ji·had·ica

Revisions or Just a Change of Heart?

Islam Online, an Islamic website founded by Yusuf al-Qaradawi, recently published an article called “Jihadist Revisions or Changing Their Minds” by Jordanian writer Yasir al-Za’aterah. It argued that revisionists (see here, here, and here) may have shifted their positions on violence, but they have not changed their fundamental political views.

Al-Za’aterah stated that the revisionists are basing their new approach on “religious legitimacy,” which is what they used to justify their violence in the past. He maintained that the issue of forcibly expelling an unjust leader who claims to be a Muslim is contentious in Islamic jurisprudence because it often involves many “mistakes”, making it closer to what scholars consider fitna or civil unrest, which is why many refuse to condone force against a Muslim ruler.

Al-Za’aterah concluded that modern Islamic movements have not rejected armed insurrection because they consider violence non-permissible; rather, they have rejected it because such action is impossible in the face of the modern state with a powerful security apparatus supported from abroad. Thus, revisionists have not acknowledged their failure.  Instead, they have adopted a new “intellectual” position, not a new political position. “The reality is that [these groups] were defeated on the ground before their ideas changed and the revisions are only paving the way for the release of their leaders and members from prison.”

Al-Za’aterah’s article suggests two points. First, revisionists will continue to push for their version of Islamic rule, which could bolster the most conservative segments of Islamic society. Second, since it is state power that has caused the revisionists to stop their calls for violence, if such power were to wane, they could revert to armed action. Thus, while the revisionist trend is a positive step, the revisionists themselves have not changed much and may represent a security threat or an obstacle to reform in the future.

Coveters of Paradise

In the continuing salafi-jihadi media barrage against Hamas, the al-Sumud Media entity released its inaugural edition of the journal “Coveters of Paradise”. The cover is adorned with a photo of the battle-scarred Ibn Taymiya Mosque, which is where Hamas waged a battle against the salafi-jihadi group Jund Ansar Allah in August. The journal mainly consists of reprints of articles written by others.

The Table of contents listed the following articles:

· The Opening Article – by the Believer in God

· The Piercing Pen and the Candid Word – by Abu al-Hasan Ghuraib

· Comments on the Speech of Sheikh Osama bin Laden – by Sheikh Abi Ahmad Abd al-Rahman al-Masri

· Golden Advice for the Ismail Haniyah Government – by Abu al-Nur al-Maqdisi

· Raising the Argument between the Martyred Sheikh Abi al-Nur al-Maqdisi and between Secular Hamas – by Sheikh Abi Ahmad Abd-al-Rahman al-Masri

· The 80 Year Old Ghost: The Muslim Brotherhood and the Condemnation of the Global Jihad – by the journalist Akram Hijazi

· You Kill a Man Who Says My Lord is God? Is there not Among You a Rightly Guided Man? – By Sheikh Abu Muhammad al-Maqdisi

· Hamas Kills One Seeking Protection in the House of God – by Doctor Hani al-Sibai

· As If They Wanted to Say, “Sorry Abd al-Naser, We Wronged You”: A Reflection on the Gaza Events – by Walid Yusuf

· Take Refuge in the People’s Lord from the Evil of What Hamas Did – by Muhammad Asad Buyud al-Tamimi

· We Lead with the One God and We Excommunicate with International Legitimacy – by Abd al-Aziz bin Naser al-Jalil

· Do not Grieve, the Islamic United States is at the Gates – by Doctor John Boutros

· Western Education is Forbidden [al-Buku Haram] and the Crime of the Villans: Between Cataracts of Blood and Media Collusion – by The Eagle’s Banner [Rayat al-‘Uqab]

· The Art of Fighting from a Motorcycle

· Smuggling

The journal does not provide any other identifying information except its own transliteration of al-Janna (Paradise) into English, which is “elgana”. Using “g” instead of the “j” indicates either the Egyptian dialect or another Arabic dialect heavily influenced by Egypt such as Gaza. Given the journal’s heavy focus on Hamas and Abu al-Nur al-Maqdisi, I think it is reasonable to assume that whoever compiled this journal is in Gaza or of Gazan origins.

Salafi-jihadi anti-Hamas rhetoric has existed for some time, but it seems that the amount of it has increased since Hamas killed Abu al-Nur al-Maqdisi. It will be interesting to see the effects, if any, this propaganda will have on Hamas, Gazans, international jihadis, and the West. I believe that Hamas will continue to oppose the salafi-jihadis, but if the organization weakens under international sanctions, will it attempt to appease the salafi-jihadis to maintain its Gaza power base? Again, I think it is unlikely, but what if Gazans, frustrated with Hamas, turn to salafi-jihadis and transform these jihadis into more than a marginal movement? Will international salafi-jihadis make a stronger effort to enter Gaza? Will these jihadis have a more receptive audience when they get there? Finally, how will Israel and the West react if its efforts against Hamas do manage to weaken the organization significantly and salafi-jihadis become more powerful?

Information War in Gaza

The “Department of Documents and Research” from the “Jihadi Media Elite,” a jihadi media production entity, has recently announced its “Series for God and then for History” publications. These productions are intended to “document the important events” in the jihadi world “that are considered historical turning points in the Ummah’s path and in the circle of conflict between truth and falsehood.”

The first installment is a book titled, “The Ibn-Taymiyyah Mosque Incident.” It deals with the violent August 2009 clash in Gaza between Hamas and Jund Ansar Allah, a group espousing salafi-jihadi ideology. The book is divided into several sections including jihadi “Statements” and “Hamas Statements” about the attack, “Articles Justifying Hamas’s Crime,” “Articles Regarding the Event,” “Photos,” and “Video.”

The book is a salafi-jihadi attempt to capitalise on the event and ensure the jihadi storyline of events is the dominant version. Including the statements from Hamas and various other pro-Hamas commentators is an effort to make the jihadi version more objective and credible, which would strengthen salafi-jihadi arguments against Hamas.

Due to current time restrictions, I will be reading the book in its entirety once this semester concludes. If I glean any useful information or analyses, I will share them at that time.

Media Incursion of Abu al-Nur al-Maqdisi

The Global Islamic Media Front, in cooperation with the Faloja Forums, has announced, “The Media Incursion of the Imam and Martyr Abu al-Nur al-Maqdisi.” It has five goals:

  1. Expose the truth about Hamas’s “crime” and “lies,” i.e. the recent attack on Jund Ansar Allah (JAA).
  2. Expose the truth about Hamas today and how it has “strayed” from its foundational roots.
  3. Let Muslims know that the money they give Hamas equates to “bullets in Muslims’ chests.”
  4. “Support the monotheistic mujahidin, who fight for the word of God and for the rule of God’s absent law.”
  5. “Distribute the legacy of the Imam Shaykh Abu al-Nur al-Maqdisi.”

Thus far, the effort consists of a new forum dedicated to Abu al-Nur al-Maqdisi on Faloja. There are not many posts yet, but several appear to be interesting, such as a photo list of JAA members killed in the battle with Hamas. Other posts include: “Two Imams of Truth: The Red Mosque and the Ibn Taymiyyah Mosque. What is the difference?”; “Was Abu al-Nur al-Maqdisi one of the Khawarij or a Tyrant?”; “Dangerous Speech: Hasan al-Banna – Hamas is not Islamic and it Claimed That”; “A Resounding Scandal: A Voice Recording Confirming the Execution of Wounded Mujahedin by Hamas During their Ride to the Hospital”; and “Hamas’s Crime in Rafah.”

This makes the split between Hamas and the salafi-jihadi movement plainly obvious. As the attack against JAA and last year’s attack on the Army of Islam indicate, Hamas is currently powerful enough to deal with these fringe elements. However, if conditions in Gaza continue to worsen or Hamas’s position becomes more perilous, these groups may gain more momentum and power, complicating any reconciliation with Fatah or Palestinian agreements with Israel.

The Mou10ra11bitt18oun25 Code

On 3 October 2009, Mou10ra11bitt18oun25″ (sic), a “new member” on the Faloja Forums, posted a statement reiterating the threat of an al-Qaida attack on Germany. He claimed that the attack will occur on a Sunday in October stating, “After we [al-Qaida] chose Thursday for London, Tuesday for New York and Washington, and Tuesday for Madrid, we choose Sunday for you….”

Additionally, the name Mou10ra11bitt18oun25 appears to indicate the same with the 10 equating to October and the 11, 18, and 25 equating to the remaining Sundays in October. In Arabic, Mourabittoun is difficult to translate, but generally means people laying in wait.

Another forum member, “Abu Hamza 2005”, cited similarities between the names of Mou10ra11bitt18oun25 and the Ikhlaas member p2l0a0g8u9e, who supposedly caused a media stir when he threatened nuclear attacks. Abu Hamza asks, “What does he [Mou10ra11bitt18oun25] carry in his quiver, or is he a general member [of the forums]? There is great similarity in the letters, numbers, and type of name.”

The Mou10ra11bitt18oun25 statement adds to the media hype regarding possible attacks on Germany. As Thomas has pointed out, these threats may be propaganda rather than preludes to an attack. If so, I am curious what the affect these threats will have beyond sending security organizations and on-line jihadis into a frenzy. If there is not an attack in Germany, will al-Qaida’s credibility suffer among its supporters?  Or, will the terror organization be able to pass it off as part of a larger strategy?

Abu Talha the German Threatens to Attack Germany

On 18 September 2009, alleged al-Qaeda operative Abu Talha al-Almani (“The German”) implicitly threatened an attack on Germany within two weeks if Germany does not withdraw its forces from Afghanistan. Here is a rough translation of what Abu Talha said:

“For the Muslims in Germany I say, Peace and God’s mercy and blessing be upon you: My beloved brothers in God, al-Qaeda requests that you keep away from everything that is not necessary in the two weeks following the elections if the German people do not decide to withdraw their troops from Afghanistan. Keep your children close to you during this time. Ask God to protect you, your children, and all the children.”

He went on to say, “To the people of Islam I say: My brothers in God! If the jihad in Germany begins, then leave al-Qaeda to work. If there were the need to move to the second level, then we will inform you of what you can do to participate in the German jihad. No matter how long the conflict lasts, the city of Kiel will remain safe. This is a promise from me.” A Faloja forum participant named Qaher commented on Abu Talha’s remarks and suggested that Kiel would not be attacked because of a new Islamic center located in the city.

Additionally, the video does not appear to be an official al-Qaida production. The beginning of the video states that it is an “al-Qaida statement”, something the organization generally does not do. Rather, the production entity will put its name on the very first section that warns others not to attach music to the video. The video also may indicate that Abu Talha is acting alone, since he noisily turned the pages of his speech while speaking instead of having someone turn cue cards.

While Abu Talha’s threat may be real, it is possible that he is operating either alone or in a very small group. The video is not up to normal al-Qaida standards, which may indicate that any attacks Abu Talha attempts to perpetrate will be equally sloppy and, hopefully, easier for security officials to prevent. It is also noteworthy that he promised not to attack Kiel. Perhaps he is from or has some connection to the city?

Tajdeed is Back

While conducting some research today, I found that as of August 2009, the jihadi forum Tajdeed.org.uk is back. The website was one of the most prominent – if not the most prominent – jihadi discussion forum until it went down about a year and a half ago. The website’s administrator was and remains Muhammad al-Massari. After Ekhlaas and Faloja, it seems it is all the rage to bring back shut down jihadi forums.

Faloja and Jihadi Libraries

On 14 September 2009, the Faloja Forums announced their return after they were knocked off the Internet three days previously. It seems the administrators have been researching methods to avoid permanent banishment from the Internet so the cat and mouse game will continue.

Additionally, Boraq has opened a new library dedicated to preserving statements of jihadi leaders. It currently houses over 150 documents organized by the entity that published the statements. The new site also has links to nine different Faloja addresses, six of which work. This site could become a valuable resource for researchers.

Ikhlaas Speaks Out, but Questions Remain

The Ikhaas forum that recently resurfaced just issued an explanation for its reappearance, only to close down again shortly afterwards. Site administrators claimed they kept the website down for the past year in order to “prevent the crusaders from entering and manipulating it.” They decided to go public again in commemoration of 9/11, but there was poor cooperation between the Global Islamic Media Front (GIMF) and the Fajr Media Center, who “produced dirty lies against our beloved site.”

The statement insisted that the site was not fabricated. Instead it counterattacked, stating, “It is not possible to guarantee the honor of the Fajr Media Center and the Global Islamic Media Front because they … initiated a campaign against our beloved site.”

The statement concluded saying that Ikhlaas would remain “concealed” until Fajr and the GIMF can confirm their honor, but it stated that the Ikhlaas “network” is prepared to call upon “the brothers” to “expel the crusaders from our lands.”

The authenticity of the Ikhlaas statement is difficult to assess. If someone else does control the site, this message is just another aspect of a well-orchestrated IO campaign designed to disrupt the jihadi message. However, if the Ikhlaas administrators, along with Fajr and the GIMF, really did botch the Ikhlaas return, then incompetence rules and a jihadi media war may be brewing. Either way, the future is not bright for jihadi media.

Poser Salafi-Jihadis in Gaza?

The “Followers of Monotheism and Jihad” in Palestine released a statement on 31 August 2009 that lambasted Hamas for its narrow interests and the killing of Salafis (Part 1 and Part 2). They claimed that Hamas continues to arrest and harass members of the Salafi movement in Gaza and that “a long beard and Sunni clothes have become an accusation to be arrested for.”

They stated that they carry weapons and train only to “fight the apes and pigs.” They maintained that if Hamas were to implement Sharia law, if only gradually, they would serve Hamas, but Hamas “fights anyone who threatens its position.” They continued, “[Hamas] is forcing us to use our weapons to defend ourselves after [they] severed every method of settling differences.”

Therefore, they announced that on 29 August 2009, they had attacked a Hamas governmental compound, the Security and Protection HQ, and the Internal Security HQ using “sound charges as a message to you [Hamas] to stop your crimes against the sons of monotheism and jihad, and the adherents to Salafism in Gaza.” They stated that they did not intend to spill any pious blood and they disavowed any responsibility of that happening during their attacks.

These types of groups come and go in Gaza and it is unclear if the Followers of Monotheism and Jihad in Palestine are an actual jihadi group backed by a cleric, like Jund Ansar Allah, which was backed by Abu al-Nur al-Maqdisi, or merely a group of thugs. The fact that their statement was not distributed by an established media production company like the Global Islamic Media Front suggests the latter, but time will tell. However, the document does clearly indicate the stark division between Hamas, which is attempting to assert its authority, and the Salafi-jihadis (or at least poser Salafi-jihadis), who are trying to usurp the “un-Islamic” elements of Hamas.

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