ji·had·ica

Maqdisi Response To Abu Rumman Article

Abu Muhammad al-Maqdisi has released a statement on his website, Tawhed.ws, in which he responds to the questions of one of his followers about the Abu Rumman article I referenced yesterday.  Maqdisi denies being a revisionist but he is also clear that he is not an extremist and that he is trying to regain control of the dragon he unleased in his earlier writings.  

In his statement, Maqdisi finally names his main nemesis, the brother-in-law of Zarqawi’s wife.  I haven’t seen Abu Qudama’s book yet but I’ll try to track it down.

Here’s a summary:

Question 1: Abu Rumman says you are shunning Zarqawi’s supporters.  Is it possible to consider this part of the “revisions,” as he says?

Those of us who signed the statement are not dissociating ourselves from the brothers.  We are talking about a small group of ignorant people who haven’t studied at all, were not in prison with us, and who did not fight in a jihad.  The beliefs of these people are like the Khawarij of old because of their general excommunication of people.  They excommunicate anyone who does not clearly dissociate themselves form the government.  Moreover, many of them believe you can’t pray behind imams of mosques that are part of government-administered endowments.  Some are attributing these teachings to me and this is the source of my disagreement with them, not their support of Zarqawi.  Those of us who signed the statement are closest to Zarqawi and knew him best.  This statement is not a “revision” as is being talked about in the media because we never previously held to the awful tenets being circulated by this group.

Question 2: Is it true you called the youth to stay away from this group before talking to its members first?

I sat with them twice in their homes and discussed the excommunication of imams who run mosques that are part of government-adminsitered endowments.  We also discussed the excommunication of government employees for not dissociating themselves from the government.  I rejected these ideas.  I succeeded in turning one of them around in a meeting at my home, but he later reverted.  I have followed the online discussions about me and I’ve spent my precious time engaging these people in hopes that they will repent.  Some have but others have become worse.

Question 3: Abu Rumman says some of your earlier works were revisions and that they are at odds with the legacy of Zarqawi.

That is not true.  The Thalathiniyya is not a revision because I didn’t revise anything.  I also wrote it alone in Zarqawi’s presence.  The Waqafat was not just directed to Zarqawi but to the whole mujahid community. [see Joas Wagemakers’ comments on my post yesterday]

Question 4: What’s your opinion of the book Fursan al-Farida al-Gha’iba [Knights of the Neglected Duty] by Abu Qudama, the husband of Zarqawi’s sister?

He has slandered me and called me a liar based on what some of the extremists mentioned above are saying.  He wasn’t with us in prison and he’s talking about things he knows nothing of.  I have been criticized because of his book, which has been published on some of the forums.  People on the forums also published his slanders against the wife of Zarqawi.

Document (Arabic): 12-13-08-faloja-maqdisi-responds-to-abu-rumman-article

Maqdisi’s High-Wire Act

On December 4, Abu Muhammad al-Maqdisi–Zarqawi’s former mentor and one of the world’s most influential Jihadi ideologues–spoke briefly to the al-Ansar Paltalk chat group.  In his brief remarks, Maqdisi appears to distance himself from the Jihadi revisionists:

For you and me I prescribe the fear of God, working for the sake of this religion, and being its helpers in the time before the victory (al-fath).  God, powerful and mighty, says: “Those of you who spent and fought before the victory are not equal (to those who didn’t); you are greater in rank than those who spent and fought afterwards” (Q 57:10).  Today, brothers and friends, you see the nations assailing us and there is no doubt that we are like the Companions of the Prophet (PBUP) before the victory.  I beseech God to hasten the victory for the people of Islam and the people of monotheism.  

Action for the sake of the religion at a time like this…the one who aids (the religion) and tries to assist it, establish it, and raise its banners–there is no doubt that he is greater in rank than those who act after the victory.  I prescribe for you and for myself constancy in this religion and working to aid it and raise its banner and to always be concerned with steadfastness–to be steadfast in (the religion) and in the truth and to not turn back, turn toward those who retreat, or turn toward those who fall away.  We must always remember the hadith of the Prophet (PBUH): “A group in my umma will always manifest the truth.  Those who oppose them cannot harm them, neither can those who abandon them, until the command of God is fulfilled.” 

Despite Maqdisi’s appeals to constancy, I wouldn’t take his rhetoric at face value given that he has made clear efforts to shift the course of Jordanian Jihadism in a different direction, as I and Abu Rumman have pointed out.  Maqdisi’s primary audience is militants, so he has to engage in a very careful balancing act.  Compare this to Sayyid Imam, who can dispense with such subtleties since Jihadis are not his primary audience.

Document (Arabic): 12-5-08-shamikh-transcript-and-audio-of-maqdisi-paltalk-session

Ignored Puzzle Pieces Of Ain Hilweh Knowledge

Here are two more puzzle pieces to add to those I put on the table yesterday.  First, Aaron learned that Fatah al-Islam renewed the domain name for its website two days ago.  Second, the Lebanese paper al-Mustaqbal reports that the Lebenese Army has heard that there may be attacks on UNIFIL, the UN force keeping the peace in southern Lebanon.  Moreover, UNIFIL has warned its soldiers to stay away from the Ain Hilweh camp.

So to recap:

  • Fatah al-Islam announced a few days ago that its old leader, Shakir al-`Absi is either dead or in custody.
  • The new leader of Fatah al-Islam is being “protected” by the Jihadi group, `Usbat al-Ansar, in the Ain Hilweh camp.
  • `Usbat al-Ansar has declared that it is forbidden to attack the Lebanese Army “or any other army” and it is a duty to attack Jews in Palestine.  At the same time, it is negotiating the handover of the new leader of Fatah al-Islam to the Lebanese Army.
  • There are threats against UNIFIL and its been told to stay away from Ain Hilweh.
  • Fatah al-Islam has made sure that its web presence remains intact.  In the past, its website was where the group posted statements about its leaders and recent attacks.

There’s too little information here to predict what is going to happen but something is bubbling in the Ain.  Is `Usba going to attack UNIFIL to get cover for turning over the new head of Fatah al-Islam?  Or does Fatah al-Islam want to hit UNIFIL to fire up its supporters and pressure `Usba not to hand its leader over?  Or is none of this related at all?  Come on you Lebanon watchers, let’s hear some theories.  Use the cover of anonymity and put forward some bold predictions.

More On Sayyid Imam’s Effectiveness

Monika Maslikowski has a smart take on Sayyid Imam’s communication strategy vs. that of Zawahiri (it’s part of a larger assessment of the latter’s stumbles as a communicator this year).  She seconds my argument that Imam’s personal attacks on Zawahiri are effective because “Zawahiri’s success as a leader is dependent on whether or not he can gain trust and support.”

On the same subject, the Shack has an essay by an Egyptian lamenting Imam’s personal attacks.  For a different perspective by another Egyptian, I’d point you to Caliph’s remarks in the comments section of a previous post.  Without revealing too much, Caliph has closely followed Egyptian media and Islamism for years.  I’d rate his comments pretty high on their own merit, but one’s background seems to matter in these sorts of debates.

Fatah Al-Islam, Ain Hilweh Intrigue

The Arab press is buzzing with news of the death or capture of Shakir al-`Absi, the head of Fatah al-Islam, the militant Islamist group that revolted against the Lebanese state at Nahr al-Barid last year.  News of his death or capture broke on the forums two days ago with the release of a document purporting to be a short history of what happened to the organization after Nahr al-Barid. (more…)

New Book On Al-Qaeda And WMD

Many of you who follow al-Qaeda may not be familiar with FFI, but you’re doubtless familiar with the excellent work of its members (e.g. Lia, Hegghammer, and Nesser).  However, FFI has a secret weapon who only insiders know: Anne Stenersen.  Anne is an outstanding Arabist (and Russianist) and has an unfair amount of knowledge about terrorist training and weaponry.  She’s now published a book on al-Qaeda and WMD.  Like everything else the FFI crew produces,  I’m sure it’s going to set a new standard for study of the subject.

Shabaab In Somalia Declare Another Governorate, Hint At Caliphate

Yesterday, the Shabaab Movement announced the establishment of the “Islamic Governorate of Shabelle” (wilayat shabila al-islamiyya) in the region of Lower Shabelle in southern Somalia.  The Shabaab says that it was “necessary for the brothers to establish civil administrations for carrying out the matters of the Islamic state (al-dawla al-islamiyya)” after they liberated Lower Shabelle from criminal tribal groups that were extorting its inhabitants.  The new governorate has a governor and supervisors for missionizing and education, security and morality policing, courts, and the treasury.  

Apparently, this is the not the first governorate that the Shabaab has established.  Today, its “Islamic Governorate of Juba” announced that it has ordered the destruction of local saints’ shrines, at once burnishing the institution’s Salafi bona fides and undermining the local tribal Sufism that permeates Somalia.

Two things strike me about the Shabelle announcement.  First is the terminology used to describe the new entity.  As I noted a few weeks ago, this is a touchy issue among Jihadis because it is unclear what new Jihadi governments should call themselves after the Islamic State of Iraq used the term dawla to describe itself, suggesting the Islamic superstate (dawla), or caliphate, of old.  Notice that the Shabaab entity is neither an emirate (imara) as claimed by the Taliban in Afghanistan nor a state (dawla) as claimed by the Islamic State of Iraq.  It is something in between, a governorate (wilaya).  Under the early caliphate, governorates were semi-autonomous but owed allegience to the caliph.  Later, the term was more vague and now usually has the meaning of “province.”  Judging from the Shabaab declaration that it is setting up the wilaya to carry out the matters of the Islamic state (al-dawla al-islamiyya), the group seems to have the older meaning in mind, thus putting it in a subordinate but semi-autonomous relationship with the ISI.  What is unclear is whether the Shabaab will set up an intervening “emirate” of Somalia to stand between the superstate (dawla) and the governorates (wilayat), as the Islamic Emirate of Caucasus has done.

Second, everything about this statement reeks of Abu Bakr Naji.  I try not to cite Naji too much because he is just one strategist among many and every student of Jihadism puts their guy forward as THE guy.  Still, this is the first time I have seen a statement that so clearly evokes Naji’s concept of rudimentary “administrations” (idarat) being set up to provide basic services to people after Jihadis have rid an area of criminals.  The idea, says Naji, is that the people will be so grateful to you for ridding them of scoundrels that they will accept your rule.  After the “administration” is functioning, it can then begin to network with other administrations, which will all eventually become noncontiguous statelets or nodes in the web of the caliphate. 

Document (Arabic): 12-8-08-faloja-announcement-of-wilaya-in-somalia

Document (Arabic): 12-8-08-faloja-somalia-wilaya-announcement-that-it-will-destroy-graves

Response To Rob At The Shack

We’re probably now at the point of diminishing returns, but the issue of Jihadi revisions is important enough to work through the particulars until it’s clear what’s fact, what’s unproven, and what’s merely a matter of taste.  It’s important not just for assessing the impact of Sayyid Imam’s work but for understanding how ideological challenges to Jihadism fail or succeed.  My response to Rob is below the fold: (more…)

The Connection Between Sayyid Imam And The Mumbai Attacks

Khalil al-Anani wrote an article two days ago about the ideological connection between Sayyid Imam and the Mumbai attackers.  There are bits I disagree with, but he’s right to highlight the contribution of Sayyid Imam’s earlier works to the attackers and the contribution of his current revision to our understanding of those attacks.  A paraphrastic summary follows:

(more…)

Assessing The Impact Of Jihadi Revisionists

Rob at Media Shack has posted a summary of a discussion on al-`Arabiyya’s “Death Industry.”  Of interest to him (and me) is Montasir Zayat’s assessment of Sayyid Imam’s latest book (Zayat only read the first one and a half chapters).  Here’s Rob’s take:

In Zayat’s view, what’s being printed now in Al-Masri Al-Youm is a disgrace and jeopardizes the reputation of the entire Revisions process.   No Jihadists or even Muslims anywhere will treat them seriously.

Rob agrees with this sentiment (as does Nathan Field).  But that’s not exactly what Zayat says.  Zayat does say the book is a disgrace, but he’s also pessimistic that anything can move Jihadis, no matter how refined.  Here he is in the same interview responding to the host’s question of which man, Imam or Zawahiri, has more popularity:

Dr. Sayyid Imam has an abundance of Sharia knowledge and he certainly had these beliefs before he was imprisoned.  He used to say the same things before he was imprisoned and I believe him.  However, Dr. Ayman al-Zawahiri has charisma and popularity, and he is readily accepted among the youth also.  Many of the youths’ hearts and heads are attached to him.  It is difficult for the words of Sayyid Imam to affect them.

Exactly.  There is nothing Sayyid Imam can say to sway hardcore fans of Zawahiri.  It doesn’t matter how mean or nice he is.  Thus, as I argued yesterday, we shouldn’t be assessing the impact of Imam’s book on Jihadis but rather on neutral pious, educated Arabs, particularly high school and college-age youth, whom Imam considers his primary audience.

But how do we measure this impact?  Rob says that it is by looking at the discussion of Sayyid Imam’s new book in the mainstream press.  By this measure, he says, it’s a failure because “there has been almost no coverage in the Arabic media.”  I don’t concede the latter assertion–the book was printed in full in Islam Online, al-Masry al-Youm, and al-Sharq al-Awsat and commented on in at least thirteen print news venues.  It is also all over the forums and the Arabic blogosphere.  Still, I agree that it is getting less coverage than Imam’s last book.  Rob says that’s because the tone of the book is bitter and personal.  A simpler explanation is that the subject–Imam turning on Zawahiri–is old news.

However, for the sake of argument, let’s say the story wasn’t covered by anyone in the mainstream media.  So what?  As I observed regarding a different matter (Jihadi forums), the fact that the Arab press ignores a phenomenon does not mean the phenomenon has little impact on Arabs.  The Arab press wrote nothing about Abu Bakr Naji until the Saudi arrests.  The Arab press has also missed the recent Maqdisi story.  Aside from this blog and an excellent article in Jamestown, only al-Hayat has caught it.

So how are we to assess the impact of Sayyid Imam’s new book on its target audience?  Here are a few places to look:

  • Mainstream Muslim discussion forums
  • News discussion forums (al-Jazeera, etc)
  • Personal blogs

Much of the circulation, of course, will be person-to-person, which we can’t possibly track.  Still, I’m willing to partially concede that it’s a dud if the mainstream forums and blogs are largely negative.  But let’s wait a little bit before rendering judgment.  As Sayyid Imam said in his last installment, it’s simply unfair to judge a book before it’s even been released.

Latest Jihadica
Subscribe to receive latest posts
Follow us