ji·had·ica

What’s AQIM’s Strategy?

Will McCants July 20, 2011

“What is the brothers’ plan in the Islamic Magreb?”  That’s the question raised today by Shmukh member Abu Safiyya.  He thinks it’s perfectly legitimate to kill troops but it’s getting Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Magreb (AQIM) nowhere.  AQIM should be going after the leadership of the militaries in the region.

Some readers are sympathetic but most respond that you have to kill troops to get to the officers. To which Abu Safiyya retorts, “What effect does it have on the tyrants to kill a thousand or two thousand of their servants?”  Abu Safiyya’s retort is inadequately answered with, “Show us a better plan.”

AQ’s Enabler

Will McCants July 19, 2011

Don Rassler and Vahid Brown have written one helluva report on the Haqqani network, the folks who have been providing aid and sanctuary to AQ Central for decades. Based on thousands of pages of primary source documents–many not previously released to the public–Rassler and Brown explain how the Haqqanis did (and do) it.

Still not sure you want to read it? The authors borrow network analysis tools from Renaissance Studies to show how the Haqqani network functions. C’mon.

Al-Qaeda Is Making a Cartoon

Will McCants July 18, 2011

According to a member of the Shmukh jihadi forum, the media wing of al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula is making a cartoon. I haven’t seen anything like this before and I am very skeptical that it is a real product. But if it’s legit and anywhere near like the purported screen shots and promotional banner below, it would indicate that AQAP is becoming even more sophisticated in its efforts to reach out to youth. Now they just need some action figures. (If this is old hat or a rip-off of some other cartoon, please let me know and I’ll update the post.)

Update: Adam Rawnsley at Danger Room has dug deeper. His references to the Super Friends and Thundercats clinch his credibility.

Update2: Yammani, the Shmukh user who posted the pics, provides an update today.  He explains that the film is in the final stages and the “brothers” asked him to share the pics and the basic concept with the forum to elicit their feedback. The brothers will then edit as needed.

Update3 (July 21): Shmukh members have translated a Reuters story on the cartoons that mentions Jihadica. They are elated at the press attention and are calling on the cartoonists to hurry up and release the film.



Redesign

Will McCants July 17, 2011

As you can see, Jihadica is going through a redesign. I’m going to be tweaking the features too. If there’s something you’d like to see added, please drop us a note in the comments section.

How Online Propaganda Works

Will McCants June 23, 2011

Shmukh user al-Sakit argues that you need a wide distribution of jihadi propaganda on mainstream forums in order to attract a small amount of people.  He observes that the three top mainstream Arabic forums have one million users each.  If you post jihadi propaganda to all of them, only 10% (300,000) are likely to look at it.  Of those, 10% (30,000) will like what they see.  Of those, 10% (3000) will embrace the idea of jihad. Of those, 10% (300) will propagandize. Of those, 10% (30) will go out to fight in a jihad.  Of those, 10% (3) will seek martyrdom.  

That’s much the way I think about it, which is why countering the effects of jihadi propaganda is so difficult.  It just needs to mobilize a few.

Zawahiri at the Helm

Will McCants June 16, 2011

In a statement released online nine hours ago via the Fajr Media Center and dated June 2011, the General Command of al-Qaeda declared its decision to appoint Ayman al-Zawahiri the new head of al-Qaeda.  This move was not unanticipated except by those with strange Awlaki/Libi fixations.  Leah Farrall guessed it would be so on organizational grounds and Murad and I parsed Zawahiri’s eulogy to Bin Laden to arrive at the same conclusion.

In addition to naming Zawahiri as the new amir, here are other highlights from the statement:

  • A special shout out to Palestine, promising its people that al-Qaeda is fighting for their liberation.
  • A reaffirmation of Zawahiri’s oath of allegiance to Mullah Omar, saying that “We stress to our brothers in Afghanistan that we are with you, in spirit and what we possess, under the leadership of commander of the faithful Mullah Muhammad Omar. “
  • A shout out to Umar Abd al-Rahman and other imprisoned mujahids.
  • Encouragement for the uprisings in the Middle East but also a caution that true change will only come after implementing the Sharia and that won’t happen until all forms of occupation are gone.

Update: A great Foreign Policy round table on the significance of Zawahiri’s elevation.

Now We Know

Will McCants June 1, 2011

There are going to be loads of conferences this September looking back on 9/11.  This is the one I plan to attend: “10 Years Later: Insights on al-Qaeda’s Past and Future through Captured Records” sponsored by the Conflict Records Research Center (CRRC) at the National Defense University on Sept. 13-14.  The CRRC has picked up where West Point’s CTC left off and is the US government’s primary conduit for releasing loads of material from the Harmony Database, which houses scans and translations of documents captured in Afghanistan and Iraq.  Over the last decade, these documents have yielded much of what we know about al-Qaeda’s inner workings, and they continue to be a treasure trove of fresh finds for grad students and scholars alike.

The CRRC is taking proposals for papers now (deadline June 15) and they want drafts by August 15 (email Joseph Simons here).  I hope Anzalone, Zelin, Farrall, Gartenstein-Ross, Watts, Berger, Brown, Fishman, Johnsen, Kaplan, the FFI crew, et al will submit something so we can have a massive jihad dork fest in DC.

Crowdsourcing the Revolution

Will McCants May 9, 2011

Several weeks ago, Leah noted the appearance of five new letters sent by Sayf al-`Adl, one of the most senior al-Qaeda members, to Abu al-Walid al-Masri.  This is in addition to the five letters Sayf sent at the end of 2010 that Vahid ably summarized here.  Given Sayf’s historical importance to the organization, his reported leadership role in the tribal areas, and the uncertainties surrounding the succession to Bin Laden, I thought readers might be interested in what he’s thinking.  I’ll summarize some of their contents over the next few days.

As of Jan-March, when the letters were written, Sayf was preoccupied with the Arab Spring and its implications for al-Qaeda.  Al-Qaeda has been justly accused of being on the sidelines of the revolutions but somewhat unfairly dinged for not grasping the technological advances that have enabled them.  Sayf, for one, sees the power of social media and what it can mean for creating more just institutions in the wake of the revolutions.  Here is his suggestion for Egypt (dated Feb 27):

I propose the establishment of a new site on the Internet for social networking, particularly in Egypt, that is similar to Facebook and whose proceeds would support the families of the martyrs and orphans in Egypt.  On it, the umma will express its vision for the reform of its institutions.  I think many wonderful ideas that can be beneficial will be put forward on these pages because genius is not confined to an individual or a family or elements of the regime.  Wisdom and reason are not limited to a person, and Egypt and the umma are filled with people of knowledge, competence and wisdom.

Not a bad idea.

No New Bin Ladens

Will McCants May 8, 2011

The title is both a prediction and a plea.  The prediction is that Bin Laden is sui generis and none of his successors will combine in one person the man’s organizational skills, media savvy, and personal charisma.

The plea is that experts on al-Qaeda resist the temptation to answer the media’s question, “Who Will Be the Next Bin Laden?”  Putting forward a name risks misunderstanding Bin Laden’s unique role and capabilities, which are not likely to be replicated in a single person.  It also risks elevating the global stature of others who might otherwise fail to win the international following that Bin Laden won.

Note that answering this question is different from answering the perfectly innocuous question, “Who Will Run al-Qaeda?”  That’s a question about an organizational role, not a person.  Leah has provided the best answer so far.

Readers may wonder why I am harping on experts and not the media. It is because the media relies on experts, who should resist the temptation to feed fear for the sake of fortune or advance a name to advance their own career.  In recent years, both impulses have led to a strange symbiosis in which AQ ideologues and Western experts feed off one another’s attention.  Watching the Watchers indeed.

Lest anyone think me holier than thou, I confess I am as susceptible to this temptation as the rest and I have not always resisted it well.  But I do try, particularly in this time of peril for AQ.  I don’t want to give the organization an assist.

To end on a high note, here’s a good example of how some AQ experts are doing the right thing.  And tomorrow I promise no more righteous finger but rather a post on some new Sayf al-`Adl letters.

Why Don’t Jihadi Orgs Tweet?

Will McCants April 30, 2011

I’ve been thinking for awhile about 1) why the social media of choice for jihadi orgs and media outlets is discussion forums and 2) why few to no jihadi orgs and media outlets have a Twitter or Facebook account (recent exception here).   (Marc Lynch first noted this phenomenon some time ago but I can’t find his post.)  Since Shaun Waterman raises the issue in a recent column, I thought I’d take a stab at explaining why.  Here are two hypotheses:

  1. Vulnerability:  Accounts on Twitter and Facebook are too easy to shut down.  You can flag an account to the administrators and they will remove it.  Jihadi orgs could set up new accounts but then they’d have to let their followers know where to find them.  By the time they do, the admins will be hip to the problem and move to close the accounts down again.  Compare this with the forums, which have multiple addresses and jihadis control membership.
  2. If It Ain’t Broke, Don’t Fix It:  Jihadis jumped on forums around 2005 and have perfected their use for pushing propaganda and building communities.  The system still works well for them, so why bother changing it (h/t Daniel Kimmage, who is now in ghayba).  Recent forum closures may make them question this inertia.

I know AaronW and others will have different takes, and I look forward to hearing them.  Just want to get the ball rolling.  Note that this is about organizations and not individuals supporters, many of whom have accounts on Twitter and Facebook.

Caveat lector: I am a complete Twitter neophyte and have managed to withstand the ridicule from friends and family for not having a Facebook page.

Update: The Translation Brigades on Ansar forum have translated Shaun’s article into Arabic (jihadi site). H/T Aaron Zelin.

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