ji·had·ica

The Denudation Of The Exoneration: Part 10

Will McCants November 29, 2008

 

Amidst the personal attacks on Zawahiri in part 10, Sayyid Imam mentions a few more interesting historical tidbits.  First, he notes the opposition of two prominent Jihadis, Abu Mus`ab al-Suri and `Abd al-Rahman al-Kindi (died in 2003), to the attacks on the U.S.  He also discloses that Zawahiri’s imprisoned brother, Muhammad, has been trying to cut a deal with the Egyptian authorities.  Finally, Sayyid Imam claims that Bin Laden told him that the Sudanese had encouraged him to turn against Saudi Arabia in 1994.  Whatever the truth of this last bit, it reminds us that states have frequently used al-Qaeda to their own ends.

By the way, Nathan Field has a review of Sayyid Imam’s book.  His take: it’s lame.  I’ll withhold my final judgment until the whole book has been published but I like what I’ve seen so far.  It may be less theoretical than the first book and engage in more ad hominem, but Sayyid Imam is trying to build a case that Zawahiri can’t be trusted.  Reminds me of good ol’ rijal literature.  Those hoping for a true reformulation of jihad doctrine should look elsewhere.  Sayyid Imam would completely lose his core audience, which takes the medieval tradition as seriously as he does.  Remember, whatever else the Document and its sequel are good for, they have to be palatable enough for Egyptian Islamic Jihad members to support.  Finally, Sayyid Imam’s vigorous rejection of the victimization that permiates Jihadi thought is breathtaking.  I can’t recall another Islamist (or most Arab secularists for that matter) saying anything of the sort.

Continuing…

Zawahiri has worked for 30 years to establish an Islamic state.  However, when the Taliban succeeded in establishing one, he and bin Laden squandered it by attacking the United States.

Zawahiri has a dark history of failure.  He says to Muslims:

 

  • You establish groups and I will destroy them.
  • You establish a state and I will tear it down.
  • You fight jihad and I will flee, leaving my family behind and collecting donations in your name.
  • You give contributions to me and I will spend them on my personal security.
  • You go to prison and I will hold a microphone and encourage you to do it.
  • You abide patiently in prison while I pay for my release with thousands of dollars.
  • You fight America in Egypt so you can make it easier for me to negotiate with them.

 

Zawahiri is like a bad doctor you repeatedly send your family members too.  If he keeps failing and they keep dying and you keep sending them there is something wrong with your mind, even your faith.

God has prescribed jihad, but he prescribes it in the first place for defending Muslims from harm and in the second for making Islam dominant.  If the latter brings harm and dissension to Muslims, it should be stopped.  Yet Zawahiri keeps urging actions that harm his brothers and Muslims for the sake of his own personal fame.

A number of the brothers in Afghanistan tried to dissuade bin Laden from attacking the United States between 1998 and 2001.  Among them was Abu Mus`ab al-Suri and Abu `Abd al-Rahman al-Kindi.  Yet Bin Laden continued and neither respected the etiquette of being a guest nor his oath of allegiance to Mullah Omar.

What Bin Laden and Zawahiri did is like the story of the Bedouin who found a small, orphaned hyena.  He took it to his tent and let it nurse on one of the sheep.  When the hyena grew up, it killed the sheep that had nursed it.

Zawahiri quotes some famous shaykhs in an attempt to justify his actions.  One is `Abd Allah `Azzam, whom Zawahiri opposed during the Afghan jihad.  Zawahiri spoke out against him at a large meeting, saying he had changed his stripes.  Al Qaeda would never have been established without splitting with `Azzam.

As for `Umar `Abd al-Rahman [“The Blind Sheikh”), Zawahiri was his greatest opponent in the early 80s when the various Islamic groups tried to unite under `Abd al-Rahman’s leadership.

Zawahiri and others have accused me of using disrespectful words to describe those who violate sharia laws.  I only use sharia terminology found in scripture and in the writings of the Salaf.

* One of the mischievous things that Zawahiri is doing is repeating the question “what do you believe regarding Arab rulers?”

He should ask his brother Muhammad al-Zawahiri and Bin Laden.

Muhammad told Egyptian security he believes the ruler is a Muslim.  Then he told a gathering of youth that these rulers are hypocrites who should be killed if they don’t leave.  This is not in accordance with the sharia because the consensus of the Islamic scholars says that the hypocrite is a Muslim and cannot be killed.  In June 2007, his brother indicated his willingness to reconcile with the authorities, but he did so in secret.

Bin Laden wanted to fight Saddam in Kuwait in 1990 under the banner of the Saudi government.  Then he rebelled against them and excommunicated them in 1994 when they revoked his citizenship and took his passport.  The Khawarij excommunicated people for major sins but Bin Laden does it for citizenship and a passport.

I was in Sudan when this happened and asked bin Laden if he was afraid of the Sudanese response.  He said, “They encouraged me to do it.”  When Sudan expelled Bin Laden in 1996, he wrote a letter of apology to the Saudi government so they would take them back.  A major Sudanese representative carried his message to them, but they rejected it and he went to Afghanistan.

When Bin Laden settled in Sudan in 1992 I was in Pakistan.  I advised him at the time to remain in Saudi Arabia to help the Islamic affairs there as he had done in the Afghan jihad.  He didn’t accept my advice.

Document (Arabic): 11-29-08-al-masry-al-youm-denudation-part-10

 

The Denudation Of The Exoneration: Part 7

Will McCants November 25, 2008

In today’s installment, Sayyid Imam begins section three of his rebuttal in which he surveys the rhetorical tricks Zawahiri employs to misguide his readers.  Imam continues to portray Zawahiri as the student of Bin Laden, the inverse of the common description of their relationship.  To this end, Imam says that Zawahiri has adopted UBL’s obsession with oil.  The inversion may be pure invention, but it’s worth thinking about.

Continuing….

In the first section, I demonstrated that Zawahiri is a liar, making him unfit to give religious opinions.  In the second section, I showed how he distorts the Sharia to justify mass murder.  He should call his book The Justification rather than The Exoneration.

In this third section, I will expose the deceptions Z uses.  Z asks around one hundred questions in the Exoneration but does not offer any answer.  He does this to confuse the reader, leaving him in a thick fog.  Here are some of Z’s deceptions:

1) Z quotes contradictory statements on legal questions.

He does this to give the reader the impression that there is a difference of opinion on an issue and that the reader one can adopt any of the opinions he likes.  But God has commanded us to resolve contradictory statements by weighing them with scripture.  The statements of religious scholars and the scripture have to be weighed against one another.  Anything that contradicts scripture is false.  Failing to weigh the statements in order to know right from wrong is forbidden.

2) Another of Z’s deceptions is his statement that he wrote the Exoneration to protect Islam.

How can this be the case when he has made so many jurisprudential errors, which have made him turn his back on scripture and on the statements of scholars, seeking refuge instead with Nasir al-Fahd?  He has denied the obligation of fighting the near enemy first.  He has adopted the ideas of Bin Laden and become one of those who want to sell oil at its true price, meaning that it is obligatory for Muslims to engage in a jihad against oil.

3) Another of Z’s deceptions is that he claims to have been accused without proof or evidence.

Everything I have said against him I have backed up with scripture or well-known information about Z.  As for the private things I disclosed, I know much more than I have revealed.

4) Z has stirred up trouble by saying, “no allegiance to a prisoner.” [This is an allusion to Imam’s imprisonment and to a controversy involving the Umar Abd al-Rahman, “The Blind Sheikh,” that roiled the Islamic Group.]

No one has given their allegiance to me.  I haven’t had contact with them [EIJ?] for 15 years.  As I already said, Yemeni intel wanted me to set up an opposition party against Egypt and I refused.

5) Z has also stirred up trouble by saying that if my [Sayyid Imam’s] revisions are true, why didn’t I put them forward before I went to prison.

Z contradicts himself on p. 10 of the Exoneration when he acknowledges that I wrote a book criticizing my colleagues 14 years ago, well before I was imprisoned.

I never called my book a revision.  Moreover, I’ve said the same things before.  When Z published my book, The Compendium, he cut out my criticisms of the Islamic movements.  Now when he can’t control what I write, he resorts to stupidity.

Finally, a revision is not a sin if it moves closer to the truth.

6) Another of Z’s deceptions is his claim that the Document ignores the real criminals, America and its allies.

This is a lie.  Just as I admonished the Islamic movements, I admonished local rulers in part 14 of the Document and the enemies of Islam in part 15.

Z has completely adopted UBL’s positions, including UBL’s obsession with oil.

If America is a criminal and the cause of Muslims’ woes, why did UBL offer the U.S. a truce and Z offer to negotiate?  Did U.S. crimes end?  Or did AQ want the truce for its own safety?

When the U.S. did not respond to the demands of AQ for a truce or negotiations, AQ in Algeria bombed foreign interests that killed dozens of Algerians.  That is a heavy price to pay for the safety of AQ’s leadership.

They kill Algerians but weep when Jews kill Palestinians.  Z censures Hamas for killing some innocent Jewish children with its primitive rockets but says nothing about killing children them on 9/11 or in Afghanistan.

* An important principle: “The crimes of the infidels do not justify a Muslim’s mistakes.”

Z lambastes anyone who criticizes the mujahids for wrongdoing on the grounds that the sins of the U.S. are greater than the sins of the mujahids.  Scripture indicates that the infidels’ crimes do not justify silence on the mistakes of Muslims.

Z uses the crimes of America and Israel as cover for AQ’s wrongdoing.

Document (Arabic): 11-25-08-al-masry-al-youm-denudation-part-7

Divide And Conquer

Will McCants November 12, 2008

The Hesbah forum’s reaction to two recent rumors is instructive. First, the claim by a Hamas official that Obama’s advisers met with members of the organization during the U.S. election is being met with derision.  The derision is directed not at Obama but at Hamas for selling out and walking down the trail blazed by Fatah.  Interestingly, the credibility of the story is not doubted. 

In contrast, many Hesbah members are skeptical of a recent report that the U.S. is trying to cut a deal with Taliban ally Hekmatyar (a seriously bad dude).  Respondents doubt that someone of his stature, ideology, and ties to Bin Laden would cut a deal.

Three thoughts:  First, Hesbah members believe the news about Obama’s advisers because it makes Hamas look bad; they don’t believe the news about Hekmatyar because it makes the Taliban look bad.  The Taliban is one of the Jihadis’ last, best hopes for establishing an Islamic state, whereas Hamas has long been viewed as a sell out by most Jihadis.  

Second, Jihadis are splitting or becoming demoralized on the mere rumor of talks, either with Hamas or with the Taliban.  What will happen when serious deals are made?  In the case of Hamas, deals will only disturb the minority of Jihadis who have been sticking up for the organization; everyone else views it as a lost cause.  But in the case of the Taliban, it will be an earthquake and cause serious cognitive dissonance among the Jihadis outside of Af-Pak (those inside already know how fractious the Taliban is).

Finally, to state the obvious, the Jihadosphere is having trouble coping with the shades of grey that color the current U.S. approach to counterterrorism and COIN.  

Document (Arabic): 11-11-08-hesbah-reaction-to-news-of-obama-advisers-meeting-with-hamas

Document (Arabic): 11-12-08-hesbah-reaction-to-news-of-us-seeking-to-split-hekmatyar-from-taliban

Hesbah Discusses U.S.-Taliban Negotiations

Will McCants October 30, 2008

A quick rundown of the opinions on the Hesbah forum in reaction to news that the U.S. is negotiating with elements of the Taliban:

  • `Umar: “Humilated, they [the Americans] will leave (Afghanistan) and all of the Muslim countries.”
  • Al-Islam Nasir: “Aren’t negotiations with the Taliban a victory for us, brothers?  What if the result of these negotiations is the exit of the occupier from the land of Khorasan [Afghanistan]?  Is this not our objective?”
  • Al-`Arabi Muslim: “It depends on what they are negotiating.  If they want to leave, then let them leave.  But if they want to negotiate for Karzai to stay, I think this should be refused.”
  • Qahir al-Rafida: “A failed attempt to divide the ranks, fragment the efforts, and destroy the fruit of jihad.  These methods will do not be used by the troops of the emirate and its leaders, by the permission of God.  They are not Shamari [spokesman for the Islamic Army of Iraq], Abu Risha [Anbar Awakening tribal leader], or others.
  • `Abd Allah al-Harbi: “But the Taliban will not negotiate, by the permission of God.  They [the Americans] will leave (Afghanistan) humiliated and submissive.”
  • Al-Islam Nasir: “What if the result of these negotiations is the exit of the occupying power and the return of the Taliban government and with it the Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan?  Is this not what we all want?”
  • Qahir al-Rafida (addressing Al-Islam Nasir):  “I don’t think you understand the news well brother.  Think about this passage [quoting a news article from the beginning of the thread]: ‘Officials in the White House and the Pentagon are considering negotiating with a part of the Taliban, excluding the leaders of the movement.’  I think you’ll now change your mind because you definitely don’t want that!”
  •   Al-`Arabi Muslim: “America is begging for negotiations.  Would you have us think that America will flee in this manner without covering it with a lie?  No brother.  Do we think that there will be a split in the movement for the sake of negotiations?  Just today the mujahids of the emirate carried out an operation in Kabul, inside a top ministry.  What remains if the gates of Kabul are opened to them?” [the ministry is the the Information and Culture Ministry]

It looks like U.S. negotiations with the Taliban will fracture the Jihadi movement.  But it also looks like many Jihadis believe that the U.S. is negotiating from a position of weakness and want to press their advantage.

Document (Arabic): 10-28-08-hesbah-discussion-of-us-negotiations-with-taliban

Jihadis Skeptical Of Reported U.S. Pardon Of Mullah Omar

Will McCants October 28, 2008

Members of the Shumukh forum are skeptical of a report in al-Islam al-Yawm that the U.S. is willing to remove Mullah Omar from its blacklist as part of its negotiations with the Taliban (a similar story, in English, is here).  One member, Jaysh al-Zahf (The Advancing Army), says its a Saudi ruse.  Another, Abu Muhajir, goes one better by crediting Satan with the ruse’s creation.  

Document (Arabic): 10-26-08-shamikh-response-to-news-that-us-may-pardon-mulla-omar

New Issues of Two Jihadi Journals

Will McCants October 5, 2008

Issue 12 of the Tala’i` Khurasan (Vanguards of Khurasan) is out.  Several big names have written pieces, including Atiyyat Allah (we have to learn from our mistakes), Abu al-Walid al-Ansari (how past jihads failed), Abu Yahya al-Libi (fighting to restore the Sharia is the only way forward in Palestine), and Mustafa Abu al-Yazid (the meaning of piety and patience).  It also includes a 9/11 anniversary article on al-Qaeda’s strategic reasons for attacking the U.S., an article on Jihadis released from prison in Afghanistan, and a summary of the most important operations in Afghanistan over the last four months.

This month we also have a new journal published by al-Shabaab, the AQ-linked group in Somalia.  Marisa thinks its publication means Shabab is growing stronger; that may be, but they can’t produce an attractive journal yet.   The name of the journal, Millat Ibrahim (The Religious Community of Abraham), is an allusion to a Qur’anic verse and a book by Abu Muhammad al-Maqdisi that have to do with shunning lukewarm Muslims.  There’s even a blurb for Maqdisi’s book at the end of the periodical.  Not surprisingly then, some of the content is devoted to exposing the evils of more compromising Somali opposition groups; for example, there’s a chart of differences between the Shabab and the Liberation Party of Somalia.  Also of interest is a biography of slain Shabab leader Adam Ayro.

Document (Arabic): 10-4-08-shamikh-issue-12-of-talae28099i-khurasan-released

Document (Arabic): 10-4-08-faloja-shabab-publishes-new-journal-millat-ibrahim

Pakistani Taliban Videos Posted On Mainstream News Site

Will McCants August 27, 2008

[Chipotle Mystery] One of the difficulties in studying militant groups in Pakistan is that there aren’t a lot, if any, forums dedicated to these groups that are affiliated with the Taliban. Most Taliban-related information that is available in forums comes through Al-Qaeda clearinghouses like Al-Sahab, though smaller studios occasionally have videos that make it to the Internet (these were more common in the past). News about the activities of the Pakistani Taliban generally comes from the media and we have very few “primary sources” from such groups.  Although it is well known that they do produce and distribute tapes in Pakistan, I must admit from personal experience that I was unable to locate any when I was in Pakistan a few months ago.

Asia Times Online has posted two videos from the Pakistani Taliban today. Syed Saleem Shahzad has alluded to these in his recent posts. They’re both interesting videos and even though one they lack the polish seen in Al-Qaeda video, they are clearly influenced by these productions; the latter video even includes Arabic-language hymns. The first video (“Recruiting”) is a recruitment video with English subtitles in the first portion. It appears to have been produced in late 2007 and takes aim at the Pakistani government and military, portraying them as apostates and slaves of the United States while lauding the piety of militants. Such propaganda has been effective as demonstrated by reports of low morale among the largely Pashtun soldiers sent to fight Pashtun militants and continued opposition to attacks against militants among elements of the Pakistani populace.

The second video (“Battlefield”) is especially interesting to long-time observers of such groups as it is published by Ummat Studios. Ummat appeared to have stopped publishing videos in 2005 after Nek Muhammad Wazir, a pro-Taliban militant from Waziristan, was killed following an insurgency in that region. The studio was thought to have been affiliated with him, and his death appeared to have ended its run. In the past, I have only seen two Urdu-language videos put out by this studio on the Internet, and I believe it published a number of Pashto-language videos.

Upon viewing the video, one might think it is old.  But during the second segment, the Urdu narrator (who sounds exactly like the narrator from older Ummat videos) mentions Baitullah Mehsud and the Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP). The TTP was not officially formed until late 2007, and Mehsud did not become prominent until sometime in 2006. Mehsud also belongs to a tribe that rivals Nek Muhammad’s (despite the stated universal Islamic character of the Taliban, it remains a distinctly Pashtun entity, and internal Pashtun tribal differences remain an exploitable weakness).  In fact, Muhammad’s tribe appears to be now led by Hafiz Gul Bahadur, a pro-Taliban militant from North Waziristan, who has not joined the TTP and appears to have a personal rivalry with Mehsud).

The end of the video confirms its recent vintage and is dated to February 2008. Unlike the first video it has no English subtitles and most of the dialog is in Pashto, but it has some violent scenes of battles against Pakistani forces, apparently in early 2008 in various locales in Waziristan. The use of the Ummat Studio brand in the latter video means that it either never went out of business (perhaps it only stopped posting videos to the Internet) or it has been brought back to life by Mehsud.  Either way, it shows a growing media awareness among the Pakistani Taliban.

Pakistan Preparing All-Out Confrontation of Militants?

Will McCants August 25, 2008

[Chipotle Mystery] Since late July a number of suicide attacks have struck Pakistan, reminiscent of the spate of violence that ringed in the New Year and witnessed the assassination of Benazir Bhutto. The rise in violence comes as the Pakistani military appears to be engaging in a large-scale offensive in Bajaur, one of the seven agencies that make up the semi-autonomous Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA), and also follow the visit of Yusuf Raza Gillani to Washington in July (It appears that the U.S. Government gave its approval for the removal of Musharraf during this meeting – but this is just speculation).

Quick background: The FATA serves as a sanctuary for various Taliban-affiliated groups, notably the “Pakistani Taliban” led by Baitullah Mehsud who has been blamed for Ms. Bhutto’s assassination. The FATA may also house Al-Qaeda leaders, and Bajaur in particular has often been speculated as serving as a hiding place for Ayman al-Zawahiri, who has been the target of a number of air strikes in the area in recent years.

With this “raising of the temperature” by the Pakistani military, lead by Ashfaq Pervez Kiyani since late 2007, the Pakistani Taliban and its cohorts appear to be returning to their time-tested tactic of spreading terror in order to persuade the government to return to the status quo: reduced Pakistani military interference in the FATA in exchange for a termination of terrorist attacks. This dance has played out regularly in the past, seeing the army launching offensives, only to sign peace deals and retreat, allowing militants a relatively free-hand along the Afghan border. Understandably, such maneuvers by Pakistan have been criticized by Afghanistan and NATO for allowing militants to increasingly target forces in Afghanistan.

Amidst this apparent repetition of history is an interesting report from a Pakistani journalist, Syed Saleem Shahzad, claiming that the Pakistan has decided to pursue an all-out offensive against militants. Before delving into the report, I should point out that Shahzad’s own background is murky: He often reports exclusives on the Taliban and appears to have an unprecedented amount of access and information about militant activities in the frontier regions. He has been alleged to be everything from an Indian intelligence agent (by some Pakistani extremist groups) to an affiliate of Pakistani intelligence. I would bet the later is true to some degree as some of his previous reports have come true, while others haven’t panned out (maybe he serves to spread disinformation for intelligence?). The fact that he has had so much apparent access to militants along the Pak-Afghan border indicates that he has some sort of protection, as journalists sniffing around in the area have regularly died on the job.

Shahzad’s claims are notable as he claims that Pakistan will not just confront Mehsud, who poses a real threat to Pakistan, but members of other Taliban and pro-Taliban groups. This includes the leadership of the Afghan Taliban, led by the faceless Mullah Omar, and militants under the command of Jalaluddin Haqqani, a famed Afghan warrior who made his name fighting the Soviets. Both of these factions have not pursuing attacks against Pakistan or its military, and in fact have historic links with Pakistani intelligence. A number of reports in the Pakistani media earlier in the year, claimed that Omar had removed Mehsud from his position of power due to the latter’s willingness to pursue confrontation with Pakistan. It is very difficult to know if such reports are true, but it makes sense if Omar is really hiding in Quetta as has been alleged. At the same time, as if often the case when discussing the Taliban, it could be a ruse to separate Omar from being blamed for Mehsud’s actions (the degree of coordination between the Afghan and Pakistani Taliban remains unknown, but they surely maintain some level of links). Omar and other Afghan Taliban leaders may also be loathe to provoke Pakistan due to the possible continued existence of links between Pakistani intelligence and the Afghan Taliban, maintained due in part to Pakistani strategic concerns, an allegation that has been forth in the media after last month’s attack in Kabul on the Indian Embassy.

With that said if Shahzad is correct, this indicates a major paradigm shift by the Pakistani government. It means that the government has either decided to attempt to eradicate militancy, which is unlikely if only due to the nature of militancy; or the government has been received some major incentives or pressure to take such action by an outside power. It could also be that the military (Pakistani intelligence is part of the military structure) has decided to clamp down on militants in the interests of its own preservation, or no longer finds them useful for its strategic objectives.

Ultimately, whether or not Shahzad’s report is prophetic; the changing situation in Pakistan bears watching as it will have an effect on both Pakistan and Afghanistan, and South Asia at large, especially in light of worsening tensions between Pakistan and India. The removal of Musharraf, infighting in the government, increased international scrutiny and a renewed terrorist campaign could make things very hot in the coming weeks. This may also be portended by Zawahiri’s recent video focused exclusively on addressing Pakistanis, where he spoke English for the first time, perhaps serving as a warning before the launch of an Al-Qaeda campaign to coincide with the upcoming holy Islamic month of Ramadan.

The Chameleon Strategy

Will McCants August 21, 2008

Muhami al-Dawla (“Defender of the State”) has written an essay on Ekhlaas titled, “The Connection between the State of Islam and the Taliban is the Strategy of the ‘Chameleon.'”  His argument is that the Taliban’s recent successful surge in Afghanistan is the result of using “chameleon cells,” which are small, well-organized, armed bands that 1) blend into the population, 2) do not take orders from a commander, and 3) have penetrated the state security apparatus.

Muhami claims that the Taliban borrowed the strategy from the Islamic State of Iraq, which used it after the tribal Awakenings.  The chameleon groups in Iraq are able to carry out attacks on Awakening leaders because of their infiltration of the Awakening security forces.  Moreover, their presence in these forces means that they can undertake attacks for which the Awakening leaders get blamed.

Muhami argues that the Taliban has adopted this strategy because it is working so well in Iraq (is it?).  The group’s successful use of the strategy in Afghanistan is linked to its increased proficiency at gathering intelligence.

Document (Arabic): 8-19-08-ekhlaas-the-connection-bn-islamic-state-of-iraq-and-taliban-is-strategy-of-chameleon

Abu al-Yazid Alive

Will McCants August 18, 2008

That’s the claim of Zamjari, which Ekhlaas ranks as “a major author” on the forum.  He writes:

We proclaim to the supporters of the mujahids everywhere that our beloved shaykh is alive, prosperous, fighting, moving about freely, and leading battalions of mujahids.  Martyrdom has not yet been decreed for him.

That’s quite a claim for a major forum member to make given that al-Qaeda could release a statement that would prove him wrong.   Since there’s been no such statement, I’m inclined to give this unofficial proclamation some weight.

Document (Arabic): 8-16-08-ekhlaas-major-forum-member-says-mustafa-abu-al-yazid-still-alive

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