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Apocalypse Delayed

Today, Turkish-backed rebels took another small town in their relentless march to secure northern Syria from ISIS and the Kurds. The news of Dabiq’s fall would be unremarkable—the final battle lasted hours and the casualties were low—but for the fact that ISIS spent the last two years proclaiming the town to be the site of an End-of-Days showdown with the infidels. This isn’t quite what the group had in mind.

ISIS’ spirit animal, Abu Musab al-Zarqawi, first signaled the importance of Dabiq a decade ago when he cited an ancient Islamic prophecy about a meadow outside the town. There, Muslims would fight a “great battle” against the infidels (a separate prophecy says they would number eighty nations, each ten thousand strong). Although two-thirds of the Muslims would flee or die, the remainder would go on to conquer the eastern Roman capital of Constantinople. Zarqawi proclaimed that the fire he had ignited in Iraq would blaze a trail to the apocalyptic showdown in Dabiq.

As I document in my book, the Islamic State did not emphasize the Dabiq prophecy until 2014 when it began to gobble up territory in northern Syria. In April, the ISIS spokesman listed the town among others that were promised to fall to the Muslims’ End-Times armies. In July, ISIS released its first English-language magazine, which it named Dabiq after the town. A few weeks later, the group captured the town itself.

ISIS propaganda immediately began daring its enemies to take the town. In October 2014, it released a video of European jihadists quoting the prophecy from a hilltop overlooking the town. “We are waiting for you in Dabiq,” challenged Abu Abdullah from Britain. “Try, try to come and we will kill every single soldier.”

After the United State and its allies began bombing ISIS in August, its followers on Twitter were sure the prophesied battle was upon them. “Thirty states remain to complete the number of eighty [nations] that will gather in Dabiq and begin the battle,” tweeted one. In November, ISIS’ executioner, Mohammed Emwazi, beheaded Peter Kassig in Dabiq, saying, “Here we are, burying the first American Crusader in Dabiq, eagerly waiting for the remainder of your armies to arrive.”

But by the spring of 2015, the group’s confidence began to soften under the coalition’s relentless aerial assault. Issue 8 of Dabiq magazine floated the idea that the fulfillment of the prophecy would be delayed if the coalition didn’t invade and fight the group in Dabiq. Instead, another prophecy about the Romans making and breaking a truce with the Muslims might be operative.

Still, as late as May 2015, ISIS’ leader Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi assured his followers that the final battles of the apocalypse were upon them. They could not help but be victorious because prophesy had so decreed.

When the Turkish-held noose tightened around Dabiq over the past few weeks, ISIS’ followers began to frantically explain why the approaching showdown in Dabiq would not be THE showdown. Well, the expected Mahdi, a messiah figure, had not yet appeared to lead the battle. Or the required eighty nation coalition had not rolled into town. In the past few days, ISIS’ own newsletter tried to downplay the significance of the town’s coming fall. The “great battle” will come to pass because God has promised it would; but this isn’t that battle because all the other preceding prophecies haven’t come to pass. Never mind that ISIS neglected to mention those other prophecies in its earlier hyping of Dabiq. Days later, the town fell with little resistance.

It’s easy to conclude that ISIS’ leaders cited the prophesy cynically. They played it up when it was to their advantaged and downplayed it when it was not. That may be the case, as I wrote in my book. But another theory I offered is that ISIS, like other apocalyptic groups, changes its understanding of prophecy’s fulfillment based on circumstances. We won’t know for sure which interpretation is right until we hear high-level defectors or discover internal documents bearing on the matter.

Regardless, the current spin offered by ISIS and its followers is further evidence that things aren’t going so well for the group. Gone is the proud boasting that accompanied the early citations of the prophecy in 2014. Now its fulfillment is a distant hope to sustain the weary during constant setbacks, much the same tone Zarqawi used when he first cited it. With the fall of the prophesied caliphate on the horizon, expect more of the same spin soon.

ISIS and Israel

[Jihadica is pleased to welcome Dana Hadra. You can find her on Twitter @dhadra20. -ed.]

 

On October 23, 2015, ISIS released its first video in Hebrew addressing “the Jews occupying Muslim lands.” “Not one Jew will remain in Jerusalem,” a masked ISIS member warns. “Do what you want in the meantime, but then we will make you pay ten times over.” This video is the latest in a string of statements made by ISIS threatening to invade Israel and slaughter its citizens.

Does ISIS’s rhetoric match its strategic reality? Does it really have its sights set on Israel?

To be sure, Israel has seen an uptick in ISIS activity along its southern border in recent months. In July 2015 ISIS’s Egyptian affiliate “Wilayat Sinai” claimed responsibility for three rockets that exploded in southern Israel. The Gaza-based jihadist organization Sheikh Omar Hadid Brigade, which might have ties to ISIS, launched a rocket attack on the Israeli port city of Ashdod in May 2015.

ISIS itself makes the occasional threat. In February 2008, for example, Abu Omar al-Baghdadi, then leader of the al-Qaeda affiliated Islamic State of Iraq (ISI), announced his intention to oversee “the liberation of Al-Aqsa,” stating, “…we ask God and hope that the [Islamic State of Iraq] will be the cornerstone for the return of Jerusalem.” In widely circulated videos released in June 2014, an ISIS member states that Anbar is “only a stone’s throw away from Al-Aqsa Mosque.” In another video message released in July 2015, ISIS members threaten to “uproot the state of Jews,” which will be “run over by our [ISIS] creeping crowds.”  More recently, ISIS released a series of videos encouraging Palestinians to engage in lone wolf attacks against Jews. “Bring back horror to the Jews with explosions, burnings, and stabbings,” says one ISIS militant in a propaganda video, circulated with the hashtag “#The_slaughter_of_ Jews.”

Despite its threats, ISIS tanks won’t be rolling into the Holy Land anytime soon. Overthrowing the Israeli government is not a pressing priority for the ISIS high command. It’s more interested in taking over Sunni lands where state authority has broken down. Dabiq, ISIS’s English-language magazine, summarizes its strategy: weaken Muslim governments through terrorism, thereby creating security vacuums (literally, “chaos” or tawahhush). ISIS fighters will move in and  establish new state-like structures (idarat). So far, ISIS has stuck to this plan; its fighters are most active and successful in areas where there is a security void. Israel, which has one of the mightiest militaries in the Middle East, is the opposite of a security void.

Theologically, the defeat of Israel is also a low priority. Unusual for a Sunni group, ISIS is motivated by Islamic prophecies of the End Times—or at least pays a lot of lip service to them. Those prophecies envisage the conquest of Jerusalem and a war with the Jews as the final act in the End Times drama. ISIS is still in the first act, the reestablishment of the caliphate. It still has to spread the caliphate throughout the world and defeat the Christian infidels.

So despite its combative messaging, ISIS’s threats to storm Israel are empty, meant to recruit Muslims angry about the occupation rather than signal an invasion. ISIS is focused on consolidating its state and expanding it into Sunni Muslim lands; its gaze will remained fixed on Jerusalem but it won’t try to plant its flag there anytime soon.

Why Is ISIS So Bad?

Why is ISIS bad? It’s a basic question that I encounter a lot, along with the related question, why is ISIS so evil?

Good and evil are value judgments, so everyone will have a different opinion about what deserves the labels. But we can at least say that ISIS (aka the Islamic State) is out of step with mainstream morality in most Muslim and non-Muslim countries.

Still, that begs the question: why is ISIS so bad relative to mainstream culture? The answer lies in ISIS’s needs and desires.

  • ISIS wants to revive parts of Islamic scripture written in the early Middle Ages. Perhaps those parts reflected mainstream morality then but they’re out of step with today’s mainstream.
  • ISIS wants to terrify the local population to subdue it. As you’ll see in my book, ISIS could govern and fight differently but it doesn’t think the alternatives are effective.
  • ISIS needs to raise money, which is hard to do legally when everyone wants to destroy you.
  • ISIS needs to excite young men to fight for its cause. Sex and violence is one way to do it.

Most of what ISIS does arises from one or more of those needs and desires. They combine to motivate some of ISIS’s worst atrocities, like slavery, destroying and looting antiquities, and beheadings.

ISIS atrocities 9-15-2015 (2)

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

For more on what motivates ISIS, read The ISIS Apocalypse: The History, Strategy, and Doomsday Vision of the Islamic State.

Baghdadi’s Family Tree

Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi, the leader of the Islamic State and self-proclaimed caliph, claims to be a descendant of Muhammad. That’s not surprising since most Sunni Muslims believe only a descendant from Muhammad’s tribe can be caliph. What makes Baghdadi’s lineage interesting is that he claims to descend from Muhammad through ten of the twelve Shi`i imams. That’s an unusual and sadly ironic genealogy for a man hellbent on eradicating the Shia. I mention Baghdadi’s genealogy in passing in my profile of him but you can read a fuller discussion of it in my forthcoming book, ISIS Apocalypse. There you’ll learn about the apocalyptic prophecies that his pedigree supposedly fulfills.

Baghdadi's family tree

New Abbottabad Documents

In the course of the Abid Naseer trial, the U.S.  Department of Justice released several documents recovered from the raid on Bin Laden’s Abbottabad compound. As I did with the Abbottabad documents released to West Point’s Combating Terrorism Center, I have cataloged the new documents and created a handlist with links to translations and originals.

The reference numbers in brackets are keyed to the original Arabic texts to avoid confusion. In the course of preparing the handlist, I noticed that two of the translations were attached to the wrong documents (translations of 424 and 432 were switched). I also saw that item 404 is actually three separate letters, none of which is translated (I split the document into three labeled a, b, c). If anyone wants to type up the documents and translate them, I’ll post your work here.

Of the authors and recipients, Sultan al-`Abdali “Qattal” al-Jadawi is unknown to me so I’m not sure if I transliterated his name properly.

  • Date: al-Sabt 7 Rabi al-Akhir 1430 (3? April 2009), From: Abu Bashir al-Najdi, To: Bin Laden, (Ar) [404-10-CR-019-S-4-RJD (a)]
  • Date: 7 Rabi al-Akhir 1430 (3? April 2009), From: Sultan al-`Abdali (aka “Qattal” al-Jadawi), To: Bin Laden (aka al-Walid (“the father”)), (Ar) [404-10-CR-019-S-4-RJD (b)]
  • Date: al-Sabt 7 Rabi al-Akhir 1430 (3? April 2009), From: ِ`Abd Allah b. `Umar al-Qurashi (aka Abu Damdam al-Qurashi), To: Bin Laden, (Ar) [404-10-CR-019-S-4-RJD (c)]
  • Date: ca. May 2010, From: Bin Laden, To: al-Hajj `Uthman, (Eng) (Ar) [426-10-CR-019-S-4-RJD] [date and author based on reference to letter by son Khalid]
  • Date: ca. May 2010, From: Bin Laden (aka Zmaray), To: al-Shaykh Yunis, (Eng) (Ar) [424-10-CR-019-S-4-RJD] [date based on similarities to Hajj `Uthman letter]
  • Date: 7 Rajab 1431 (19 June 2010), From: `Atiyya (aka Mahmud), To: Bin Laden (aka Abu `Abd Allah), (Eng) (Ar) [420-10-CR-019-S-4-RJD]
  • Date: al-Sabt 5 Sha`ban 1431 (17 July 2010), From: `Atiyya (aka Mahmud), To: Bin Laden (aka Abu `Abd Allah), (Eng) (Ar) [422-10-CR-109-S-4-RJD]
  • Date: al-Jum`a 26 Sha`ban 1431 (6 August 2010), From: Bin Laden (aka Zmaray), To: `Atiyya (aka Mahmud), (Eng) (Ar) [432-10-CR-019-S-4-RJD
  • Date: al-Thulatha’ Dhu al-Hijja 1431 (23 November 2010), From: `Atiyya (aka Mahmud), To: Bin Laden (aka Abu `Abd Allah), (Eng) (Ar) [428-10-CR-019-S-4-RJD]
  • Date: al-Sabt Awa’il Jumada al-Ula 1432 (5 May 2011), From: `Atiyya (aka Mahmud), To: Bin Laden (aka Shaykhuna (“our Shaykh”)), (Eng) (Ar) [430-10-CR-019-S-4-RJD]
  • Date: Unknown, From: Unknown, To: Unknown, (Eng) (Ar) [403-10-CR-019-S-4-RJD]

 

 

 

 

Office Space

Earlier this week, the AP’s Rukmini Callimachi revealed one of the memos she discovered in the sixth trashbag full of AQIM documents she collected in the aftermath of the French attack on jihadis in Timbuktu in January. The memo, dated October 2012, is from the shura council of AQIM to the shura council of the Masked Brigade, a subsidiary of AQIM at the time. Until October 2012, the Masked Brigade had been run by Mokhtar Belmokhtar, the most infamous jihadi in Africa. We previously knew that AQIM leadership had removed Belmokhtar from his position in that month, afterwhich he established his own group, the Blood Signers left to run the Masked Brigade as a separate organization. But we did not specifically know why AQIM had taken its decision until now.

The memo is AQIM’s response to a letter sent by the Masked Brigade that criticized AQIM leadership and recommened a course correction. For AQIM’s leadership, the letter was a final act of insubordination in a long history of such behavior by Belmokhtar, which they recount in scathing detail.

Several things stood out:

  • Belmokhtar wanted to sever his group from AQIM and pledge allegience directly to AQ Central. In addition to being a play for more autonomy, the move calls to mind the recent attempt of Nusra to get out from under AQ Iraq’s control and pledge allegience directly to Zawahiri. Combined with Shabab infighting over leadership and appeals to Zawahiri to intervene, the three episodes suggest that AQ Central does not have a firm hand on the reins.
  • Zawahiri is hard to reach. In rebuffing Belmokhtar’s desire to pledge allegience directly to Zawahiri, AQIM’s leadership explains that it would do nothing to elicit more attention from AQ Central because the organization rarely communicates with AQIM as it is. AQIM states that they have received just a few letters from Bin Laden and Zawahiri and a handful from Atiyya and Abu Yahya al-Libi, “despite our multiple letters to them for them to deal with us effectively in managing jihad here.”
  • Al-Qaeda is run like a business or government agency. As long-time AQ watchers know, Bin Laden established orderly administrative procedures for conducting the business of terror. AQIM’s memo is one more window into how the adminisrative machinery functions. The leadership gripes at Belmokhtar for not filing expense reports, not playing well with the other vice presidents (ie emirs) in the region, and not returning headquarter’s phone calls.
  • Even if jihadis recognize Internet communication is compromised, they still do it. The memo from the Masked Brigade to AQIM reminds AQIM’s leaders that they should not try to communicate with their subordinates over the Internet, referencing a message from Zawahiri saying the same (anyone know if this letter was public?). AQIM’s leadership retorts by observing that Belmokhtar is the one who is carelessly communicating with Internet forum administrators (they mention Ansar al-Mujahideen forum in particular) and airing AQIM’s dirty laudry to the media.
  • Spectacular attacks can be motivated by petty infighting. It is natural to look to a group’s ideology and strategy first when explaining a sudden change in attack patterns. This year’s attack on the gas fields in Algeria elicited just such commentary. While such explainations paint part of the picture, the AQIM memo suggests infighting can also be a big motivation for action and target selection. According to the memo, Belmokhtar criticized AQIM’s leadership for not carrying out any “spectacular military action” over the last decade despite having the resources and permission to do so. AQIM turns this charge back on Belmokhtar, saying that he was the one who was charged with carrying out such attacks. Belmokhtar answered by carrying out the spectacular attack on the Algerian gas field three months later.
  • Something is brewing in Libya. AQIM and Belmokhtar trade barbs over who was the first to try and consolidate jihadi groups fighting in Libya. I’ll leave it to folks like Clint Watts and Andrew Lebovich to surmise how successful AQIM and Belmokhtar have been in that endeavor. I’d only note that in the midst of their success in Mali last year, AQIM was already looking over the horizon at Libya as the next theater. If the jihadis in Mali continue to be squeezed by the French and others, they may head northeast.

Jabhat al-Nusra: A Self-Professed AQ Affiliate

[Jihadica is pleased to welcome a guest post from Charles Lister (Charles_Lister), a London-based terrorism and insurgency analyst. The views expressed below are entirely his own and do not represent those of his employer.]

An article recently released by EA Worldview claims to refute the widespread belief that Jabhat al-Nusra (JN) is an al-Qaeda affiliate; rather, it is a “local faction” in the Syrian insurgency that respects al-Qaeda but maintains its autonomy. According to EA Worldview, when JN’s leader, al-Golani, recently renewed his oath of allegiance (bay`a) to al-Qaeda leader Ayman al-Zawahiri on April 10th, it was merely a formal nod of respect without significance for command and control.

EA Worldview’s interpretation of Golani’s oath of allegiance is wrong & here’s why:

(more…)

Attacking Oil Installations

To give some ideological context for the jihadi hostage-taking at the Algerian gas facility, readers might be interested in two jihadi documents on the permissibility and advisability of attacking oil installations. Such attacks are not universally popular in jihadi circles–even Bin Laden vacillated on this point–because they harm the local economy, which alienates the Muslim public. But some jihadis have argued that there are upsides as well.

One such jihadi is `Abd Allah b. Nasir al-Rashid, who wrote a fatwa explaining the benefits of attacking oil installations:

  •  It harms the infidels’ economy by raising oil prices.
  • Although this rise in oil prices is good for apostate Arab countries that produce oil, the rise in prices makes the infidels dislike those countries more.
  • States and companies have to dedicate more resources to protecting oil infrastructure.
Another is Abu Bakr Naji, who offers the following in his Management of Savagery:
  • Attacking an oil installation causes the local government to commit more resources to protecting oil infrastructure. That means there will be less financial and human resources available to guard against jihadi incursions into undergoverned spaces. (p.19)
  • It harms the American economy. (p.41)
  • Kidnapping an infidel working at the oil installation can be a great way to publicize your cause. (p.43)
It’s worth noting that both authors admit attacks on local oil infrastructure carry a significant risk of alienating Muslims; thus, the tactic should be used with care. Naji in particular explains what criticisms the jihadis will face and how they should blunt them.

Shabab and al-Qaeda Infighting (or Game of Thrones, Somali Style)

The most high-profile foreign fighter in Shabab, Omar Hammami, published two documents online yesterday detailing splits among Shabab’s leaders. Clint Watts has the scoop. Last night, I helped Clint read through the longer of the two Arabic documents and here were some things that struck me:

  • Global vs. Local: Hammami uses “Ansar” (“Helpers”) for Somali jihadis and “Muhajirun” (“Emigrants”) for foreign fighters, which hearkens back to the distinction between Ansar and Muhajirs in Medina. The Ansar are divided between those who support the global jihad of al-Qaeda and those with a more local focus. He portrays the Muhajirs in Somalia as uniformly “globalist.”
  • Oath of Allegience: On the one hand, Hammami claims that Godane, the current leader of the Shabab and the architect of its merger with al-Qaeda, has a lofty view of al-Qaeda:  “[Godane] said that an oath of allegiance to al-Qaeda is tantamount to an oath of allegiance to the caliphate” (bay`at al-qa`ida bi-nafsi mathabati bay`at al-khilafa). On the other hand, Hammami argues that those who gave their bay`a to al-Qaeda later felt tricked by Godane into doing so and that Godane used the merger to isolate his rivals and silence his critics among the foreign fighters. Read Clint’s post for details.
  • Game of Thrones: Clint suggested that the best pop culture lens for viewing Shabab infighting is Game of Thrones. Case in point, much of the dispute between the two principal powers in the Shabab, Godane and Robow, centers on protecting their geographical bases of support from one another.
My takeaway as an analyst: Understanding the historical roots of terminology or concepts will only get you so far. What matters more is how actors use those concepts to articulate their aspirations for power.

US Embassy Protests

Update 9/21/2012: Here’s a Foreign Affairs essay I wrote about the roll of Salafis in the riots.

Below are some thoughts I shared with a friend this morning who asked about the protests. I had to edit one pretty heavily in light of the events of the past few hours, and I’m sure I’ll have to revise them again in the coming weeks given how confusing everything is right now. If I’ve made any egregious errors in well-established facts, please let me know here or on twitter and I’ll update it.

1.     Who’s behind the film? A Coptic Christian living in California who claimed to be an Israeli-American. Other Coptic Christians living in the US promoted the film on their Arabic websites and also enlisted the support of Terry Jones (ie Qur’an burner).

2.     How did the film get to the Arab world? An Egyptian channel supervised by a Salafi cleric (Muhammad al-Zughbi) was the first to broadcast clips of the obscure film, which it likely obtained from YouTube. The Egyptian commentators on the news channel seem to be Islamists of the Muslim Brotherhood variety, if we can stereotype from appearances (short, full beards, suits and ties). I was told by a reporter that the host, Shaykh Khalid Abdullah, caters to Salafis (ie Sunni puritans). Consider him the equivalent of the usual Fox news commentators, finding obscure insults to their religion to fire up their conservative viewers.

3.     Who’s behind the protests? It’s not clear yet who organized them but Salafis and Ikhwanis in Egypt seem to have fanned the flames. Soccer hooligans and anarchists were also in the mix. Once news of their protests made it to twitter, facebook and satellite TV, it was only a matter of time before they spread.

4.     Who will be targeted for retaliation? Copts are going to be a major target in Egypt, and anyone associated with the production of this film in the US is likely going to be targeted by Islamist terrorist organizations. Perhaps Israelis will be targeted too if it doesn’t get out that the director lied about his Israeli identity. YouTube/Google might also be targeted for carrying the film clips. As for the attacks on the US embassies, the protesters blame the United States for the film because many Arabs don’t understand how we treat free speech; they believe we have the power to censor films as is done in Arab countries or proscribe them with hate speech laws like those in Europe.

5.     Is this just about the film? The film was the trigger, and most of those protesting are furious about it, whether they’ve seen it or not. Sabb al-nabi (insulting the Prophet) is bad, bad stuff in classical Islamic law (it’ll get you killed). But there are other things at play too, like public discontent with the slow pace of reforms and prominent officials and firebrands stirring the pot out of conviction or for more cynical reasons.

6.     What’s al-Qaeda going to do? This is a major win for AQ. Protesters (some unwittingly it seems) are flying the AQ flag (specifically the Islamic State of Iraq’s flag) as _the_ flag of protest. Jihadis everywhere are celebrating this symbolic victory. If AQ was also involved in the killing of the ambassador, it’s a major operational victory. The fact that they are now shaping events in the more stable Arab Spring countries, in addition to their prominent profiles in the Yemeni and Syrian insurgencies, is a huge shot in the arm for the jihadi movement. They will try to capitalize on the Muhammad film by vowing to undertake revenge attacks on those responsible for its distribution. They will certainly blame the United States and perhaps Google/YouTube for not shutting it down.

7.     What does this all mean going forward? If we’ve learned one thing during the Arab Spring, it’s the demonstration effect of large protests. People in the Arab world have now seen that the US embassies can be targeted with impunity for slights to Muhammad originating in the United States. There will certainly be more slights because “anti-jihad” Christian extremists in the United States and Europe will be all too happy to stir the pot, particularly after they’ve seen what can be achieved with such a shabby film.  That being the case, we can expect more protests like these. New Islamist governments like the one in Egypt will have to be careful how they thread the needle. They have to strongly condemn known insults to Muhammad, and they can’t afford to curtail popular anger too much lest it be turned on them. But they’ve also got to be careful about alienating the United States.

8.     Is there a silver lining? The reaction of Libyan citizens to the US ambassador’s death was pretty remarkable. Perhaps citizens in other countries will be moved to demonstrate similar solidarity with Americans against religious extremism of all stripes. Moreover, Obama’s unscripted, not-an-ally statement got positive results out of Egypt. I’d love to see more of the same to remind the more belligerent of the new governments that they should not take US support for granted.

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