ji·had·ica

Al-Qaida Advises the Arab Spring: The Case for al-Baghdadi

Joas Wagemakers September 21, 2013

The once fledgling Islamic State of Iraq has appeared to be going strong again since its leader, Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi, merged it with the jihadi efforts in Syria to become the Islamic State of Iraq and al-Sham (ISIS). Although this merger was apparently rejected by Abu Muhammad al-Julani, the leader of the Syrian Jabhat al-Nusra, at first, things now seem to be going smoothly. (See here for a recent report on Syria’s military opposition, by the way.)

Since the start of the ISIS in April of this year, much support for this state and al-Baghadi has been expressed among jihadis across the world. Not everybody seems to be convinced, however, and apparently some still see the need to criticise al-Baghdadi as a proper leader of the ISIS. For this reason, Abu Hummam Bakr b. ‘Abd al-‘Aziz al-Athari, one of the scholars who used to be on the Shari’a Council of the Minbar al-Tawhid wa-l-Jihad (and in theory still is) but now just publishes random articles every now and then, has written a tract in which he makes the case for swearing fealty to al-Baghdadi. As such, it gives interesting insight into the question of leadership of an Islamic state.

The man

Al-Athari starts his case by singing the praises of al-Baghdadi’s background. First of all, he writes, Abu Bakr al-Qurashi al-Husayni al-Baghdadi is a direct descendant of the Prophet Muhammad himself. Although this does not guarantee in any way that jihadis will like you – just think of the Jordanian and Moroccan royal families, who also claim to descend from Muhammad – it does give honorary status to al-Baghadi, which al-Athari stresses by citing hadiths in which the Prophet’s family is lauded.

Apart from al-Baghdadi’s family background, he is also a scholar of Islam according to al-Athari, having obtained an MA-degree in Qur’anic studies and a PhD in Islamic jurisprudence (fiqh) and having written a book on tawhid (the unity of God). This comination of Islamic knowledge and Prophetic descent makes him a special man indeed, al-Athari claims.

The mujahid

Al-Baghdadi’s qualities cannot just be found in his person, but also in his activities as a jihad fighter. He has taught at several mosques in Iraq, where he also served as an imam and preacher, al-Athari states, and he has led several jihadi groups. He is also a member of the Majlis al-Shura (consultation council) of the mujahidun and heads the shari’a and judicial councils of the Islamic State in Iraq.

Besides mentioning the many jobs al-Baghdadi has, al-Athari stresses that his leadership of ISIS was achieved through the pledge of fealty by the state’s Majlis al-Shura and the scholars in it, who agreed that al-Baghdadi should succeed the previous two leaders, Abu ‘Umar al-Baghdadi and Abu Hamza al-Muhajir, to become the new amir.

In his various capacities, al-Baghdadi has actively resisted the American invasion of his country “against his religion and his honour” and was instrumental in setting up and organising the Islamic State of Iraq, which was ruled on the basis of the Qur’an and the Sunna, al-Athari claims.

Throughout the period that preceded his leadership, al-Athari states, al-Baghdadi tried hard to listen to people, both young and old, in order to make Islamic rule pleasant for them. As such, he met with tribal representatives, jihadi groups and militias and called on all of them to pledge fealty to his predecessor.

The amir

Despite the man’s alleged abundant qualities, al-Athari dedicates several pages to “proving” that al-Baghdadi is indeed suitable for the job of amir. He lists ten conditions for leadership: the amir should be male, free, an adult, sound of mind, just, courageous, a descendant of the Prophet Muhammad’s Quraysh tribe, knowledgeable and suitable to lead the umma and serve its interests. Suffice to say, al-Athari believes that al-Baghdadi fits all the criteria.

Al-Athari then asks whether someone can actually be a good amir if not all Muslims have pledged fealty to him. He answers in the negative, stating that only the scholars responsible for this, the ahl al-hall wa-l-‘aqd, need to swear their loyalty to him and even they needn’t necessarily all agree on this. The idea that all members of the ahl al-hall wa-l-‘aqd should give their pledge of fealty (bay’a) to the amir is a Mu’tazilite idea, al-Athari claims, and the notion of popular support is derived from the concept of democracy. It will come as no surprise that al-Athari rejects both.

The fact that scholars from areas conquered by the ISIS may not necessarily endorse al-Baghdadi’s rule is no problem, al-Athari writes. These areas were not ruled by the shari’a, so the fact that al-Baghdadi’s state controls them now is great in and of itself, but even if these areas had been under shari’a rule, the consensus of the scholars is that the new ruler should be obeyed. The idea that al-Baghdadi is unknown to people and that this may hamper his ability to rule is false, al-Athari states, since he is not unknown at all. Even if this were the case, however, this would pose no problem to his leadership because individual people obviously do not have to know the leader personally to follow his rule.

Al-Baghdadi’s incomplete rule over Iraq and his lack of agreement with scholars in Syria about ISIS do not impede his leadership abilities either, according to al-Athari. The Prophet Muhammad did not rule everywhere on the Arabian Peninsula either and his leadership was certainly not in doubt. As for the scholars in Syria, al-Athari claims that the amir does not necessarily have to consult them to be allowed to incorporate this area into his state.

The caliph?

Al-Baghdadi’s descent of the Prophet Muhammad, his scholarly credentials and his actions as a mujahid who clearly builds his activities on the consensus of scholars and tries to work with others are the reasons why al-Athari believes he is such a great leader. He refutes all arguments that one may have against al-Baghdadi’s leadership and calls on Muslims in both Iraq and Syria to follow his lead and unite. In fact, al-Athari states that “we ask God that the time will come in which we will see our shaykh sitting on the thrown of the caliph”.

Much of this praise seems rooted in the idea that is also found in the work of Abu Muhammad al-Maqdisi and the Shari’a Council he started – of which, as mentioned, al-Athari is nominally still a member – namely that jihad should be legitimate, effective and fruitful. In other words, it should consist of exactly the type of scholarly sanctioned, thoroughly considered and widely consolidated actions that al-Baghdadi apparently engages in. Al-Baghdadi seems to combine the qualities of a thinker with those of a fighter and, in a nutshell, therefore seems to be precisely the type of “philosopher jihadi”, to use Nelly Lahoud’s phrase, that scholars like al-Maqdisi and al-Athari are searching for.

Memo about Syria: Jihadis are people too

Joas Wagemakers September 6, 2013

Perhaps the most important reason mentioned by a lot of people why the United States should not bomb targets in Syria is that the possible downfall of President Bashar al-Asad’s regime may lead to a situation in which jihadis come to power, who may be even worse than the country’s current leader. Such fears are certainly justified. Yet we should also be careful not to exaggerate the threat that these men supposedly represent.  In this post, I look at a specific series of fatwas from the Shari’a Council of the Minbar al-Tawhid wa-l-Jihad that deals with the problems and questions that potential jihadis have (these, these, these, these and these), which shows that jihadis – their sometimes radical views notwithstanding – can be quite human too.

Refusing parents

Many of the questions that Abu l-Mundhir al-Shinqiti, the shaykh who has long been the sole scholar on the Shari’a Council, has to answer deal with questions related to the classical jurisprudence (fiqh) of jihad that go back centuries: “Am I allowed to wage jihad if I am in debt?”, “I am able to do jihad. Does that mean I have to?” etc. One of the questions that also falls into this category is that of parental permission. Quite a few budding jihadis ask whether it is allowed to go to Syria if their parents refuse to let them go. According to the classical laws of Islam, parental permission is needed for someone to wage offensive jihad.

It is obviously easy to make fun of such questions (“I want to kill Nusayris but my mum won’t let me. What should I do?”). I believe this misses the point of why these jihadis ask such questions, however. They seem to be motivated primarily by a great concern for what is going on in Syria – and aren’t we all? – and want to take armed action to stop it, but are afraid they will violate Islamic law at the same time.

Some youngsters admit to lying to their parents about their true intentions when going abroad and wonder whether this is allowed. Others clearly don’t want to go to Syria and mention that their parents won’t permit them either, but apparently feel compelled to ask the shaykh anyway, perhaps hoping that he will excuse them from their jihadi duty. For similar reasons, several questioners ask if it is okay if they just donate money to the jihad, without actually going to Syria themselves. One potential fighter even asks al-Shinqiti to tell him what legitimate excuses exist that allow him to refrain from waging jihad.

Unfortunately for some of these hesitant youngsters, shaykh Abu l-Mundhir points out to them that the jihad against the al-Asad regime is a defensive one, meaning that it is an individual duty (fard ‘ala l-‘ayn) for every able-bodied male Muslim. This, in turn, means that parental permission is not needed and that lying to them about this is permitted as well.

Family problems

Although al-Shinqiti comes across as someone whom one would perhaps not easily qualify as “a good family man”, he does take into account that problems at home may excuse one from waging jihad. Several questioners indicate that if they went to Syria, their parents would not be able to cope without them for financial reasons. Others state that their parents are old and need to be cared for, which these men will not be able to do from abroad. Still another questioner tells the shaykh that if he leaves for Syria to wage jihad, he fears his mother will die of grief and pain.

As mentioned, al-Shinqiti is somewhat more understanding of such problems. He encourages people to find others to take care of their parents and their (financial) needs, but also states that if this does not work the jihadis are allowed to stay home. He is less compromising with regard to marital problems – in the broadest sense of the word. One person wants to know if it is a sin to go off to Syria if it means leaving behind a sick child and a wife who is five months pregnant, a question that is posed several times in various forms. Another wants to wage jihad, but also wants to get married. Realising that he desires both, he asks al-Shinqiti what to do. There is even a person complaining that his family in his homeland have abandoned him financially, that he has no education and no job and that he wants to wage jihad, but that his wife starts crying every time the subject comes up.

Al-Shinqiti does not prove particularly helpful with regard to recalcitrant wives (“Try to go to the jihad together with your wife.”), but he does understand that spouses cannot simply be left to their own devices and therefore encourages the questioners to let them stay with their families if possible. He is much more accommodating, however, when it comes to the somewhat related problem of potential fighters wanting to finish their education. Some men point out that they study something that is useful to the jihad and that they themselves will also be of greater use if they are allowed to graduate. Abu l-Mundhir is quite forthcoming in this respect, allowing such youngsters to finish their studies, even if it means putting jihad on hold for the moment.

Attachment

Such expressions of doubt, hesitation and concern by jihadis obviously do not mean that we should dismiss fears about their goals and behaviour. The ideas of some of the men going to Syria are clearly problematic and there is indeed reason to fear sectarian strife and even all-out war between some of the various sects if the al-Asad regime should fall. The ideas about ‘Alawites expressed by some Jihadi-Salafi groups and scholars are quite explicit in this respect and do not bode well for the future.

At the same time, however, the fatwas mentioned above do show that those men wanting to join Jabhat al-Nusra and similar groups have plenty of other things on their mind besides jihad. In fact, quite a few fatwas betray their attachment to earthly things such as their families, their wives and children and even their careers. This, in turn – and without wanting to negate the real threat that some of these men may pose, means that they are  perhaps not the wide-eyed extremists hell-bent on world-wide jihad that some believe they are. In fact, they look surprisingly human in these fatwas and none more so than one questioner who asks:

“Is a mujahid who is killed fighting also considered a martyr if he is afraid to die?”

Al-Qaida Advises the Arab Spring: Al-Maqdisi

Joas Wagemakers August 23, 2013

As Cole Bunzel pointed out some time ago, Abu Muhammad al-Maqdisi, the famous Jordanian radical Salafi scholar, has published several fatwas and other documents in the last few months. Cole mainly dealt with only two of al-Maqdisi’s recent publications, however, while there are several others he wrote afterwards that are quite interesting as well.

Joining rallies

Several months ago, al-Maqdisi started publishing a series of short documents containing one or more fatwas. It’s not clear who’s asking the questions, but this doesn’t make his answers any less interesting. In the first installment of the series, al-Maqdisi discusses questions that are quite similar to some that his brother in arms Abu l-Mundhir al-Shinqiti also dealt with several years ago, namely whether or not it is allowed to participate in rallies against the regime. Al-Maqdisi’s answer is similar to al-Shinqiti’s – it is allowed – but far more detailed.

Al-Maqdisi states that every period in history has its own methods and weapons to demand people’s rights and that one would be foolish not to make use of these. The period that we are in now – that of the Arab Spring – has shown, al-Maqdisi states, that the regimes in the Arab world fear the masses. In fact, the revolutions that have taken place are based on these massive demonstrations against the regimes, al-Maqdisi maintains.

He further claims that Muslim scholars have stated that every legitimate method that instills fear in the enemies of Islam can and should be used as a means to repell them and wage jihad against them. If mass rallies in which people demand their rights, call for the application of the shari’a, insist on fighting corruption or ask for help for the Syrian people constitute such methods, then Muslims should use them.

Al-Maqdisi subsequently mentions several hadiths to “prove” that Islam allows instilling fear in the hearts of the Muslims’ enemies. Al-Maqdisi would not be al-Maqdisi, however, if he didn’t add that jihadis should try to coordinate such activities and organise them well so that no sinful things will happen and the enemy is not able to drive a wedge between them.

Alliances

The emphasis on unity among Muslims is an issue that al-Maqdisi dwells on further in his answer to the second question of the same document. Asked whether Muslims are allowed to enter alliances with other (non-Salafi) Islamist movements, al-Maqdisi again answers in the affirmative. Interestingly, the questioner draws a parallel with the hilf al-fudul, an alliance between several polytheist Qurashi clans during the life of the Prophet Muhammad. The latter is said to have claimed later in life that, had he been given the chance, he would have joined this alliance. This suggests that the Prophet would not have objected to alliances with polytheists.

The interesting aspect about the hilf al-fudul and Muhammad’s comments on it for our discussion here is that they are sometimes used as prophetic legitimisation of “political” cooperation between Muslims and non-Muslims. Islamists have sometimes used this example as a justification of their willingness to engage in the parliamentary politics of secular or less than perfectly Islamic states. Jihadi-Salafis have always rejected the parallels between this example and modern-day politics, which makes al-Maqdisi’s response all the more surprising.

Al-Maqdisi quickly makes clear, however, that such alliances should be forged with Islamic movements – not with “apostate” regimes – and should serve the propagation of Islam (da’wa). Any cooperation, moreover, should be based on piety and, of course, nothing can be done that violates the absolute unity of God (tawhid).

For the same reason, al-Maqdisi also allows people to ask the authorities for permission to set up charitable organisations. As long as Islam is served by it and no Islamic rules are violated in asking for such permission, one should not be like the “zealots” (mutashaddidun) who forbid such requests, simply because they are directed at “apostate” regimes. Al-Maqdisi has long maintained that not all rules in non-Islamic states are necessarily bad or “anti-Islamic” and laws that allow people to do good and pious things through charitable organisations are apparently among the “good” laws.

Organisation

Another question deals with the organisation of jihadis. How does al-Maqdisi feel about organising their affairs by setting up a council (majlis) for every region, with a media spokesperson for all of them? Given al-Maqdisi’s tendency to stress organisation and collective efforts in his writings, he wastes no time in saying that “the true scholars” see this as “one of the most necessary duties”.

Al-Maqdisi stresses, based on several hadiths, that every group, no matter how small, should have a leader and contends that if “the ant and the bee” live in a very organised way, so should human beings. (The more Biblically inclined readers of Jihadica may recognise a touch of Solomon in this remark, by the way, of which a partial Qur’anic parallel can be found in Q. 27: 18-19.)

Palace scholars

A second important treatise that al-Maqdisi published recently deals with a fatwa written by what al-Maqdisi calls “palace scholars” (my rough translation of ‘ulama’ al-sulta). This fatwa was published by the General Fatwa Department in Jordan and seems to be part of a wider effort by Jordanian Muslim scholars to provide so-called “moderate Islam” with theological underpinnings. This process was kicked off by the “Amman Message”, a speech by the Jordanian King ‘Abdallah II on what Islam is all about, delivered in 2004.

Since 2004, King ‘Abdallah II has presided over several meetings with Muslim scholars who denounce radical Islam and provide a more tolerant alternative. As the people who follow me on Twitter know, a major meeting with scholars from all over the world was held just this week in Amman (see here and here, for example). Al-Maqdisi has explicitly denounced the Amman Message in a separate treatise. Although neither is explicitly linked to the Arab Spring, they were published this year and deal with issues that are quite relevant for the post-revolutionary phase that several Arab countries are in right now.

Al-Maqdisi believes that Islam is complete and perfect the way it is and that any additions to it, for example in the form of the Amman Message, are entirely unnecessary and even sinful. Moreover, the brotherhood and tolerance that is spoken of in the Amman Message should, in al-Maqdisi’s view, not be extended to non-Muslims but should strictly apply to Muslims only. There is, furthermore, no equality between Muslims and adherents to other religions. Such talk, al-Maqdisi claims, deviates from the shari’a and should have no place in Islam.

The type of scholars who support these messages are also responsible for the fatwa of the General Fatwa Department mentioned earlier. They claim that elections are legitimate and Islamic means to choose representatives in parliament that even the companions of the Prophet Muhammad used. Al-Maqdisi disagrees with this, of course, since he believes that democracy gives people the power t0 legislate, which is a right that belongs only to God. Democracy therefore infringes on God’s sole right to be sovereign in every sphere of life, which in turn violates his absolute unity. This is polytheism (shirk), which cannot be forgiven.

Shura and ‘Urafa’

He further contests the scholars’ use of shura (consultation), which many Islamists see as an Islamic form of democracy since the idea behind it is to ask people for advice before taking a decision. Al-Maqdisi claims, however, that shura only means consultation in areas in which the shari’a is not clear; whenever there is a clear rule, this should simply be followed. Thus, al-Maqdisi claims, shura is consultation within the bounds of the shari’a, while democracy is people power within the limits of a secular constitution.

Al-Maqdisi further objects to the scholars’ use of the term ‘arif (pl. ‘urafa’) to describe members of parliament (MPs). ‘Urafa’ in early Islam were civil or military leaders recognised by Muhammad. By equating MPs with these ‘urafa’, the scholars seem to legitimise the former on Islamic grounds. Al-Maqdisi dismisses this comparison, however, since MPs are engaged in creating “un-Islamic” legislation, while ‘urafa’ were not. If MPs were truly ‘urafa’, they would refrain from making “man-made laws”, al-Maqdisi maintains. The job of MP, in short, is kufr (unbelief), although al-Maqdisi explicitly denies calling every voter an unbeliever.

While the Arab Spring has brought new challenges and new opportunities, al-Maqdisi thus sticks to his old ideas. He is willing to adopt new measures in the new circumstances that the Arab Spring has brought about, but still rejects democracy in every form. Although it is unlikely to change his mind, it would be interesting to see if al-Maqdisi could keep up this attitude if real democracy were ever to take root in countries such as Egypt and Syria. With the situation being as it is now, however, it seems unlikely that al-Maqdisi will ever see that day.

Al-Qaradawi and the Help of the Unbelievers

Joas Wagemakers May 1, 2013

 

Yusuf al-Qaradawi, the famous Egyptian Muslim scholar who’s often described as the most influential Sunni scholar alive, is well known for his comments on politics, society and other practical issues that believers have to deal with. Yesterday, I read in an article that he has added a new comment of that type to an already long list: he has called upon the United States to “hit” Syria. This may not come as a surprise to some, but it is nevertheless a position that is worth taking a closer look at.

“Please sir, I want some more”

In a recent Friday sermon delivered in the Qatari capital Doha, al-Qaradawi thanked the United States for giving 60 million dollars’ worth of weapons to the Syrian rebels fighting the regime of President Bashar al-Asad. This is remarkable enough in itself, but al-Qaradawi even added to that by asking for more help from the US.

Interestingly, after claiming that the US fears Israel and dreads the idea that Syrian rebels will cross the border into that country, he makes his request for more American aid to Syria quite explicit and asks: “Why hasn’t America acted [in Syria] the way it acted in Libya? America must defend the Syrians and adopt a position of masculinity (waqafat rujula), a position for God, what is good and what is just.”

Libya

As mentioned, it may not come as a surprise that al-Qaradawi takes this position. After all, the article states, al-Qaradawi had more or less the same view about Libya when that country’s leader, Mu’ammar al-Qadhafi, was still in power and faced revolts against his rule: “Whoever can kill Mu’ammar al-Qadhafi”, al-Qaradawi is quoted from an earlier speech or sermon, “let him kill him. Whoever can shoot him, let him do it, so that the people and the umma are rid of the evil of this madman.”

Necessity

Like al-Qaradawi supported the call for (the “un-Islamic”) NATO to help the Muslims in Libya, so he now supports asking the Americans for aid in Syria. Apart from the Libyan case, such calls for non-Muslim help in conflict or even jihad are not without precedent. The most famous contemporary example of this is probably the Saudi King Fahd’s 1990 plea for American protection against a possible attack from Iraq, which had just invaded Kuwait at the time.

This decision to invite 500,000 US troops in 1990 was not only highly controversial in Saudi political circles, among the Saudi public and in the Middle East in general, but it was also a fiercely debated religious issue. The major Saudi scholars at the time legitimised their decision to allow the US troops to come by pointing to the necessity of keeping the country secure.

Asking unbelievers for help

Not everyone agreed with the decision of the major Saudi scholars, however. In fact, as I pointed out in an article published in the International Journal of Middle East Studies last year, this decision sparked a debate over whether it was allowed in general to ask unbelievers for help (al-isti’ana bi-l-kuffar) in conflicts, particularly when this help was directed against other Muslims.

The famous Salafi scholar Muhammad Nasir al-Din al-Albani (1914-1999), argued that such calls for non-Muslim help were not allowed against other Muslims. Scholars stating that former Iraqi President Saddam Husayn was no longer a Muslim because he was a member of the socialist Ba’th Party were dismissed by al-Albani since the Iraqi army, which was going to do the actual fighting, did consist of mostly Muslim soldiers, he said.

The example of the Prophet

According to some Muslims, there are indications in the main sources of Islam – the Qur’an and the Sunna – that asking non-Muslims for help during conflicts is, in fact, not permissible. Q. 5: 51, for instance, says: “O believers, take not Jews and Christians as friends; they are friends of each other. Whoso of you makes them his friends is one of them.” Similar words are expressed in Q. 60: 1, although the statement there is more specific and clearly refers to a particular episode in Islamic history.

Perhaps more clearly military in nature are some sayings of the Prophet Muhammad, in which he rejected seeking assistance from unbelievers in certain battles. At the same time, however, one hadith does state that the Prophet sought help from the Jews of the Medinan tribe Banu Qaynuqa’ against another Jewish tribe, namely the Banu Qurayza.

Fighting against whom?

The above suggests that the sources may not be entirely clear on asking unbelievers for help against others, despite assertations by some Muslims to the contrary. The last example given above, however, deals with asking unbelievers for help in fighting against other unbelievers, not against fellow Muslims. This is obviously an important distinction and one that could explain why al-Qaradawi made his statement.

Bashar al-Asad, important parts of his regime and parts of his elite troops are ‘Alawi Muslims, who are often seen by Sunnis as being so heterodox that they are really not considered Muslims anymore. If al-Qaradawi agrees with this, asking American unbelievers for help against the Syrian regime is then, in his view at least, not directed against Muslims, but simply at other unbelievers. This, in turn, would justify making a theological distinction between asking the Americans for help in fighting, say, Iraqi soldiers and ‘Alawi special forces from Syria.

Of course, it has to be borne in mind that all of this theological reasoning may well act as nothing more than a religious justification ex post facto, rather than an actual reason for al-Qaradawi to make his call for American help in the first place. Al-Qaradawi may well have been inspired to call on the US to help by the killing which the Syrian regime is responsible for and nothing more. Still, his statements did provide me with an opportunity to expound on an important ideological issue among jihadis, which is never a bad thing I suppose.

 

 

Al-Maqdisi and the Jordanian Jihadi-Salafi Movement

Joas Wagemakers December 1, 2012

As most readers of Jihadica will know, the famous Jordanian radical scholar Abu Muhammad al-Maqdisi was arrested in September 2010 on suspicion of aiding terrorists and was sentenced to five years’ imprisonment in July 2011. Since then, however, we have rarely heard anything from the man often described as the most important radical Islamic scholar alive. As my current research focuses on quietist Salafis and the Muslim Brotherhood in Jordan, I regularly read Jordanian newspapers, which not only give us some idea of what is happening with al-Maqdisi, but also report on the Jihadi-Salafi community that he has left behind.

Hunger strike

For those who know something about al-Maqdisi’s earlier stays in prison, it is clear that these periods have often been some of the most productive ones in his entire life. He once even referred to the period 1994-1999 as the “blessed days”, as they allowed him to write many books, articles and fatwas. Since his earlier re-arrest in 2005 (released in 2008), however, very few of his writings have reached a wider audience while he was in prison. This is not to say that he was not engaged in putting his thoughts on paper, but just that he was apparently less successful in getting them out to the rest of the world.

His most recent stay in prison is also characterised by an almost complete black-out to the media and others. Almost, that is, since the Jordanian Islamist Al-Sabil newspaper reported on 9 November that al-Maqdisi sent them a letter from behind bars in which he told them of his threat to go on a hunger strike. Al-Sabil had reported this before and al-Maqdisi also sometimes took the same action during his previous stays in prison. The reason this time, according to al-Maqdisi’s letter, is that he wants to be transferred from the current prison in which he is staying in al-Mafraq (in the north of Jordan) to one closer to al-Rusayfa, where his family live, but the prison authorities are apparently not forthcoming in granting his request.

In his letter to Al-Sabil, al-Maqdisi also writes that life in prison has not been easy for him. On top of his assertion that he is innocent and therefore wrongly imprisoned and is withheld the support of a lawyer, he claims to suffer from back pains and also has a knee that hurts. The latter, al-Maqdisi states, was caused by an intelligence officer (described by him as the son of the current Jordanian Minister of Justice) who beat him there with the butt of his rifle. Meanwhile, the prison authorities refuse to give him the treatment he needs, al-Maqdisi claims, and – to his frustration – also offer him fruit on which the words “Produced in Israel” are written.

Al-Maqdisi’s Jordanian heirs

With al-Maqdisi apparently languishing in prison, it is interesting to see what the Jihadi-Salafi community he left behind is now doing. First of all, there is the question of leadership. While al-Maqdisi was clearly a scholar with a wide and international following, none of the remaining Jihadi-Salafi leaders seem able to fill his shoes in this respect. The movement’s current leaders include men such as Abu ‘Abdallah Luqman al-Riyalat, Nur al-Din Bayram and Abu Muhammad al-Tahawi. Although all three enjoy the respect of their local base in the cities of al-Salt, al-Zarqa’ and Irbid, respectively, none of them have the same scholarly credentials as al-Maqdisi and they are virtually unknown outside Jordan.

If the amount of media exposure is any guide to indicating who al-Maqdisi’s Jordanian temporary heirs are – until he is released from prison again, that is – the movement’s undisputed leaders are Muhammad al-Shalabi (better known as Abu Sayyaf) from Ma’an, in the south of Jordan, and especially the aforementioned Abu Muhammad al-Tahawi from the northern city of Irbid. The latter is obvious, since he was a prominent figure even when al-Maqdisi was still a free man and was on good terms with him. Abu Sayyaf is a different matter, however, since he was considered little more than a firebrand several years ago, but is now often called upon to comment on issues related to radical Islam.

Al-Maqdisi’s jihad

The Jihadi-Salafi movement led by the men mentioned above may have few scholars and even fewer high-profile activists, but al-Maqdisi left them some very clear ideas on why, when and how to wage jihad. As I point out in detail in my recently published book on al-Maqdisi, the most important reason to wage jihad according to the latter is to overthrow “apostate” rulers in the Muslim world, rather than defending Muslim land against non-Muslim invaders, although he certainly considers this legitimate too.

Even a legitimate jihad, however, should not be engaged in hastily and recklessly, but only if there is a real chance of succeeding. There is little use in jihadis simply acting as cannon fodder for their enemies, as al-Maqdisi once explained in the context of his opposition to youngsters going off to Iraq to fight the Americans there. Moreover, even if someone decides to join a jihad, this needs to be waged in a way that is legitimate from the point of view of the shari’a, meaning that the ends (victory over the enemy) do not always justify the means (beheadings, killing innocent civilians, etc.).

In short, it is necessary for all jihadis, al-Maqdisi believes, to think twice before they to run off to some war front; even in legitimate jihads, he wants them to join a proper organisation that fights under the banner of Islam so that their fighting efforts will be organised, effective and legitimate. Now that al-Maqdisi is not available to guide and correct his followers, however, how are they faring?

Fighting on two fronts?

The Jordanian Jihadi-Salafi movement seems to have been engaged in at least one jihad this year, namely the fight to overthrow the regime of President Bashar al-Asad in Syria. According to al-Tahawi, some 250 Jordanians are fighting the regime in Syria at the moment. Several of these were reported to have been killed, including – incidentally – al-Tahawi’s own son-in-law, and some of them have also been arrested after returning from Syria in increasing efforts by the Jordanian regime to crack down on border-crossing jihadis.

The second front – if there is one – is less clear. Although al-Tahawi proclaimed in late October that his movement “is determined to do a martyrdom operation in Israel”, little has come of such efforts in the past and the fact that such threats are published in the media seems to suggest that they are little more than empty rhetoric. More interesting is the arrest of eleven Jihadi-Salafis suspected of wanting to attack shopping centres and Western diplomatic targets in Amman in October. While much of the Jordanian press praised the security services for nabbing these men before they could do any damage, some took the trouble of asking Abu Muhammad al-Tahawi about his thoughts on the case. The latter rejected the regime’s accusations and stated that he believed they were innocent since his movement condemned killing other Muslims.

What would al-Maqdisi do?

It is unclear whether al-Tahawi’s claims should be taken at face value. Do the actions that we can be sure about (i.e., the Jordanians fighting in Syria) conform to al-Maqdisi’s jihadi preferences? Although it remains difficult to assess, al-Maqdisi’s focus on fighting “apostate rulers” most probably means that he agrees with a jihad against al-Asad, especially since the jihadis actually have a (long) shot at succeeding, particularly as no Western armies have entered the fray yet.

Al-Maqdisi would also look favourably on the Jihadi-Salafi groups set up in Syria itself, such as Jabhat al-Nusra li-Ahl al-Sham, which at least some Jordanians are said to have joined and which ensure that the jihad being waged is better organised and fought under a legitimate banner. Although he would definitely lament the fact that no true scholar has temporarily succeeded him to provide religious guidance to Jordanian jihadis, al-Maqdisi may well be quite satisfied with what his followers are doing.

 

Fatwa on the Permissibility of Killing an Ambassador

Joas Wagemakers September 21, 2012

I have to admit that it makes me feel rather uneasy choosing a title like this and writing a post about last week’s death of four staff members of the American embassy in Libya, including the ambassador himself, Christopher Stevens. Yesterday, however, a fatwa was published on the permissibility of killing ambassadors that I think Jihadica readers should know about.

Three questions

The fatwa, published by Abu l-Mundhir al-Shinqiti, is in response to three different questions by three different people. The first question deals with the permissibility of killing an ambassador who doesn’t approve of insults against Islam and has a positive attitude towards Muslims. For those readers thinking this is a direct reference to ambassador Stevens, who was apparently known for his affection for the Libyan people, think again. The person asking the question adds that he’s not talking about the American ambassador since “targeting American embassies in all corners of the world is permissible without them having insulted the Prophet”.

The second questioner wants to know if the post of ambassador can be compared with that of “messenger” (rasul), a job specified in Islamic law that is given to a representative of a non-Muslim country to bring a message to the rulers of the abode of Islam (dar al-Islam). Such a person was given some sort of aman (temporary protection) under Islamic law so that he could do his job safely. If there is indeed a parallel between a messenger and an ambassador, this could mean the latter is not allowed to be killed.

The third question is related to the second since it deals with the concept of ‘ahd (covenant). In the course of Islamic history, Muslim scholars have come up with ways to avoid calling all non-Muslim countries dar al-harb (the abode of war; i.e., those countries with which the Muslims are at least nominally at war). One of the alternatives they chose was dar al-‘ahd (the abode of the covenant), denoting countries with which the Muslim empire has a treaty. Such countries, Islamic jurists held,  should not be attacked since their treaty with the Muslims forbade fighting between them. Some modern scholars have argued that a visa can be seen as a modern equivalent of such a covenant or treaty and that persons who hold a visa or are citizens of a non-Muslim country are not allowed to fight these countries. Similarly, this questioner wants to know whether the ambassador’s legal status in Libya should have protected him from being attacked.

Messenger or ambassador?

While al-Shinqiti refers to an earlier fatwa of his for the third question, he does answer the first two questions. He denies the existence of any direct references to ambassadors in the sacred texts and also disagrees that ambassadors are the modern-day equivalents of the messengers dealt with in Islamic law. To prove his point, al-Shinqiti lists three differences between the two jobs. Firstly, an ambassador is a representative of a state that has sent him to do a job, while a messenger is simply a person sent with a message and nothing more.

Secondly, and closely related to the first argument, an ambassador has a whole range of tasks that his government sets for him, which depend on the relationship between the two countries. A messenger, by contrast, only brings a message and that’s it, al-Shinqiti states.

Thirdly, an ambassador is only dispatched to a country with which his own country has friendly relations. If these relations sour, ambassadors are called home. Messengers, on the other hand, could be sent to another country no matter what its relations with Muslims were like – peaceful, hostile or subject to a truce – and are therefore incomparable to ambassadors.

War on Islam

Because of the supposed differences between messengers and ambassadors, al-Shinqiti rejects any parallels between them and thus dismisses the argument that non-Muslim ambassadors cannot be killed by Muslims. Al-Shinqiti seems to believe, however, that this whole question of whether ambassadors are modern-day messengers is entirely beside the point with regard to ambassador Stevens.

In recent days, I have explained several times to people my conviction that the riots currently going on in the Middle East should be seen in the broader context of a) the dire political and socio-economic situation many Arabs are in; and, especially, b) the alleged war on Islam that is supposedly being waged by Western countries, in which the film “Innocence of Muslims” is perceived by many as simply the latest attack. I believe that the attacks on the American embassies have very little to do with Muslims’ rejection of images of the Prophet Muhammad as such, as some media would have us believe, but should be ascribed to the more specific factors mentioned by Will within the context mentioned above. In other words, if the Middle East had been a free and nice place to live and relations with America had been strong and widely supported by the people, I believe the reception of this film would have been entirely different.

The importance of this context is underlined by al-Shinqiti’s fatwa, which states that ambassadors are not only incomparable to messengers, but even if they were, it wouldn’t apply to the American ambassador. This is because the inadmissibility of killing messengers depends on them not being spies whose presence and jobs are damaging to Muslims. American embassies, al-Shinqiti claims, are not like other embassies. The Americans try to increase their influence in Muslim countries, wage war on Islam and spread “the democratic religion”, he contends, and all of this is planned from inside the American embassies.

There is no legitimate need for the presence of American embassies in Muslim countries, al-Shinqiti believes. On the contrary, he states, relations with the United States should be severed. Al-Shinqiti claims America has killed more Muslims than Israel and while Muslim states are always arguing for cutting ties with the latter, they don’t do the same with the former and, in fact, even assist the United States in its war on Islam. American embassies are expressions of a country that is at war with Islam and, he maintains, should be treated as such.

The Film

Not only does it not make any difference whether the American ambassador can be seen as a messenger or not; al-Shinqiti also states that whether such a person agrees or disagrees with the film “The Innocence of Muslims” is irrelevant since the country as a whole is responsible for that. American ambassadors, even if they disagree with the film, do agree with the “killing of Muslims in Iraq and Afghanistan that their government is engaged in”, with “the occupation of the lands of Islam” and with “the plundering of the revolutions of the Muslim countries”.

Interestingly, al-Shinqiti states that American embassies are not the biggest insult to the Prophet. That role is ascribed by him to “the deserting opportunists who reject violence and want to help the Prophet with words, not deeds, like [the famous Egyptian Muslim scholar Yusuf] al-Qaradawi and [former head of the IAEA Mohammed] El Baradei and others”.

“Killing all American ambassadors and destroying all American embassies won’t quench our thirst for those who have attacked the sanctity of our Prophet”, al-Shinqiti states. Muslims should therefore not show sympathy for the American ambassador and the other diplomats killed in Libya, as many did, and neither should they call for non-violence, as other Muslim scholars have done. Instead, al-Shinqiti insists, the proper response to the film is “to attack [American] interests, to attack their security, to attack their existence and to attack their economy because this is the language they understand”.

Just so you know.

What’s in a Name? A Jihadi Labels Himself

Joas Wagemakers September 11, 2012

As all academics know, defining the subject you study is very important and often complicated. This is obviously no different in the study of jihadis, where terms such as “radical Muslims”, “Muslim extremists”, “Jihadi-Salafis”, “takfiris” and even “Islamo-fascists” are often used to describe Muslims engaging in violence against others. Such terms are based on criteria set by outsiders, sometimes resulting in terms that are crude, imprecise and/or used to describe people who strongly differ from one another.

Others take the approach of simply listening to what the people that one’s research focuses on – in this case jihadis – call themselves. This often yields widely divergent and biased answers that are frequently ill-suited to be used by academics. Terms such as “Muslims”, “mujahidun” and “ahl al-Sunna wa-l-jama’a“, for example, are rather general and, more importantly, are also claimed by Muslims who have nothing to do with al-Qa’ida whatsoever.

Defining one’s subject of research is thus often quite difficult. The fact that asking jihadis – for lack of a better term – to define themselves often yields unsatisfactory answers does not mean, however, that it is not interesting to listen to what they say. An example of a radical Muslim scholar who recently tried to provide an answer to the question “Who are we?” is Abu l-Mundhir al-Shinqiti, the Mauritanian shaykh who seems to be running the Shari’a Forum of the Minbar al-Tawhid wa-l-Jihad – originally a collective effort by about a dozen scholars – entirely on his own these days.

Unity

Al-Shinqiti’s starting point is that Islam is one and that the jihadis he is addressing should stand together against “the enemies”, which they are apparently not doing now, according to him. Although it is clear that Abu l-Mundhir believes jihad is legitimate, both against non-Muslim invaders and “apostate” rulers in the Muslim world, unity should not be limited to fighting but should encompass every aspect of Islam and he cites many a hadith to make his case.

If jihadis came together to practise their religion as one, al-Shinqiti states, they should also have one name to describe themselves. This name should reflect the fact that jihadis strive for the application of the Shari’a, as well as their desire to fulfill the obligations of Islam. What name could possibly cover this?

The alternatives

An name that al-Shinqiti briefly considers is “Salafis”. He states that several names are applied to jihadis that lead to a misrepresentation of who they are, and “Salafis” is one of them. Sure, Abu l-Mundhir writes, we are Salafis, but that label has come to be associated with people who do not wage jihad, help “apostate” rulers and take part in democracy. These are obviously characteristics that al-Shinqiti wants to avoid and therefore he dismisses “Salafis” as a good name.

What about the label “Jihadi-Salafis” then? Doesn’t this distinguish them from other Salafis? Al-Shinqiti answers this question in the affirmative but nevertheless objects to the term because to him it suggests that Jihadi-Salafis only engage in jihad. This is not correct, he maintains, since other activities such as the propagation of Islam (da’wa) also play a role.

The name to end all names

The name that al-Shinqiti comes up with to cover exactly what he wants is “Ansar al-Shari’a” (“helpers/protectors of the Shari’a”), a name reminiscent of, but not necessarily connected with, the Yemeni militant group of the same name. (As I pointed out before, al-Shinqiti supports this group and has defended it against criticism.) The name undoubtedly also reminds Muslims of the original ansar in Islamic history: the believers from Medina who accepted the Prophet Muhammad as their leader and helped him in his battles with Meccan polytheists.

This name is so good, al-Shinqiti writes, because “it describes what is considered the goal and the end that the upholders of the unity of God unite for” and serves as “a title, a banner and a goal at the same time”. Unlike terms such as “Salafism” and “Jihadi-Salafism”, Abu l-Mundhir states, “Ansar al-Shari’a” cannot be criticised since “who can refuse and reject it? Who can be against it?” Anybody who is serious about fulfilling the obligations of Islam cannot feel different about this, he maintains.

A bigger goal

As interesting as this labelling business may be, al-Shinqiti seems to have a bigger goal in mind. He calls on like-minded Muslims to set up da’wa groups in their own countries and to call them “Ansar al-Shari’a”. These groups should unite and become one group. They should focus on studying “useful knowledge”, spreading the right creed and correcting wrong ideas and misconceptions. They should obviously call for the application of the Shari’a and reject democracy and “man-made laws” and try to motivate others to join them, thereby working to transform public opinion into one that is supportive of applying the Shari’a but rejects Western ideas.

Such goals – to be achieved through means such as sermons, lessons, spreading writings, etcetera – will unite these groups “around one goal and around one project”, will make their leadership more prominent and will take them away from “reckless action that scatters power and wastes energy”, among other things. This way, the Shari’a might be applied through legitimate means instead of through democracy.

This last argument suggests that al-Shinqiti partly responding to Salafi groups in Egypt and elsewhere that are now trying to achieve their goals through elections and parliamentary participation. This is probably true. His emphasis on unity, learning the right knowledge, da’wa, collective efforts and the inadmissibility of recklessness in action probably hint at something else, however, namely his more long-term efforts to achieve these goals for the jihadi movement. As I have argued elsewhere, uniting and correcting jihadis and making them more effective in their actions was probably the main reason why the Shari’a Council of the Minbar al-Tawhid wa-l-Jihad was founded several years ago. Al-Shinqiti’s attempts to label them all as “Ansar al-Shari’a” seems to be part of this bigger goal.

Now let’s just see if the name catches on.

Al-Qaida Advises the Arab Spring: Abu Basir’s Scrapbook

Joas Wagemakers July 28, 2012

In my previous posts on al-Qaida scholars advising the Arab Spring (here, here, here and here), we have frequently come across the Syrian-British Abu Basir al-Tartusi. His advice to the people of the Arab world trying to overthrow their dictators has often been at odds with that of his fellow radical ideologues, as we have seen, since Abu Basir frequently encourages fighters to be lenient with others or even scolds them for using violent methods too recklessly. As we saw in my previous post on Yemen, other scholars have criticised Abu Basir for this. Similarly, when Abu Basir published a fatwa on his website in February in which he expressed support for the (non-Islamist) Free Syrian Army fighting against the regime of Syrian President Bashar al-Asad and not for the much more overtly Islamic Jabhat Nusrat al-Sham, he was criticised for this by Abu l-Mundhir al-Shinqiti on the Shari’a Forum of the Minbar al-Tawhid wa-l-Jihad. In a fatwa of his own, al-Shinqiti states that Abu Basir’s endorsement of the Free Syrian Army, with its “democratic method” and his simultaneous criticism of a group that strives for “the implementation of the Islamic shari’a” shows that Abu Basir “has a major methodological shortcoming”. (For more on this issue, see this article).

Commitment

Despite Abu Basir’s tendency to state things differently from his colleagues, nobody seems to question his commitment to the cause of the Arab Spring, particularly in his native Syria. He has written numerous articles and fatwas about the revolts in the Arab world and has even gone to Syria himself to support the people there, as others have pointed out (see here, for example). Moreover, Abu Basir’s nephew is said to “have achieved martyrdom” in Syria earlier this month and al-Tartusi himself has long been involved with the Facebook page “The Islamic Opposition to the Syrian Regime”, which shows some photographs of him, including one in which he is holding a gun, suggesting that he’s actually out there fighting the regime.

Perhaps Abu Basir’s most extensive sign of his commitment to the Arab Spring is his almost 500-pages long scrapbook on everything related to the revolutions in the Middle East. Entitled “The Scrapbook of the Revolution and the Revolutionaries: Words Written for the Arab Revolutions and Particularly the Syrian Revolution”, it contains Abu Basir’s daily (?) musings on what goes on in Egypt, Libya, Tunisia and, as the title suggests, particularly Syria. Although many journalists may do similar things, Abu Basir is the only radical Islamic ideologue that I know of who does this.

Conspiracies

Even in posts focussed on countries other than Syria, Abu Basir often finds a way to make a connection with the country of his birth. In his criticism of the former Libyan leader Mu’ammar al-Qadhafi, for example, he apologises to his readers for the support the Syrian regime gave to its Libyan counterpart (contribution no. 6). He does state, however, that “al-Asad is more criminal than the criminal al-Qadhafi” since the latter “only started using weapons against his people after a week of demonstrations”, while the Syrian president did so “from day one” (contribution no. 53).

Abu Basir’s scrapbook abounds in conspiracy theories. In one contribution (no. 46), he claims that the reason the United States does not invade Syria to overthrow the regime there is that the country – unlike Libya – lacks oil on the one hand and, on the other, because Syria “has played the role of watchdog” for Israel for more than forty years. He also states that Syria is a “servant” of “its master”, the US and the international community (contribution no. 304).

Readers may wonder if such thoughts aren’t rather odd considering, among several other things, Syria’s long-time support for Hizbullah’s attacks on the Israel. They might be, if Hizbullah wasn’t part of another conspiracy, namely the “coalition between the Syrian sectarian regime, Iran and Hizbullah in Lebanon” (contribution 35). He accuses the latter of contributing to the killing of Syrian demonstrators (contribution 231) and sees them as part of a Shiite plot, which has supposedly succeeded “through the Syrian secret service and the media” to brand all demonstrators as “Salafis”, which many see as a synonym for “terrorists” (contribution 226). According to Abu Basir’s logic, which he leaves largely unexpressed, such conspirators must apparently work hand in glove with those other countries allegedly pulling all the strings (i.e., the US and Israel).

Shallow

Some of the contributions that appear in Abu Basir’s scrapbook are also available as individual articles. Still, there is a clear contrast between this book and his other writings on the Arab Spring. Whereas the latter are relatively careful and considered, the collection of short contributions to his scrapbook are often rather crude and shallow. This does not just apply to his accusations of conspiratorial plots and his cheap shots at Shiites – which, to be honest, can also be found in his longer writings – but also in his downright celebration of the death of al-Qadhafi: “God is great… God is great and praise be to God… Today the tyrant al-Qadhafi has been killed… The father of ignorance of this age has been killed… Musaylima [an early-Islamic false prophet] of this age has been killed” (contribution 688).

Perhaps such tendencies can be expected in a scrapbook, in which deep thoughts usually have no place. Abu Basir is also less likely to be criticised for saying such things, since some of these “arguments” go down particularly well with his fellow radicals. Still, Abu Basir might do the Arab Spring more good if he stuck to his genuine efforts – no matter how unpalatable these may still be to most – to help the revolutionaries find solutions to their problems rather than egging them on with hollow rhetoric that doesn’t do anybody any good.

 

Everything you always wanted to know about al-Maqdisi (but were afraid to ask)

Joas Wagemakers June 25, 2012

Well, perhaps not quite. Nevertheless, readers of Jihadica will be interested to know that my book on Abu Muhammad al-Maqdisi, one of the most prominent jihadi ideologues alive, was recently published by Cambridge University Press. Maybe the book doesn’t tell you everything you want to know about the man, his ideas and his influence, but together with some of my articles, it will surely satisfy most people’s curiosity.

Al-Qaida Advises the Arab Spring: Yemen

Joas Wagemakers June 5, 2012

Uh-oh. Several jihadi scholars are engaged in some ideological infighting again and it’s not pretty. As long-time readers of Jihadica know only too well, several jihadi ideologues have participated in quite heated debates about jihad, violence and suicide bombings with the people who are supposedly their brothers in arms. The best-known among these are the accusations between Sayyid Imam and Ayman al-Zawahiri (see here for the first installment of Will’s series of posts on this subject, for example) and the conflict between Abu Muhammad al-Maqdisi and the supporters of his former pupil Abu Mus’ab al-Zarqawi (see here, for instance). This time, it’s the Syrian-British shaykh Abu Basir al-Tartusi who starts this discussion by criticising the Yemeni militant group Ansar al-Shari’a, which is responsible for several major attacks in Yemen in the past months and is said to have strong ties to al-Qaida. This discussion does not just tell us something about differences of opinion on one radical organisation, but also sheds light on highly diverging views on what the Arab Spring should be all about.

Brothers

As usual, Abu Basir starts his criticism of Ansar al-Shari’a by pointing out that his critique is simply brotherly advice. That’s about as far as his politeness goes, however, since he immediately starts accusing the group of using suicide bombings without taking the limits and conditions of such operations into account. He also asks: “What is your problem with the Yemeni soldier? You are dealing with him as if he is an American soldier!” Abu Basir states that Yemeni soldiers are against the regime too yet they apparently still constitute legitimate targets for Ansar al-Shari’a. “Is this the shari’a that you proclaim and on whose behalf you’re working?”, he asks rhetorically.

Abu Basir suggests that Ansar al-Shari’a change its strategy now that Yemeni President ‘Ali ‘Abdallah Salih has left. He accuses the group of continuing their fight “as if the tyrant ‘Ali Salih hasn’t left […], as if the revolution never happened and no changed whatsoever occurred in Yemen!” This unchanged policy has resulted in alienating the protesters and demonstrators in Yemen and “a policy of aggression” that has left many innocent people dead. This only appears to strengthen the claim made by Salih that al-Qaida would fill the void he left. This leads Abu Basir to conclude that Ansar al-Shari’a is not serving the purpose of the revolution but is, in fact, doing exactly what “the tyrant” wants. Despite fighting for more than ten years, the group has not succeeded in implementing the shari’a at all, Abu Basir states. “Or do you think that the shari’a is only about raising slogans?”, he asks sarcastically. “What strategy is this that you are following?”, he adds, while pointing out that they should go and seek the advice of Yemeni scholars on what to do.

End and means

Abu Basir’s criticism was published on his website in March of this year and in that same month, Abu Hummam Bakr b. ‘Abd al-‘Aziz al-Athari wrote a still rather friendly refutation of his critique. He states that he excuses Abu Basir for his latest remarks because “what we have learned from him […] is more than […] what we criticise him for.” Nevertheless, al-Athari goes on to accuse Abu Basir of ignoring – not being ignorant of – two things: the goal that change must bring about and the means to bring about change. The former is to bring people from darkness to light and this is not going to happen, al-Athari states, through democratic reforms called for by the demonstrators; rather, it will be achieved by applying the shari’a, which is exactly what Ansar al-Shari’a wants. The means that will lead to this end has been provided by God himself, al-Athari states: jihad.

Al-Athari further wonders why Abu Basir would like the revolution to stop because President Salih has left. “[Ansar al-Shari’a] fought [Salih] because he ruled through something different than the shari’a.” His successor ‘Abd Rabbuh Mansur has only added to that, al-Athari states. “How can it be allowed to fight the former but not the latter?! Or [how can] the democracy of Mansur be Islamic but the democracy of Salih unbelief?!” They both ruled through “un-Islamic” laws and allowed their armies to fight on behalf of the Americans, which also shows you why Ansar al-Shari’a has “a problem” with Yemeni soldiers.

Scholars

Also in March, Abu l-Zubayr ‘Adil al-‘Ubab, a writer or ideologue who appears affiliated with Ansar al-Shari’a itself, wrote another refutation of Abu Basir’s letter. He specifically targets Abu Basir for his criticism of the supposedly reckless use of suicide bombings by Ansar al-Shari’a. He claims that, contrary to what Abu Basir says, the organisation does try to take the conditions and limits of suicide bombings into account and has only been involved in nine of them, which he describes in such a way that makes it seems like a very high number. We only use suicide bombings, he says, “if we have no alternative, if the alternative is very difficult or if it involves more losses”.

Al-‘Ubab says things about Yemeni soldiers and the army that are similar to what al-Athari pointed out about them, but delves more deeply into the question of the scholars Abu Basir advises Ansar al-Shari’a to consult. He distinguishes three categories of scholars in Yemen. The first category consists of Sunnis, with whom they consult regularly and from whom they seek advice, except for those Sunni scholars who support the regime or want to go into politics. Then there the scholars of the Muslim Brothers, whom he dismisses as “politicians” and, finally, “the scholars of religious innovations like Sufism, Shiism (al-rafida), Zaydism and those who adhere to them”. Since it is obvious that the members of Ansar al-Shari’a will not ask the latter for advice, al-‘Ubab wonders what Abu Basir is talking about.

Disgusting

If the previous two refutations of Abu Basir were still rather friendly, this does not apply to Abu l-Mundhir al-Shinqiti’s refutation: “The Disgusting Deviations of the Critic of Ansar al-Shari’a: A Refutation of Shaykh Abu Basir”, which was published some two weeks ago. Al-Shinqiti is a formidable foe for Abu Basir since the former is one of the most active jihadi ideologues at the moment and seems to be almost the sole provider of fatwas on the Shari’a Council of the Minbar al-Tawhid wa-l-Jihad. In fact, with other leading scholars such as Abu Qatada al-Filastini, Nasir b. Hamd al-Fahd and Abu Muhammad al-Maqdisi locked up, Abu Basir and al-Shinqiti may well be the most influential and most prolific radical scholars in the world right now.

Whatever the case may be, al-Shinqiti does not mince words. He accuses Abu Basir of not basing his views on real arguments and of simply wanting to slander the mujahidun. On top of this, he adds that Ansar al-Shari’a does consult with scholars in Yemen and that these are “more famous and knowledgeable” than Abu Basir. If the latter is so serious about his “advice” to Ansar al-Shari’a, al-Shinqiti says, does he not believe that the Yemeni government is an apostate government that should be fought? “Do you want to abandon the method of jihad and do democracy like the rest of the revolutionaries?”, al-Shinqiti asks. He gets even more direct with regard to Abu Basir’s question about why Ansar al-Shari’a targets Yemeni soldiers. “I don’t understand”, al-Shinqiti says. “Is it possible that you are really ignorant of the answer to this question?”  Al-Shinqiti deals with the same points mentioned above, but does so much more vehemently and elaborately, dismissing Abu Basir’s accusations as “fabrications”.

It is clear that Abu Basir’s criticism of Ansar al-Shari’a is quite unacceptable to several of his radical colleagues. His advice to lay down arms and take a more peaceful approach is not an exception, however, as we have seen in my previous posts in this series. Abu Basir consistently takes a more irenic approach towards certain remnants of the regimes that have been toppled and people who do not follow the right type of Islam and often condemns extreme violence. That major radical scholars such as Abu Basir and especially al-Shinqiti are more and more on a collision course is not just clear from the above but also from the fact that the latter ends his critique of Abu Basir by saying: “God willing, we will continue this conversation with shaykh Abu Basir in a forthcoming article entitled “The Enlightenment of the Truth of Shaykh Abu Basir’s Method”. We have not seen the last of this.

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