Jihadis Debate Egypt (3)

Brynjar Lia February 7, 2011

Two other pieces may deserve some attention. Both of them have been flagged as very important on Shumukh.

Yesterday, “the Mas’adat al-Mujahidin in Palestine”, a jihadi media outlet claiming to speak on behalf of Palestinian jihadis, issued a statement on Shumukh in support of “the Brothers of Monotheism in Egypt”. It calls upon them to remain steadfast, maintain “the frontlines in all streets of Egypt”, and stresses that participation in this Uprising is a fard ‘ayn, an obligatory individual Islamic duty upon every able man. The communiqué also contains the obligatory listing of Mubarak’s evildoing.

What I find most interesting in the communiqué is the emphasis on the post-revolutionary phase and the character of the new regime. This is different from Abu Mundhir al-Shanqiti’s fatwa (see my earlier post) and Abu Sa’d al-Amili’s epistle (see below). The Mas’adat al-Mujahidin communiqué stresses the need for “preserving the fruits of your jihad”, not allowing the opportunists “to steal it”: “Any other rule but Islam will not protect you”. Furthermore, it states that “there is no excuse to delay the efforts to achieve this hope.” Failing to do so, it warns, the Egyptian brothers will face a new regime that “will be worse” and many times more corrupt than Mubarak’s. The international dimension of the post-revolutionary phase is not ignored: “you have not only broken your own shackles, but you will liberate the peoples of the other Arab countries from the tyrants of corruption and oppression. The hopes of the Islamic nations depend upon you.” The communiqué ends with a call to Egyptian clerics to forcefully declare their support for the Uprising and remove any doubt about its religious legitimacy.

As “abu hakam” was kind to point out Shaykh Abu Sa’d al-Amili has also commented on the Uprising in a recent epistle, which is among the most recommended propaganda pieces on Shumukh. Shaykh al-Amili recommends a wait-and-see strategy for the mujahidin: “the people’s revolution is like a typhoon, which you cannot stop […] We have to wait until the typhoon ends its course and reaches its destination”.

A prolific “Internet Shaykh” who has gained very high standing on jihadi webforums over the past few years, Shaykh al-Amili has other interesting things to say as well. He talks about the importance of getting the priorities right and selecting the appropriate battlefields. The necessity of proselytizing (da’wa) is highlighted: the latter is “the most important battle field and the basic vantage point for the operations of jihad.” A big part of this effort is to remove the mentality of fear. Clearly attempting to claim some credit for the uprising, Shaykh al-Amili argues that the jihadis have contributed to restoring self-confidence among Muslims. In fact, various jihadi struggles in different parts of the world “were the very spark” which ignited the revolutions in Egypt and Tunisia. What we are witnessing now, he claims, are “the fruits and blessings of the jihad, which al-Qaida and the other Mujahidin groups have conducted in every place, even though these peoples do not recognize this (my emphasis).” Shaykh al-Amili evidently suggests that the unconscious Arab masses have finally been awakened from their slumber by al-Qaida’s armed operations.

Well, I don’t think so. The current popular uprisings are just about the complete opposite of everything al-Qaida stands for: they are non-violent, mass-based, popular, all-inclusive, mostly secular, democratic, and perhaps most important: they work! I sense a difficult time ahead for al-Qaida.

Jihadis Debate Egypt (2)

Brynjar Lia February 4, 2011

Al-Qaida’s senior leadership (AQSL) is full of Egyptians, but they have yet to produce an official communiqué about events in their home country. Yesterday, a short message was published by a leading Egyptian jihadi figure. It is not from AQSL, however, but from someone we haven’t heard from for many years. The London-based Al Maqreze Center run by Hani al-Sibai has relayed a message from Thirwat Salah Shahata, a veteran of the old Egyptian Islamic Jihad (Jama’at al-Jihad bi Misr). Now nearly fifty one years old, he has been absent from the spotlight for many years. In 2005, he was reported to be under some sort of house arrest in Iran, and Al-Sharq al-Awsat’s sources claim the message was sent from Tehran. Al Maqreze, however, suggests he is now hiding in “Khurasan” (i.e. the Northern Af-Pak region).

In his communiqué, Shahata speaks on behalf of the Jihad Group (EIJ), not al-Qaida. He expresses his solidarity with the courageous Egyptian people “with all segments of its society” in their fight against tyranny, and says “we wish we could have been on the front line, and shared this honour with you”. In an attempt to explain the jihadis’ absence from the scene, he talks about the imprisonment of numerous EIJ cadres in Egypt, their escape from Egypt during various stages of their struggle with the regime, and their participation in other arenas for jihad. He ends his message by urging Egyptians not to be deceived by the regime’s concessions, but continue the current uprising until the regime is gone. Shahata also addresses the army, urging them to heed the nation’s aspirations and side with the people.

In short, Shahata’s communiqué is rather unremarkable and triggered only measured responses on the jihadi web. In fact, apart from the obligatory “bless you” and “God protect Shaykh Tharwat”, it triggered negative comments about Shahata’s appeal to the army: “I don’t know how he can appeal to the army. This is a secular army … and one that produced the tyrants such as Gamal Abdul Nasser, Sadat and now, the damned (“unblessed”) Mubarak …”

Such a response and the mere fact that this anonymous and murky EIJ figure, issues a message, and not a leading Egyptian al-Qaida member, is significant. Again, it demonstrates the jihadis’ irrelevance to the rapidly evolving situation in Egypt.

Jihadis Debate Egypt (1)

Brynjar Lia February 4, 2011

With Tunisia’s President Bin Ali tucked away in Jedda and the world’s attention fixated on the popular uprising in Egypt, al-Qaida may be about to lose one of its main ideological selling points: that only armed struggle can bring down the regimes in the region.

Not surprisingly, the jihadi online community is captivated by the uprising, but many are also bewildered about what this means for their cause, and their leaders have been slow to respond. Jarret Brachman has a point when he taunts Zawahiri: “Your Silence is Deafening.” As of Thursday afternoon, the leading jihadi forum Shamikh only featured a handful of authoritative responses to the events in Egypt, from pro-jihadi pundits, a legal scholar and other participants. However, not a word from the leadership. The closest thing to an official response is AQIM’s statement on the events in Tunisia (available also in translation).

Over the past few days, the most popular sub-forum on Shamikh, the “Umma Affairs Forum”, claiming more than 300,000 visitors, has gradually increased the number of “sticky posters” dealing with the situation in Egypt. The rank-and-file participants are organizing in Q & A sessions and open discussions to bring more clarity to the situation.

Among the few authorative voices we find Abu Mundhir al-Shanqiti, a member of the legal council at Minbar al-Tawhid wa’l-Jihad and a prolific fatwa writer. A few days ago, he issued a fatwa on “the permissibility of participation in the present revolution in Egypt,” which expands on a previous article from January 25th entitled “Revolt against Mubarak”. But don’t let the word “fatwa” mislead you. This is all about politics.

The first thing that strikes me is how much praise Shaykh al-Shanqiti heaps on the anti-Mubarak demonstrators and how frank and outspoken he is about the jihadi movement’s failure to remove the regime: “We need to acknowledge that removing the ruling regime in Egypt is a matter which may be hard even for the largest jihadi organizations, so if these demonstrators succeed in toppling it [the regime], it will be a great victory for Islam and Muslims.” Yes, you read it right: al-Shanqiti openly declares that these demonstrators, who by all accounts have no jihadi links or sympathies whatsoever, are apparently achieving what the jihadis have tried to do for decades. Of course, al-Shanqiti quickly turns his attention to the usual enemy, the Western world and the United States, claiming that they are trembling in fear of losing “one of their most important agents” in the region. Furthermore, Shaykh al-Shanqiti alleges that Western powers are now polishing ElBaradei to become their next “dependent agent”.

But this does not mean that we are back to jihadi ranting as usual. In al-Shanqiti’s view, the repercussions of Mubarak’s downfall will be significant; indeed it might cause “a large earthquake similar to the 9/11 raids”. He points to Israel’s dependence on the Egyptian regime as its Southern “border guard”, but also to implications for the region as a whole. Al-Shanqiti cannot overstate how recent events have overwhelmed him: “we are facing a historic moment and a critical phase in the history of the Islamic nation.” But instead of plunging into the usual jihadi tirades, he is surprisingly nationalist in tone. Check out this quote: “As for the Egyptians today, it means that they have wrestled back their dignity, honour, and freedom and have gotten rid of Western agents. This means the birth of a new era, in which Egypt will possess its own will and realize its own future and belonging, to its religion, to God’s laws and to its Islamic nation.” And this one: “How we long to be among our brothers in Egypt so that we could enjoy the honour of contributing to the downfall of this regime, be it only with half a word”. Al-Shanqiti’s fatwa is so filled with enthusiasm and excitement over events in Egypt, that he almost forgets to provide the obligatory religious justifications for his fatwa. Rarely have I seen a pro-al-Qaida cleric being so excited about secular demonstrators!

True, he hasn’t entirely forgotten the jihadis, and he hopes to see them play a role: “If some of the mujahidin are present today in Egypt, their most preferable jihad would be to participate in this blessed revolution.” Al-Shanqiti also suggests that the mujahidin should be prepared to sacrifice “ten or even hundred of their best fighters” in a suicide operation to put an end to Mubarak and his regime. He also portrays events as though the Egyptian public now finally is about to realize what the jihadi groups have said over the past two decades. Conveniently glossing over the huge differences between the armed strategy of the militant Islamist opposition of the past and today’s non-violent mass protests, al-Shanqiti presents one comparison after the other, attempting to create a sense of historic continuity.

But again, Shaykh al-Shanqiti’s enthusiasm for the (largely secular) protesters is what really stands out. He applauds “the courage of the non-committed youth and their dedication and struggle for the Islamic nation”. He even holds them up as a shining example compared to Egypt’s Salafi current who “call themselves seekers of knowledge”, but “are not even lifting their heads.” Al-Shanqiti accuses them of serving the regime’s cause by their warnings about “fitna”, and he rages against Egyptian Salafis who have claimed that the toppling of Mubarak’s regime will lead to secular rule. Shaykh al-Shanqiti’s order of priorities is clear, politics first, then religion: “the issue we are talking about is the removal of the regime. This is a demand on which we are in agreement with the rest of the [Egyptian] people. We should contribute to realizing this goal. After the regime has gone, it is possible to strive for the creation of a new regime which implements God’s Law”. In other words, the revolutionary agenda takes precedence over the Islamic character of the revolution.

To be continued.

More Fitna in Cyberspace: Mihdar vs al-Maqdisi

Brynjar Lia February 7, 2009

Is another chapter in the history of cyber-jihadi infighting about to be written these days? The latest controversy is a series of attacks by the webforum Madad al-Suyuf on Abu Muhammad al-Maqdisi, perhaps the most influential salafi-jihadi clerics alive.

That the cyber-Jihadis quarrel with one another should come as no surprise. Despite calls for unity and brotherly counseling, jihadi writers frequently fight it out in the open. In fact, inter-jihadi quarrels seem to have become more common and less ‘brotherly’ in tone in recent years. As for al-Maqdisi himself, most of you will recall his open letter of advice to al-Zarqawi in mid-2005, which earned him a stern reply from his former disciple and many enemies among al-Zarqawi’s numerous buddies. More recently, people have suspected that al-Maqdisi is being pressured to follow in the footsteps Sayyid Imam Sharif and other revisionists. Will, Joas and others have already covered these accusations brilliantly on Jihadica (See also Murad al-Shishani’s piece).

A key player in the latest round is ’Mihdar’, the Madad al-Suyuf administrator. His full name is apparently Abu Harith Mihdar al-Shadhili and he is a very controversial figure. He has been kicked out of many jihadi forums and is notorious for his attacks on well-known clerics. Mihdar is now accusing al-Maqdisi for posting studies on his website the Minbar al-Tawhid wa’l-Jihad without referencing their source. (This is an odd accusation coming from a cyber-jihadi since copyright is usually seen as a ’kafir’ invention. In jihadi propaganda one is more likely to find statements like ’this is the property of the entire Islamic Umma’ than ’all rights reserved’.) However, the harsh tone in Mihdar’s criticism suggested that the issue was not merely about copyright.

Al-Maqdisi took this accusation seriously and posted a response on his website, as he has done in the past. What followed was an avalanche of hostile postings on Madad al-Suyuf on a range of serious matters. One sticky posting entitled “For discussion: ambiguity problems in al-Maqdisi’s thinking” accused him of confusing and misguiding the mujahidin with his ambivalence on the takfir issue. Another details al-Maqdisi’s ‘disgraceful acts’ in prison.

Others have jumped in to try to reconcile the parties and mend differences. Hani al-Sibai at the al-Maqrizi Centre in London was called upon to support al-Maqdisi, and he came out firmly on al-Maqdisi’s side, as he has done in the past. This in turn triggered yet another angry reply from Mihdar. On many other webforums, people have responded harshly to Mihdar’s attack, most of them denouncing Mihdar and accusing Madad al-Suyuf of being “nothing more than an intelligence operation”.

Some of this wrangling smacks of a type of blue-collar vs white collar jihadists: we fight and they only criticize. Mihdar may well be an armchair jihadi himself, but his criticism could reflect growing discontent among jihadis in the field toward jihadi clerics. Are we witnessing a renegotiation of the very nature of the commander vs clerical mentor relationship? The neo-Zarqawists and their like clearly seek and welcome clerical counseling, but not in public. And they respond by showing their strongest card: battlefield glory. In the current debate, for example, the Madad al-Suyuf crowd hold against al-Maqdisi that the latter does not have “any jihadi credentials”. This is precisely what Abu Musab al-Suri, also more of a jihadi practitioner than a cleric, used to say about Abu Qutada: the latter never fought in Afghanistan. He “was not a jihadi and had no history in that field.” The clerics’ resort to public admonishments instead of discrete counseling is a common theme elsewhere too. Critics of Shaykh Hamid al-Ali’s controversial repudiation of the Islamic state in Iraq have also complained: Why don’t you keep this out of the public eye? At the very least, there is an inherent contradiction between two oft-heard slogans in jihadi discourse: “the mujahidin in the fields know best” and “pay respect to the clerics”.

Document (Arabic): 1-al-maqdisis-response-to-madad-al-suyuf

Document (Arabic): 2-boraq-forum-on-mihdar

Document (Arabic): 3-for-discussion-ambiguity-problems-in-al-maqdisis-thinking

Document (Arabic): 4-call-to-the-two-shaykhs-al-maqdisi-and-al-mihdar

Document (Arabic): 5-madad-al-suyufs-respons-to-hani-al-sibai

Document (Arabic): 6-the-truth-about-the-differences-between-shaykh-al-maqdisi-and-the-heirs-of-al-zarqawi