ji·had·ica

The Non-Strategic “Special Strategic Study”

Scott Sanford July 22, 2009

The “Falluja Think Tank” recently published the “Special Strategic Study of the Global Battle and the Jihadi Movement’s Place in It.” Like Thomas, I had high expectations, but was disappointed in the end because the study amounted to little more than general summaries of U.S. and jihadi history. However, the author did state that divine providence allowed 9/11 to happen, which caused the U.S. to abandon its principles of democracy and human rights.

The author started by establishing that the battle between the United States and the jihadis is religious in nature rather than geopolitical or for acquiring resources. He commented that today’s “crusaders” are not only supported by their governments, but also by the “dogmatists” like the Knights Templar and the Knights of Malta, who, he claimed, “resemble the mujahedeen because they fight for faith.”

He went on to chart America’s “path” to global dominance and then gave a history of the jihadi movement from colonialism until now. He broke the “Jihadi Path” into four distinct phases. The first was the “Popular Jihad” against colonialism that was marked by Moroccan ‘Abd-al-Karim al-Khattabi allegedly killing 25,000 “crusader” troops and capturing 20,000 others, including 95 generals and five marshals. I am not very familiar with Moroccan history, but the numbers sound highly exaggerated.

The second phase was the “Local Jihad” (الجهاد القطري) against the ruling regimes allied with the West, i.e. the near enemy. He made a point to exclude Hamas and the Moro Islamic Front because they deviated from the proper jihadi ideology.

The third phase was the “Regional Jihad,” which was the result of oppression at home that sent the jihadis elsewhere. He stated that Afghanistan was the ideal model for this because jihadis could go there, receive training, and go on to other battle fronts. He mentioned that jihadis still aid Kashmir, Somalia, the Philippines, Kosovo, Burma, and other places as well.

Finally, the fourth phase is the “Global Jihad,” which sprang from the “crusader invasion of the Arabian Peninsula” in 1990.

The meeting point of the American and jihadi paths, according to the author, was al-Qaeda drawing the U.S. into an asymmetrical conflict where al-Qaeda’s “stupid technology” (تكنلوجيا الجهل), i.e. suicide bombers, could check American technological superiority. September 11th marked the beginning of this conflict.

The author then identified two paths to victory for the jihadi movement. The first is the continuance and completion of the historical path already laid out through the previously stated four phases, while the second path is converting the West to Islam. I believe it is unlikely that either path will come to fruition. However, I have concluded that if the entire West were to convert to Islam, it should convert to Shi’a Islam in order to study the jihadi reaction.

In conclusion, the author stated that it was God’s will for 9/11 to happen because if the jihadis had conducted a nuclear attack, the whole world would be against them. However, the knee-jerk U.S. response to 9/11 and the human rights issues it raised allowed the U.S. to destroy itself without al-Qaeda taking the blame. He stated:

“If we substituted the 9/11 plan for the plan of targeting American nuclear reactors that al-Qaeda planners had previously abolished, its massive destructive damage could have reached a degree of existential disaster. If we were to have done that, America would be completely forgotten. However, the entire world would hate us for what we did to the exemplary system for human life and we would become enemies of the freedom and justice that America represents in the eyes of the people. It was God’s wisdom that struck America on its skull causing it to agitate, provoke, and anger without a care, exchanging the principle of peaceful coexistence in the shadow of the United Nations for the principle of either you are with us or against us. It caused America to substitute the principle of respecting sovereignty and referring to the Security Council for a principle of occupying two countries without physical evidence, and to exchange spreading democracy around the world to rejecting the votes of Palestinians who elected Hamas. His wisdom caused America to exchange the system of trade globalization for a system of occupying sources of raw materials, and to replace the principle of defending general freedoms and respecting human rights for the principles of Abu-Ghraib, Guantanamo, and secret prisons.”

While the “Special Strategic Study” was somewhat disappointing, the author does underline the importance, for the jihadis, of defeating America’s image abroad as a symbol of freedom. He also points out that the best way to defeat this symbol is to provoke America into destroying its own reputation. However, the author inadvertently highlights a jihadi weakness in that the jihadi ideology is too weak to destroy and replace American ideals. Only America can do that.

Shishani on Salafi-Jihadism in the Levant

Scott Sanford July 2, 2009

On 29 June 2009, the Jordanian journalist Murad Batal al-Shishani published an article in al-Hayat titled “Salafi–Jihadism: A New Face in Jordan, Lebanon, and Syria’s Palestinian Camps.” The article talks about the new generation of “neo-Zarqawis” and the increasing radicalization of Palestinian refugees. This radicalisation, he argues, stems from the failure to resolve the Arab-Israeli Conflict, the deterioration of the PLO and its control over the refugee camps, the political ramifications of the Fatah-Hamas conflict, and rising poverty and unemployment. Al-Shishani states that attacks such as the 2008 incident in Jordan where Thaer al-Wahidi, a refugee from the al-Baq’ah refugee camp, assaulted a Lebanese classical music troupe, are emblematic of this phenomenon.

Al-Shishani argues that the Salafi-jihadi ideology in the refugee camps has come in three phases. The first was the establishment of the ideology in the mid-1980s. The establishment of ‘Usbat al-Ansar in the Ain al-Hilweh refugee camp in southern Lebanon was typical of this phase. According to al-Shishani, this period witnessed the beginning of nationalist groups using Islamic slogans and the establishment of Hamas and the Islamic Jihad.

Al-Shishani writes that the second phase was when the Salafi-jihadis started playing a larger role in sheltering and training non-Palestinian Salafi-jihadis. Al-Shishani cited the 2003 bombing of the McDonalds in Lebanon by the Yemeni Muammar al-Awami as an example of this development.

According to al-Shishani, the third phase is when the Salafi-jihadi ideology becomes the primary ideology for Palestinian youth in the camps. This phase is occurring now,  as individuals and small groups are increasingly taking up the ideology. Al-Shishani states that the members of this new generation “are described as ‘neo-Zarqawis,’” and are the legacy of the Levantine Salafi-jihadi current that Abu Musab al-Zarqawi started in his Afghan training camp in 2000. They believe the route to Israel is through Iraq. Al-Shishani maintains that this trend is regional, centering on Iraq, Syria, Jordan, and Lebanon, and it rejects the Salafi-jihadism of Abu Muhammad al-Maqdisi (more on the al-Maqdisi dispute here and here).

In describing the Salafi-jihadi situation in Jordan, al-Shishani states that the refugee camp in Irbid has become a transit point for foreign fighters headed to Iraq and this is important because commentators normally associate Salafi-jihadism in Jordan with the cities of Zarqa, Salt, and Maan in addition to Palestinians not living in camps and East Jordanians. According to al-Shishani, Irbid is where the leader of al-Wahidi’s cell, Shakir ‘Umar al-Khatib, recruited al-Wahidi and called on Palestinians to join “the fighters in Iraq and Lebanon.”

For Lebanon, al-Shishani agrees with Omayma Abdel-Latif, a research associate at the Carnegie Endowment’s Middle East Center, that Lebanon is “fertile ground” for radical Salafi organizations. The lack of official Lebanese control over the camps, due to a previous agreement between Palestinian factions and the Lebanese government, compounds this threat.

Unfortunately, due to the lack of information, al-Shishani does not provide many details of the situation in Syria except to say that there have been clashes between militants in the Yarmuk refugee camp and the Syrian government.

The study of Salafi-jihadism in the Levant often takes a backseat to that of Iraq and AfPak, and to that of Hamas and Hezbollah, but, as al-Shishani indicates, the ideology does have a persistent and dangerous following in the region. If the modicum of stability that Iraq currently enjoys holds after the US withdrawal, the next logical endpoint for the neo-Zarqawis would be the Palestinian Territories, where they could act as spoilers to any possible peace initiatives.

“The Iran Crisis and Its Effects on the Global Jihad”

Scott Sanford June 23, 2009

How will the Iran debacle affect al-Qaida? This was the question raised yesterday in a short strategic study titled “The Iran Crisis and Its Effects on the Global Jihad by Abu al-Fadl Madi (أبو الفضل ماضي), a Falluja forum member with so-called “great writer” status. He briefly outlined the situation in Iran claiming that the protests mark the end of the second period in Iran’s modern history, with the first ending in 1989. He called the new period the “Termination of the Rule of the Jurisprudent Theory.” He argued that the crisis could alter regional “balances, priorities, and strategies” and the “Global Jihadi Current” cannot ignore these events.

He described four possible outcomes of the Iranian protests. The first was the possibility of the regime defeating the opposition by force. He argued that this would increase Ahmadinejad’s power, giving him more leeway to negotiate with the West, but due to the protest he will fail in obtaining Western recognition of Iran as a regional and nuclear power. Abu al-Fadl believed that the West could try to help the opposition by striking Iran, which would create a 2003 Iraq-like scenario. He stated, “This is the best scenario possible for the jihadi movement” because they could benefit from the chaos and security void.

The second possibility was the opposition bringing down the current Iranian regime, which would lead to a new period of improved relations with the West. He argued that there would be better cooperation between the West and Iran on Iraq, Afghanistan, Syria, Hezbollah, Hamas, and nuclear issues. That is in addition to more cooperation with President Obama vis-à-vis the Israeli-Palestinian Peace Process. Finally, he fretted about the greater pressure al-Qaeda would face in Pakistan, Afghanistan, and Iraq. This is ostensibly the worst-case scenario for the jihadi movement.

The third option is the possibility of a stalemate between the two sides. He believed that in such a situation, not much would change for the “global jihad” and Iran would continue to support its current foreign proxies. This is also not an ideal situation for al-Qaeda espousing terrorists.

Finally, the fourth option he mentioned is the possibility of a settlement between the two sides. In this scenario, he believed that Khamenei would weaken considerably and Rafsanjani would emerge as the “Godfather of the Regime.” He estimated that Iran’s foreign policy would be more restrained and pragmatic in this scenario. Like options two and three, this option is unlikely to make the jihadi movement happy.
If, as Abu al-Fadl suggests, the geopolitical nature in the Middle East changes because of the Iran crisis, the question will become how will the jihadi movement react to the possibility of a weakened Hezbollah, Syria, or Hamas?  If the United States or Israel attacks Iran to help the protesters, handing al-Qaeda “the best scenario possible,” will the jihadi movement be strong enough to exploit that opportunity?  As events continue to develop on the ground in Iran, it will be interesting to watch the jihadis’ response.

“Fatah al-Islam between Asad al-Jihad2 and al-Maqdisi”

Scott Sanford June 8, 2009

A post by an unknown author titled, “Fatah al-Islam between Asad al-Jihad2 and al-Maqdisi / Lessons and Considerations,” has been making its rounds through the various forums. The author offered a scathing critique of Fatah al-Islam (FI) and of recent comments by FI’s Sharia Officer, Abu Abdallah al-Maqdisi (not to be confused with the Jordanian ideologue Abu Muhammad al-Maqdisi). Using statements from Asad al-Jihad2 (AJ2), who is a possible al-Qaida (AQ) leader, the author argued that FI’s leadership lacked clarity in its mission and was too afraid to attack Israel.

In considering al-Maqdisi’s statements, the author concluded that al-Maqdisi:

  1. Is not in Lebanon
  2. Is not aware of the complex relationship between the Lebanese and the Palestinian refugees living in the camps
  3. Is not aware of the “sectarian balances” in Lebanon
  4. Is not aware of the extent of Hezbollah’s state building in Lebanon

He also criticized FI for not having Lebanese Sunni priorities when the organization started in 2006. He claimed, “The Sunni aspired to reach a balance with Hezbollah and were not looking to the Israeli danger.” These accusations echoed statements by AJ2, who the author claimed grasped the full picture of the various battles in Lebanon. AJ2 stated that when FI entered Lebanon, it quickly lost Sunni support because it “began provoking and targeting the weakest party in Lebanon, which was the Sunnis in the army and internal security. It lost the support of all the Sunni at the same time because of the slaughter that took place on elements of the army, who were sleeping or separated from their weapons.”

According to AJ2, at this point, FI had two choices. 1) Eliminate its Sunni enemies and establish an emirate in Tripoli before starting clashes with Hezbollah, which controls access to Israel. 2) Transform the Sunnis into a potent fighting force supported by a wide majority. However, AJ2 reported that FI did not have the opportunity to make any choice because it clashed with security forces too soon, causing the Nahr al-Bared siege. He claimed that the other jihadi groups in Lebanon did not support FI because it had lost popular support.

AJ2 also maintained that Syria is highly active in penetrating and disrupting jihadi cells in the Levant. He claimed that Hashim Minqara, the leader of the Islamic Unification Movement, and Najib Miqati, a former prime minister of Lebanon, gave former FI leader Shakir al-‘Absi to the Syrians. He singled out Minqara alleging that he not only helped capture al-Absi, but also helped Syria penetrate the jihadi groups to further Syrian relations with the Hariri family and to gather information to sell to the US and France. He stated that Syria had unsuccessfully tried similar operations with the Islamic State of Iraq.

According to the author, al-Maqdisi’s story largely confirmed that of AJ2, but al-Maqdisi also tried “to confirm the role of Fatah al-Islam in the leadership of al-Qaida in the Levant.” However, AJ2 stated that there were no organizational links between FI and al-Qaida in the Levant (AQL).

The author then offered lessons learned from al-Maqdisi’s statements and criticisms of these lessons. The first was the limitation for recruitment from secular Palestinian organizations that are close to Syria. Al-Maqdisi claimed that after al-‘Absi was released from prison in Syria, he contacted “the brothers” and “decided to carry out the plan” and “exploit” Fatah al-Intifada, the precursor to FI. He convinced members of Fatah al-Intifada to prepare for operations against Israel from Lebanon. Accepting all nationalities, he wanted to “transform the conflict with the Jews from a Jewish-Palestinian conflict to a conflict between the Ummah and the Jews.”

The author criticized this, stating “How could have al-‘Absi expected to establish all of these complicated operations, and include Arab mujahidin, without the attention of Syrian spies, or without Syrian intelligence attempting to plant its spies within the organization?”

The second lesson was the loss of FI’s priorities. The author stated that FI started training and sending fighters to Iraq, which represented a diversion from FI’s stated aims of attacking Israel. He then mentioned a FI desire to target the entire Levant. Finally, he stated that the last FI goal was establishing an Islamic emirate in northern Lebanon. He quoted al-Maqdisi, “After easily controlling the camp and gaining the loyalty of some of the Islamic groups, there was the idea of establishing an Islamic emirate in Tripoli as the key in the battle with the Jews and to assist their brothers in Iraq. It would also attract the downtrodden Sunni in Lebanon, who raced behind Hariri the apostate. Additionally, it would be for the sake of attracting Sunnis to Syria because the tyranny of the Baath Party forced them to fear themselves.”

The author countered, “What are the priorities of the organization? Fighting the Jews, combating the Syrian regime and besieging it, or supporting the mujahidin in Iraq with trained men?” He also asked how FI thought it could fight Israel, when it was trying to open a front with Syria. He added that if the goal was to train fighters and send them to Iraq, then why cause trouble with Syria. According to the author, regardless of what FI’s goal was, it was not taking a course of action that could have achieved any goal.

The third lesson was the danger of miscalculations. According to the author al-Maqdisi said, “The Fatah al-Islam leadership did not expect the Army to enter the [Nahr] al-Bared camp. It calculated politically that the clashes would last for two days or more and then there would be calm like what happened in Ain al-Hilweh.” He claimed that that the decision to enter the camps was taken internationally because they are linked to the UN. He also thought that Lebanon’s complicated politics would forestall the Army from entering the camp and that the US hastened the decision to enter because it learned about FI’s presence in the camp, and its strategy and future goals.

The author responded with a question about why FI did not fear the repercussions of a Lebanese Army attack, but feared what would happen if they carried out an alleged plan to abduct Israelis, which essentially states that FI was too scared to attack Israel.

Finally, al-Maqdisi supposedly claimed that it is best if a group does not announce its responsibility for terrorist attacks because the enemy does not know where to respond. The author thought that the idea was bad because anyone could use the group’s name for bloody acts.

Two developments from this story will be interesting to watch in the coming months. The first is the criticism of FI, which may evolve into another incidence of jihadis bickering amongst themselves. The second is the supposed announcement of AQL. AQ has long attempted to establish a presence in the Levant and many groups have claimed to be AQ syndicates. Over a year ago, AJ2 warned that AQ would announce its presence in the Levant after the US presidential elections and it would begin attacking Israel by 2010. It appears that he is keeping his word. However, I will believe AQ is an actual presence in the Levant when I see it due to the multitude of groups in the past claiming to be AQ and the difficult operating environment in the Levant, which is largely due to the lack of ungoverned spaces on the border with Israel. Nevertheless, al-Zarqawi managed attacks in Jordan and launched rockets into Israel, so an attack is not completely out of the question.

Weekend Reading: “The Second Foreign Fighter Glut”

Scott Sanford May 29, 2009

Longtime Jihadica friend Clint Watts recently published an article at the Small Wars Journal titled, “Countering Terrorism from the Second Foreign Fighter Glut.” This article is the third in a series he has authored using data from the Sinjar records (Part 1 and Part 2 of the series). He concluded, “The key to success for future CT strategies will be the disruption of terrorist recruitment in foreign fighter source countries using a mixture of cost effective, soft power tactics to engage local, social-familial-religious networks in flashpoint cities – cities that produce a disproportionately high number of foreign fighters with respect to their overall population.” It is a good analysis and is definitely recommended reading.

Jihadi Spam

Scott Sanford May 27, 2009

On 15 May 2009, the Jihadi Brigades of Internet Incursion, which appear to be a part of the Shumukh Forums, announced a successful “incursion” of over 250,000 email addresses. Their announcement stated:

We bring good news to the Islamic Ummah of the continuation of the electronic jihadi media raids in support of the truth in a time of disgrace and shame. Your brothers in the Jihadi Brigades of Internet Incursion have targeted 265,612 email addresses belonging to citizens of the Arabian Peninsula and surrounding countries … with emails containing Usama bin Laden’s “Practical Steps to Liberate Palestine,” which the al-Sahab Foundation for Media Production published. The emails were distributed as follows:

Saudi Arabia – 102,785 emails

Egypt – 54,500 emails

Iraq – 27,222 emails

Yemen – 20,373 emails

Kuwait – 15,755 emails

Oman – 12,031 emails

Bahrain – 8,336 emails

Qatar – 6,096 emails

The announcement went on to state that the Jihadi Brigades of Internet Incursion have reached 2.6% of their targeted email addresses and membership registration for anyone wishing to join the group is still open.

I have seen this group make similar announcements in the past, but do not know who is on their email distribution list, or how effective it is. Do to the large numbers of emails, some people are likely to read the email and maybe even watched the video, but, based on the way I treat unsolicited email, I doubt that this method would be very successful in recruiting large numbers to their cause.

When Hamas is not Islamic Enough (Part 1)

Scott Sanford May 27, 2009

On 4 May 2009, Abu Yunis al-Abbasi wrote an article critiquing Hamas’s supposed “neglect” in implementing strict sharia law in Gaza. He claimed that his article was a response to a lecture that two alleged Hamas jurisprudents, Mazen Haniyah and Wael al-Zard, gave to the student council at the Islamic University in Gaza. His critique provides excellent insight into many of the issues takfiris have with Hamas since it took power in Gaza.

Al-Abbasi started his article emphatically stating, “Our demand is sharia rule, it is not a demand for implementing boundaries only,” implying Hamas is only employing partial sharia law and that will not do. He stated that sharia law is important for five reasons:

  1. Protecting Islam by punishing those who leave it with death
  2. Protecting oneself by punishing aggression with “reprisal”
  3. Protecting the mind by punishing aggression upon it with 80 lashes, an example of violating the mind is drinking alcohol
  4. Protecting honor from slander with the punishment of 80 lashes
  5. Protecting money from stealing with the punishment of amputation

Al-Abbasi claimed that a common question regarding Hamas’s use of law is, “Isn’t this implementing the provisions of sharia?” He replied that the need to ask such a question proves that Hamas is not employing full sharia law, which is “a great defect.” However, he did provide several of the examples al-Zard gave allegedly demonstrating how Hamas has employed many aspects of sharia such as “jihad and martyrdom …  steadfastness in the face of a series of struggles, and banishing drugs and debauchery.” He cited four reasons why these claims are incorrect. First, he maintained that Hamas achieved most of its accomplishments before it seized power in Gaza.  Therefore, the accomplishments could not be a result of sharia. Second, he stated that Hamas’s assertion that it was steadfast “in the face of a series of struggles” is incorrect because it is based on nationalism, not sharia. Third, in regards to Hamas and drugs, he mentioned that every government fights drugs and that Hamas is using temporal laws to fight drugs instead of God’s law. He complained that Hamas does not attempt to right the supposed other wrongs in society like makeup, unveiling, and “shameless parties.” Finally, he faulted Hamas for supposedly using many sources of law, like the Bible and Torah, as well as the Quran. He claimed that this is grounds for being an infidel and furthered his point by stating that the Mongols and the Jahiliyah period Arabs, presumably all infidels, used varied sources as well.

Allegedly, al-Zard stated that if Hamas ruled by sharia, the results would be negative. Al-Abbasi responded by citing evidence that when Muhammad was surrounded in Medina during the Battle of the Ditch, he did not give up Islam. Al-Abbasi continued, “Who ordered us to rule by sharia? Was it not God? Therefore, it is not permissible for us to fear anyone when we implement it because he who orders us to implement sharia will defend us and will not surrender us to our enemy when they fight and make war upon us.” It is possible that when al-Zard spoke of the negative results from implementing sharia, he was speaking about the probable negative repercussions to Hamas’s popularity. Gazans may be conservative, but there is little evidence that they aspire to a Taliban-like state as al-Abbasi proposes.

Al-Abbasi continued his attack with four responses to al-Zard’s supposed commentary that implementing sharia is not possible because Hamas is not powerful enough. First, he claimed that executing temporal law also requires power and since Hamas has enough power to implement temporal law, there is no reason for the organization to not employ sharia. Second, he maintained that since the Hamas government is independent it should be able to institute sharia, even if it is under siege. He cited the Taliban’s destruction of the Buddha statues in 2001 as evidence of a government under siege that was still able to assert its authority using sharia. Third, he maintained that if Hamas can defeat Israel, it could implement sharia. Finally, he claimed that the Taliban, the Islamic State of Iraq (ISI), and the Shabab al-Mujahideen all successfully implemented sharia. Thus, Hamas can too. Again, al-Abbasi ignored the popular backlash that resulted due to the Taliban and the ISI supposedly ruling by sharia law.

Finally, al-Abbasi countered al-Zard’s supposed claims that Hamas has found a middle way in Islam by “feeding the hungry, not amputating the hand of the thief.” He stated, “Islam is the religion of moderation, without a doubt. However, moderation is not limited to whims and temperaments. Rather, it is bounded by legal guidance from the Quran and the Sunnah.” Unlike Hamas, takfiri organizations are not known for their charitable work, another reason why they generally are not very popular in the communities they wish to rule.

This summary of the first half of al-Abbasi’s argument illustrates some of the ideological differences between Hamas and takfiris. (Look here for Abu Muhammad al-Maqdisi’s take on Hamas.) Al-Abbasi was emphatic in stating that Hamas has not implemented what he considered sharia law and that the organization does not intend to do so anytime soon, which he believed is a mistake. Thus far, al-Abbasi has refused to consider that the extreme nature of the ISI and al Qaeda makes them unpopular in the Arab world. This lack of retrospection will lead like-minded individuals and groups to new failures and will make it difficult for them to achieve a large following in the Palestinian Territories.

The Islamic State of Iraq in Gaza?

Scott Sanford May 18, 2009

On 15 May 2009, Falluja Forum contributor Wahj al-Rasas (Blazing Bullets) posted photos of leaflets the Islamic State of Iraq (ISI) supposedly distributed recently in Gaza. The leaflets claim that the recent announcement of Abu-Omar al-Baghdadi’s capture is a fabrication, the ISI does not know the identity of the person in the alleged photos of al-Baghdadi, and al-Baghdadi is doing just fine. The leaflets were signed by the “Ministry of Information / The Islamic State of Iraq” and the “the al-Shahid Abi-Mus’ab al-Zarqawi Brigade for Jihadi Media Jerusalem.”

The content of the announcement is not surprising, given al-Baghdadi has already released a statement refuting claims of his capture, and it is possible that the announcement is a forgery. However, if it is legitimate, it is interesting that the ISI would be so concerned about how Palestinians perceived the alleged al-Baghdadi capture – I have not seen a special ISI statement issued by a Somalia, North African, or Yemeni ISI branch. Additionally, it could indicate that the ISI is looking beyond Iraq and has already started activities in Gaza. It remains unclear whether or not these activities are merely for propaganda value, i.e. another attempt to connect the Palestinian issue to the wider global jihad, or an actual effort to build an ISI presence in Gaza. However, if it is the latter, the ISI faces a step uphill battle because, as I have argued previously, it is unlikely that Hamas will allow a competing organization to operate in Gaza freely.

Transformations of ‘Usbat al-Ansar

Scott Sanford May 14, 2009

Falluja Forum contributor Abu al-Ghadiyah recently posted an article titled “Transformations of ‘Usbat al-Ansar” that the Lebanese paper al-Akhbar published in March. The article was part of a larger series of reports that journalist Hasan ‘Aliq wrote regarding the political and security climate in Lebanon’s largest Palestinian refugee camp Ain al-Hilweh. He argues that the Islamist position is growing stronger in the camp due to changes in their attitudes towards the Lebanese state. However, Fatah attempts to check the Islamists’ growing influence have resulted in bloodshed and instability.

In “Transformations of ‘Usbat al-Ansar,” ‘Aliq claims that since 2003 ‘Usbat al-Ansar, a Palestinian militant organization that espouses takfiri ideology and allegedly sends fighters to Iraq, has recently undergone three major transformations. The first is the surrendering of Badi’ Hamadah, aka Abu ‘Ubaydah, to the Lebanese Army. According to the article, this move negatively impacted the organization’s relations with and support from al-Qaeda and “a number of religious men, especially in Saudi.”

The second “transformation” is the movement of ‘Usbat al-Ansar militants from Lebanon to Iraq. The organization claims that 20 of its members were killed in Iraq while engaging “occupation forces.” Additionally, it alleges that its members never participated in the sectarian violence that plagued Iraq. The article also maintains that Syria arrested ‘Usbat al-Ansar’s leader Abu Muhjin while he was in transit to Iraq. The article reports that ‘Usbat al-Ansar denies rumors that it is negotiating with Syria to release Muhjin for two fugitives hiding in Ain al-Hilweh. However, a second article by ‘Aliq states that Abu Muhjin left for Iraq in 2003 and has since returned to Ain al-Hilweh, according to an unnamed “Palestinian official.” Thus, it appears that Abu Muhjin’s whereabouts and status remain hazy.

The third “transformation” is a change in ‘Usbat al-Ansar’s behavior towards the Lebanese government. The article claims that the group once saw the Lebanese state as an enemy, but it now has an open communication line with Lebanese intelligence officials and helps maintain some stability in the camp. According to the report, the organization states that it will not partake in any Lebanese sectarian violence, but it did offer help to Hezbollah during the 2006 war with Israel.

‘Usbat al-Ansar’s actions are a positive step in building security in Lebanon. During the 2007 siege against Fatah al-Islam, ‘Usbat al-Ansar refrained from opening the so-called “second front” against the Lebanese Army and prevented its sister organization, Jund al-Sham, from doing so as well, a move that the Lebanese army was undoubtedly thankful for. However, not everything is on the up and up in Ain al-Hilweh.

According to a third report by ‘Aliq titled “Abu al-‘Abd the Palestinian: I Will not Forgive,” elements within Fatah are attempting to prevent the Islamists growing influence in Ain al-Hilweh. This article claims that Muhammad ‘Isa, aka al-Linu or Abu al-‘Abd, is a prominent Fatah military leader, who dislikes Islamists because he is allegedly is a member of the al-Habashiyah Sufi sect, which Salafi Islamists are hostile towards. He also reportedly has a desire to “return lost pride” to Fatah after its setbacks to Hamas in Gaza.

The article maintains that al-‘Abd “started a series of purifications” that have pitted Fatah against Jund al-Sham and have killed several people including Shehada Jawhar, a self proclaimed al-Qaeda trainer in Iraq and weapons smuggler in Lebanon. The article also states that al-‘Abd has been implicated in several explosions that have recently rocked Ain al-Hilweh and that he has rankled Fatah’s Lebanese leadership because he has supposedly found outside funding.

Lebanon’s Palestinian refugees remain a contentious issue. They appear to be heavily armed and well trained since many of them have fought in Iraq. Currently, the Palestinians are fragmented and suffer internal strife due to the strengthening of the Islamist position. The Islamists enjoy this position and are not keen to squander it by provoking another Nahr al-Bared. However, the internecine fighting will likely keep Ain al-Hilweh a dangerous place and the Lebanese Army on its toes.

Falluja Analytics

Scott Sanford May 11, 2009

[Editor’s note: I am pleased to introduce another new contributor, Scott Sanford, who is a graduate student at George Washington University specialising in jihadism in the levant. Scott has guest blogged for Jihadica in the past, but now he is joining us on a more regular basis.]

 

“What is the Secret of the Falluja Forum’s Success?” This was the intriguing title of a recent post on Falluja presenting a detailed analysis of the web traffic to the forum itself. The contributor, named “Song of Terror”, broke the article into two parts: the first supplying the web analytic data and the second providing strategies and further analysis.  While he claimed that jihadi propaganda efforts on the Internet are successful, the data does in fact not support his analysis.

Using data from Alexa.com, Song of Terror started by asserting that Fallujah is the most “successful” jihadi forum.  Fallujah’s “Daily Reach”, the percent of global Internet users visiting Al-faloja.info, was up 42% from 0.00163% three months ago to 0.0022% on 27 April 2009.  A majority of Fallujah’s users, 36.5%, were in Iraq.  Algeria held the second spot with 9.1% followed by Egypt with 8.2%.  Al-faloja.info’s traffic rank was 220 in Iraq, 759 in Georgia, and 821 in the Palestinian Territories.

Song of Terror reported that 19.64% of Fallujah’s visitors came from Google.com, 5.89% from Muslm.net, an Islamic forum that many militants frequent, and 5.56% from Youtube.com.  He appeared to be disappointed with Youtube.com’s third place ranking and suspected that it would increase in the next “two weeks” because “a campaign to spread Fallujah’s link via [YouTube] continues in its infancy.”  In fact, YouTube now has a new channel called FallujahTube that appears to be connected to this “campaign.”  He also recommended that others who post videos on YouTube put the Fallujah link in the video description under the user name to make it more visible to users.  He also claimed that the percentage reported for YouTube is inaccurate because other websites take videos from YouTube and post them elsewhere, which would make its percentage higher.  As for Muslm.net, he stated that due to his own personal efforts posting Fallujah links on the website since 2007, it now holds the number two spot.

In regards to Google.com, Song of Terror claimed that Fallujah’s success is due to not requiring a login, which makes Fallujah searchable on Google.  The top Google search terms leading to Fallujah were “The Fallujah Forums” written in Arabic and “al-faloja” written in English.  He also noted that “proxy without installation” written in Arabic and “filezzz rapidleech” written in English lead visitors to the Fallujah Forums for technical advice.  Indeed, a 10 May 2009 Google search of “proxy without installation” in Arabic revealed that the third link on the page connected to a Fallujah post about surfing the Internet without a proxy.

After visiting Fallujah, 14.85% of the visitors returned to Google, 5.46% returned to YouTube, 4.61% each went to Hanein.info and Muslm.net, and between 3.92% and 2.9% visited the upload sites Zshare.net, Rapidshare.com, and Archive.org.  Song of Terror noted that this is evidence that Fallujah users use the website as a means to access videos.

In the second section of the post, Song of Terror outlined eight strategies and pieces of advice:

1.      “Determine Your Goal,” which is “Winning the Battle of Hearts and Minds,” “Planting the seed of jihad in the hearts of the general Muslim population,” and “Transmitting the mujahedeen voice to the general population.”

2.      “Choose the Means of Arriving to Your Goal,” which is using the Internet.

3.      “Study the Field Data and the Means of Influence,” where he again stressed the importance of YouTube to the jihadi propaganda effort because of the supposed rising popularity of the Internet in the Middle East and because YouTube is the second most popular site in the world according to Song of Terror.  He added that Falluja should not be the primary focus of propaganda efforts because many Arab countries ban the site.

4.      Properly distribute one’s efforts to endeavors that yield the most results.

5.      Remain flexible to adjust to the different characteristics of various websites.

6.      This section dealt with security issues and Song of Terror added a link to a Fallujah post on how to use the Tor anonymity software.  He also added links to several “Crusader websites” because they “distribute mujahedeen films”.  It is unclear why he added this, but possibly, it is because jihadis could use links to videos on these sites as safe links that government censoring would not prevent.

7.      The connection between the real world and the “hypothetical world.”  Here it appears that Song of Terror was attempting to prove a connection to jihadi Internet propaganda efforts and the number of foreign fighters entering Iraq.  In making his argument, he cited reporting from the Combating Terrorism Center at West Point, an unidentified Rand report, and al-Qaeda in Iraq reporting about their “martyrs,” which all supposedly concluded that most foreign fighters in Iraq are from Saudi Arabia, followed by Libya, Yemen, Syria, and Algeria.  While he did not make his point explicit, it appears that he was insinuating that the movement of foreign fighters to Iraq from these Arab countries was proof of jihadi Internet propaganda success.

However, adding this point contradicts his entire argument that the Fallujah Forums are successful.  Saudi Arabia placed tenth on the country list of Al-faloja.info users with only 2.5% of the site’s visitors being of Saudi origin.  If Song of Terror’s correlation between Internet propaganda and the number of foreign fighters were correct, we would expect the number of Saudis entering Iraq to be much lower or the number of Saudi visitors on the Fallujah Forums to be much higher.  Additionally, from the countries ranked above Saudi Arabia on the country list of Fallujah users – Algeria, Egypt, Turkey, Pakistan, Libya, the UAE, Georgia, and Jordan – we would expect more of these nationalities to enter Iraq or less of them to visit the Fallujah Forums.  It is possible that many of Fallujah’s visitors have gone to Pakistan and Afghanistan instead of Iraq, but it is reasonable to assume, with the exception of Pakistan, that the numbers and nationalities of foreign fighters entering these countries would be similar to Iraq’s experience, which still negates Song of Terror’s analysis.  Finally, according Song of Terror, nearly 50 Yemenis entered Iraq, but Yemen is not even listed on the country list of Fallujah users.  According to his analysis, we would expect Yemen to hold a much higher position on the list.  In short, his data does not add up and it does not support the theory that jihadi Internet propaganda alone determines the flow of militants to war zones.

8.      “Strategies of Intellectual Penetration and Contradicting Psychological Conditioning.”  In this final point, Song of Terror encouraged jihadi propagandists to distribute documentary programs supportive of jihadi ideology and to learn about “psychological conditioning” by mainstream Arab satellite stations such as al-Jazeera.

Song of Terror attempted to apply some quantitative analytical reasoning to verify the success and usefulness of the Fallujah Forums and jihadi efforts at Internet propaganda.  However, the data does not support his analysis.  One might even use his data to make the exact opposite argument, that jihadi Internet propaganda has relatively little effect on radicalization and recruitment.

Document (Arabic): 05-01-2009-falujah-traffic-ranking-1
Document (Arabic): 05-11-2009-fallujahtube-2
Document (Arabic): 05-10-2009-without-a-proxy-post-4
Document (Arabic): 05-11-2009-how-to-use-tor-5

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