ji·had·ica

Did the Quetta Shura Break With al-Qaida?

Anne Stenersen March 22, 2010

Mustafa Hamid, aka Abu’l-Walid al-Masri, published a blog piece a little while ago which discussed the arrest of Mullah Baradir. It’s fascinating reading, especially the first part which deals with the historical role of Mullah Baradir in the Taliban insurgency. It’s already been covered in part by Leah Farrall.

I thought I’d add some comment about the opening lines of the article, in which Mustafa Hamid says that the Taliban’s high council made three important decisions after 2001, one of which was to “break the ties between the Taliban and al-Qaida.” Mustafa Hamid has previously said that al-Qaida and the Taliban have moved further apart after 2001, although I don’t think he’s ever been this specific. We have heard similar things in the media, but the reports are hard to confirm. Was there actually a decision in the Quetta shura, led by Mullah Baradir at the time, to break ties with al-Qaida?

If true, it would be really interesting, especially since we know that al-Qaida militants and at least parts of the Taliban movement continue to cooperate closely on a tactical level in Afghanistan. In an article in Sumud magazine in 2008, Mullah Baradir also acknowledged the presence of foreign fighters in the Taliban’s ranks. If the Quetta Shura indeed made a decision to break ties with al-Qaida after 2001, it doesn’t seem to have impeded the tactical cooperation between the two. It is tempting to assume that either, the Quetta Shura has little influence on the actual insurgency in Afghanistan, or Mustafa Hamid’s statement is incorrect.

The first point may in part be true. Al-Qaida fighters are most active in eastern Afghanistan, where the Quetta Shura’s direct influence over the insurgency is probably also the lowest. However, I think there’s another interpretation as well, namely that the Shura never actually intended to break ties with the al-Qaida militants who supported them in Afghanistan. On the other hand, they might have wanted to distance themselves from certain aspects of al-Qaida’s ideology. Reading the rest of Mustafa Hamid’s article, we see that he’s not really talking about an all-out rejection of foreign fighters in Afghanistan after the fall of the Taliban in late 2001. Rather, he refers to the Quetta shura’s rejection of the “al-Qaida strategy” of instigating sectarian war between Sunnis and Shi’ites in Iraq after 2003. (A “strategy” which was actually criticised by al-Qaida Central as well – but that’s the pitfall of lending out your brand name to unruly regional associates).

Rejecting this particular aspect of “al-Qaida” is pretty easy for the Taliban, which has never been a sectarian group anyway. But rejecting the presence of al-Qaida fighters and ideologues in AfPak is a much more complicated matter.

The Taliban, the UN and al-Qaida

Anne Stenersen October 30, 2009

(Editor’s note: Anne tried to post a comment on Vahid Brown’s landmark post on Al-Qaida-Taliban relations. Given that she is one of the world’s foremost experts on this issue, there was no way I was going to let her remarks “disappear” into the comments section. So here they are. Her text begins with a response to an earlier comment about Taliban’s view of the UN).

“Mullah Omar’s statement should not be interpreted to mean that he or other Taliban leaders are ready to recognize the United Nations. In fact, the Taliban’s leaders have criticized the UN on a number of occasions, in addition to the one you mention. In 2006 Mullah Omar accused the UN of being nothing but a “tool for America” and Mullah Baradir echoed this in 2008, saying that “we regard all the decisions of the United Nations towards Afghanistan, as American orders.” I do not think their 12 Oct 09 statement was issued as a direct response to forum criticism, since it is pretty consistent with the Taliban’s past propaganda statements on the UN.

From the Taliban’s perspective, opposing the UN and wanting to have “good relations” with neighbouring countries are not necessarily contradictory. In the 1990s there was a huge debate within the Taliban regime on whether to join the UN or not – the main argument against it was that joining the UN would mean that the Islamic Emirate would have to subordinate itself to “infidel” laws (the UN Charter, etc). Having strategic alliances with other countries is another matter, which may also be easier to defend from a religious point of view (this seems to be the point of the al-Sumud editors as well). But clearly, there are many within the wider jihadi community who do not agree to this distinction.

By the way, excellent article Vahid – I agree that AQ central are probably not too happy about the Taliban-IEA’s recent propaganda statements, although I do not think it will have any practical implications for the insurgency – there is simply not enough incentive for neither the Quetta Shura or AQ central to “turn on” the other as long as there is a common enemy to fight and the Quetta Shura see themselves in a position of strength (i.e. there is no need for them to enter into negotiations with the Afghan regime, in which they would probably have to renounce their relationship with al-Qaida). Al-Qaida’s close relationship with Haqqani (as you mention in the comment) is also a crucial point – while the Quetta Shura may not be dependent on al-Qaida they are indeed dependent on having Haqqani and his allies on their side. That may partly explain why the Quetta Shura is putting up with al-Qaida propaganda that contradicts their own agenda.”

Taliban’s View of the Upcoming Elections

Anne Stenersen May 5, 2009

Afghanistan’s next presidential elections have been scheduled for 20 August 2009, and Taliban’s media committee has already started its campaign. That is, a campaign to discredit the election process and defame its candidates. President Karzai is the most popular target, but the others are also starting to receive their portion of insults. This is of course in line with Taliban’s broader media campaign, described in detail in this International Crisis Group report.

The headlines in last months’ issues of al-Sumud are telling enough: The March issue featured an article entitled “The coming presidential elections, or an agreement to sell Afghanistan to the occupiers?” The May issue followed suit with a similar rhetorical question: “Will the replacement of Karzai with another agent solve the Afghan problem?” In both articles, the line of argumentation is simple: As long as foreign troops are present in Afghanistan, there can never be free and fair elections. The outcome is controlled by the Americans, and whoever will be elected will act as a US “puppet” just like his predecessor.

According to the Taliban, the solution is equally simple: Expel the “occupiers” first, and talk politics later. For those who have followed Taliban’s official propaganda this is not very surprising. Ever since the start of the insurgency in Afghanistan, the Taliban’s leadership has, at least officially, consistently refused to make any kind of compromises with the Afghan regime, let alone taking part in the democratic process.

It remains to be seen whether and how these signals from the Taliban leadership will translate into actual action on the ground. The above-mentioned articles do not contain any details in this regard. In general, the aim of Taliban’s propaganda is not to discuss or suggest effective strategies to defeat the enemy, but rather, to project a worldview where Taliban’s victory is already seen as inevitable.

But the “war of words” is one thing, the war on the ground is a different matter.

Document (Arabic): 03-03-09-sumud33-al-intikhabat-al-riasiyya
Document (Arabic): 05-05-09-sumud35-hal-istibdal-karzai

 

The History of the Jihadi Forums

Anne Stenersen March 4, 2009

One of the most intriguing questions about the jihadi internet is how it came into being. The early history of jihadi websites remains very poorly understood. Most of us started studying them too late, and we are too busy keeping track of present developments to examine the past.

My curiosity was therefore piqued by a recent article by ‘Mihdar’ on Midad al-Suyuf, who provides what he calls a ‘complete historical analysis’ of the jihadi forums on the web. Considering Mihdar’s record as a somewhat controversial figure – for other controversies involving Madad al-Suyuf, see here or here, the study should be taken with a grain of salt. And indeed, Mihdar is more interested in politics than in facts. He devotes a considerable part of his ‘analysis’ to lashing out at other jihadi forums, in particular criticising the policy of closing forums to registered members only. This, he argues, both restricts the flow of information (since password-protecting a forum means that you cannot enter it from public search engines, like Google), and facilitates the formation of cliques and factions among the members.

Anyway, the article does also provide a brief overview of the early history of Arab and jihadi web pages, as seen from an ’insider’. The article starts out by talking about Arabic and Islamic forums in general. He claims the first Arabic forums started around ten years ago, but they were general forums and not jihadi forums as such. Examples include al-Sahat, Ana Muslim (which he claims was “bought by Saudi intelligence” early on) and Sahab (not to be confused with al-Qaida’s media company al-Sahab). Around 2000 the page Islamway appeared, which was dominated by Egyptians. After 11 September, Islamway was shut down but other forums took its place such as al-Tajdid, al-Qala‘a, al-Islah and al-Tawhid. Of these, the only jihadi page was al-Tawhid, where Abu Qatada and Abu Hamza were believed to be writing. With regards to the others, they were political forums, but not strictly speaking jihadi.

Then, at the end of 2003, the forum al-Ansar appeared, and it was the only true jihadi forum at the time. It was preceded by a page named jehad.net, but this was shut down after its owner was arrested. Al-Ansar carried news about the Iraqi jihad in particular, distributed by a man named Abu Maysara al-Iraqi. Al-Iraqi started posting on the page in early 2004, and was the official source of information from the Iraqi jihad. In the beginning, al-Ansar was open for everyone to watch. However, in May 2004 the forum was shut down, after it had posted a video of the beheading of the American hostage Nicholas Berg. It later reappeared, but started requiring members to register. [As some of you might be aware, al-Ansar disappeared for good in 2004 or in 2005]. During the “last days of al-Ansar”, the forum al-Ikhlas was also established, founded by a young man named Muhibb al-Shaykhayn al-Tunisi.

Thus the historical overview seems to end, as the article goes on to discuss other and more internal matters, which will not be detailed here. The writer does also mention the newer and more well-known discussion forums such as al-Hisba, al-Buraq, al-Firdaws etc., but does not provide details on their history. Interestingly, he argues that none of these forums are run by intelligence agencies (contesting a common rumour, in particular with regards to al-Hisba) but that they have been corrupted by the members themselves, making free and open discussion impossible.

It is hard to judge the historical accuracy of this account, and it is apparently not complete. At FFI we only began to follow the forums closely in early 2002, so we missed the crucial formative period from 1999 to 2001.  Perhaps Reuven at E-Prism or Aaron at Haganah have some insights?

Document (Arabic): 01-04-09-madad-al-suyuf-the-jihadi-forums

A Unified Strategy towards Germany?

Anne Stenersen February 2, 2009

Over the past few months, several German-speaking jihadists have appeared in propaganda videos emanating from Afghanistan and Pakistan. Bekkay Harrach (aka Abu Talha al-Almani), who was recently featured in a production by al-Qaida’s official media arm al-Sahab, is only the most recent example. As described in this article, the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU) and its offshoot, the Islamic Jihadi Union (IJU), also boast Germans in their ranks, and have actively used them in their media productions. Meanwhile, a suicide bomber, believed to be from the Taliban, attacked the German embassy in Kabul on 17 January 2009. All of this has been interpreted  as a sign that Germany is being targeted by al-Qaida.

The German focus is indeed intriguing. But what I find even more interesting are the differences between these productions and what they tell us about the landscape of jihadi groups in Afghanistan. Too often, groups like al-Qaida, IMU and IJU are looked upon as one and the same organization. There are certainly links and cooperation. But do they, in fact have a unified strategy against, let’s say, Germany?

Let us start with the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan, believed to be led by the Uzbek Tahir Yuldashev, a long-time affiliate of Osama bin Laden. A video produced by Jundullah (a media company associated with the IMU) dated September 2008 features several German-speaking jihadists (see English transcript here). They address German-speaking Muslims and urge them to come and fight in Afghanistan. One of the speakers encourages potential recruits to bring their families along, pointing out that “this has become a very family-friendly place”, with possibilities to live ”far away from the front” and with ”hospitals, pharmacies, doctors, and schools”. They do not, however, lash out against the German government or threaten with attacks inside Germany. Rather, the message is more in line with Abdallah Azzam-style “classical jihadism” where Muslims are encouraged to go and fight directly in the “occupied” Muslim lands, in this case Afghanistan.

This is in contrast to the propaganda produced by the Islamic Jihad Union, a group thought to have split from the IMU in 2002, and established itself under the protection of the Haqqani network in the tribal areas of Pakistan. The IJU claims to have several German members, and has been targeting Germany for a while now, both through propaganda and also with operations. In an IJU production from October 2008 entitled “A Call from Hindukush”, the German convert Eric Breininger (aka Abdulgaffar al-Almani) states that Germany’s policies towards Muslims, including its military engagement in Afghanistan, is “increasing the risk of attacks on German soil”. He also encourages the German people to ”approach their own government if they want to be spared from the attacks of Muslims in Germany”. Unlike the IMU, the Islamic Jihad Union has also shown a willingness and capability to actually support terrorist attacks in Europe. Last year the group was linked to the so-called Sauerland cell, whose members were arrested in the fall of 2007 suspected of planning attacks against targets in Germany. The IJU even took responsibility for the failed operation in Germany (see the article by Petter Nesser in this issue of the CTC Sentinel).

IJU’s local hosts, the Haqqani network, do not seem to share their foreign guests’ interest in targeting Europe. Sirajuddin Haqqani, one of the top commanders in the network, stated in an interview with the Pakistani journalist Rahimullah Yousufzai in August 2008 that ”we are busy in our own war here in Afghanistan and it is not our policy to attack or carry out acts of sabotage in other countries”. They seem to have so far turned a blind eye to IJU’s international activities, possibly because the IJU are also active supporting the insurgency in Afghanistan (including an attack against a US guard post in March 2008 carried out by the Turkish-German jihadist Cueneyt Ciftci, described as “Germany’s first suicide bomber”). In combining international terrorism with local guerrilla warfare, the IJU’s approach is similar to that of the rest of the al-Qaida network in Afghanistan.

Finally, it has been reported that a German citizen named Bekkay Harrach (31) has risen to high ranks within “al-Qaida Central”. The news emerged after Harrach appeared in a propaganda video entitled “Rescue Package for Germany”. Harrach’s words largely echoed those of the abovementioned Eric Breininger. Harrach warned that if Germany continues its military engagement in Afghanistan, it will not “get away with it for free”, and therefore, the German people should “stand up and be reasonable” in the September 2009 Parliamentary elections. In other words: vote for someone who will pull the German troops out of Afghanistan, or face the consequences. It is not the first time that al-Qaida has threatened European countries engaged in Afghanistan, or encouraged Europeans to put pressure on their governments (see for example this bin Laden message from 2004, or this one from 2007). It is, however, the first time al-Sahab has tailored a message specifically to Germans. By using a German citizen to address Germans, al-Sahab strengthens the image of al-Qaida as a truly global organization. As we know, al-Qaida already has an American convert in their ranks: Adam Gadahn (aka Azzam al-Amriki), who has been featured in several al-Sahab productions.

However, the differences in IMU’s propaganda on the one hand, and that of IJU and al-Qaida on the other, seem to indicate that there is still no unified strategy among al-Qaida and their affiliates with regards to how to target Germany and other coalition members. The legality of targeting German troops inside Afghanistan, on the other hand, seems to be undisputed.

Document (English): 01-12-09-imu-video

Document (Turkish): 10-21-08-call-from-hindukush

Document (Arabic): 01-19-09-rescue-package-for-germany

For two other reports on the IJU, see Ronald Sandee, “The Islamic Jihad Union” , and Guido Steinberg, “A Turkish al-Qaeda: The Islamic Jihad Union and the Internationalization of Uzbek Jihadism”

Latest Jihadica
Subscribe to receive latest posts
Follow us
Facebook Twitter Google-plus Pinterest

Copyright © 2025 Jihadica