ji·had·ica

Al-Qaida Advises the Arab Spring: Egypt

Joas Wagemakers April 22, 2012

The number of jihadi publications on the Arab Spring is increasing dramatically as the months go by and my time has – as always – been very limited, hence my recent absence from Jihadica. I have several posts about al-Qaida’s advice to the Arab Spring lined up, however, including this one about Egypt.

Scepticism

When one thinks of Egypt and jihadis, the first person that comes to mind is probably Ayman al-Zawahiri. Al-Qaida’s leader has issued many a “letter of hope and good tidings to our people in Egypt” since the beginning of the Arab Spring and although that title may sound as if these epistles contain Christmas greetings to the country’s Coptic community, they offer nothing of the sort.

In part three of his series of letters to the Egyptian people, al-Zawahiri spends most of his time warning his countrymen about the supposedly evil intentions of the United States and their Arab henchmen (“the Arab Zionist rulers of injustice and betrayal”). The US, al-Zawahiri claims, conspires with the rulers of the Arab world to “wage war on Islam and its sharia”, expressed in banning the headscarf, spreading evil and besieging the people of Gaza. All of this happens, of course, under the guise of the “war on terrorism”, al-Zawahiri explains.

Such talk about strong ties between the US and Arab regimes sounds quite familiar, but al-Zawahiri needs it to make his point, which is that current events in Egypt are not going to give Egyptians what they really want: “These international powers and particularly the US”, al-Zawahiri writes, want to “change the old faces for new faces to deceive the people with some reforms and freedoms”. Such token gestures will give people the idea that things are changing but this will actually only serve “the interests of the world powers of arrogance and injustice”. Egypt, al-Zawahiri maintains, “will remain the basis of the Crusader attack and a founding partner in the American war on Islam”.

Al-Zawahiri thus offers nothing but the same old arguments. One could argue that his scepticism is somewhat understandable. Having grown up under the repressive regime of Gamal ‘Abd al-Nasir (Nasser), whose revolution was als0 hailed as a liberation of Egypt at the time, having seen several Egyptian dictators come and go and having suffered from brutal torture in prisons in his own country, one could forgive him from not immediately jumping up and down with glee at seeing the first signs of a revolt. Al-Zawahiri has seen it all before and has been disappointed too many times to believe it all.

Agenda

There may be some truth to the above. Reading the fourth part of his series of letters to the Egyptian people, however, should convince anyone that al-Zawahiri is not so much a sceptic, but rather someone with his own agenda aimed at claiming credit for overthrowing Mubarak. In this letter, he repeats the same stuff mentioned above and then claims that “your mujahidun brothers are with you fighting the same enemy and confronting America and its Western allies that have made [Egyptian President] Husni Mubarak rule over you”. America, he says, is now trying to reverse its previous policy of supporting dictators and currently wants to co-operate with the people. This policy change, he claims, “only came as a direct result of the blessed raids in New York, Washington and Pennsylvania”.

So apparently the Arab Spring came about as a direct result of 9/11 and the US is now on the people’s side. Yet doesn’t that last bit clash with his earlier statement that the US only cares about token reforms and “changing the old faces for new faces” while retaining its own interests? Yes it does, and al-Zawahiri is therefore quick to point out that this revised US policy is something that “is not enough and does not satisfy any noble and free Muslim”. In a seemingly reassuring way, he adds that “your mujahidun brothers […] will continue to strike America and its partners and hurt them until they leave – with God’s permission – the lands of the Muslims and have had enough of supporting the tyrants in these countries”.

Al-Zawahiri pushes his own agenda a bit further by claiming that the problem with Egypt lies in the secularism of its state: “This was not the choice of the Egyptian people”, he states. “On the contrary, the Egyptian people have demanded and have repeated their demand numerous times to have the Islamic sharia as the source of laws and legislation so that Islam is the ruling system in Egypt.” This call for being ruled by Islamic law, al-Zawahiri claims, “is still and has been the demand of the overwhelming majority of the people of Egypt since the 1940s”.

Democracy

Al-Zawahiri’s reasoning is obviously meant to show that the US, by waging a “war on Islam” is going against the will of Egyptians but that he and al-Qaida are actually on the people’s side. In this sense, al-Zawahiri appears to be the real supporter of democracy. He quickly dispels this idea, however, since he explicitly rejects the “democracy that America wants for us, a special democracy for the Third World in general and the Islamic world in particular”. Such American-sponsored democracy, al-Zawahiri states, could be seen in Algeria, when that country cancelled elections in the early 1990s after they had been won by Islamists, or in Gaza, when the world refused to deal with Hamas after it had won elections there.

Al-Zawahiri does not just object to democracy because he associates it with injustice, however. He also claims it is an idol that is worshipped by its followers since they blindly follow what the majority wants, irrespective of what religion says. The majority thus becomes the object of worship instead of religion. As an alternative, the current Egyptian regime should leave and the country should be ruled by a pious, Islamic regime instead. The people will have the right to choose their leaders, al-Zawahiri claims, but obviously within the bounds of the sharia. The misery of the people should be ended, the West should be confronted and the oppression should be lifted “in Palestine, Iraq, Afghanistan and every corner of the world of Islam”. Jihad should therefore be continued until this goal has been achieved.

Peaceful

Unlike al-Zawahiri, who basically extends his old ideas to the new situation created by the Arab Spring, the Syrian-British jihadi scholar Abu Basir al-Tartusi actually comes up with something new. As we saw in my previous two posts in this series (here and here), Abu Basir is much more nuanced and practical than the likes of al-Zawahiri in what he has to say about the Arab Spring and his advice to Egyptians is no exception.

In a response to questions about political participation by radical Islamists in Tunisia and Egypt, Abu Basir states that Muslim youngsters should ensure that any participation in Egyptian politics should be in accordance with the Qur’an and the Sunna as understood by the first three generations of Muslims (al-salaf al-salih). Establishing a political party is allowed, he says, but only if it does not fall into the trap of acting on behalf of party interests instead of those of the Muslim community as a whole. Such remarks may seem nothing special, but considering the widespread opposition to political participation among jihadis, such answers are quite remarkable.

Also worthy of note is Abu Basir’s advice to Egyptians to use peaceful methods, unlike al-Zawahiri who – as we have seen – actually calls for continued jihad. Abu Basir claims that the current circumstances in Egypt (and Tunisia) are dominated by freedom and tolerance and this calls for peaceful means, not violence. “As long as the conflict with others can be fought by words, communiqués and dialogue […] we don’t have to resort to violence”. Abu Basir gives three reasons for this: firstly, he says, there is no need for violence; secondly, Muslims are the strongest in using words “because they posses the strongest arguments”; and thirdly, he claims, a kind approach is more likely to be accepted by others and yield results.

Humanist

Abu Basir is by no means satisfied with the situation as it is in Egypt right now, but he states that at least everyone can agree that it is better than under the tyrants. Muslims should therefore make use of the possibilities that have opened up for them, as long as it accords with Islamic law. Interestingly, Abu Basir explicitly allows political acts of an executive or bureaucratic type and also believes that things that serve the people and society as a whole are permitted. He draws the line, however, at participating in legislation, since coming up with your own laws instead of leaving this to God is, in effect, polytheism by violating God’s absolute unity in the legislative sphere.

This latter bit is familiar ground for jihadis, but Abu Basir’s explicit endorsement of participation in other branches of politics than the legislative branch is quite astonishing. Without changing his earlier views, he reconsiders his beliefs in light of new circumstances and condemns only those things that he believes really need to be condemned, thereby going quite far in accommodating those Muslims who want to participate in politics after the Arab Spring. Abu Basir ends his epistle by saying: “Know that Islam has come for the protection of man and saving him. Its goal is man.” Although this remark should be read in the context of the rest of his epistle, whose contents do not differ all that much from what al-Zawahiri believes, the phrasing itself is quite different and almost makes Abu Basir sound like a humanist alternative to al-Qaida’s leader. Not bad for a jihadi!

Against Palestinian Reconciliation

Joas Wagemakers February 12, 2012

With the recent news of a Palestinian deal between Fatah and Hamas, which is supposed to result in a unity government in which both are represented, a long-standing feud between the two organisations looks like it is coming to an end. (Having said that, the prospects of Palestinian reconciliation have looked hopeful before, only to end in disappointment later on.)

Whatever the outcome may be, it seems obvious that, from a Palestinian point of view at least, the process of reconciliation is a good thing. One might think that this even applies to more radical Islamic groups in the Gaza Strip. Sure, these groups don’t exactly like Hamas and they probably hate the secular Fatah even more, but you might think that even they would agree that Palestinian infighting serves no purpose and that a united opposition against Israel is certainly better. Well, think again. In this post, I will look at a document called Palestinian National Reconciliation in the Balance of the Islamic Shari’a, prepared by the Shari’a Council of the Jama’at al-Tawhid wa-l-Jihad – Bayt al-Maqdis, one of the radical groups in Gaza.

Qur’an and Sunna

While the authors of the document acknowledge that division and conflict is bad and reconciliation and unity is commendable in Islamic tradition, they state that it should happen on certain conditions. One of these is that any reconciliation should conform to the Qur’an and the Sunna (the example of the Prophet Muhammad). Citing verses (Arberry’s translation) Q. 4: 59 (“[…] If you should quarrel on anything, refer it to God and the Messenger […]”), Q. 4: 65 (“But no, by thy Lord! they will not believe till they make thee the judge regarding the disagreement between them […]”) and Q. 42: 10 (“And whatever you are at variance on, the judgment thereof belongs to God”), the authors state that the Qur’an itself calls on Muslims to appeal to God and the Prophet for mediation. Instead, the document claims, Fatah and Hamas base their reconciliation on “man-made law” (qanun wad’iyya) and future “polytheistic elections” (intikhabat shirkiyya), which shows that their efforts are born in sin.

Legislation

This issue of “man-made laws” and elections is taken a step further by the authors, who point to the desired results of the Palestinian reconciliation: forming a new parliament and a government that “judges according something else than what God has sent down”. Citing Q. 42: 21 (“Or have they associates who have laid down for them as religion that for which God gave not leave?”) and Q. 5: 50 (“Is it the judgment of pagandom then that they are seeking? Yet who is fairer in judgment than God, for a people having a sure faith?”), the authors equate such “un-Islamic” legislation with the yasiq, the Mongol system of legislation that combined Islamic, Mongol and other laws–a system Ibn Taymiyya condemned in his day. The authors, unsurprisingly, condemn such a system of laws as “clear unbelief”.

Another bone of contention related to legislation is the authors’ claim that the Palestinian reconciliation is based on international laws and treaties that have been drawn up by international organisations such as the United Nations and the Arab League. Since these are, in the authors’ view, “infidel” organisations themselves, they are not to be followed. Moreover, isn’t the United Nations the organisation that has adopted a string of resolutions “that have destroyed Palestine and have allowed crimes against the Muslims, their houses and their possessions”? The international and regional support this reconciliation enjoys, the document suggests, shows you that it’s utterly wrong.

Recognition

The final obstacle that the authors discern in the Palestinian reconcilliation is the implicit recognition of Israel that it entails. They point out that Muslim scholars agree that jihad is an individual duty (fard ‘ayn) if a non-Muslim enemy occupies as much as an inch of Muslim land. Nevertheless, the authors state, Fatah is not ashamed to proclaim openly that they accept and recognise Israel’s right to exist and its right to live in freedom and security on “the lands occupied in 1948”. This is bad enough to the authors, of course, but Fatah’s reconciliation with Hamas at least implies that the latter will go along with this. Didn’t Hamas’s Khalid Mish’al himself talk about cooperating with Fatah “to realise the shared national goal”, which he mentioned as being the founding of “a free Palestinian state and complete self-determination on the land of the [West] Bank and the [Gaza] Strip with Jerusalem as its capital without any settler”? The authors seem to assume that this is not only a shared goal between Fatah and Hamas but also the latter’s final goal. If it is, the author’s suggest, Hamas is openly violating its duty to wage jihad against Israel.

What is interesting in all of this is the important role legislation plays. Many of the arguments (no recourse to Islamic law in reconciliation, no government on this basis, reliance on international law, support from regimes and organisations that apply “man-made laws”) focus on this issue and only one argument points to Fatah’s more conciliatory stance towards Israel. Only as an afterthought do the authors add the alleged betrayal of Palestinian President ‘Abbas by supposedly encouraging Israel to wage war on Gaza in late 2008 and early 2009. This portrays the Jama’at al-Tawhid wa-l-Jihad – Bayt al-Maqdis as pious and very concerned with doctrine, even to the point of apparently attaching more value to it than to political reconciliation. Whether this is going to be a very popular stance among Palestinians in general is highly doubtful.

Al-Qaida advises the Arab Spring: Libya

Joas Wagemakers January 9, 2012

Unlike the Arab uprising in Syria, which was the subject of my previous post, the one in Libya seems to have reached its end. The regime has been overthrown and Mu’ammar al-Qadhafi and some of his sons are dead. Although it is by no means certain that Libya is on its way to becoming a fully-fledged liberal democracy, the Libyan people have achieved things that most Syrians can still only dream of. In this post, I will look at how some scholars and ideologues associated with al-Qaida responded to the situation in Libya.

The West

One member of al-Qaida Central who responds to the situation in Libya is, perhaps unsurprisingly since he is a Libyan himself, Abu Yahya al-Libi. His comments stress that the United States is “the idol (taghut) of the age” (i.e., the country that other countries “serve”) and “the source of terrorism”. He asks rhetorically: “Isn’t America the one who supported the regime of ‘Husni Barak’, the pharaoh of Egypt, but why is it that today it is singing the praises of the Egyptian people’s freedom?! Aren’t America and the governments of the West the ones who supported and [still] support the despotic regime of ‘Ali ‘Abdallah Salih [in Yemen]? Aren’t America and France the ones who totally supported the tyrannical regime of Zayn al-‘Abidin [in Tunisia] that refused its people the least of their rights?! But why is it that afterwards they praise the people for obtaining their freedom?!”

Powerful stuff indeed. It is not entirely clear, however, how this is related to Libya, with which the United States has long been on very bad terms and for whose regime it therefore cannot really be blamed. The reason for al-Libi’s criticism of the US seems to be that the country has contributed to liberating Libya through NATO, for which many Libyans are supposedly quite grateful, and he may fear that this will lead to a positive image of the West among many Libyans.

NATO’s influence in Libya is also the subject of an “open letter to the Muslims in Libya” by Abu l-Hasan Rashid al-Bulaydi. The author emphasises that it is important to understand that “the Crusader NATO” is not out to help the Muslims but to “fight their religion”. “The Crusader West”, al-Bulaydi says, wants to serve its own interests and NATO aims to “contain your revolution”, give it “a secular identity and a Western spirit” and aim for “loyalty to the enemies of Islam and enmity and war against the jihadi trend”. He therefore advises Libyans to act with wisdom and “not to fear the power of the Crusader West, because God is more powerful”.

Continue fighting

Somewhat in line with the above, several scholars argue that the fighting in Libya may have stopped after the fall of the regime but that it should continue until the country is an Islamic state. The Jordanian radical scholar Abu Humam Bakr b. ‘Abd al-‘Aziz al-Athari, in a short piece entitled “Oh people of success, have you already put down your weapons?”, states that Libyans should “fight for the sake of legislating the heavenly shari’a. That is the goal and for its sake does the upholder of the unity of God (muwahhid) fight till the end.” He cites a tradition about the life of the Prophet Muhammad in which the latter is said to have put down his weapons but was encouraged by the angel Jibril to fight on, which Muhammad subsequently did. This should serve as an example for Libyans today, whom Abu Humam advises not to listen to or try to satisfy NATO since “Jews and Christians will not be satisfied with you until you follow their religion” (Q. 2: 120).

Libya is ideally placed for a continuation of such a fight, argues Abu Sa’d al-‘Amili in a treatise on the revolution in Libya, because the country has certain advantages for mujahidun. First of all, he says, Libyans are conservative people; secondly, it has a “noble jihadi history”; and, thirdly, the country is geographically close to Algeria, where al-Qaida in the Islamic Maghrib (AQIM) has its base. Since Libya is part of the Islamic Maghrib and AQIM also has some Libyan leaders, Abu Sa’d writes, the revolution offers some excellent chances to link up with like-minded radicals in the rest of the region. The application of the shari’a should be the result of the jihad that Muslims in Libya have to wage. This is really necessary because the temporary leaders currently ruling Libya cannot be relied upon. “We cannot imagine”, Abu Sa’d states, “that these liberators [i.e. the revolutionaries who overthrew the regime] will give their loyalty to a gang of unknown secularists who follow the Crusader West to continue the occupation and exploitation of the country in the name of democracy.” NATO, the author writes, did not “participate in striking the military bases of al-Qadhafi to defend the honour of the Libyan people and to save thousands  of likely victims from the brutality of al-Qadhafi and his soldiers”. The West, he says, was involved to serve its own economic and security interests and actually “has a great fear of the Islamic tendency of the revolutionaries”. This, he says, is why there is a transitional council of secularists.

Reconciliation

An entirely different approach to the situation is taken by the Syrian-British Abu Basir al-Tartusi, who also had much to say about Syria. This time, however, we will look at what he wrote on the revolution in Libya. Although he obviously agrees that Libya should become an Islamic state with the shari’a as its only source of legislation, he stresses that the country should work on internal reconciliation. He states that all Libyans are Muslims who love God and the Prophet Muhammad and that jihadis should take care not to create a distance between themselves and the people by saying “these are with us and these are against us, these are with Islam and these are against Islam”. Also, he emphasises that the Libyan people have lived under a tyrannical and infidel leader for over forty years, which means that jihadis are likely to encounter tensions in society. Abu Basir advises jihadi to deal with these with friendliness and wisdom.

Interestingly, Abu Basir not only advises jihadis to take a friendly approach towards the Libyan people as a whole, but also towards the remnants of the regime. He mentions that most of those working for al-Qadhafi’s regime were probably ignorant, poor and forced to cooperate and that they should be dealt with in a spirit of justice and leniency. It is wrong, Abu Basir states, to treat your opponents with the mindset and law of a tyrant. In fact, and quite opposite to men such as Abu Humam al-Athari, Abu Basir advises that people should stop fighting once the regime has fallen and solve conflicts with words and through dialogue. The country is now entering the phase of rebuilding, which is more difficult than fighting. Jihadis therefore need all the wisdom they have to set up an Islamic state in Libya.

Al-Qaida advises the Arab Spring: Syria

Joas Wagemakers November 19, 2011

With the Arab Spring going strong in several countries, al-Qaida (in a broad sense, so including ideologues and scholars supportive of the organisation) still finds it necessary to comment on what is happening. In a series of posts, I will deal with the advice al-Qaida is giving the people of several countries, starting with Syria.

Praise

One of the men “advising” the Syrians currently revolting against the regime of President al-Asad is Ayman al-Zawahiri, the current leader of al-Qaida. In an epistle meant solely to greet, encourage and heap praise on the people he is addressing, al-Zawahiri spends one of the first paragraphs of his letter saying “salamun ‘alaykum” to his audience no fewer than eight times. He addresses them as “the mujahidun who command good and forbid evil”. This seems to be an attempt to claim that al-Qaida-like people are the ones trying to overthrow the Syrian regime, which is a good thing from his point of view because it allows him to create the idea that his organisation is alive and kicking and busy overthrowing “infidel” rulers, as it should be. From the Syrian people’s point of view, however, it is doubtful whether this is going to do them any good. As radical scholar Abu l-Mundhir al-Shinqiti pointed out in a fatwa that I wrote about in a previous post, it may actually be more advisable for Syrian jihadis to lay low, not giving the regime any extra excuse to crack down on them with the argument that the demonstrators are, in fact, terrorists. Al-Zawahiri doesn’t seem to realise this, urging his audience to tell President al-Asad that he is “a partner in the war on Islam in the name of terrorism and a protector of the borders of Israel”. Even more explicitly – in a phrase that sounds better in Arabic than it does in English – he tells them to say to al-Asad: “We have broken the shackles of fear and smashed the prison of weakness. The free [men] of Syria and its mujahidun have decided that they will live as honourable people and die as martyrs (ya’ishu a’izza’ wa-yamutu shuhada’).”

Al-Zawahiri also keeps going on about the supposedly strong American ties to the Syrian regime. He states that “America, which has co-operated with Bashar al-Asad throughout his reign, now claims that it is on your side”. He advises the Syrian protestors to say to the U.S. and President Obama that “we are the sons of the conquerors, the offspring of the mujahidun and the heirs of the murabitun (fighters operating from garrison cities).” The battle fought against the Syrian regime, al-Zawahiri claims, will obviously continue until “we raise the banners of victorious jihad” over Jerusalem. How exactly this is to be achieved in the face of a brutal regime that is not afraid to kill thousands of its own people is not entirely clear.

Syrian sectarianism

A more rational and level-headed approach is taken in another document, this one by Abu Basir al-Tartusi, a scholar living in London who is in no way part of the core leadership of al-Qaida but is one of the major thinkers reponsible for the organisation’s ideology. The originally-Syrian Abu Basir is churning out writings on Syria faster than you can say “the people want to topple the regime”, which may force me to dedicate another post to this country. In any case, Abu Basir wouldn’t be a true Salafi if he didn’t start by criticising the sect of the al-Asad family, the ‘Alawites, which Salafis (and, to a lesser extent, Sunnis in general) view as deviant or even infidel. He claims that they – among other things – are batinis (i.e. people who believe the Qur’an has an inner, esoteric meaning apart from its outer, exoteric meaning), idol worshippers and people who claim that caliph ‘Ali b. Abi Talib is God.

These ‘Alawites, Abu Basir claims, do not care about their homeland, or about its citizens. They have never amounted to anything and have never given any thought to what the people need. Abu Basir claims that the Syrian sectarian system is largely to blame for this, probably because the large number of sects and the differences between them encourage their members to act only on behalf of their own group, at the expense of loyalty to the country and the people as a whole. As a result, this regime has only brought awful things such as destruction, division and poverty. Surprisingly, however, given Abu Basir’s views of ‘Alawites in general, his approach is nuanced enough to distinguish between ‘Alawites who are part of the governing circle of President al-Asad and the majority of ‘Alawites, who suffer from poverty just like other Syrians. His wrath is therefore directed towards the regime and he thus advises the Syrian people to unite and express only one demand: the fall of the regime. Raising any other demand, Abu Basir claims, would be quite unwise, presumably because he realises that Syrians are not united enough to form a coalition on the basis of any demand other than the fall of the regime.

Practical advice

In two other writings (here and here), Abu Basir continues about the situation in Syria and stresses the need for peaceful resistance but also the legitimacy of self-defence. The regime, he says, has killed or wounded tens of thousands of people and the latter should therefore learn how to protect themselves by setting up security committees that can defend the protestors. These committees, he states, should not participate in demonstrations or in any peaceful activities, so as not to give the regime an extra reason to crack down on protestors. Abu Basir also wants “the noble free officers” (i.e. the ones that abandoned the regime’s army) to increase in number, expand their military activities and co-ordinate them with the aforementioned security committees.

Apart from advising the Syrian people on using non-peaceful methods, he tries to convince them that violence is justified. While he keeps stressing that peaceful resistance is good and commendable, he fails to see its use after so much bloodshed and scolds Syrians for refusing even to take violent means into consideration after it has become clear that sit-ins and other peaceful means have proved useless. He encourages the people to obtain arms and even quotes a verse from the Qur’an about military preparedness to underline the legitimacy of the use of violence. After having compared the Syrian regime with the French colonialism of the past, he wonders what the difference between the two of them really is and calls on the remnants of the army to fear God and take their responsibility towards Syria and its people by defending them and their honour “against the imperialism of the sectarian regime of al-Asad”.

If and how this advice is accepted by Syrians in general and jihadis in particular is unclear. What is clear from Abu Basir’s writings, however, is that he obviously cares about Syria. The tone of his work here is not one of fighting against “infidel” rulers who fail to apply the shari’a but much more one of concern for his native land, which he even refers to as “the beloved Syria”. Whether this is also the case with other commentators “advising” demonstrators in other countries is something I intend to explore in future posts.

Defending Failure in Gaza (Part 2)

Joas Wagemakers September 9, 2011

As we saw in the previous installment of this short series on jihadis in the Gaza Strip, the leader of the Jama’at al-Tawhid wa-l-Jihad, Abu al-Walid al-Maqdisi, was pretty defensive about his organization’s actions in his answers to questions from visitors of the Shumukh al-Islam forum. The rest of his answers indicate that the group may have grandiose plans and plenty of enemies against whom these may be applied but that in the end they are not really capable of living up to their own rhetoric.

Interestingly, one of the things Abu al-Walid mentions as – unfortunately – being an impossibility is expanding his activities to the Sinai desert in order to give his organization more strategic depth. This is the case because of “the heavy security oppression on everyone who is thought to have even the slightest link to Jihadi-Salafism” (question no. 16). Recent attacks on Israel possibly coming from this area suggest that this situation may have changed. The revolution in Egypt has made the security situation in the Sinai desert less strict, perhaps allowing groups such as Abu al-Walid’s to obtain the breathing space they so desperately need. When answering his readers’ questions in late 2010, however, none of this had occurred yet. Nevertheless, they provide context for the group’s actions today:

(more…)

Defending Failure in Gaza (Part 1)

Joas Wagemakers August 18, 2011

Will’s latest post suggested that at least one jihadi is quite critical of what al-Qa’ida is doing regarding the Palestinian question. Well, he’s not the only one. Late last year, the Shumukh al-Islam forum published a book of its Q&A sessions with a jihadi leader from Gaza, namely Abu l-Walid al-Maqdisi, the amir of the Jama’at al-Tawhid wa-l-Jihad and a member of the Shari’a Council of the Minbar al-Tawhid wa-l-Jihad. While most questioners praised Abu l-Walid and wished him well, many also asked critical questions that forced Abu l-Walid to defend what essentially boils down to his group’s failure to achieve any substantial successes. In a short series of posts, I intend to work my way through this book, thereby providing insight into the problems that jihadis in the Gaza Strip face.

Unity

The book has about 160 pages (there’s no pagination) and contains 292 questions. What is interesting is that a large number of them refer to the unity (or, rather, the lack thereof) among jihadi groups in the Gaza Strip; in fact, the very first question deals with this. Abu l-Walid doesn’t really get much further than saying there are efforts to unify groups from Gaza and that this has been discussed a lot. He stresses that jihadis in Gaza are suffering from a difficult security environment – presumably because of both Hamas and Israel – and that this hampers efforts to unify the groups.  Abu l-Walid might be right that the “servants of God” are weak because of the repression by “the enemies of God from among the Jews, the lords of secularism and the propagandists of democracy” (response to question no. 9), but it does not explain why jihadi groups are still working separately. Abu l-Walid later adds (in response to question no. 7) that the reasons for this lack of unity among jihadi groups in Gaza has nothing to do with major differences in ideology, and he even admits that there is no real Islamic legal obstacle that prevents them from uniting. They just have legitimate differences that keep them separate.

The fact that this question is repeated so often – with Abu l-Walid repeatedly referring back to his previous two answers – indicates that many questioners have strong feelings about it and are perhaps frustrated that the different groups have not united. One can hardly blame them. Apart from general factors, such as belonging to the same people and speaking the same language, the different jihadi groups operate in a relatively small piece of territory that they necessarily have to share; they have two common enemies (Israel and Hamas); and they share the same ideology. Given these circumstances, it is easy to see why many questioners are apparently frustrated at the lack of unity among them.

Hamas

Things are not looking up vis-à-vis Hamas, the ruling power in the Gaza Strip, either. Abu l-Walid states that cooperation between Hamas and Fatah can only increase the security pressure on jihadi groups since Fatah is experienced in cracking down on organizations and has the power and the means to do it (question no. 11).

Considering the jihadis’ apparent lack of fighting against Israel (see Will’s post again), one might assume that Abu l-Walid is a strong advocate of fighting Hamas, but he’s not. In response to a questioner asking why there are no military operations against the Hamas government, “knowing that most Salafi movements excommunicate this government,” Abu l-Walid states that the time is not ripe for that yet, given the weakness of the jihadi groups at the moment (question 14).

Beyond Gaza

The weakness argument is used often by Abu l-Walid, including to defend his group’s decision not to engage in activities beyond the Gaza Strip. He describes his group as “small” (question no. 18) and states that the security situation on the West Bank is difficult because of the “coalition” between “the [Palestinian] Authority and the Jews” (question no. 19).

One reader nevertheless advises Abu l-Walid to leave Gaza altogether: “Don’t you agree with me”, this questioner asks, “that Palestine has never been liberated throughout history except from the outside and not from within?” Abu l-Walid retorts that it is indeed difficult but not impossible and that patience, preparation, education, mobilizing people’s efforts, and setting up cadres are needed to make it work (question no. 35).

Whether these defensive answers are enough to satisfy Abu l-Walid’s readers is what we will see in the next installment of this series.

To be continued…

Jihadi Dilemmas in Syria

Joas Wagemakers May 3, 2011

A few days ago, it was reported that Abu Muhammad al-Maqdisi, the radical Jordanian ideologue, had issued a fatwa supporting the revolts in Syria (see here, here and here, for instance). This struck me as odd, since al-Maqdisi has been in prison since September 2010 and has been quiet ever since, presumably because the prison authorities do not allow him to write anything. A quick look at the relevant page on his website, however, reveals that it was not al-Maqdisi himself who wrote the fatwa, but Abu l-Mundhir al-Shinqiti, a member of the Shari’a Council of al-Maqdisi’s website. Despite the obvious mix-up by several media, the fatwa itself is nevertheless quite interesting and worth another look.

Syria

Al-Shinqiti has already expressed his enthusiasm for the recent protests in Egypt (see for example Brynjar’s post) but, as the revolutions keep on coming, the questions posed to scholars such as al-Shinqiti become more nuanced. This time, a jihadi from Syria is not only wondering whether it is allowed to participate in protests against the regime of Syrian dictator Bashar al-Asad but he has several more complicated queries. The questions that engendered this fatwa are actually more interesting than the answers because the former provide insight into the dilemmas that jihadis in Syria have to deal with and how at least some of them are apparently weighing the pros and cons of joining the protests.

First, the jihadi wants to know whether it is allowed to participate in peaceful protests against the regime, knowing that the regime will try to kill or arrest the protesters without giving the jihadis any chance to defend themselves. Al-Shinqiti answers that the protests are undoubtedly legitimate and even if some people die during these demonstrations, that will be better than the continuation of the regime. He also encourages the jihadis to engage in violent protests against the regime if necessary but acknowledges in his answer to question no. 6 further down that they don’t have the strength and the numbers to be a match for the Syrian regime.

Dilemmas

The most interesting questions start with number 2. In this question, the jihadi states that most of the slogans used by the protesters in Syria focus on national unity, which the jihads consider an un-Islamic (kufr) idea and they therefore find it difficult to shout these slogans along with the rest of the demonstrators. Al-Shinqiti answers that such slogans are indeed against the shari’a but not “un-Islamic”. Muslim protesters should, in his view, participate with the other  demonstrators but shout their own, shari’a-compliant slogans.

Perhaps most interesting of all are questions no. 3 and 5, which state that most Salafis in Syria today participate in the protests because they want to get rid of the regime, even if the alternative is democracy. The latter may be a godless system but at least it offers the possibility of greater religious freedom and more opportunities to proselytize. Still, the questioner is worried that the protests will not lead to a caliphate but to a new system based on international law. Al-Shinqiti, who is clearly no supporter of democracy, agrees that the fall of the Syrian regime may lead to a democracy but that this may also lead to greater freedoms to proselytize which, in turn, could pave the way for the implementation of the shari’a. Moreover, he writes, one should distinguish between bringing down the regime and creating a democracy. The former is good, the latter bad. As long as Muslims stick to good things, they’ll be alright. They should not refrain from participating in attempts to overthrow the regime to avoid the democratic system that may replace it. For the moment, the goals of the democratic and the jihadi protesters are one, even if their ultimate goals differ.

Related to this issue is question no. 7, in which the jihadi wonders whether a person who gets killed during the protests is a martyr (shahid). Al-Shinqiti states that if such a person had the right intention (niyya) to do what is right and to alleviate repression from himself and the Muslims, he may indeed be considered a martyr.

Excuse for repression

One reason often given by Arab dictators for their brutal rule is that their opponents are dangerous terrorists and that the West is better off with a brutal yet predictable tyrant than with unruly and overzealous religious extremists. Syrian president al-Asad has also used this argument to delegitimize the current protesters, which our  jihadi questioner is aware of. He states that using religious slogans during the protests will provide the regime with a powerful argument to blame the unrest on the Muslim Brotherhood and al-Qa’ida and subsequently begin an armed conflict against them. Al-Shinqiti acknowledges the dilemma and advises to stick to bland religious slogans, such as Allahu akbar, and to stay close to the other protesters so as not to give the regime the ability to distinguish between religious and secular demonstrators.

For those who read Brynjar’s post on al-Shinqiti’s candid and at times even nationalist talk on the revolution in Egypt, the rather pragmatic views expressed above will not come as a surprise: this jihadi scholar is encouraging his like-minded brethren in Syria to participate in mostly peaceful protests by reform-minded people of all stripes, to co-operate with democrats in bringing down the regime and even sympathizes with their unwillingness and inability to use violence at the moment. Such careful reasoning is certainly no exception among radical scholars and it stresses once again that jihadis are not mindless extremists bent solely on death and destruction but are keenly aware of their surroundings and quite able to adapt to difficult circumstances. This is a sobering and important thing to keep in mind amidst the cheering and celebrating over Osama bin Laden’s death today.

A Crash Course in Jihadi Theory (Part 4)

Joas Wagemakers February 14, 2011

As we saw in the previous parts of this series, the Shari’a Council of the Jama’at al-Tawhid wa-l-Jihad in Gaza wrote a book that can be described as a “crash course” in jihadi theory. In part 1, I described how the council used the term taghut (idol, pl. tawaghit) to accuse the rulers of the Muslim world of unbelief and why they were adamantly against both democracy and secularism. In part 2, we saw that the council believes Muslim rulers should be overthrown because of their man-made legislation but that something beneficial for Muslims should replace them, with the obvious favourite being a truly Islamic imamate of course. Finally, in part 3 it became clear that, its radicalism notwithstanding, the council did not believe any sinful Muslim should simply be fought by means of jihad but that one should be careful in applying takfir (excommunication). The “infidel” rulers, though, should preferably be fought since they cannot possibly claim ignorance of the major tenets of Islam that they are apparently violating so clearly.

Loyalty

This final part of the series on the council’s “crash course” deals with several subjects that are closely related to previous ones. The first of these is “loyalty” (wala’), which the authors state Muslims should always show towards each other but never towards non-Muslims, whom they should stay away from through disavowal (bara’). The concept of al-wala’ wa-l-bara’, the authors state, is “among the most prominent beliefs” of Islam. The authors distinguish between tawalli to “infidels”, which is a form of wala’ that is kufr akbar (major unbelief, which expels the culprit from Islam), and muwalat, which only amounts to kufr asghar (minor unbelief, which is sinful but does not expel one from Islam). This way, the authors link up their description of al-wala’ wa-l-bara’ with the various types of kufr dealt with in other parts of their book (see here).

The authors move on to describe what forms of wala’ to non-Muslims amount to tawalli (and therefore justify takfir and jihad) and what forms are simply muwalat, which do no just legitimise such measures. Not surprisingly, the “sins” that irritate the council most (the rulers’ support for non-Muslims and their adherence to “un-Islamic” legislation) are in the more serious tawalli category, while relatively minor issues such as resembling non-Muslims in manners and celebrations are only labelled muwalat. Thus, the authors again use their interpretation of a new concept (in this case al-wala’ wa-l-bara’) to show that their views on the unbelief and “un-Islamic” legislation of the rulers are completely accurate.

The “Abodes”

The next section of the book deals with an age-old subject, namely “the abode of Islam” (dar al-Islam) and “the abode of unbelief” (dar al-kufr). While most readers of Jihadica will be familiar with these terms (or similar ones such as dar al-iman and dar al-harb), the authors specify them in a way that seems much too detailed for a “crash course”. They define “the abode of Islam” as the land where Islamic legislation and power rule supreme, even if the majority of its inhabitants are non-Muslims; “the abode of unbelief”, on the other hand, is the land where “infidel” rules are applied, even if Muslims are the majority of its population. This latter term is specified into three different terms: the original abode of unbelief (dar al-kufr al-asli), such as the U.S. and Europe; the unusual abode of unbelief (dar al-kufr al-tari’), which was once under Muslim rule but not anymore, such as Spain and Israel; and the abode of apostasy (dar al-ridda), which obviously includes Muslim countries whose rulers have supposedly abandoned Islam.

The authors continue by distinguishing a number of other “abodes”: the dar al-kufr may, for example, be dar al-harb (the abode of war) or dar al-‘ahd (the abode of the treaty). The former is obviously a country or part of the world that is formally at war with the Muslims while the latter is not dar al-Islam but has established a treaty with it, hence its name. In order to complicate things further, the authors add – crisscrossing the abodes already distinguished – “the abode of security” (dar al-amn) and “the abode of chaos” (dar al-fitna), referring to the lands where Muslims are safe and those where they are not, respectively. The council comes up with more terms and asks questions such as: “Can the dar al-kufr become dar al-Islam and vice versa?” The answer is obviously “yes”, since even cities such as Mecca and Medina once used to be part of the dar al-kufr and, considering the allegedly “infidel” nature of the Saudi regime, may be so again.

Emigration and International Relations

Strongly related to the different “abodes” is the question of emigration (hijra) from one abode to the other. The authors state that, with regard to Islamic law, hijra can be described as either a) moving from the dar al-kufr or dar al-fitna to the dar al-Islam or dar al-amn; or as b) moving away from one’s sins and starting a new and more pious life. Concentrating on the former, the council discusses whether hijra from the dar al-kufr to the dar al-Islam is compulsory (wajib), deplorable (mandub), neither, or forbidden (muharram). This is a complicated discussion that not only involves texts but also questions such as whether Muslims are able to “show Islam” (izhar al-din) in the lands in which they live. Since exact definitions of what “showing” Islam really means are often lacking, the authors simply provide all points of view, showing that there is no clear-cut answer but that each situation needs to be looked at separately.

Expanding further on the distinction between the two abodes, the council states that international relations in Islam are really about conflict and that war is actually the basis of the ties between the dar al-Islam and the dar al-kufr. There can be treaties between the two abodes, as mentioned above, but there can never be true peace. It should perhaps be mentioned that this discussion on the different abodes, how they should interact and what Muslims living in the West should do is obviously not only relevant to jihadis but is also frequently discussed by more irenic Muslim scholars in the U.S. and Europe as well as the Muslim world itself. Unlike the latter group of thinkers, the members of the council claim that war is the constant state in which the two abodes exist and come up with a large number of verses from the Qur’an such as Q. 2: 193 (“Fight them, till there is no persecution is God’s”) that they believe support this claim.

Coherence

The rest of the “crash course” deals with “miscellaneous subjects,” such as whether photography is allowed or not, but does not go into any depth on either of them. Of course, detailed analysis was probably never the intention of the authors since this book can, after all, justifiably be called a “crash course”. The strength of the book therefore lies not so much in its comprehensive treatment of the topics dealt with but in its clear-cut answers, the fact that it’s to-the-point and offers lots of seemingly convincing evidence. As such, the book displays a great deal of ideological coherence, making this “jihadi catechism” perhaps more dangerous than it looks.

From the Pen to the Sword

Joas Wagemakers January 3, 2011

One of the things that struck me about the Stockholm bomber, Taimour Abdalwahhab, was that he was apparently active on the internet as a radical before he decided to engage in actual terrorism (see Thomas’ posts below for more details). This transition reminded me of a similar but much more serious process by someone who also moved from “jihad by the pen” to “jihad by the sword”: Abu Dujana al-Khurasani, the Jordanian former internet-jihadi turned suicide bomber who killed several CIA-agents in his attack on an American base in Khost, Afghanistan, on 30 December 2009.

The attack in Khost, which took place exactly a year ago, led many to praise al-Khurasani for his supposed heroism, his willingness to move from cyber-jihadism to an actual suicide bombing and his loyalty to the cause. A few months ago, an e-book was released by the Jihadi Media Elite (Nukhbat al-I’lam al-Jihadi) that not only continues this praise but also contains dozens of articles about al-Khurasani and provides all the writings and recordings by the man himself as well: Abu Dujana al-Khurasani: The Hero of the Jihadi Media and the Destroyer of the Intelligence Services (only the link to the e-book works).

Jihadi historiography

The book is obviously hagiographic, but that doesn’t make it less interesting since it gives the jihadi version of things and, as such, can be seen as jihadi historiography. Al-Khurasani is described as a hero who, after having become a physician in Jordan and marrying a Turkish wife, becomes a prominent member on the Hisba jihadi forum, which eventually leads to his arrest by the Jordanian security service. While the latter start using him as a spy to work for them in Afghanistan, al-Khurasani is described as cleverly turning on his masters by secretly working for the Mujahidun who he is supposed to help combat. His suicide bombing is portrayed as extremely important because it supposedly struck very senior officials within the CIA. The subsequent American statement that “the seven American officers that were killed in Khost were among the finest officers in the entire world” is held up as proof of this.

Another part of the book lists numerous statements by various people, ranging from American CIA-officials to jihadi ideologues, who indicate the impact al-Khurasani has had or praise him. A recurring theme that is left implicit but is nevertheless striking is the oft-mentioned transition al-Khurasani made from the Hisba forum to actual military action. Although he quite possibly saw no other way out than to cooperate with the Jordanian authorities, only to turn on them when he got in touch with al-Qa’ida, he is implicitly described in the book as someone who gradually worked his way from his keyboard to his bombing-belt.

An exemplary life

One cannot escape the thought that the Jihadi Media Elite released this book for more reasons than just to praise al-Khurasani. For one thing, the editors present him as a sign that al-Qa’ida is still alive and kicking. More important, however, is that they seem to believe that al-Khurasani lived not only a pious but also an exemplary life. Although I have not found any explicit reference to this in the book, the editors may well be presenting al-Khurasani as a hero precisely because they know there are many people who, like him before his transition to actual military action, are simply armchair jihadis only engaged in commenting on forums without joining the Mujahidun in Afghanistan or elsewhere.

The alleged stimulus that the editors want to provide for other would-be jihadis sitting at home to take up arms and wage jihad is not uncontroversial. For example, a fatwa from 2009 (responding to a questioner who happens to be from Afghanistan) states that a person capable of waging military jihad may still dedicate himself to cyber-jihad if that is where he is needed. While the editors may not necessarily disagree with this, it does seem that they – under the guise of praising one of al-Qa’ida’s heroes – may have released this book to stimulate other participants on jihadi forums to follow al-Khurasani’s example. Whether the latter will do so remains to be seen.

A Crash Course in Jihadi Theory (Part 3)

Joas Wagemakers November 24, 2010

In the first part of this series on a book written by the Shari’a Council of the Jama’at al-Tawhid wa-l-Jihad in Gaza, we saw that its authors were highly critical of the rulers of the Muslim world and employed their Islamist terminology to accuse these rulers of kufr (unbelief), the details of which are dealt with in the second part of this series. Knowing this, you might expect the Council’s treatment of excommunication (takfir) to deal entirely with the legitimacy of excommunicating Muslim rulers and why they may be called “infidels” and expelled from Islam. Well, this is actually not the case. Apparently, the authors believed they had made a strong enough case against Muslim rulers in the previous chapters because chapter 4 is virtually entirely dedicated to giving a theoretical description of what takfir is, what its conditions and obstacles are and when it may or may not be applied. Perhaps surprisingly for a group advocating takfir of Muslim presidents, kings and (prime) ministers, they come across as extremely careful in applying the practice of excommunication.

Conditions and obstacles

Although this book is by no means the most detailed study on takfir in existence, it is pretty meticulous for a “crash course”. The authors define takfir as “the judgement against a Muslim to expel him from the religion of Islam for his kufr belief, speech or action”. (These latter words show that the authors adhere to what one may refer to as the orthodox Islamic idea that faith (iman) is found in one’s beliefs, one’s speech and one’s actions. Muslim scholars have had some extremely interesting debates on this issue for centuries but most seem to have settled on this position.) Then, the authors start by mentioning the conditions that have to be met before one can apply takfir to another Muslim: the Muslim supposedly guilty of unbelief should be legally capable of being charged with this (i.e. he should be an adult in his right mind), it should be clear that he actually intended to act in the sinful way he did and he must have acted out of his own free will. Moreover, the act of alleged kufr is also subject to certain conditions. There should be a clear indication that it’s really about unbelief and there should be some proof of that.

After listing some more conditions, the authors mention that there are also certain obstacles to takfir that must be overcome in order to apply it. If a Muslim is forced to commit a sin that can be classified as unbelief, takfir may not simply be applied to him, nor can this be the case when the supposed sinner simply made a mistake. The culprit may also have made a wrong interpretation, leading to honest and well-intended but faulty conclusions. In none of these cases may takfir be applied. The same is the case, the authors claim, if the allegedly sinful deed is unclear, if the evidence against it is not full-proof or if the witnesses who claim a Muslim committed a sin are unreliable. Although the authors make clear that takfir is not a dirty word, that it has firm roots in Islam and that none of these conditions and obstacles should make the reader excuse Muslim rulers for their supposed unbelief, the overall impression one gets from reading all this is that the book’s authors are relatively careful not to apply takfir too broadly. Much of the chapter is dedicated to keeping people from applying the concept and the authors even list a number of “widespread mistakes” regarding takfir, which include declaring entire (Muslim) societies to be “infidel” or excommunicating people who do not belong to a certain group or organisation.

Ignorance

At this point, the reader might wonder: is it really reasonable to expect supposedly apostate Muslim rulers to know all of this? In other words, if President Husni Mubarak, King ‘Abdallah II, President Bashar al-Asad and their colleagues simply don’t know about the precise details of what constitutes kufr, might their ignorance (jahl) perhaps excuse them? This is the subject of chapter 6 of the book, which discusses what jahl is and when ignorance can be used by a Muslim to excuse his supposedly sinful behaviour. If he didn’t know certain acts or words were sinful, how can he be blamed for them?

The authors of the book define jahl in this case as “not knowing about Islamic legal rulings and their underlying precepts”. They claim there are two schools of thought regarding ignorance as an excuse for kufr: those who do not accept jahl as an excuse at all (associated with early-Islamic extremist groups such as the Khawarij) and those who accept ignorance as an excuse without looking at the context. The right way to think about this subject lies, of course, somewhere between these two extremes. Although the subject is too complicated to deal with in detail here, a highly important point about this issue is whether the person using ignorance as an excuse has been reached by a messenger bringing the message of Islam or not. If they have not, jahl may excuse their sinful deed. If they have been reached by such a messenger, however, they cannot claim ignorance since they were given the chance to learn about Islam.

The authors are careful to point out that – and this is where their true political colours come shining through again – jahl cannot be used as an excuse in cases where a Muslim claiming ignorance is actively shunning the search for Islamic knowledge, has been reached by a messenger bringing the message of Islam, has been in contact with missionary activities etcetera. Although it is not pointed out very specifically, it is clear that the political leaders these radicals are so adamantly against have all the Islamic literature they could possibly wish at their disposal, making them utterly unable to claim ignorance of Islam as an excuse for their “infidel” actions.

By dealing specifically with ignorance and its inapplicability in certain situations as an excuse for kufr, the authors implicitly return to their original premise that the rulers of the Muslim world are apostates and are indeed worthy of the judgement of takfir, in spite of their carefulness to express this. How this is connected to other themes will be dealt with in the next installment of this series.

To be continued…

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