ji·had·ica

The Allure of Parliamentary Politics

The Sharia Council of the Minbar al-Tawhid website has issued a new fatwa today by Abu Mundhir al-Shinqiti. The fatwa rules on the permissibility of Muslims electing representatives to parliaments and serving in those bodies. Since the Minbar’s Sharia Council has become the jihadis’ go-to resource for religious opinions, its fatwas on the Arab Spring matter in jihadi circles (see Joas’ and Brynjar’s earlier posts on the council’s output). This may become even more true in the months ahead if al-Qaeda continues to fade as the vanguard of the jihadi movement.

Unsurprisingly, the council rules that it is forbidden for Muslims to participate in a parliamentary system, even if it is to make the constitution more Islamic (the reasons are the same as those outlined in my Foreign Affairs article). It also enjoins Muslims to focus on fighting in “lands of jihad,” which is somewhat at odds with al-Shinqiti’s earlier ruling that mujahids should stay and fight in Egypt.

Of more interest than the council’s ruling is the question to which it responds. It gives a sense of the misgivings some jihadis have about their leaderships’ hard-line stance when there are real opportunities to advance their agenda to create an Islamic state. It is also an astute take on the political maneuverings of some Salafis in Egypt. Finally, it shows how the loyalties of some jihadis are split between Salafi and jihadi scholars:

Some of our noble shaykhs who have educated us have conducted ijtihad on this issue and sanctioned participation in the Egyptian legislative council (parliament) for a single term. That will be the term in which the new positive constitution for the country will be written for the coming period. They have sanctioned this for the sake of drafting legal material that is closer to Islam than secularism, although they recognize that participating here [Egypt] means the entry of some monotheists into elections and not just voting (although some differ on this matter).

What is your opinion? Do we agree or disagree with their ijtihad?

What is your opinion on the question of participating in the new political parties that they are presently establishing in the country, especially the Light Party and the Virtue Party, which are aligned with the well-known salafi mission in this country and are famous throughout the land?

What is your opinion on how we participate in the political movement after the election, knowing that the former regime used to imprison for years anyone it suspected of loving or supporting the mujahids or those who held their pure beliefs?

Or do we limit our goals to only seeking a way to go to the land of jihad?

I urge you to reply quickly since events are developing rapidly.

 

English-Speaking Jihadis Lose Principal Propagandists

According to U.S. and Yemeni officials, Anwar al-Awlaki and Samir Khan have been killed in an airstrike. Awlaki was the spiritual leader of the English-speaking jihadi community and Samir Khan was its chief propagandist. Both men joined al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula over the past few years and have been responsible for producing al-Qaeda’s English-language magazine, Inspire. Awlaki also had an operational role directing AQAP’s external attacks and the current head of AQAP reportedly asked Bin Laden to make Awlaki the group’s leader. This is yet another major blow against al-Qaeda and seriously damages its ability to recruit and attack in the West.

Update: For background on AQAP and its ties to Yemeni tribes, there’s a brand new report from CTC.

Decade of Fear

As is the case for many others, the tenth anniversary of the 9/11 attacks has made me reflect on their impact over the past decade. To this end, Michelle Shephard‘s Decade of Fear has been indispensable. A very personal account of her journalistic efforts to chronicle the war on terrorism over the past decade, Michelle weaves the weft of her narrative over the warp of New York just after 9/11; Somalia after the rise of the Islamic Courts Union and, later, the emergence of al-Shabab; Pakistan after the rebound of the Taliban and al-Qaeda; and Yemen at the formation of al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula and the retreat of President Saleh.

Michelle’s account puts a human face on the knotty legal, ethical, and political problems the United States and its allies have grappled with as they tried to stop al-Qaeda and its supporters: torture for information, overthrowing stable governments who might align with terrorist groups, rendition, entrapment, collateral damage, and indefinite detention. There are also the less “kinetic” but  no-less-knotty problems like countering radicalization online in multi-cultural societies that value free speech.

What struck me most about Michelle’s account was her juxtaposition of violence and inanity. Hassan Aweys, the head of a group allied with al-Shabab in Somalia, covets Michelle’s boots. Hamid Gul, the former head of Pakistan’s ISI and sponsor of some of the United States’ worst enemies in the region, does not know who Tony Soprano is but, upon being told, empathizes with his bifurcated psyche. The white-polo-and-khaki-wearing Abu Jandal, UBL’s chief bodygaurd, is gracious to Western journalists while explaining that Bin Laden didn’t target the civilians in September. “He simply hit targets, and civilians happened to be around.” Kitch and karaoke permeate Guantanamo, along with euphemisms to describe poor detainee treatment.

Wisely, Michelle does not try to resolve the contradictions or unravel the knots. But she is hopeful that the Arab Spring and the death of bin Laden will take the wind out of the sails of the global jihadi movement and help the United States and its allies put the threat in perspective so they can abandon some of their worst counterterrorism tools. Me too.

Al-Qaeda’s Past and Present

The newest issue of Foreign Affairs on the ten-year anniversary of 9/11 includes an essay by me (free registration required) on the history of al-Qaeda and its prospects after the Arab Spring. The essay covers the reasons for al-Qaeda’s founding, its targeting of the United States, its strategic thinking under Zawahiri’s leadership, its concept of an Islamic state, and its enduring problem with Islamist parliamentary politics.

Regular readers of Jihadica will find much that is familiar but the essay makes one point I have not seen elsewhere: al-Qaeda is not against democratic elections, just parliamentary politics. The misperception that it is against democratic elections arises from a general ignorance of al-Qaeda’s thought on Islamic states and statecraft, a subject I also treat in the essay. Islamic states, not the caliphate, are central to al-Qaeda’s strategic planning and its interpretation of the aftermath of the Arab Spring.

I look forward to your comments. Original Arabic for the passages I translated in the article are below the fold.

  • Update 1: My postscript for Foreign Affairs on the death of Atiyya.
  • Update 2: I give some As to the Qs of Foreign Affairs.
  • Update 3: Foreign Affairs has published “Al Qaeda’s Challenge” in its 9/11 Ten Year Anniversary ebook. Brynjar’s article on Bin Laden’s death is in there too.

(more…)

Reasons for the Strategic Failure of al-Qaeda in Palestine

In an essay provocatively titled, “Reasons for the Utter Strategic Failure of al-Qaeda to Threaten the Security of the Zionist Entity,” Ansar forum member Qandil al-Bahr is at pains to explain why al-Qaeda is advancing the Palestinian cause by focusing its attention in the United States:

There is no doubt that al-Qaeda is incapable of undertaking a single operation in the land controlled by the Israeli enemy. The mujahids of al-Qaeda are not even able to pay for a single shot or assassinate a single Jewish person in the land of Palestine. What is the reason for this utter failure? The reality is there is no reason behind it worth mentioning other than that the premise is faulty. It is not possible to defend a faulty premise other than by first critiquing it and moderating it then base it upon reality.

Qandil says he has heard this faulty premise over and over but has not felt safe enough to respond to it in public or private. He believes he is safe enough to respond on the forums.

The reality, Qandil argues, is that al-Qaeda wants to carry out operations in Palestine but the circumstances aren’t right. The Salafi-Jihadi movements are weak and fragmented, so al-Qaeda is taking its time to study and plan. The key is to end Western support for Israel, which will make the state vulnerable to a local challenge. Reducing American support is particularly vital. Until then, any terrorist attacks on Israel will be futile.

Can this be done? Qandil says yes:

The Great Powrs do not have enemies or friends. They only have interests. If the United States of America comes to believe that the Zionist Entity is becoming a dangerous and strategic burden to its interests and its existence, it will abandon this “Zionist leech” without the least hesitation.

Qandil believes it is only a matter of time before this happens. The key is to continue to bleed the United States economically.

There is a strong realist streak in jihadi thinking, which is what Qandil is drawing on to explain why al-Qaeda has chosen to focus on the far enemy of the United States rather than the near enemy of Israel. But as his frustration suggests, it is a tough sell.

Strategic Theory of the Second Generation of Jihadis

Three days ago, Abu Hafs al-Sunni al-Sunni, a member of the Atahadi forum, posted an article he titled, “The Strategic Theory of the Second Generation of Jihadis: Propagandistic Foundations and Operational Methods.” Despite the title, it is less about strategy and operations and more about the public relations problems plaguing the jihadis. Here are his main points:

  • The first generation of jihadis did not do an adequate job of winning over ordinary Muslims. This left the field open to the quietist Salafis. Jihadis need to engage commoners by showing them videos of the suffering of Muslims and gauging their interest in doing something about it. However, one has to be careful so as not to be accused of inciting terrorism.
  • Jihadis need to avoid actions that alienate the masses, like beheadings, and demonstrate how much more ethical they are in waging war than the Americans.
  • The second generation of jihadis is woefully ignorant of Islamic scripture and law, which makes it easy for quietist Salafis to discredit them.
  • Be polite when disagreeing with non-jihadi Salafis and the clerics they follow. Many of these clerics agree with the jihadis on most things, like the Egyptian Salafi cleric Abu Ishaq al-Huwayni.
  • Focus on destroying the economy of the infidel. Burn their forests and damage their power grids.

Sayf al-`Adl a Nobody

Shmukh forum user Amal wa-Alam complains that the brothers are disparaging Sayf al-`Adl, the operational leader of al-Qaeda.  “They are beginning to talk about him as if he is a nobody.” Amal strongly disagrees and adduces as evidence West Point’s study of his handiwork in Africa that Clint Watts, Jake Shapiro, and Vahid Brown had a hand in. “It’s strange that the Americans know” and the brothers do not.

It’s not clear who these naysaying brothers are, and another Shmukh user disagrees with Amal, saying that he has heard no disparaging remarks. But if it is true that Sayf is being criticized in some jihadi circles as irrelevant, it is quite a change from the rumors two months ago that he was the acting head of al-Qaeda after Bin Laden’s death.

This isn’t the first time that jihadi leaders have referenced the studies of American and European analysts to bolster their authority. This latest post underlines once again that jihadism is not a static phenomenon but one influenced by those who study it and vice versa.

 

Breivik and Al-Qaeda

In his summary of a massive manifesto written by Anders Breivik, the alleged terrorist who carried out Friday’s horrible attacks in Norway, Blake Hounshell observes that although Breivik wants to purge Europe of Islam, he also deeply admires al-Qaeda.  Indeed, Breivik is inspired by the organization’s quest for cultural purity in the Middle East and wishes to do the same in Europe using similar means: “Just like Jihadi warriors are the plum tree of the Ummah, we will be the plum tree for Europe and for Christianity.”  This symmetry is also noted by Spencer Ackerman, who provides a very useful rundown of the intellectual parallels between Breivik and al-Qaeda.

Breivik admires few other terrorist groups, listing al-Qaeda as one of only two successful terrorist organizations. The reason for al-Qaeda’s success, he argues, is that it made other Islamists look moderate in comparison, making it easier for them to culturally gobble up non-Muslims:

Al-Qaeda’s relatively unknown but most important achievement is the fact that they have made moderate Islamist organisations more approachable by expanded [sic] the radical political axis. This legitimised several Islamist groups and therefore changed the very definition of “extreme Islam”. Several Islamic political entities that used to seem radical now seem moderate. As such, they work in tandem with the so called moderate Muslim organisations. They all have the same goal, conquering everything non-Muslim.

Although it is true that al-Qaeda has made some unsavory Islamist groups seem mild in comparison, it is not true that they share the same agenda. (I have an article coming out in a few weeks that explains what I mean, so I won’t steal my own thunder here.) It is also not quite true that al-Qaeda wants to remove religious minorities from Muslim-majority countries; they want them firmly under Islamic rule. Still, al-Qaeda does seek cultural purity in the Muslim world and Breivik sees it as a model for what he hopes to inspire others to do in Europe.

Strikingly, Breivik countenances working with al-Qaeda or other Muslim organizations and states that violently oppose European and American hegemony “if we feel that conventional approaches are fruitless or if the intelligence agencies/system protectors working for the Western European regimes successfully manage to neutralise our long term efforts to liberate our countries.”  Under such circumstances, he recommends working with these organizations or states to acquire weapons of mass destruction to deploy in “European capitals and other high priority locations.”  (In addition to al-Qaeda, he mentions al-Shabab and Iran as possible candidates.)

Breivik acknowledges two problems with this approach.  First, how do organizations or states with profoundly diverging interests agree to give Breivik’s colleagues high-end weaponry for an attack against a high-end target in Europe?  Breivik’s answer is that their interests are not that different.  He and his fellow travelers do not wish to destroy Islam but “simply to isolate it primarily outside Europe.”  He also supports the establishment of a caliphate as long as it does not encroach on Europe.  Since the primary interest of Muslim groups and states violently opposed to European and American hegemony is the end of that hegemony in Muslim-majority countries, Breivik believes carrying out a cooperative WMD attack in Europe would go a long way toward accomplishing both sides’ goals.

The second problem Breivik acknowledges is the lack of trust between his colleagues and Muslim organizations or states.  This trust can be established, Brevik asserts, by performing a “great sacrifice.”  He suggests one of the following options to his colleagues: “surgically remove his penis and testicles and/or execute a fixed number of civilian children.”  Such a great sacrifice should be sufficient to convince one’s Muslim interlocutors that he is serious and not a spy.  (Or that he is completely insane.)

Breivik admits that collaboration of this sort is unlikely but he believes that if things get desperate enough for his colleagues, they will be willing to entertain such a measure.  Both sides need each other.  European patriots, he argues, would have an easier time deploying WMD in Europe than Muslim organizations or states would.  Conversely, European patriots do not have the safe havens necessary to construct such weapons whereas Muslim organizations and states do.

I have not seen evidence that would lead me to believe that al-Qaeda or al-Shabab could ideologically accept working with someone like Breivik, although stranger things have happened. The more pragmatic Iran may be open to it in theory since it would give them plausible deniability. But in practice they likely have their own agents in Europe who could carry out such an attack, which is itself extremely unlikely unless there is an attack on Iran.  Nevertheless, it is chilling that someone as dangerous and heartless as Breivik–a WMD himself–entertained the notion of becoming a proxy for others and that he has urged his radical readership to do likewise–a readership that doubtless now numbers in the thousands, as Breivik had hoped.

Alleged Claim for Oslo Attacks

This was posted by Abu Sulayman al-Nasir to the Arabic jihadi forum, Shmukh, around 10:30am EST (thread 118187).  Shmukh is the main forum for Arabic-speaking jihadis who support al-Qaeda.  Since the thread is now inaccessible (either locked or taken down), I am posting it here.  I don’t have time at the moment to translate the whole thing but I translated the most important bits on twitter.

Update: Abu Sulayman has now issued a retraction, stating clearly that “Helpers” was not involved in the operation and that his statement was not an official statement. He says those who carried out the attacks “must surely be known to all.”

Update2: “Surely known to all” apparently means a right-wing Norwegian extremist who likes World of Warcraft and Dexter.

الحمد لله ناصر عباده الموحدين ومذل اهل الشرك والكفر اجمعين والصلاة والسلام على نبينا محمد خاتم النبيين وعلى اله وصحبه اجمعين وبعد
قال تعالى : (فَقَاتِلْ فِي سَبِيلِ اللّهِ لاَ تُكَلَّفُ إِلاَّ نَفْسَكَ وَحَرِّضِ الْمُؤْمِنِينَ عَسَى اللّهُ أَن يَكُفَّ بَأْسَ الَّذِينَ كَفَرُواْ وَاللّهُ أَشَدُّ بَأْساً وَأَشَدُّ تَنكِيلاً) [النساء : 84]
فها قد وصلت دول اوروبا رسالة اخرى من المجاهدين واثبات اخر لدول اوربا ان المجاهدين لن يقفوا مكتوفي الايدي تجاه حربهم ضد الاسلام والمسلمين.
واليوم قد تم استهداف النرويج لتكون درسا وعبرة لباقي دول اوروبا وقد سبق ان هددنا منذ غزوة ستوكهولم بمزيد من العمليات وقد طالبنا دول اوروبا بسحب جيوشها من ارض افغانستان وايقاف حربها ضد الاسلام والمسلمين ونكرر تحذيرنا مجددا لدول اوروبا ونقول لهم نفذوا مطالب المجاهدين فما ترونه ليس سوى البداية والقادم اكثر من ذلك.
اما عن اسباب استهداف النرويج فهي كثيرة اهمها مشاركتها في احتلال افغانستان والاساءة لنبينا الكريم محمد(صلى الله عليه وسلم).
فالحمد لله ان مكن لعباده الموحدين ..وندعو الله ان يحفظ اخواننا ومجاهدينا في كل مكان.
سبحانك اللهم وبحمدك اشهد ان لا اله الا انت استغرك واتوب اليك.

ابو سليمان الناصر
من انصار الجهاد العالم

 

Sign of the Times

A cleric who was very popular among the 9/11 hijackers and jihadis in North Africa, Muhammad al-Fazazi, is now causing a stir with an article he published in Hespress. The following passage addressed to a secular critic is particularly aggravating his former fan club:

I am now in the same trench with the king [of Morocco] fighting the enemies of God and the nation on all sides, including associates like yours who are homosexuals, eat during Ramadan, and advocate apostasy.  You pick a fight with the government and still do not understand that I accept the establishment of an Islamic party if it offers assurances. I may join the Justice and Development Party–the party you hate for no other reason than it is Islamic.

Shmukh forum member abuhamza rightly observes that Fazazi previously considered parliamentary politics to be heresy. “His words now resemble the words of the secularists and the Brotherhood.”

Fazazi’s sentiments may be off putting to some but they are the words of a religious conservative getting involved in parliamentary politics.  A sign of the times.

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