in Afghanistan is linked to its increased proficiency at gathering intelligence.

Document (Arabic): 8-19-08-ekhlaas-the-connection-bn-islamic-state-of-iraq-and-taliban-is-strategy-of-chameleon

Latest Jihadica
Subscribe to receive latest posts
Follow us
Facebook Twitter Google-plus Pinterest

Copyright © 2025 Jihadica