ji·had·ica

A Crash Course in Jihadi Theory (Part 2)

Joas Wagemakers October 26, 2010

In the first part of this series on a book describing what every jihadi ought to know, we saw that the authors of the book, the Shari’a Council of the Jama’at al-Tawhid wa-l-Jihad in Gaza, initially seemed to give a purely religious description of things but quickly moved on to the political relevance of what they were saying. In a response to this post, one reader stated that their words were “just a rehash of Qutb”. He has a good point. In Qutb’s famous Milestones (Ma’alim fi l-Tariq), the author does indeed point out that those who fail to rule according to the shari’a and use man-made laws instead are claiming God’s sovereignty (hakimiyya), thereby turning themselves into gods or idols (tawaghit), just like we saw in the previous post. The scholars of the Jama’at al-Tawhid wa-l-Jihad go further, however, and show that they have much more detailed ideas than Qutb ever wrote down about such issues, as we will see below.

Judgement and Legislation

Unlike Qutb, the book dealt with in this post gives a much more detailed description of “un-Islamic” rules, laws and legislation and what judging “according to what God has sent down” (Q. 5: 44, an important verse for Qutb and other Islamists) means and distinguishes between “judgment” and “legislation”. The authors point out that, whereas a wrong judgment can be made for several reasons and therefore does not automatically amount to unbelief (kufr) of the person responsible for it, the term “legislation” denotes a system of laws that – when applied in the service of anyone or anything other than God – means that its legislator is placed outside Islam.

After discussing the exact definition of “legislation” and several other issues, the scholars move on to one of the major questions related to the issue of “un-Islamic” legislation: when can something be called “major unbelief” (kufr akbar) and when is it simply “minor unbelief” (kufr asghar)? The difference between the two is that the former places the culprit outside Islam, while the latter merely entails that he is guilty of something awful but not so bad as to expel him from the religion altogether. Perhaps not surprisingly, the list of legislative sins that amount to “major unbelief” is much longer than the list of “minor unbelief” categories. Although the discussion is more detailed and nuanced than can be discussed here, most forms of “major unbelief” entail that the legislator shows that he actually believes “man-made laws” to be superior to the Islamic shari’a, which is a blatant form of kufr. While other Muslim scholars often state that one cannot possibly know a person’s real intentions, that one should therefore be extremely careful in ascribing “un-Islamic” motives to rulers and legislators and that, subsequently, the application of the label “major unbelief” to sinful acts should be highly limited, the authors have different ideas. They contend that certain actions betray a ruler’s true beliefs, making it possible for others to determine whether his “man-made laws” are simply mistakes or are actually forms of unbelief. One example of this (mentioned on p. 81 of the book), is when rulers exchange the shari’a for an entirely different system of laws. This, according to the authors, makes it obvious that the legislator doesn’t want to have anything to do with the shari’a anymore, which constitutes a form of “major unbelief”.

Overthrow the rulers, unless…

The authors’ conclusion of this discussion on different types of kufr is that the rulers of our day and age are guilty of acts of unbelief and apostasy (ridda) because they, among other things, supposedly apply legislation on the basis of “other than what God has revealed” (bi-ghayr ma anazala llah), use constitutions and adhere to international law. This, in turn, means that they may be overthrown. The authors, however, set two conditions for overthrowing the rulers, of which especially the second one is interesting. The first condition tells the reader that the ruler must be guilty of clear (major) unbelief that can be proven. The second condition, however, states that overthrowing the ruler should “cause the strength that enables the Muslims to overthrow [the ruler] to increase”. In other words, the authors seem to point out that radicals wanting to topple a regime should not do so unless they will actually be strengthened by it and replace the “infidel” president or king by “a Muslim ruler who governs them according to the Qur’an and the Sunna”. This apparently excludes simply killing a president or king, since such random actions are unlikely to create an Islamic state. The authors do state, however, that if Muslims’ power is increased by toppling a ruler, they really have no other choice than to do so.

The Imamate

Quite conveniently, the authors also provide an alternative to the regimes that ought to be overthrown: the imamate (Islamic leadership). Quoting the great Ibn Khaldun to point out the difference between Islamic leadership and ordinary kingship, they state that the imamate is meant to establish Islam by spreading, propagating and defending it on the one hand and applying it through the application of the shari’a on the other. The imam himself (i.e. the leader of the Muslims, not to be confused with a prayer leader in a mosque) also needs to fit a certain profile: he should be a Muslim who has come of age, should be in his right mind, must be knowledgeable of the shari’a and he should also be just, among other things. He also has duties and enjoys certain rights, among them the right to be obeyed and advised.

Possibly in order to complete the picture, the authors also include the possibility that the imam himself is overthrown, which may be done if he is guilty of the major unbelief mentioned before, and list the conditions under which this may be done. Although the authors list four different groups willing to overthrow the rulers, of which only one would do so justifiably, they nevertheless leave open the possibility that even the imam himself may not be up to scratch. This brings us to the option of declaring the ruler to be an unbeliever (kafir), i.e. the issue of excommunication (takfir), which will be discussed next time.

To be continued…

Reflections on al-Maqdisi’s Arrest

Joas Wagemakers October 2, 2010

Several days ago, it was reported that Abu Muhammad al-Maqdisi, the Jordanian radical Islamist ideologue and former mentor of Abu Mus’ab al-Zarqawi, had been arrested again on 17 September. The news was quickly confirmed on his website and also picked up by Jordanian newspapers (see here, for example). It seems that the Jordanian Security Services had asked him to come to their offices, from which he apparently did not return. While this description of how it happened may well be correct (al-Maqdisi is said to have been summoned to their offices before without returning), the obvious question is why he was re-arrested.

Millat Ibrahim

Several newspaper articles mention that the Saudi authorities were angry about al-Maqdisi’s book Millat Ibrahim and that this somehow led to his arrest. Although this book was a clear indictment of Muslim governments for their perceived failure to apply Islamic law and Saudi Arabia is indeed mentioned a few times in the book, it seems unlikely that Millat Ibrahim caused al-Maqdisi’s arrest since that book was written in 1984 (and not 1982, as some articles state). Moreover, I doubt whether the Jordanian Security Services are at Riyadh’s beck and call and would simply arrest al-Maqdisi if they don’t have a reason of their own to do so.

The mentioning of Millat Ibrahim (The Religion of Abraham) in several articles may actually be a misunderstanding. While the original book by that title is more than twenty-five years old, al-Maqdisi recently released a document called Millat Ibrahim: Limadha Tukhifuhum? (Millat Ibrahim: Why does it Frighten Them?). In this treatise, al-Maqdisi compares the leaders of Saudi Arabia with the literary antihero Don Quixote, who keeps failing in his quest and always blames outside factors but never himself. This is similar to what Saudi rulers do, al-Maqdisi claims, when they criticise his book Millat Ibrahim while failing to realise what their real problem is, namely that the book merely cites Saudi Wahhabi scholars without saying anything new. If Saudi rulers really object to the book Millat Ibrahim, al-Maqdisi states, they actually object to their own Wahhabi tradition, which clearly shows that the state has deviated from the teachings of Muhammad b. ‘Abd al-Wahhab and his followers. This unwillingness to face the facts and admit that they are infidels according to the religious underpinnings of their own state, al-Maqdisi maintains, is the real reason the Saudis are frightened by his book Millat Ibrahim.

One can argue over whether al-Maqdisi has really simply quoted the (Wahhabi) sources or has added and introduced ideas of his own that are not necessarily supported by the Wahhabi tradition, a topic I have discussed elsewhere. Al-Maqdisi nevertheless hits a sore point by referring to this subject since his writings (and particularly his book Millat Ibrahim) are indeed full of references to Saudi Wahhabi authors and he certainly makes it look as if the greatest adherents to Saudi Arabia’s own religious tradition would surely accuse the country of apostasy if they were still alive. If Saudi Arabia is indeed in any way involved in al-Maqdisi’s arrest, it is much more likely it was this recent reminder of the Kingdom’s alleged hypocrisy, not the original Millat Ibrahim, which precipitated his incarceration.

Deradicalisation?

Whatever the actual involvement of Saudi Arabia may be, al-Maqdisi’s recent arrest is probably best understood through the prism of Jordanian politics. As a radical scholar who has enjoyed a relatively free existence for the past two years, al-Maqdisi must be something of an irritant to the country’s security services. The fact that he has not been in prison for a long time and that his website is as accessible as ever obviously raises the question whether he might possibly be used by the Jordanian authorities for some purpose. Considering the fact that al-Maqdisi wrote several books and treatises in which he criticised what he calls “extremist” expressions of jihad and takfir (excommunication), one would be justified in thinking that the Jordanian authorities are quietly grooming him as a tool to deradicalise jihadist youngsters. While one cannot be 100% sure about these things, I believe this is probably not the case.

Firstly, al-Maqdisi has continued to write radical treatises even while criticising others who were even more radical. He has never stopped calling the leaders of the Muslim world “infidels” and “apostates”, for instance, and one may wonder whether the Jordanian authorities would want a man who holds these views to “deradicalise” their youngsters. Secondly, al-Maqdisi has spent considerable time in prison but was released every time because no evidence linking him directly to any crime or terrorist activity could be presented against him. In fact, human rights organisations such as Human Rights Watch have frequently and explicitly protested the treatment al-Maqdisi received in Jordanian prison (see here, for example). The fact that Jordan has kept al-Maqdisi imprisoned for longer periods of time on several occassions but has encountered international protests every time, which in the end also caused him to be released again each time, may mean that the Jordanian authorities feel they have more or less exhausted the option of simply keeping al-Maqdisi permanently locked up for no reason. This could explain why al-Maqdisi has mostly lived in relative freedom for the past two years. Thirdly, it is not entirely correct to state that al-Maqdisi has been completely free since his release from prison in March 2008. Since then, he has reportedly been under house arrest (though certainly not all the time) and was even arrested for a  traffic violation some time ago. This suggests that the Jordanian authorities may not have him imprisoned but are nevertheless keeping him in their sights.

All of this means that al-Maqdisi’s recent arrest was most probably not, as reports have suggested, caused by sudden Saudi ire over Millat Ibrahim but – if Saudi Arabia was indeed involved – more likely over his sarcastic reminder that “the land of the two holy places” supposedly cannot even live up to its own Wahhabi credentials. In any case, the Jordanian authorities are probably keeping al-Maqdisi on a tight leash and may have used the release of his recent treatise as an excuse to arrest him in order to show him who’s boss again. As it’s been two years since al-Maqdisi’s latest long-time incarceration, the security services may well have felt that it was about time to arrest him again. All the better if it pleased a powerful neighbour in the process.

A Crash Course in Jihadi Theory (Part 1)

Joas Wagemakers September 21, 2010

Throughout the years, the number of jihadi writings has grown enormously. Nowadays, books and fatwas on any given subject related to jihadi thought can easily be found and downloaded from the internet. As a service to those who can’t see the forest for the trees anymore or to those people who simply want a brief overview of what every budding jihadi theorist should know, the Shari’a Council of the Jama’at al-Tawhid wa-l-Jihad in Gaza (not to be confused with the Shari’a Council of the Minbar al-Tawhid wa-l-Jihad, on which I wrote previously) produced what can be described as a crash course in jihadi theory some time ago. The book, entitled The Gift of the Unifiers on the Most Important Issues of the Basics of Islam (also available here), describes the theoretical underpinnings of jihadis’ animosity towards Muslim states and their policies in a mere 273 pages. This post is the first of a series in which I discuss this book.

Taghut

The book starts by focusing on one of the central terms of jihadi discourse, namely taghut (pl. tawaghit). Traditionally used to refer to idols, the authors of this book describe it as something that makes you cross the proper boundary of worship and obedience. In other words, a taghut is anything “one appeals to (yatahakamuna ilayhi) besides God and his Messenger or worships besides God”. The authors go on to state that “every human being needs to disbelieve in all types of taghut because that is the precondition of Islam”, which should be expressed by one’s heart, tongue and limbs (i.e. actions).

So far so good, one might think. The authors, however, continue by listing three types of taghut and this is where their true intentions become clear. Besides mentioning actual idols and other objects of what can clearly be described as worship, they also name “the idol of judgment” as a type of taghut. This category encompasses “the rulers, princes, kings, ministers, deputies, heads of tribes and judges […] if they do not judge by what God has revealed”. The idea is that following another type of legislation besides the shari’a amounts to accepting another legislator apart from God. Since God is believed to have the sole right to legislate, allowing another person to do this effectively means that one permits someone else to do part of God’s job, thus treating him/her like God. This way, the authors imply, a legislator is turned into another god, an idol. The concept of taghut thus gives these scholars the tools to equate political rulers and their governments with idols, making them fair game for the jihad they advocate.

The authors list the most important idols that tend to be “worshipped”. Interestingly, while Satan is mentioned first as the one who “calls [people] to worship [others] besides God”, “the despotic ruler who changes the rule of God” and “the one who rules on the basis of something other than what God has revealed” are listed as numbers 2 and 3, even before actual idols that people worship, which indicates how important politics and politicians are to the authors. Other tawaghit include lusts, magicians, (non-Islamic) laws and legislation, the nation and all other religions besides Islam. It speaks for itself that the authors believe that people who do “worship” such idols cannot be seen as Muslims but should be labelled “helpers of the idols” (ansar al-tawaghit) and excommunicated as infidels, for which they offer several pages of “evidence” from the Qur’an and the Sunna (the example of the Prophet Muhammad). While they certainly present many verses that condemn polytheism, these only seem to focus on the actual worship of concrete idols, not political rulers. The clever part of their reasoning is, however, that because the authors have just equated “un-Islamic” rulers with idols, they can bring down the full weight of the Qur’an and the Sunna on these political leaders every time those sources mention the word “taghut” unfavourably.

The authors subsequently analyse whether the wives and children of these political tawaghit or their helpers may also be seen as infidels. Their answer to this question is that It depends on whether or not they are aware of their husbands’ and fathers’ unbelief. If they know and agree, they are infidels too; if they don’t, they are excused. The Shari’a Council also points out that not everyone who works for a taghut is automatically an unbeliever. Economic jobs for the government, for example, or making deliveries are not necessarily forms of unbelief (kufr) but should be seen as forbidden (haram).

Democracy

A special chapter is dedicated to the concept of democracy. Because democracies are ultimately ruled by the people, the latter become the source of legislation instead of God, turning the people themselves into idols. The authors are clearly against democracy and list their grievances about that system, including freedom of conscience, the right to become an apostate, freedom of expression, equality and other things that the authors consider incompatible with Islam. Interestingly, the authors also compare the concept of democracy with the Arabic shura (consultation). While some Muslim scholars have argued that shura is a pre-modern, Qur’anic and therefore authentically Islamic form of democracy, the writers of this book disagree, primarily because the (nominal) head of a shura is God, while this is not the case in a democracy.

Because democracy is so awful according to the Shari’a Council, the authors claim that it is a taghut that actually hurts and damages Islam. They state that it pervades Muslim rule and gives unbelievers power over Muslims. This is also why the authors reject setting up one’s own political party or entering parliament. Although these scholars leave themselves some room to be able to deny that all politicians are inbelievers, they are pretty sweeping in their judgement, allowing only MPs who are willing to ignore and actively disavow the constitution and other “un-Islamic” legislation to run for parliament, which basically excludes most if not all of them.

Secularism

Another taghut the authors pay special attention to is secularism. Although not as strong a trend in the Arab world as a century or so ago, the writers apparently still feel the need to spend some time on this subject. They see the “worship” of the idol of secularism as responsible for moral decay in the Muslim world’s educational facilities, believe it hampers the spread of Islam’s message, leads to the persecution of Islamic preachers and, interestingly, leads to the cancellation of the duty to perform jihad.

Although this duty of jihad is not mentioned very often throughout the book, it is clear that the condemnation of political rulers in the strongest Islamic terms possible is expressed in order to show the governments’ illegitimacy and justify fighting against them. What other ways the authors of this book use to achieve the same goal will be dealt with in the next parts of this series.

To be continued…

A Portrait of the Terrorist as a Young Man

Joas Wagemakers July 18, 2010

Of all the jihadis we’ve seen in recent years, Abu Mus’ab al-Zarqawi must rank as one of the most violent. Nicknamed “the slaughtering sheikh” (al-shaykh al-dhabbah) by fellow militants, he is widely held responsible for killing hundreds of Shiites in Iraq and personally beheading the American hostage Nicolas Berg. It would therefore be interesting to know what went on in the mind of this man, who was killed in an American attack in 2006.

While several publications have tried to show us the man behind the myth, it would be even better if we could get a glimpse of what al-Zarqawi thought in his pre-Iraq years. Well, the time has come. About a week ago, a jihadi website posted a notebook allegedly used by al-Zarqawi while imprisoned in Jordan in the 1990s. The link on the website (the eleventh title from the top) is called Safahat min Daftar al-Shaykh Abi Mus’ab al-Zarqawi (Pages from Shaykh Abu Mus’ab al-Zarqawi’s Notebook) and leads to an .exe file that actually allows you to flick through the man’s writings.

Some Jihadica readers may remember that Will McCants discussed this document two years ago (on 22 June 2008 to be exact). At the time, however, only a few pages were available and the links to the rest of the document didn’t work (or at least don’t work anymore). Some readers may also be familiar with the Jordanian journalist Fu’ad Husayn and his book Al-Zarqawi: Al-Jil al-Thani li-l-Qa’ida (Al-Zarqawi: The Second Generation of al-Qa’ida, available in English here), which also only showed a few of the notebook’s pages on pp. 21-23. Now, however, the full 77-page document is available in its original form, including even the blank pages.

Authenticity and timing

The document seems to be authentic. As Will noted at the time, the notebook is dedicated to several people, including Umm Qudama and Abu Qudama, who are respectively al-Zarqawi’s sister and brother-in-law, and al-Zarqawi was indeed in prison in 1998, when the document is said to have been written. This information could, of course, easily have been known by others but there is a third reason to believe this document is indeed the real deal. As mentioned, Will discussed some of these pages before when they appeared on a jihadi forum and so did the book by Fu’ad Husayn, who told me he had received the notes directly from al-Zarqawi’s family. Now that they appear on another jihadi website, it seems unlikely that three different sources keep recycling different pages of a notebook that was never written by al-Zarqawi, although one cannot be entirely sure of course.

As to why this document was posted now, one can only guess. The notebook wasn’t written or discovered recently and, considering al-Zarqawi has been dead for four years, nothing of interest seems to have happened to him that caused the document’s publication. Moreover, if it was posted on the website to commemorate some kind of anniversary (his death, his birth, his release from prison etc.), it would presumably have been announced with quite a bit of fanfare but it wasn’t. The most likely reason it was posted a week ago is that the website it appeared on, tawhed.ws, has posted several collections of jihadi writings as e-books over the past few weeks. These include Ayman al-Zawahiri’s writings, for example, but also those of Mustafa Abu l-Yazid. The posting of al-Zarqawi’s notebook may thus be part of a general effort by the people behind the website to release collections of writings, even of those that have been in their possession for a long time.

Religious texts

In any case, and as Will noted at the time, this is a great source for academics studying the backgrounds and inner workings of terrorists. Although this blog post is not the place for an in-depth analysis of the content, we can surely take a quick glance. The document is filled with religious texts that deal with various topics. There is Qur’anic exegesis, for example on p. 8, where al-Zarqawi cites the explanation of the verse “and be not as those who say, ‘We hear,’ and they hear not” (Q. 8: 21) by the mediaeval exegete al-Qurtubi (d. 1273), and on p. 20, by Ibn Kathir (1300-1373). It also contains several texts apparently copied from books by Ibn Qayyim al-Jawziyya (1292-1350), for example on pp. 9-11 and 15-16. Although Ibn al-Qayyim is generally a favourite among radical Muslims for his uncompromising and strict views on various issues – like his teacher Ibn Taymiyya (1263-1328) – the fact that he was persecuted and imprisoned because of his ideas may also have inspired al-Zarqawi.

Dedication

While the notebook does not have a single topic or message, most of the texts mentioned seem somehow related to what I would call “dedication” to the cause. The passage explained by al-Qurtubi mentioned above seems to serve as a reminder to stay pious and focused, for example. Al-Zarqawi also discusses jihad (p. 12) and cites a hadith (tradition on the life of Muhammad) about not having to fear if one trusts in God (p. 13). He continues by mentioning the various types of consolation to the believers (p. 15). Al-Zarqawi sometimes also writes short pieces that he seems to have made up himself. One of them (p. 25) mentions the close connection one should maintain with God, while one should break with the tawaghit (idols, used here probably to refer to “un-Islamic” rulers). The rest of the notebook is similarly filled with poems, religious texts and exhortations to remain patient and to keep one’s faith.

What all this adds up to is a collection of short pieces that seems to portray a man dedicated to his faith who uses religious texts to get him through the tough times he is facing. Considering the fact that he was in prison when he wrote this and would go on to become one of the world’s best-known jihadis, this makes a lot of sense, of course. I will leave it to others to decipher all of the notebook, which contains a lot of blank pages after p. 34 but also shows some nice drawings (for example on pp. 70-71). It should be clear, however, that any scholar seriously dealing with al-Zarqawi cannot afford to ignore this source.

What’s the Minbar doing in Moscow? (Part 3)

Joas Wagemakers July 13, 2010

In the previous two parts of this short series (here and here), we saw that the Jordanian radical ideologue Abu Muhammad al-Maqdisi and his website, Minbar al-Tawhid wa-l-Jihad, have been closely involved in efforts to support the mujahidun in the Caucasus by offering advice, translating books into Russian and encouraging and praising their efforts. We still don’t know why this is the case, however. In this final part of the series, we will try to answer that question.

The Shari’a Committee

To understand why al-Maqdisi and his website are so interested in the mujahidun in the Caucasus, we need to go back a few years to an interview that al-Maqdisi gave to the Jordanian newspaper Al-‘Arab al-Yawm, which was published on 5 July 2005. As regular Jihadica readers know, al-Maqdisi used his week-long release from prison in that year to criticise his former pupil Abu Mus’ab al-Zarqawi and to scold other jihadis for their – in his view – extremist and sometimes plain stupid actions in conflicts that they could never win anyway. He also mentioned that he wanted to set up a committee of religious scholars that could guide jihadi youngsters all over the world by giving them advice and fatwas. Although this latter piece of information was not widely reported at the time and was not acted upon by al-Maqdisi – he was quickly rearrested in 2005 and not released until 2008 – it is nevertheless highly interesting because he seems to have realised this goal of setting up such a committee in 2009.

Since September last year, Minbar al-Tawhid wa-l-Jihad has had a forum on which readers can ask al-Maqdisi and ten other scholars all kinds of questions related to Islam. Although many of these questions (collected in ten volumes so far) are about issues that have nothing to do with jihad, such as wearing trousers (vol. 5, p. 25) or determining the first day of Ramadan (vol. 2, pp. 5-6), many of them do deal with fighting and violence. Considering the context given above (i.e. that this forum was perhaps partly meant to prevent young jihadis from using too much violence), it is not surprising that several of these fatwas actually discourage questioners from using force. A question on Hamas’ Qassam Brigades in the Gaza Strip is answered with the advice to radical jihadis to remain patient and not to seek any confrontation with Hamas (vol. 1, pp. 1-2), notwithstanding the Shari’a Council’s strong disagreements with that movement. Another reply to a Belgian group called Shariah4Belgium advises that group’s members to support jihad elsewhere, but to refrain from using violence in their own country because of their weakness there.

So what is the Minbar doing in Moscow then?

The Minbar’s communique about the subway bombings in Moscow earlier this year, its interest in the Caucasus and its efforts to translate certain books into Russian should probably be seen as part of this wider plan by al-Maqdisi and certain like-minded scholars to support and encourage mujahidun who try to wage a “clean” jihad and to advise others on how to do that. In fact, if one were to take a look at the communique with which this series started as well as al-Maqdisi’s epistle about the Islamic Emirate in the Caucasus, it is striking that so much of these texts is spent praising the mujahidun for their eagerness to obtain knowledge, their supposed purity of arms, the situation in which they allegedly had no other choice than to use violence, their correct choice of victims etc., while hardly any attention is paid to their military prowess. The praise, in other words, seems to be caused not by the mujahidun‘s firepower but by their careful and considered use of violence and appears to be directed not just at the mujahidun in the Caucasus but also at other aspiring jihadis as if to tell them: “Take a good look guys, this is how you wage a proper jihad.”

The Shari’a Committee is only less than a year old and consists of relatively unknown scholars (apart from al-Maqdisi) and it remains to be seen whether its fatwas actually have the kind of influence that its authors want them to have. Still, throughout the past year, several new scholars have been added to the committee – sometimes with much fanfare – and if others (perhaps Abu Basir al-Tartusi?) join too, al-Maqdisi’s and the Minbar‘s efforts to stem the extremist tides of unlimited violence could pay off and have the potential to become an influential ideological force.

What’s the Minbar doing in Moscow? (part 2)

Joas Wagemakers June 3, 2010

In part 1 of this short series of posts, we saw that the Minbar al-Tawhid wa-l-Jihad website published a communique by the leader of the Islamic Emirate in the Caucasus, Dokku ‘Umarov, claiming responsibility for the attacks in Moscow on 29 March 2010. This was slightly odd since the Minbar mostly publishes books, articles and fatwas, not claims of responsibility for attacks committed anywhere. Although a quick glance at the website may give the impression that this is indeed an exception, a more detailed look reveals that it is part of a broader trend.

It appears that the Minbar has been involved in the conflict between Russia and the Islamic Emirate of the Caucasus for some time. For instance, the Jordanian owner of the website, Abu Muhammad al-Maqdisi, has written an epistle in support of the mujahidin in the Caucasus. In it, al-Maqdisi praises the supposed ideological purity, leadership and righteousness of the fighters in the Caucasus and writes that this group can serve as an example for other jihadi groups in the Muslim world. He speaks highly of their acts but especially of what he describes as their knowledge, their carefulness in applying takfir (excommunication of Muslims) and their unwillingness to deviate from tawhid (the unity of God) and compares them favourably with Hamas, another group fighting a non-Muslim enemy.

Advice

The group’s qadi (judge), Abu ‘Imran Anzur b. Aldar, has also asked al-Maqdisi for advice about Muslims working for the Russian government and to what extent the fighters in the Caucasus are allowed to co-operate with them. Abu ‘Imran observes that some Muslims are not very pious or fear for their lives but nevertheless sympathize with the fighters in the Caucasus and therefore use their positions in the Russian army or governmental circles, which Abu ‘Imran believes to be forces of unbelief, to secretly help the Islamic Emirate and wants to know how he should deal with this phenomenon. Al-Maqdisi’s rather general answer is that Muslims should show their true faith to others but their unwillingness to do so because they are weak or scared should not automatically lead to their excommunication. In fact, he maintains that these Muslims may be able to help further the cause of Islam as a whole and that this could be a good thing in certain situations.

The “mujahid leader” Abu ‘Imran also asked al-Maqdisi for advice about Muslim participation in the Olympic Games or the football World Cup. Interestingly, his question does not deal with the tight shirts and short trunks that athletes wear but concentrates on whether it is allowed to participate in sports while wearing clothes that prominently display the word “Russia” as well as Russian symbols. He also wonders whether the pagan Greek origins of the Olympic Games are acceptable in this respect and complains about youngsters who refuse to wear Nike clothes because that brand derives its name from a Greek goddess but who have no problem wearing shirts with the name of the “false god” Russia on it. One may wonder how relevant this question is for people who are busy waging a war against Russian troops, but al-Maqdisi treats it as a serious matter. He states that while participation in sports is not wrong in itself, it is in this context, although he is again careful not to brand those who do participate in the Olympic Games as infidels.

Russian

These two questions mentioned above are reportedly not the only times Abu ‘Imran asked al-Maqdisi for advice since he is said to been in touch with him about other things and has also asked for the latter’s books to be translated into Russian (see here). The Minbar’s involvement with the Islamic Emirate of the Caucasus is not limited to al-Maqdisi, however, since those running the website have been busy translating not just some of al-Maqdisi’s books but also some by ‘Abdullah ‘Azzam and others into Russian.

So now we know that the communique about the Moscow bombings was not an exception but was actually part of a greater involvement by the Minbar al-Tawhid wa-l-Jihad in the Caucasus. This still leaves one question: why?

To be continued…

What’s the Minbar doing in Moscow? (Part 1)

Joas Wagemakers May 4, 2010

Although I’m awfully late in paying attention to it, there is an interesting dimension to the Moscow metro attacks that occurred just over a month ago that is relevant for jihad watchers but has not been dealt with in the media or blogs as far as I know.

While attention has obviously focused on the attacks themselves and on the video claim of responsibility by the leader of the Islamic Emirate of the Caucasus, Dokku ‘Umarov, I have not seen any references to a written statement by the same man posted on the online jihadi library Minbar al-Tawhid wa-l-Jihad (the Pulpit of the Unity of God and Jihad).

This statement – and particularly the fact that it was posted on the Minbar, the largest jihadi online library – is interesting. It indicates a development of potentially great significance to the future of jihadi ideological production. This post is the first in a short series of posts I intend to write on this subject for Jihadica. First, let’s look at a translation of the communiqué itself, which is preceded by a statement by the Minbar:

Communiqué by the leader of the Islamic Emirate of the Caucasus Dokku Abu ‘Uthman about the Moscow Explosions

In the name of God, praise belongs to God and prayers and peace upon the messenger of God.

In support of our mujahidin brothers in the Caucasus, we publish this communiqué of which news agencies and satellite channels have not spread anything except that the mujahidin accepted responsibility for the operations. The reasons and justifications the mujahidin mention for perpetrating these operations – the most important of which is the massacre that the Russian intelligence apparatuses have committed with regard to the poor civilians in Chechnya, who do not have anything to feed themselves with nor earn anything except some wild garlic from the woods, where the criminals of the intelligence apparatuses executed a number of them with knives, abusing, maiming and disfiguring their corpses without [their having committed any] offence or crime – all of this and more of the crimes of the Russian regime that the media have not mentioned in the news on the Moscow explosions nor have been mentioned in the communiqué of the emirate [are reasons and justifications for the Moscow attacks]. On the contrary, [the media] were certainly content with the acknowledgement of the explosions by the mujahidin and avoided the justifications [given by the mujahidin] that reveal the crimes of the Putin regime.

That’s why we at the Pulpit of the Unity of God and Jihad see it as our duty to spread this translation [from the original Russian] of the communiqué by the leader of the mujahidin of the Caucasus, Dokku Abu ‘Uthman – may God protect him.

And God prevails in his purpose, but most people do not realise it [Q. 12: 21]

The Shari‘a Committee of the Pulpit of the Unity of God and Jihad

16 Rabi‘ II 1431 AH [1 April 2010 AD]

————————————————————————————–

Praise belongs to God, the lord of all being, prayers and peace upon our Prophet Muhammad, on his family and his companions and on those who follow his right guidance to judgement day.

Peace to all the mujahidin who wage jihad to establish the shari‘a of God in this world.

I am the leader of the mujahidin of the Emirate of the Caucasus, Dokku [Abu ‘Uthman] ‘Umarov. I announce this communiqué on 29 March 2010.

Everyone knows that on 29 March 2010 two operations took place in Moscow. They led to ruin for the unbelievers and they were a special message to the Russian intelligence.

These two operations were done on my specific order and – God willing – they are not the last operations.

With regard to these operations, I want to make clear why we did it:

As we all know, on 11 February, intelligence troops in Chechnya – more specifically, in the district of the village of Arshti – annihilated Muslims from among the poorest and weakest who were gathering wild garlic to keep themselves barely alive and to feed their families, where the criminal special forces of the FSB [the Russian Federal Security Service] killed these innocent civilians with knives and subsequently disfigured their corpses.

These people were indiscriminately annihilated by the Russian intelligence troops, maiming, abusing and ridiculing their slain bodies.

I believe that the operation that was done on my order was not committed against the poor and the weak of the unbelievers because they lived in the heart of Moscow.

That’s why any politician, journalist or person who accuses me of terrorism today because of this act stirs up disapproval and ridicule because I have never heard – not even once – that they accused Putin of terrorism, of killing innocent people and of other crimes like those that took place on 11 February.

I assure all Russians who send their troops into the Caucasus and support the security services that perpetrate bloodbaths that these operations will not be the last.

These operations will continue on your land.

We also declare that another operation will take place in answer to the killing of a group of mujahidin, also on 11 February. God willing, you will hear and see that soon.

That will be done in a different way and on a different scale, God willing.

That’s why I’m letting you know that the war will not be limited, nor will it continue to be watched quietly on your television screens, secluded from the crimes your troops led by Putin have committed on the land of the Caucasus. On the contrary, I am warning you that the war will reach your streets. You will feel it in your lives, in your families, in your spirits and in your skins, God willing.

God is great

The question that arises after reading this communiqué is: why is the Minbar posting a claim of responsibility about metro attacks in Moscow? In fact, why is it posting this statement at all? Isn’t this usually done on jihad forums? To be sure, the Minbar posts communiqués sometimes about various issues, such as statements eulogising “martyrs” (including Abu ‘Umar al-Baghdadi and Abu Hamza al-Muhajir), but posting claims of responsibility is not the site’s specialty at all. What is going on?

To be continued…

A Jihadi-Salafi Case against Hamas

Joas Wagemakers March 23, 2010

In the past few years, an increasing number of news items have focused on the clashes between Hamas in the Gaza Strip and more radical Jihadi-Salafi groups. (For a recent example, see here.) Analyses of these groups have mostly concentrated on their alleged ties with al-Qa‘ida and their criticism of Hamas as being soft (see here, for example) but little is known about their actual ideology. Last year, however, a book giving a detailed ideological critique of Hamas (Al-Qawl al-Asas fi Hukumat Hamas) was released by a Jihadi-Salafi from Gaza called Abu ‘Abdallah al-Maqdisi, not to be confused with Abu l-Nur al-Maqdisi, the leader of Jund Ansar Allah, whose death at the hands of Hamas last year caused a widespread uproar among Jihadi-Salafis. It is not clear how representative this book is of Hamas’ radical opponents’ ideology in Gaza but the arguments are typically Jihadi-Salafi ones and are therefore likely to count for something among these groups.

Democracy and Legislation

As may be expected, the book is highly critical of Hamas’ acceptance of elections and the will of the people at the expense of the will of God. The author argues that the Qur’an states that “judgement belongs only to God alone; He has commanded that you shall not serve any but Him” (Q. 12: 40, transl. Arberry) and that the idea of power to the people is a flagrant violation of this. He takes a stand against all sorts of things he associates with democracy, such as the freedom of religion, freedom of speech, the separation of religion and state, freedom of the press and equality. Interestingly, he also tries to explain that in a democracy, it is the majority that decides on issues and gets its way, even if their point of view is entirely wrong. Although the author wants to say that God’s will should be done, not the majority’s, his dim view of human beings’ ability to do what is right reminded me of a few Greek philosophers that I’m sure the author would not like to be compared with.

In what may be a reference to the previous American administration’s goal of democratisation in Afghanistan and Iraq, the author also tries to frame democracy as inherently linked with “loyalty to the infidel West, world Zionism and the crusader Christianity in Europe”, as well as joining them in “waging wars against Muslims”. Having built up his argument that democracy is not only against God’s will but also involves fighting fellow-believers, he then goes on to quote numerous Hamas leaders stating their support for the people’s will, even if they reject implementing Islamic law (shari‘a).

Hamas’ unwillingness to apply the shari‘a in full is also dealt with in detail. The author cites numerous verses about God’s rule and uses Q. 9: 31 (“they have taken their rabbis and their monks as lords apart from God”, transl. Arberry) to “prove” that following non-Islamic legislation – just like Jews and Christians did by following “their rabbis and their monks” in this verse – actually equals worshipping other gods, thus constituting polytheism. He backs this up with a well-known hadith about ‘Adi b. Hatim, in which the Prophet Muhammad seemingly supports this explanation, in order to emphasise that the Hamas government is nothing but a bunch of infidels who worship other legislative gods.

Jihad

The author then moves on to a subject on which Hamas may be assumed to be beyond reproach, namely its willingness to wage jihad against Israel. Abu ‘Abdallah al-Maqdisi disagrees, however. He lists a number of conditions that must apply for a group of Muslims to be allowed to accept a truce with their non-Muslim enemy, including that it must be negotiated by the rightful imam or his deputy, serve “Islamic interests” and be temporary. He then compares this with Hamas’ cease-fires with Israel and concludes that these come up short. He states that Hamas is an apostate organisation to begin with and may therefore not conclude truces at all. What’s more, Hamas’ cease-fires are all based on man-made laws instead of the shari‘a and the Palestinians – despite being the weakest party – have to make all the concessions, he states. Also, he says, “the Jews” are not going to stick to a truce agreement anyway.

Al-Maqdisi then moves on to scolding Hamas for condemning all kinds of armed attacks, including ones in Saudi Arabia, Britain, Qatar and Egypt, as well as those committed during cease-fires. To add insult to injury, he claims, Hamas does not just reject certain attacks but even actively kills mujahidin and people wanted by Israel. The author presents photographs of Hamas’ bullets and shoeprints from inside mosques supporting their Jihadi-Salafi opponents – hinting at the organisation’s willingness to shoot and wear shoes where that is strictly forbidden in order to crack down on their adversaries – as well as some gruesome pictures of fighters apparently slain by Hamas. All this is supposed to give the impression that Hamas is not only shunning its own duty to wage jihad against Israel but is even trying to disrupt the efforts of those who do fight.

Al-Wala’ wa-l-Bara’

The author’s most interesting topic of the book is perhaps his use of al-wala’ wa-l-bara’ (loyalty to God, Islam and Muslims and disavowal of everything and everyone else). This concept is applied almost exclusively by Salafis, who use it to indicate that Muslims should have total and undivided allegiance to God and Islam in every sphere of life and must not show loyalty – expressed in friendship, help and affection – to “infidels”. Instead, they must disavow everything that may distract them from their devotion to Islam and Muslims, all in order to remain pure in one’s beliefs and lifestyle. Jihadi-Salafis often use the concept to portray relations between Muslim- and non-Muslim states, particularly if these result in alliances against other Muslims, as loyalty to “infidels” who should be disavowed instead.

Considering this interpretation of the concept, it is hard to think of how Hamas can be criticised. After all, the most likely “infidel” state to which Hamas could be accused of expressing loyalty would be Israel, the organisation’s sworn enemy. The author, however, takes an entirely different approach. He claims that Hamas’ frequent attempts to attain national unity mean that it has to co-operate with other Palestinian factions. Although it is left unsaid who those faction are, it is obvious that these include secular as well as Marxist Palestinian parties and organisations. This way, the author accuses Hamas of being loyal to these other, godless Palestinian groups in the name of national unity instead of doing what is best for Islam.

Similarly, Abu ‘Abdallah al-Maqdisi accuses Hamas of being loyal to “apostate” Arab regimes (by allowing them to visit and by having meetings with their leaders), Christians (by congratulating them with their religious holidays) and Shiites (read: Iran and Hizbullah, for co-operating with them and accepting their financial help). All of these forms of loyalty supposedly cause Hamas to deviate from “true” Islam and it is therefore not surprising that the author unambiguously concludes that “there is not the least bit of doubt about the apostasy of the Hamas government”. He specifically accuses “the prime minister, the ministers and the members of parliament” as well as “the different security apparatuses” that are allied to the Hamas government of being apostates as well. Interestingly, however, the author does not call for fighting Hamas since jihad against Israel has a higher priority and “fighting this government will scare people away from the da‘wa (the call to Islam)”.

Un-Palestinian

The latter paragraph might indicate why Jihadi-Salafism is a growing but nevertheless small phenomenon among Palestinians and is likely to remain limited in its influence in the long run: its emphasis on Islam over Palestinian identity, its disdain of national unity in a context where this is sorely needed and its rejection of ties with Iran, Hizbullah and Arab countries when dealing with a group that can hardly afford to lose any of its few friends is not only totally unrealistic and pig-headedly ideological but also rather un-Palestinian. Jihadi-Salafism, being anti-nationalist, proudly raises the banner of Islam over conflicts such as the Palestinian-Israeli one but ignores the strong sense of national identity Palestinians have. This, combined with the fact that these groups are up against a well-established, credible and powerful group like Hamas, means they are unlikely to gain control over the Gaza Strip, let alone the West Bank, any time soon. Unfortunately, that is probably not going to stop them from trying.

Is RAND in Bed with Extreme Takfiris?

Joas Wagemakers February 22, 2010

As regular readers of jihadi literature know, the RAND Corporation is no friend of al-Qa‘ida. Supporters of the latter have a tendency to blame RAND for trying to destroy them and the rest of the world’s Muslims into the bargain. Although RAND is not alone in being perceived by jihadis as an almost conspiratorial observer of every move the jihadis make (West Point’s Counter Terrorism Center, as long-time readers of Jihadica know all too well, is another), it is probably the one that gets criticised most. (If you were not aware of this, see Jarret Brachman’s excellent post on this subject.) Recently, however, one Nur al-Islam posed a question relating to RAND that I had not seen before: Is there a connection between the RAND Corporation and extremists of takfir?

Takfir and takfiris

Takfir, as many readers will know, is the practice of excommunication, i.e. of declaring another Muslim to be an infidel (kafir). Traditionally, Muslim scholars have generally been careful to apply this concept in their dealings with other believers because of the drastic consequences it could have; according to the shari‘a (Islamic law), a Muslim who consciously and willingly abandons Islam or converts to a different religion may be killed. In recent times, many jihadis have argued in favour of a greater application of takfir, applying it to rulers of Muslim countries for not (fully) legislating on the basis of Islamic law. Since many (but certainly not all) jihadis claim applying the shari‘a is part and parcel of being a Muslim, they contend that rulers who refrain from doing so cease to be believers and are, in fact, infidels. Because of this, they subsequently claim that waging jihad against these rulers is legitimate.

According to most Muslim scholars (as well as probably the overwhelming majority of Muslims), this is a rather extreme application of takfir that will only bring about chaos and civil strife. Jihadis who apply takfir this way are therefore often referred to as takfiris or even extremists of takfir (ghulat al-takfir). These labels are fiercely rejected by many jihadis, however, who associate the term ghulat or ghulat al-takfir with Muslims who not only excommunicate political rulers for their failure to apply the shari‘a but also ordinary Muslims who have nothing to do with legislation whatsoever. In some cases, these ghulat even excommunicate entire societies. This latter group of Muslims (i.e. the ones who are willing to apply takfir to large groups of people) is referred to as “the extremists of takfir” even among jihadis and this is also how Nur al-Islam uses the term.

Annihilating global Jihadi-Salafism

One can justifiably wonder what on earth such extremists have to do with RAND. When I first read the title of this piece, I was rather hoping to find a highly intricate and complex reasoning that starts from a ridiculous premise but is nevertheless so logically argued that one is tempted to believe it all as the only possible outcome. This is often the case with jihadi writings, which are sometimes mistakenly dismissed as the rantings of crazy radicals but are actually often cleverly reasoned, despite their horrific message. Although this piece disappointed me in this respect, it is interesting nevertheless.

The author first gives the reader some general information about RAND and continues by stating that the enemy (i.e. RAND) wants to understand its enemy (i.e. jihadis) in order to fight them better. He then goes on, however, to claim that RAND has actively sought the help of other Muslims, including the scholars of al-Azhar in Cairo and the popular Egyptian preacher ‘Amr Khalid, to “annihilate global Jihadi-Salafism”. These were only second choices, however, since the author states that RAND had first asked other, non-violent Salafis to help them with this task but this had failed. He then asks whether RAND’s next step may be to asks extremists in takfir for their help in destroying (the less extreme and supposedly pure) Jihadi-Salafism. The author continues by pointing out that these extremists in takfir not only adhere to extremist teachings but have also done tremendous damage to Jihadi-Salafism by criticising scholars and activists who do stick to the true and correct teachings, like Abu Muhammad al-Maqdisi, Ayman al-Zawahiri and others, including a surprising number of Jordanian Jihadi-Salafis.

Smear campaign

At this point, it becomes clear what the author’s real intention is. He is not at all trying to criticise RAND, as so many jihadis have done before. His real aim is to attack the people he calls extreme takfiris for their criticism of the Jordanian Jihadi-Salafi community supportive of al-Maqdisi. This has been done before, as I have pointed out elsewhere, but Nur al-Islam takes the charge of extreme takfiris to a new level. He claims that, just like RAND tries to destroy Jihadi-Salafism worldwide, so do the extreme takfiris. The author states that these ghulat al-takfir may or may not be aware of RAND’s plans “but unfortunately the result is, in any case, the same”, namely that both of them try to “bring down” Jihadi-Salafism and its leaders.

The author’s seemingly critical piece about RAND thus turns out to be little more than what may be the start of a larger smear campaign against al-Maqdisi’s jihadi enemies. By even suggesting that these supposedly extreme takfiris may possibly be working with the widely-hated RAND, the author tries to undermine their credibility. To me personally, this charge seems a bit too far-fetched to be taken entirely seriously and I therefore doubt whether the accusation will be picked up by like-minded jihadis to frame their opponents as being in bed with RAND. Still, it would be interesting to see if the already impressive array of labels Islamists use to discredit each other is soon going to be joined by another one: Randis.

Midad al-Suyuf and al-Maqdisi: Sworn Enemies?

Joas Wagemakers February 1, 2010

[Editor’s note: I am proud to introduce Joas Wagemakers as our new guest contributor. Regular Jihadica readers will know Joas as the world’s leading expert on Abu Muhammad al-Maqdisi; but as you will discover over the next few weeks and hopefully months, Joas’s expertise extends way beyond the Jordanian ideologue. A lecturer and PhD candidate at Radboud University in Nijmegen, Joas has published widely on jihadi ideology and is a rising star in the Middle East and Islamic studies field.]

In the past, Will (here and here), Brynjar (here) and Thomas (here) have written excellent posts on Jihadica about the Jordanian ideologue Abu Muhammad al-Maqdisi’s credibility problems. Just to refresh everyone’s memory: as a result of al-Maqdisi’s criticism of his former pupil Abu Mus‘ab al-Zarqawi’s extreme use of violence in Iraq in 2004 and 2005, some fellow jihadis accused him of reneging on his earlier, supposedly more radical beliefs and of betraying the mujahidin. This criticism was expressed particularly fiercely on the Midad al-Suyuf forum by contributors such as al-Mihdar, Layth Makka and especially al-Zarqawi’s brother-in-law, Abu Qudama Salih al-Hami.

Abu Qudama, a journalist who worked in the AfPak region during the fighting there in the 1980s, is said to be close to many of the mujahidin who fought there and particularly al-Zarqawi. It therefore seemed safe to assume that the reason for his hostility was al-Maqdisi’s criticism of al-Zarqawi. Abu Qudama’s hostility was expressed in several books, including The Truth of the Conflict between Shaykh al-Maqdisi and the Heirs of al-Zarqawi is Jihad in the Way of God, which were also posted on the Midad al-Suyuf forum, as well as some others. Indeed, if one were to visit the Midad al-Suyuf forum today and go to the “al-Siyasa al-Shar‘iyya” section, it would be easy to find recent threads dedicated to anti-Maqdisi themes. These include threads with titles such as “Why does Abu Qatada remain in prison while al-Maqdisi is released?”, “Shaykh al-Maqdisi is a scholar with the people of ignorance”, “When is al-Maqdisi going to wake up?” and “Al-Maqdisi and the internet… The means to realise the agreed upon goal… or only for fame?” These and other threads are highly critical of al-Maqdisi and make Midad al-Suyuf look like it is obsessed with al-Maqdisi since he criticised al-Zarqawi and doesn’t seem to take him very seriously anymore no matter what he does. Indeed, al-Maqdisi himself has dedicated an article to addressing the hostility he encounters on this particular forum. They give the impression, in other words, of being sworn enemies over their dispute about al-Zarqawi.

This impression may be wrong, however. Strangely enough, as late as 2008 al-Maqdisi’s writings were sometimes posted on the Midad al-Suyuf forum without any commentary or accompanied by praise, occasionally even by people like al-Mihdar, who would later criticise him severely. This change of tone from neutrality or even support for al-Maqdisi to downright hostility cannot be explained by simply pointing to al-Maqdisi’s criticism of al-Zarqawi; after all, this was expressed in 2004 and 2005, implying that if this was the reason, the change in attitude towards al-Maqdisi would have taken place earlier. This raises the question: what caused this change?

Umm Mus‘ab

The reason why Midad al-Suyuf turned sour on al-Maqdisi has a lot to do with the writings by Abu Qudama, which seem to have given the contributors to the forum the information on which they base most of their hostility. In 2007, he wrote a book called Knights of the Absent Duty, in which he describes his experiences with the mujahidin and especially displays his knowledge of al-Zarqawi. In the book, however, he is not very negative about al-Maqdisi at all and even describes his endurance under torture in a Jordanian prison, although he does indicate the differences between al-Maqdisi and his hero al-Zarqawi. Significantly, however, Abu Qudama points out that al-Zarqawi was killed in 2006 by an American attack because the latter’s wife, Umm Mus‘ab, wrote letters to family and friends in either Iraq or Jordan without her husband’s knowledge. He suggests that through these letters, Umm Mus‘ab must have (inadvertently) betrayed al-Zarqawi’s whereabouts, leading the Americans to the place where he was hiding. He states that this is the only way they could have known about this.

This implicit accusation of Umm Mus‘ab was apparently so offensive to al-Maqdisi that he claims to have written a letter to Abu Qudama in which he tells him that he shouldn’t defame Umm Mus‘ab and that this whole story is a lie since al-Zarqawi’s wife was not even in Iraq at the time so she couldn’t have known about her husband’s hiding place. Although al-Maqdisi has several writings on his website that briefly refer to Abu Qudama’s accusation, in none of them does he mention what Abu Qudama actually accuses Umm Mus‘ab of. He states that he didn’t mention this because he didn’t want to defame her any more than Abu Qudama had already done. Perhaps for the same reason, al-Maqdisi’s letter to Abu Qudama is also absent from his website.

According to al-Maqdisi, Abu Qudama got so angry with him over this letter that he started writing books condemning al-Maqdisi. Although he doesn’t say so explicitly, al-Maqdisi may suggest that all of Abu Qudama’s anger towards him isn’t about his criticism of al-Zarqawi at all but simply about his own anger over being reprimanded for supposedly falsely accusing Umm Mus‘ab. Although this information should be treated carefully since I do not know how Abu Qudama feels about this issue, it would explain why the Midad al-Suyuf forum turned increasingly hostile to al-Maqdisi.

This story may come across as nothing more than jihadi gossip. There is, however, some significance to it. Firstly, it shows how much influence one author knowledgeable about jihadis can have on a forum that was initially not unfavourably disposed towards al-Maqdisi. Secondly, it also shows how a man widely viewed as one of the most important radical scholars alive can quickly fall from grace among a small but dedicated group of people if targeted in the right way. Perhaps surprisingly, it appears that for some zealous jihadis al-Maqdisi’s large number of books and his prison credibility seem to count for little.

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