ji·had·ica

Justifiying Martyrdom in German

Nico Prucha May 21, 2010

Editor’s note: I am glad to introduce Nico Prucha as a new regular contributor to Jihadica. Nico is an German Arabist who has followed the jihadi Internet for a long time and has written several articles on the topic for Jane’s and other publications.]

In mid-April Elif Medya published a 30-page document in German justifying martyr operations. The text is essentially a significantly expanded translation of an English-language document published by Tibyan Publications a few years ago and attributed to the Saudi ideologue Yusuf al-Uyayri (d. 2003). The Tibyan text in turn was based on an Arabic text that al-Uyayri wrote for the Sawt al-Qawqaz website in late 2000 following the first suicide bombing in Chechnya (perpetrated by a woman named Khava Baraeva).

Signed by “your brothers of the German Taliban Mujahideen”, the document has two parts. The first is a translation of the abovementioned Tibyan text. The second part presents writings on martyrdom by three other figures, namely Nasir al-Din al-Albani, Muhammad bin Uthaymin and Sulayman al-Ulwan. The latter is a notorious  Saudi jihadi cleric while the first two are more mainstream (and deceased) figures of Salafi Islam.

As a whole, the text provides a German-language assessment and justification for suicide missions. The treatise distinguishes between the concepts of “suicide”, “self-sacrificial” and “martyrdom” (istishahdiya) operations, highlights a definition by Yusuf al-‘Uyairi on who can be considered a “martyr” (shahid), and throws in a wide mix of historical sources to illustrate and support the argument.

The main significance of the document is that it is in German and thus accessible to German speaking audience. It is the latest addition to a very rapidly growing body of German-language jihadi literature. Of all these new texts, the jihadist defense of ‘martyrdom’ operations by Elif Medya and the German Taliban Mujahideen may well be one of the most important.

Guest Post: The Story of Eric Breininger

Thomas Hegghammer May 11, 2010

[Editor’s note: This post was written by Christopher Radler and Behnam Said, who are intelligence analysts based in Hamburg, Germany. For links to the original document, see the comments to the preview post.]

On 3 May a message announcing the death of Eric Breininger (b. 3 August 1987) and three of his fellow combatants was posted on several German jihadist websites. Breininger, who travelled to the border region between Pakistan and Afghanistan in the winter 2007, was one of the most infamous German jihadists. From Waziristan Breininger, a.k.a. “Abdul Ghaffar al-Almani”, sent several videotaped messages to the jihadist community in Germany, asking them to join the jihad or at least to support it financially. Since September 2008 the German Federal Criminal Police Office (BKA) searched for Breininger, based on his assumed affiliation with a foreign terrorist organization.

A day after the announcement of his death, Breininger’s alleged autobiography, entitled Mein Weg nach Jannah (My Way to Paradise) was released on jihadi websites. The 108-page document mainly deals with Breiningers path into violent islamist militancy. It is not clear however, if Breininger wrote the document himself. In the messages he delivered from Waziristan, he spoke a very simple and often grammatically incorrect German. By contrast, the language of the published book is far more elaborate and correct. On the other hand, the content and details in the book argue for the authenticity of the document. Interestingly, the spelling of names differs throughout the book, which could indicate a collaborative effort. So we can assume that Breininger either 1) wrote it down by himself and had some help from his friends, or 2) told his story to some of his fellow jihadists and they wrote it down, as Spiegel journalist Yassin Musharbash suggested. Overall, however, we favour the first assumption.

After stating the reasons for writing down his autobiography, that is to say to disprove the lies spread by the media and to guide Muslims and non-Muslims to the path of Allah, he describes his conversion.

Radicalization and Recruitment in Germany
Breininger starts by telling us about his pre-Islamic life. Living together with his mother and sister since his parents’ divorce, he had the life of “a typical western teenager“, i.e. he went to parties and had relationships with girls. He calls this lifestyle  “following condemned Satan’s way“ (p. 6). Breininger further describes his search for the meaning of life that initially did not lead to satisfying results. However, in his workplace he came into contact with a Muslim colleague who gave him the first lessons in the Salafi way of Islam and took him to a local mosque where he felt very comfortable.

One day, Breininger and his “mentor” (who remains unnamed) were on their way home from work. They ran into “Abdullah” (a.k.a. Daniel Schneider, member of the terrorist Sauerland cell who was recently sentenced to 12 years for plotting to bomb US targets in Germany) and a person named Houssain al-Malla. Breininger was introduced to Schneider and al-Malla. It was the latter who provided the final inspiration for Breiniger to convert. After his conversion he devoted himself to the study of Islamic audiolectures and books. He quit school and spent more time with his new “brothers”. In the meantime, his former girlfriend had become Muslim and subsequently they contracted their marriage according to Islamic Law. It turned out, however, that this girl converted only to please Breininger, not out of genuine conviction. So Breininger ended the relationship and moved into Daniel Schneider’s appartment, where both of them regularly received al-Malla. Together they consumed a lot of jihadist propaganda downloaded from the Internet. The effect was dramatical:

“I knew that I had to take measures against the crusaders who where humiliating our brothers and sisters. Also every Muslim should stand up for a life according to the law of Allah and for the reason that we must build an Islamic state” (p. 53).

Breininger also states that they were appalled by the news from torture and prison abuse. Here we have another proof that it is these grievances caused by westerners themselves that help to radicalize.

Religio-ideological development
Breiningers first mentor in Germany invited him to his home and told him about the unity of God (tawhid) and the fundamentals of belief (´aqida). Breininger lays down the fundamentals of his belief by copying and pasting part of a book into his autobiography, dealing with the doctrine of tawhid.

Later on, after meeting Daniel Schneider and Houssain al-Malla, Breininger learned about the doctrine of “loyalty (towards believers and god) and enmity (towards infidels especially)” (al-wala` wa-l-bara`). Loyalty and enmity, Breininger tells us, are “the most important fundamentals in islam and are the two main conditions for the true belief” (p. 56). He underlines his point by quoting the former leader of the Iraqi al-Qaeda (AQ) branch Abu Mus’ab az-Zarqawi (p.58).

In the following part he writes about Jihad as an individual duty (fard al-´ayn), noting that “every Muslim who does not attend his duty to go out to follow Allahs path and to fight” is obviously a sinner (fasiq) and will be punished by God (p.59/60). As support he quotes the pamphlet The Defense of Muslim Land – The First Obligation after Iman by Abdullah Azzam.

Travelling for Jihad
After Breininger’s decision to participate in violent jihad and his abortion of his original plan to go to Algeria, he travels to Egypt and studies Arabic in Cairo. Four months later al-Malla joins him there and eventually convinces Breininger to travel to Afghanistan. Thus they went by airplane to Iran and subsequently took a bus to Zahidan near the Pakistani border. With the help of a human trafficker named “Mustafa” and after bribing an officer at the border they proceeded their journey to Waziristan covered with burqas (!) in a cab. Finally arrived at a safehouse of the Islamic Jihad Union (IJU), they were joined by mujahidin from Tajikistan and Turkey and were transferred to Afghanistan. Here they started a training which outlines as follows:

– Fajr prayer, dhikr, sports and stretching, one minute for breakfast, weaponry, time until dhuhr-prayer for memorizing
– Dhuhr prayer, tactics and “Anti-terror-fighting“ (close combat fighting)
– Asr Prayer, one minute for eating (bread and tea), weaponry-test (in case you failed you received punishment), dhikr
– Maghrib prayer, memorizing Qur’an until Isha-prayer
– Isha prayer, one hour guard duty once in a while

After al-Malla leaves the group for reasons unknown to Breininger (!) the latter’s situation begins to deteriorate because there were no other German-speakers amongst his comrades. Nevertheless, he completes his first training which is immediately followed by a second one. Here, the focus lies on the training with heavy weapons like recoilless guns, anti-aircraft weaponry and mines. Also the usage of GPS and radio equipment was part of the training. After moving to the so called “Istishhadi-house” (house of martyrdom-seekers) he describes some operations, one of them conducted together with mujahidin from the Taliban and AQ. It raised our eyebrows when we read that a chemical agent was used in a martyrdom operation against “murtaddin” in Khost. According to Breininger more than 100 “apostates and infidels” died (allegedly partly in the aftermath of the assault when the chemical agent began to take effect).

Assuming that Breiningers account is true,  this suggests ongoing cooperation between different organizations in Afghanistan. It also suggests, very worryingly, that Taliban and/or affiliated groups may be using crude chemical weapons.

German Taliban Mujahidin
After three years as a member of the IJU Breininger still had problems communicating with his comrades. When he was approached by his commander and told that some German Muslims had recently completed their training and planned to join the Taliban, Breininger decided to do so as well. The Taliban had no objections to the founding of a subgroup, so the “German Taliban Mujahidin” (GTM) emerged. Thanks to Breininger´s account we finally know about the background of this group that virtually emerged out of nothing and kept analysts busy for a long time. Especially since the Taliban never officially approved the GTM as part of their movement.

Threatening the Far Enemy
Breininger ends his story with an appeal to German Muslims to support the jihad financially:

“If the brothers would buy one doner kebab less a week it would be possible to buy almost 20 sniper bullets to fight the kuffar” (p. 102).

This appeal is followed by a call to Muslims to join the mujahidin because many of them want to start a family. The environment allows the breeding of children “free from the kufr of western society (…) This new generation of mujahidin grows up multilingual. They usually learn Arabic, Turkish, English, Pashtu, Urdu and their parent’s tongue” (p. 103).

Breininger’s conclusion gives us an idea about the long-term strategy of jihadist groups and clearly shows that the threat for Western countries is anything but averted yet:

“With God’s permission this offspring will become a special generation of terrorists [sic] that is not listed in any of the enemy’s databases. They speak their enemy’s languages, know their manners and customs and are able to mask and infiltrate the land of the kuffar because of their appearance. There they will insha’allah be able to conduct one after another operation against Allah’s enemies thereby sowing fear and terror in their hearts” (p. 104).

Preview: Autobiography of a German Jihadist

Thomas Hegghammer May 5, 2010

The memoirs of Erik Breininger, the German jihadist who was allegedly recently killed in Waziristan, have reportedly appeared online. I haven’t seen them myself yet, but if their authenticity can be established, we are dealing with an extremely valuable document. Jihadica will bring you more details soon.

New Report Profiling the Taliban

Thomas Hegghammer April 23, 2010

Anne Stenersen has written a new FFI report on the organizational structure and ideology of the Taliban. The report is based on field research, analysis of online Taliban propaganda and a thorough review of the secondary literature. This is essential reading for anyone working Afghanistan.

One of her conclusions caught my eye: “For the time being, it looks like any attempt to negotiate with the Taliban leadership directly would serve to strengthen the insurgent movement, rather than weakening it. A more realistic approach is probably to try to weaken the Taliban’s coherence through negotiating with, and offering incentives to, low-level commanders and tribal leaders inside Afghanistan.”

Did the Quetta Shura Break With al-Qaida?

Anne Stenersen March 22, 2010

Mustafa Hamid, aka Abu’l-Walid al-Masri, published a blog piece a little while ago which discussed the arrest of Mullah Baradir. It’s fascinating reading, especially the first part which deals with the historical role of Mullah Baradir in the Taliban insurgency. It’s already been covered in part by Leah Farrall.

I thought I’d add some comment about the opening lines of the article, in which Mustafa Hamid says that the Taliban’s high council made three important decisions after 2001, one of which was to “break the ties between the Taliban and al-Qaida.” Mustafa Hamid has previously said that al-Qaida and the Taliban have moved further apart after 2001, although I don’t think he’s ever been this specific. We have heard similar things in the media, but the reports are hard to confirm. Was there actually a decision in the Quetta shura, led by Mullah Baradir at the time, to break ties with al-Qaida?

If true, it would be really interesting, especially since we know that al-Qaida militants and at least parts of the Taliban movement continue to cooperate closely on a tactical level in Afghanistan. In an article in Sumud magazine in 2008, Mullah Baradir also acknowledged the presence of foreign fighters in the Taliban’s ranks. If the Quetta Shura indeed made a decision to break ties with al-Qaida after 2001, it doesn’t seem to have impeded the tactical cooperation between the two. It is tempting to assume that either, the Quetta Shura has little influence on the actual insurgency in Afghanistan, or Mustafa Hamid’s statement is incorrect.

The first point may in part be true. Al-Qaida fighters are most active in eastern Afghanistan, where the Quetta Shura’s direct influence over the insurgency is probably also the lowest. However, I think there’s another interpretation as well, namely that the Shura never actually intended to break ties with the al-Qaida militants who supported them in Afghanistan. On the other hand, they might have wanted to distance themselves from certain aspects of al-Qaida’s ideology. Reading the rest of Mustafa Hamid’s article, we see that he’s not really talking about an all-out rejection of foreign fighters in Afghanistan after the fall of the Taliban in late 2001. Rather, he refers to the Quetta shura’s rejection of the “al-Qaida strategy” of instigating sectarian war between Sunnis and Shi’ites in Iraq after 2003. (A “strategy” which was actually criticised by al-Qaida Central as well – but that’s the pitfall of lending out your brand name to unruly regional associates).

Rejecting this particular aspect of “al-Qaida” is pretty easy for the Taliban, which has never been a sectarian group anyway. But rejecting the presence of al-Qaida fighters and ideologues in AfPak is a much more complicated matter.

New Interview with Jalaluddin Haqqani

Qandeel Siddique November 19, 2009

The latest issue of Nawai Afghan Jihad includes an interview with Jalaluddin Haqqani.  The interview is centered on American policy in Afghanistan and the danger America poses to the world. Little mention is made of the Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan or the role of Pakistani extremists in Afghanistan.

To a question regarding the “propaganda unleashed by the Karzai government” that jihadi activity along Afghanistan’s border with Pakistan is planned and plotted in Pakistan, Haqqani gives a rather diplomatic response: “there are passionate young men from the tribal areas who have inherited the jihadi gusto of the past (fighting the British and Soviets) and who were martyred on Afghan soil. We acknowledge and appreciate their jihadi engagement.”

Asked to comment on the signs of a changing US policy towards Afghanistan – especially, for the Karzai government to initiate “dialogue” with the Taliban – Haqqani denounces this as sheer propaganda and maintains that the “pretext” of dialogue will be used by Americans to realize its political goals, including “spreading an atmosphere of distrust amongst the mujahideen.” In fact, such heavy reliance on propaganda warfare is symptomatic of an “enemy who is losing in battle.”

The truth is, he says, that the US is “connivingly promoting its own strategy by using dialogue as a cover. In order to have a dialogue, the terms and conditions of the various parties concerned need to first be discussed. However, they believe that only they are entitled to having any conditions. The Emirate’s policies and terms with regards to dialogue are clear – the key one being that all occupying forces leave Afghanistan.”

Haqqani repeatedly refers to the US as a nation who has imposed its “arrogance and terrorism” on the whole world, and especially Afghanistan, where the root of all problems is American presence and influence.  “It is America who is targeting innocent people and putting their security at risk, and imposing a secular and corrupt government on the people of Afghanistan. A government whose notoriety – profligacy, involvement in drug smuggling, and looting of its own people – was made public by the US itself.”

However, despite his harsh views of the US, Haqqani displays a certain sympathy for Obama, suggesting that the latter “protect his people from the fire Bush pushed him into.”

In response to a question regarding his preoccupation with jihadi activities outside of the Emirate, Haqqani reassures his audience that the allegation is entirely false and a figment of the enemy’s imagination. He says “I am currently engaged with leading jihadi operations in the Khost and Paktika provinces.”

The Taliban, the UN and al-Qaida

Anne Stenersen October 30, 2009

(Editor’s note: Anne tried to post a comment on Vahid Brown’s landmark post on Al-Qaida-Taliban relations. Given that she is one of the world’s foremost experts on this issue, there was no way I was going to let her remarks “disappear” into the comments section. So here they are. Her text begins with a response to an earlier comment about Taliban’s view of the UN).

“Mullah Omar’s statement should not be interpreted to mean that he or other Taliban leaders are ready to recognize the United Nations. In fact, the Taliban’s leaders have criticized the UN on a number of occasions, in addition to the one you mention. In 2006 Mullah Omar accused the UN of being nothing but a “tool for America” and Mullah Baradir echoed this in 2008, saying that “we regard all the decisions of the United Nations towards Afghanistan, as American orders.” I do not think their 12 Oct 09 statement was issued as a direct response to forum criticism, since it is pretty consistent with the Taliban’s past propaganda statements on the UN.

From the Taliban’s perspective, opposing the UN and wanting to have “good relations” with neighbouring countries are not necessarily contradictory. In the 1990s there was a huge debate within the Taliban regime on whether to join the UN or not – the main argument against it was that joining the UN would mean that the Islamic Emirate would have to subordinate itself to “infidel” laws (the UN Charter, etc). Having strategic alliances with other countries is another matter, which may also be easier to defend from a religious point of view (this seems to be the point of the al-Sumud editors as well). But clearly, there are many within the wider jihadi community who do not agree to this distinction.

By the way, excellent article Vahid – I agree that AQ central are probably not too happy about the Taliban-IEA’s recent propaganda statements, although I do not think it will have any practical implications for the insurgency – there is simply not enough incentive for neither the Quetta Shura or AQ central to “turn on” the other as long as there is a common enemy to fight and the Quetta Shura see themselves in a position of strength (i.e. there is no need for them to enter into negotiations with the Afghan regime, in which they would probably have to renounce their relationship with al-Qaida). Al-Qaida’s close relationship with Haqqani (as you mention in the comment) is also a crucial point – while the Quetta Shura may not be dependent on al-Qaida they are indeed dependent on having Haqqani and his allies on their side. That may partly explain why the Quetta Shura is putting up with al-Qaida propaganda that contradicts their own agenda.”

Al-Qa’ida and the Afghan Taliban: “Diametrically Opposed”?

Vahid Brown October 21, 2009

Mullah Omar’s Afghan Taliban and al-Qa’ida’s senior leaders have been issuing some very mixed messages of late, and the online jihadi community is in an uproar, with some calling these developments “the beginning of the end of relations” between the two movements.  Beginning with a statement from Mullah Omar in September, the Afghan Taliban’s Quetta-based leadership has been emphasizing the “nationalist” character of their movement, and has sent several communications to Afghanistan’s neighbors expressing an intent to establish positive international relations.  In what are increasingly being viewed by the forums as direct rejoinders to these sentiments, recent messages from al-Qa’ida have pointedly rejected the “national” model of revolutionary Islamism and reiterated calls for jihad against Afghanistan’s neighbors, especially Pakistan and China.  However interpreted, these conflicting signals raise serious questions about the notion of an al-Qa’ida-Taliban merger.

The trouble began with Mullah Omar’s message for ‘Eid al-Fitr, issued on September 19, in which he calls the Taliban a “robust Islamic and nationalist movement,” which “wants to maintain good and positive relations with all neighbors based on mutual respect.”  Mullah Omar further stated that he wishes to “assure all countries that the Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan … will not extend its hand to jeopardize others, as it itself does not allow others to jeopardize us.”  A week later, Abu Muhammad al-Maqdisi, one of the most influential living Salafi jihadi ideologues, released an angry rebuke to these “dangerous utterances” of the Taliban amir, pointing out that they were of the same order as Hamas leader Khaled Mashal’s statement that the Chechen struggle is a Russian “internal matter.” For a person of Maqdisi’s stature to equate the Taliban with Hamas, especially in light of the recent jihadi media onslaught  against Hamas for its “crimes” against the Jund Ansar Allah, is an extremely serious charge.  Maqdisi ends his statement with the hope that he has misunderstood Mullah Omar’s message and that some clarification from the Taliban leadership will be forthcoming; more on this below.

A week after the Maqdisi message was posted, al-Sahab issued Ayman al-Zawahiri’s eulogy for Baitullah Mehsud (on which, see my earlier post). Midway through that speech, Zawahiri turns to the Palestinian issue, arguing that the mujahidin in Palestine should destroy the “laws of Satan” being imposed upon them, among which he singles out the notion that there should be “national unity with the traitors and those who sold out the religion and the homeland.” He goes on to lambast Hizbullah as representing a model of “turning jihad into a national cause,” a model which “must be rejected by the umma, because it is a model which makes jihad subject to the market of political compromises and distracts the umma from the liberation of Islamic lands and the establishment of the Caliphate.”

On October 6, Abu Yahya al-Libi’s al-Sahab video, “East Turkestan: The Forgotten Wound,” was released, which calls for support for the defensive jihad in northwestern China, one of those neighbors with whom Mullah Omar expressed a hope for “good and positive relations.” As in Zawahiri’s Baitullah eulogy, al-Libi emphasizes the dangers of dividing the umma into nations and ethnicities. He says that “East Turkestan [Xinjiang, China] is part of the Islamic lands that cannot be divided”; that it is the duty of all Muslims to support the Uighurs in their fight against the Chinese state; and that all who would appease China are “apostates.”  In these messages, then, both al-Libi and Zawahiri are denouncing, in the strongest possible terms, a political strategy being enunciated by the Taliban’s supreme leaders.

A week later, on October 12, Jordanian jihadi writer Ahmad Bawadi posted an exchange of correspondence that he’d recently had with the editors of the Taliban’s al-Sumud magazine. Bawadi, without naming names, points out that Mullah Omar’s ‘Eid message had engendered significant controversy, leading some to say that the Taliban supported making the same sort of compromises as Hamas.  The “clarification” sent in response by al-Sumud and posted by Bawadi pretty much dodged the question. Amid some tortuous sophistry about words being like a double-edged sword, the al-Sumud editors defended Mullah Omar’s position by comparing it to the Prophet Muhammad’s divide-and-conquer strategy of distinguishing between different groups of enemies: What’s wrong, as-Sumud asks, with saying we don’t want to fight the Buddhists (read: China) now, since the aim is to divide them from the Christians (read: ISAF/NATO forces) in order to weaken the latter?  Regardless of how one reads the al-Sumud  “clarification,” any doubts that the controversies were causing the Quetta Shura to rethink its public relations strategy were laid to rest the following day, when the Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan issued an open letter to the Shanghai Cooperation Conference, reiterating verbatim the “neighborly” sentiments from Mullah Omar’s ‘Eid message.  The SCO, it should be pointed out, includes China, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan, all countries that are directly targeted by al-Qa’ida-allied groups based in Pakistan’s tribal areas.

All of this has sparked a great deal of heated argument and anxious hand-wringing on several jihadi forums, but for reasons of space I’ll just single out one thread from the al-Hisbah forum. On October 14, “al-Najjar,” in a post entitled “Mullah Omar and Zawahiri Diametrically Opposed: A plan, a problem, or…?!,” contrasts the neighborly outreach of Mullah Omar’s ‘Eid message with the aforementioned statements about the “laws of Satan” in Zawahiri’s Baitullah eulogy, and ends by asking Zawihiri, “Oh our Shaykh, how is it that these are ‘Satanic laws’ when they are essentially the same as what has been mentioned by Mullah Omar, the Commander of the Faithful, to whom the mujahidin in Afghanistan and Pakistan have pledged their allegiance?”  A later poster, “Abu Azzam 1,” adds that Mullah Omar’s messages imply some level of recognition of the United Nations, an organization which al-Qa’ida has unequivocally labelled as “infidel,” and that these opposing moves seem to him to signal “the beginning of the end of relations between al-Qa’ida and the Taliban.”  Another forum participant, “Abu Salam,” agrees, writing yesterday that “this is a clear indication that al-Qa’ida and the Taliban movement are not of one mind, and that al-Qa’ida may turn on the Taliban in the near future.”  We shall see.  But one thing is clear: the recent shift in the Quetta Shura’s strategic communications is not to al-Qa’ida’s liking, and it is raising serious concerns among the broader Salafi jihadi movement about the religio-political legitimacy of the Afghan Taliban’s leadership.

Abu’l-Walid is Back… with the Taliban (and not al-Qaida)

Vahid Brown October 9, 2009

(Editor’s note: I am delighted to introduce our next guest blogger, Vahid Brown from the Combating Terrorism Center at West Point. Vahid is a linguist and historian with deep knowledge of the history of al-Qaida and the jihadi movement. He is the author of Cracks in the Foundation and the co-author of several well-known CTC reports. Vahid and I share many research interests, so I am thrilled that he will be with us for the next month or so.)

Mustafa Hamid Abu’l-Walid al-Masri, once a senior member of al-Qa’ida, has re-emerged lately after several years of relative silence and is once again chronicling, critiquing and offering strategic guidance to the jihadi movement.  He began posting new “editions” of his voluminous early writings to a blog in 2007 and ‘08, and this July he began to add newly-written articles on the Afghan insurgency, one of which has already been covered by Leah Farrall on her blog and in the Australian.

The October issue of the Taliban monthly al-Sumud reveals that Abu’l-Walid, author of at least two of the articles in the latest issue, has taken up one of his old jihadi jobs: official Taliban propagandist and media strategist.  His recent output also leaves little doubt that Abu’l-Walid is still at odds with the al-Qa’ida senior leadership over a wide range of ideological and strategic issues, and that he has every intention of continuing to publicly air al-Qa’ida’s dirty laundry.

All of which makes the timing of Abu’l-Walid’s appearance in al-Sumud very interesting, and for two reasons. First of all, the writings that Abu’l-Walid has posted to his blog are among the most damning criticisms of al-Qa’ida in existence, and his newer articles continue to ridicule Bin Ladin; in this one from September, for instance, UBL is singled out as the spokesman of the Salafi jihadi movement, which Abu’l-Walid slams for its do-it-yourself approach to Islamic jurisprudence. That such a vociferous critic of al-Qa’ida has been given an official platform by the Taliban, in their flagship Arabic magazine, clearly sends an important signal.

Second, as documented by Farrall, Abu’l-Walid broke his operational silence, so to speak, in July, by publishing an essay giving strategic advice to the Taliban – advocating a concerted campaign to kidnap American soldiers.  Aside from a lot of rather predictable anti-ISAF propaganda, the only piece of strategic guidance in Abu’l-Walid’s two al-Sumud articles appears in the one titled “They are Killing NATO Soldiers… Are They Not?,” (al-Sumud vol. 40, pp. 40-3), where he writes, “I say again that the mujahidin need direct guidance from their political leadership to the effect that taking prisoners is of far greater importance than capturing weapons or war booty.” That Abu’l-Walid’s guidance on this issue has moved from a blog to an official Taliban organ is obviously an important – and disturbing – development.

Also interesting is that on October 2, the same day that the latest issue of al-Sumud was released online, “Hawadit,” the pseudonymous administrator of Abu’l-Walid’s blog, posted there two letters written that day to the editors of al-Jazeera and to al-Quds al-‘Arabi, respectively, taking both papers to task for relying on Leah Farrall’s aforementioned piece in the Australian in their reports on Abu’l-Walid’s pro-kidnapping essay.  Why cite a counter-terrorism security official, writing in a “Zionist” newspaper, when they could have referenced the available writings of Abu’l-Walid himself – “one of your own former correspondents,” al-Jazeera is asked.  Most interesting, though, is the one and only detail that “Hawadit” takes issue with Farrall about: her description of Abu’l-Walid as a “senior al-Qa’ida figure.”  Both letters are emphatic on this point: Abu’l-Walid is most certainly not a member of al-Qa’ida at this time.

(For background on Abu’l-Walid, see the brief biographical profile I wrote for the CTC a couple of years ago; Muhammad al-Shafi’i’s excellent series of articles on Abu’l-Walid in al-Sharq al-Awsat, including this one in English; and Sally Neighbour’s Mother of Mohammed (Melbourne University Press, 2009, and forthcoming from the University of Pennsylvania Press), which tells the story of Rabiah Hutchinson, an Australian woman who married Abu’l-Walid in Afghanistan in 2000.)

UPDATE: Leah Farrall has provided some excellent additional analysis to this issue, here, here and here.

Visions of Afghan and Somali Emirates

Scott Sanford August 27, 2009

On 25 August 2009, the Global Islamic Media Front (GIMF) published a plea by Dr. John Boutros for Muslims to aid the jihadi cause. He stated, “Do not mourn because the Islamic Caliphate is imminent… Trust me, the US is one or two thrusts” away from crumpling. However, in order to make this happen Muslims must give aid to the jihadis.

Boutros claimed that the United States is weak due to the financial crisis, which is allegedly causing the rich states to consider separating from the Union. He stated that militarily the United States is vulnerable because it has so many soldiers in the mountains of Pakistan and Afghanistan, and in the suburbs of Baghdad, who are easy targets. In regards to the United States homeland he continued, “Hundreds of thousand of soldiers stationed in the streets of Washington and Los Angeles wait for a martyr to cross the continents carrying a nuclear, biological, or chemical bomb.”

He alleged that from al-Qaida’s viewpoint, things are much better. Somalia is becoming more peaceful and prosperous because the Shabab al-Mujahidin are instilling sharia law and in Afghanistan the Taliban control 80% of the country while coalition forces only leave their bases in armored vehicles in the other 20%. However, the Islamic State of Iraq has made many sacrifices, as has Ansar al-Islam, who gave up their bombs, snipers, and bases.

He then stated that given the current state of affairs, if the United States fell, “In a short period, the Taliban Emirate will be a great state encompassing Afghanistan, Pakistan, Kashmir, Turkistan, and a large part of Iran.” In the western area of the Islamic world, the Shabab al-Mujahidin will control all of Somalia, Djibouti, and Sudan after the US fall. Then, he maintained, there will be justice in the Afghanistan and Somali Emirates and in other areas like Iraq, Chechnya, Algeria, and Nigeria where things will either turn around for the already established emirates or the mujahidin will prevail.

He then gets to the point of his fairytale, “After your mujahid brothers sacrifice themselves and their funds on this path, will you be stingy in support and assistance? Will you be stingy in spreading the word? Will you be stingy in financial support after many operations are canceled because of a shortage of materials like what happened during operations within Denmark?”

The fanciful nature of this report is striking even for the GIMF and I am not sure what to make of it. Is this an indication that something structurally has changed within the GIMF? Or, is it simply an attempt to garner support and the editorial staff did not realize how unrealistic it sounds? Regardless of its meaning, if this is the grand strategy of budding al-Qaida strategists, I am not worried.

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